The problem was happening because the ospf->oiflist has this behaviour, each interface was removed and added at the end of the list in each ospf_network_run_subnet call, generation an infinite loop.
As a solution, a copy of the list was generated and we interacted with a fixed list.
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Nardi <rnardi@netdef.org>
BGP is storing outgoing updates in a couple of different
fifo's. This is to ensure proper packet packing of
all bgp_dests that happen to use the same attribute.
How it's all put together currently: On initial update
BGP walks through all the bgp_dest's in a table. For each
path being sent a bgp_advertise is created. This bgp_advertise
is placed in fifo order on the bgp_synchronize->update queue.
The bgp_advertise has a pointer to the bgp_advertise_attr which
is associated iwth the actual attribute that is being sent to
it's peer. In turn this bgp_advertise is placed in a fifo off
of the bgp_advertise_attr structure. As such as we have paths
that share an attribute, the path/dest is placed on the
bgp_syncrhonize->update fifo as well as being placed on the fifo
associated with the advertised attribute.
On actual creation of a packet. The first item in the
bgp_synchronize->update fifo is popped. The bgp_advertise_attr
pointer is grabbed, we fill out the nlri part of the bgp packet
and then walk the bgp_advertise_attr fifo to place paths/dests in
the packet. As each path/dest is placed in the packet it is removed
from both the bgp_synchronize->update fifo and the bgp_advertise_attr
fifo.
The whole point of this change is to switch the *next, *prev
pointers in the bgp_advertise structure with a typesafe data
structure.
Signed-off-by: Donald Sharp <sharpd@nvidia.com>
`ng` was not properly freed, leading to a memory leak.
The commit calls `nexthop_group_delete` to free memory associated with `ng`.
The ASan leak log for reference:
```
***********************************************************************************
Address Sanitizer Error detected in isis_topo1.test_isis_topo1/r5.asan.zebra.24308
=================================================================
==24308==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks
Direct leak of 32 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x7f4f47b43d28 in __interceptor_calloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0xded28)
#1 0x7f4f4753c0a8 in qcalloc lib/memory.c:105
#2 0x7f4f47559526 in nexthop_group_new lib/nexthop_group.c:270
#3 0x562ded6a39d4 in zebra_add_import_table_entry zebra/redistribute.c:681
#4 0x562ded787c35 in rib_link zebra/zebra_rib.c:3972
#5 0x562ded787c35 in rib_addnode zebra/zebra_rib.c:3993
#6 0x562ded787c35 in process_subq_early_route_add zebra/zebra_rib.c:2860
#7 0x562ded787c35 in process_subq_early_route zebra/zebra_rib.c:3138
#8 0x562ded787c35 in process_subq zebra/zebra_rib.c:3178
#9 0x562ded787c35 in meta_queue_process zebra/zebra_rib.c:3228
#10 0x7f4f475f7118 in work_queue_run lib/workqueue.c:266
#11 0x7f4f475dc7f2 in event_call lib/event.c:1969
#12 0x7f4f4751f347 in frr_run lib/libfrr.c:1213
#13 0x562ded69e818 in main zebra/main.c:486
#14 0x7f4f468ffc86 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21c86)
Indirect leak of 152 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x7f4f47b43d28 in __interceptor_calloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0xded28)
#1 0x7f4f4753c0a8 in qcalloc lib/memory.c:105
#2 0x7f4f475510ad in nexthop_new lib/nexthop.c:376
#3 0x7f4f475539c5 in nexthop_dup lib/nexthop.c:914
#4 0x7f4f4755b27a in copy_nexthops lib/nexthop_group.c:444
#5 0x562ded6a3a1c in zebra_add_import_table_entry zebra/redistribute.c:682
#6 0x562ded787c35 in rib_link zebra/zebra_rib.c:3972
#7 0x562ded787c35 in rib_addnode zebra/zebra_rib.c:3993
#8 0x562ded787c35 in process_subq_early_route_add zebra/zebra_rib.c:2860
#9 0x562ded787c35 in process_subq_early_route zebra/zebra_rib.c:3138
#10 0x562ded787c35 in process_subq zebra/zebra_rib.c:3178
#11 0x562ded787c35 in meta_queue_process zebra/zebra_rib.c:3228
#12 0x7f4f475f7118 in work_queue_run lib/workqueue.c:266
#13 0x7f4f475dc7f2 in event_call lib/event.c:1969
#14 0x7f4f4751f347 in frr_run lib/libfrr.c:1213
#15 0x562ded69e818 in main zebra/main.c:486
#16 0x7f4f468ffc86 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21c86)
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 184 byte(s) leaked in 2 allocation(s).
***********************************************************************************
```
Signed-off-by: Keelan Cannoo <keelan.cannoo@icloud.com>
When netlink_link_change() errors out for a new link for
interface without MTU set, the allocated ctx is not freed..
Adding code for correctness
Ticket# 3628313
Signed-off-by: Rajasekar Raja <rajasekarr@nvidia.com>
Currently when one interface changes its VRF, zebra will send these messages to
all daemons in *order*:
1) `ZEBRA_INTERFACE_DELETE` ( notify them delete from old VRF )
2) `ZEBRA_INTERFACE_VRF_UPDATE` ( notify them move from old to new VRF )
3) `ZEBRA_INTERFACE_ADD` ( notify them added into new VRF )
When daemons deal with `VRF_UPDATE`, they use
`zebra_interface_vrf_update_read()->if_lookup_by_name()`
to check the interface exist or not in old VRF. This check will always return
*NULL* because `DELETE` ( deleted from old VRF ) is already done, so can't
find this interface in old VRF.
Send `VRF_UPDATE` is redundant and unuseful. `DELETE` and `ADD` are enough,
they will deal with RB tree, so don't send this `VRF_UPDATE` message when
vrf changes.
Since all daemons have good mechanism to deal with changing vrf, and don't
use this `VRF_UPDATE` mechanism. So, it is safe to completely remove
all the code with `VRF_UPDATE`.
Signed-off-by: anlan_cs <anlan_cs@tom.com>
At each EBGP boundary, BGP path attributes are modified as per [RFC4271], which includes stripping any IBGP-only attributes.
Some networks span more than one autonomous system and require more flexibility in the propagation of path attributes. It is worth noting that these multi-AS networks have a common or single administrative entity. These networks are said to belong to One Administrative Domain (OAD). It is desirable to carry IBGP-only attributes across EBGP peerings when the peers belong to an OAD.
This document defines a new EBGP peering type known as EBGP-OAD, which is used between two EBGP peers that belong to an OAD. This document also defines rules for route announcement and processing for EBGP-OAD peers.
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-uttaro-idr-bgp-oad
Signed-off-by: Donatas Abraitis <donatas@opensourcerouting.org>
Include a zclient value in the hash and tree key computations
for iprules in zebra: clients may collide without this.
Signed-off-by: Mark Stapp <mjs@labn.net>
The iprule/pbr rule object has a vrf id, and zebra uses
that internally, but the vrf id isn't returned to clients
who install rules and are waiting for results. Include the
vrf_id sent by the client in the zapi result notification
message; update the existing clients so they decode the id.
Signed-off-by: Mark Stapp <mjs@labn.net>
