This fixes a display glitch in xspice which is caused when
a surface create is queued, but then a direct call to update
the area is issued. Unless we flush the queue, the surface
does not exist, and we fail.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy White <jwhite@codeweavers.com>
With multiple cards configured you can have multiple workers running in
different thread.
With such configuration static variables not syncronized could lead
to undefined behavior.
Acked-by: Jonathon Jongsma <jjongsma@redhat.com>
shortlog for the spice-common changes this brings in:
Christophe Fergeau (3):
build-sys: Add missing # to comment
ssl-verify: Handle NULL return from g_inet_address_new_from_string()
ssl-verify: Don't leak GInetAddress
Francois Gouget (3):
build-sys: Add the SPICE_WARNING() and SPICE_PRINT_MESSAGES m4 macros
build-sys: Add SPICE_CHECK_GSTREAMER()
build-sys: Add SPICE_CHECK_GSTREAMER_ELEMENTS()
Lukas Venhoda (1):
canvas_base: Remove redundant switch case block
Marc-André Lureau (2):
Fix make distcheck
Use new libcacard.h if possible
This commit also updates the spice-common submodule
Christophe Fergeau (7):
Add marshaller test case
build-sys: Use ${PKG_CONFIG} rather than pkg-config
build-sys: Rework SPICE_CHECK_* m4 macros
build-sys: Add gio-2.0 to SPICE_CHECK_GLIB2
build-sys: Fix error in SPICE_CHECK_LZ4 description
build-sys: Set automake conditional in SPICE_CHECK_SMARTCARD
build-sys: Rename SUPPORT_GL to HAVE_GL
Javier Celaya (1):
Fix linearization of several marshallers with one item
Lukas Venhoda (3):
ssl-verify: Only check addr length when using IP addr
m4: Require glib version >= 2.22
ssl-verify: Changed IPv4 hostname to IPv6
cinfo.dest is allocated in spice_jpeg_mem_dest but never freed.
Note that jpeg_destroy_compress does not free this field as is
supposed to be a buffer provided by jpeg caller.
Signed-off-by: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@redhat.com>
configure.ac is checking for pyparsing availability if
client/generated_marshallers.cpp is missing. The client/ code is gone, and
the python modules checks are done in spice-common/configure.ac
nowadays, so we can get rid of this check.
There was not check for data_size field so one could set data to
a small set of data and data_size much bigger than size of data
leading to buffer overflow.
Signed-off-by: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@redhat.com>
The guest can attempt to increase the number of segments while
spice-server is reading them.
Make sure we don't copy more then the allocated segments.
Signed-off-by: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Christophe Fergeau <cfergeau@redhat.com>
start pointer points to a QXLPathSeg structure.
Before reading from the structure, make sure the structure is contained
in the memory range checked.
Signed-off-by: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Christophe Fergeau <cfergeau@redhat.com>
Limit number of chunks to a given amount to avoid guest trying to
allocate too much memory. Using circular or nested chunks lists
guest could try to allocate huge amounts of memory.
Considering the list can be infinite and guest can change data this
also prevents strange security attacks from guest.
Signed-off-by: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@redhat.com>
Free linked list if client tries to do nasty things
Signed-off-by: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Christophe Fergeau <cfergeau@redhat.com>
Do not read multiple times data from guest as this can be changed by
other guest vcpus. This causes races and security problems if these
data are used for buffer allocation or checks.
Actually, the 'data' member can't change during read as it is just a
pointer to a fixed array contained in qxl. However, this change will
make it clear that there can be no race condition.
Signed-off-by: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@redhat.com>
If bpp is int the formula can lead to weird overflows. width and height
are uint16_t so the formula is:
size_t = u16 * (u16 * int + const_int) / const_int;
so it became
size_t = (int) u16 * ((int) u16 * int + const_int) / const_int;
However the (int) u16 * (int) u16 can then became negative to overflow.
Under 64 bit architectures size_t is 64 and int usually 32 so converting
this negative 32 bit number to a unsigned 64 bit lead to a very big
number as the signed is extended and then converted to unsigned.
Using unsigned arithmetic prevent extending the sign.
Signed-off-by: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Christophe Fergeau <cfergeau@redhat.com>
Do not read multiple time an array size that can be changed.
Signed-off-by: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Christophe Fergeau <cfergeau@redhat.com>
Do not read multiple times data from guest as this could be changed
by other vcpu threads.
This causes races and security problems if these data are used for
buffer allocation or checks.
Signed-off-by: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Christophe Fergeau <cfergeau@redhat.com>
Do not read multiple time an array size that can be changed.
Signed-off-by: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Christophe Fergeau <cfergeau@redhat.com>
The overflow may lead to buffer overflow as the row size computed from
width (bitmap->x) can be bigger than the size in bytes (bitmap->stride).
This can make spice-server accept the invalid sizes.
Signed-off-by: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Christophe Fergeau <cfergeau@redhat.com>
Not security risk as just for read.
However, this could be used to attempt integer overflows in the
following lines.
Signed-off-by: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Christophe Fergeau <cfergeau@redhat.com>
Check format is valid.
Check stride is at least the size of required bytes for a row.
Signed-off-by: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Christophe Fergeau <cfergeau@redhat.com>
Prevent integer overflow when computing image sizes.
Image index computations are done using 32 bit so this can cause easily
security issues. MAX_DATA_CHUNK is larger than the virtual
card limit, so this is not going to cause change in behaviours.
Comparing size calculation results with MAX_DATA_CHUNK will allow us to
catch overflows.
Prevent guest from allocating large amount of memory.
Signed-off-by: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@redhat.com>
A driver can overwrite surface state creating a surface with the same
id of a previous one.
Also can try to destroy surfaces that are not created.
Both requests cause invalid internal states that could lead to crashes
or memory corruptions.
Signed-off-by: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@redhat.com>
Do not just give warning and continue to use an invalid index into
an array.
Resolves: CVE-2015-5260
Signed-off-by: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Christophe Fergeau <cfergeau@redhat.com>
replay.c: In function 'replay_channel_event':
replay.c:226:16: error: zero-length gnu_printf format string
[-Werror=format-zero-length]
g_printerr("");
