using the new top-level `make tidy` target, which calls perltidy via
our wrapper to enforce the desired style as closely as possible.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
See pve-common's commit 5ae1f2e ("buildsys: add tidy make target")
for details about the chosen parameters.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
The previous regex matched exactly that combination of characters,
rather than any combination of the specified ones.
Fixes: e80f840 ("openid: make groups-claim RE more restrictive")
Signed-off-by: Mira Limbeck <m.limbeck@proxmox.com>
Link: https://lore.proxmox.com/20250408113349.165831-1-m.limbeck@proxmox.com
Given that the information is only needed for case-sensitive realms,
move the read into the conditional.
No functional changes.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Heiss <c.heiss@proxmox.com>
Originally reported in the forum [0].
This is only a cosmetic fix and has no user-visible impact, just fixing
a code warning in the syslog. Applies only for case-insensitive realms
too, where Active Directory is the only type to support that.
When looking up a non-existing username on case-insensitive realms, it
currently returns `undef`, which then causes the following warning in
the syslog:
Use of uninitialized value $username in concatenation (.) or string at /usr/share/perl5/PVE/API2/AccessControl.pm line 303.
authentication failure; rhost=::ffff:10.0.0.1 user= msg=user name '' is too short
This now follows the logic from the common, case-sensitive path, to just
return the original, given username (which is then later on validated in
the auth chain).
No functional changes.
[0] https://forum.proxmox.com/threads/new-ad-realm-not-working-blank-username.157859/
Signed-off-by: Christoph Heiss <c.heiss@proxmox.com>
Upgrading from a pre-PVE 6 version directly to a (current) PVE 8.x
version can never work in the first place, so the test is not needed
anymore.
The snippet was added by commit 3a98190 ("add postinst script") and
enabled by commit 243262f ("fix #2079: activate authkey rotation every
24 hours").
Signed-off-by: Fiona Ebner <f.ebner@proxmox.com>
when creating new users or updating existing passwords this new
minimum is enforced which aligns with NIST's latest recommendations
[1].
[1]: https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-4/sp800-63b.html#passwordver
Signed-off-by: Shannon Sterz <s.sterz@proxmox.com>
Adds test cases for the GET permissions API endpoint to ensure that:
- users with the Sys.Audit perm can access any user's permissions
- users with the Sys.Audit perm can access any token's permissions
- users without the Sys.Audit perm can access their own permissions
- users without the Sys.Audit perm can access their token's permissions
- tokens with the Sys.Audit perm can access any user's permissions
- tokens without the Sys.Audit perm can access their own permissions
These tests also separate whether a token has the privilege-separated
property or not.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kral <d.kral@proxmox.com>
even if they lack Sys.Audit on /access - since tokens are self-service,
checking whether the ACLs work as expected should also be doable for every
user.
Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
Tested-by: Daniel Kral <d.kral@proxmox.com>
even when specifying an explicit userid matching their own.
Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
Tested-by: Daniel Kral <d.kral@proxmox.com>
All other groups use delete for deleting users/groups/... so it makes
sense to do so for the user token command group too.
Add an alias for the old command for backwards compatibility to avoid
that scrips and muscle memory break.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
With the PVE 8.0 major release, the scope of
non-"Permissions.Modify"-based ACL update privileges were reduced (so
that users with for example, VM.Allocate on a VM could only delegate
their own privileges, but not arbitrary other ones). that additional
logic had a wrong guard and was accidentally triggered for calls where
the user had the "Permissions.Modify" privilege on the modified ACL
path, but without propagation set.
A user with "Permissions.Modify" on a path should be able to set
arbitrary ACLs for that path, even without propagation.
Reported on the forum: https://forum.proxmox.com/threads/151032/
Fixes: 46bfd59 ("acls: restrict less-privileged ACL modifications")
Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
Stable sorting in user.cfg config file allows tracking changes by
checking into git or when using automation like ansible.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Krambrock <krambrock@hrz.uni-marburg.de>
Tested-by: Folge Gleumes <f.gleumes@proxmox.com>
This was reported by a user in the forum [0].
The cause was that the user-* standard options were not registered
when the sync was called from the scheduler, resulting in the
following error:
pvescheduler[2849]: skipping attribute mapping 'cn'->'comment' for user 'test@samba0' - no such standard option 'user-comment'
Fix this by simply importing the PVE::API2::User module, thus ensuring
the options get registered.
[0] https://forum.proxmox.com/threads/ldap-integration-comment-email-first-name-lastname.143490/
Fixes: cb93636 ("LDAP sync: improve validation of synced attributes")
Signed-off-by: Christoph Heiss <c.heiss@proxmox.com>
Reviewed-by: Fiona Ebner <f.ebner@proxmox.com>
Tested-by: Fiona Ebner <f.ebner@proxmox.com>
Add a new 'confirmation-password' parameter to the change-password
endpoint and require non-root users to confirm their passwords.
Doing so avoids that an attacker that has direct access to a computer
where a user is logged in to the PVE interface can change the password
of said user and thus either prolong their possibility to attack,
and/or create a denial of service situation, where the original user
cannot login into the PVE host using their old credentials.
Note that this might sound worse than it is, as for this attack to
work the attacker needs either:
- physical access to an unlocked computer that is currently logged in
to a PVE host
- having taken over such a computer already through some unrelated
vulnerability
As these required pre-conditions are pretty big implications, which
allow (temporary) access to all of the resources (including PVE ones)
that the user can control, we see this as slight improvement that
won't hurt, might protect one in some specific cases that is simply
too cheap not to do.
For now we avoid additional confirmation through a second factor,
as that is a much higher complexity without that much gain, and some
forms like (unauthenticated) button press on a WebAuthn token or the
TOTP code would be easy to circumvent in the physical access case and
in the local access case one might be able to MITM themselves too.
Reported-by: Wouter Arts <security@wth-security.nl>
Signed-off-by: Wolfgang Bumiller <w.bumiller@proxmox.com>
[ TL: extend commit message ]
Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
since the upcoming use case in change_password uses the returned $ruid
and the parameter is called 'confirmation-password' there
also generalize the error so it does not mention TFA
Signed-off-by: Wolfgang Bumiller <w.bumiller@proxmox.com>
now called "reauth_user_for_user_modification" since we
re-authenticate the current user while they are trying to modify
their (or others') password/tfa settings
Signed-off-by: Wolfgang Bumiller <w.bumiller@proxmox.com>
We have some API endpoints that can access the network from the POV of
a Proxmox VE node, like e.g., the one for downloading a template/ISO
image directly to a PVE storage from an HTTP URL, and the matching
query-url-metadata that makes this functionality much more convenient
to use in the UI. But the downside of such calls is naturally that
they basically allow to scan the whole network via HTTP URLs, and
potentially even download some image that the user should not have
access to and adding to a VM that the user controls.
Due to that we limited the exposure of those API endpoints to
Sys.Modify on / (in addition to e.g. basic storage privs) for the
initial addition of the feature, as we were not sure about user
adoption and if a separate privilege could be justified.
Since we got a handful requests like #5254 this justification is now
met, so add a 'Sys.AccessNetwork' privilege.
That name should make it clear that having that privilege will allow
access to the network and the sys(tem) prefix should underline that
it's about the host systems network. Add it such, that it will only be
available for the most powerful of our built-in special roles, namely
the Administration one, besides naturally the all-powerful root@pam
special user.
Admins can then e.g. create new roles that include Sys.AccessNetwork
and Datastore.AllocateTemplate which can then be used for allowing
automation to download images while adhering to the Least Privilege
Principle.
Buglink: https://bugzilla.proxmox.com/show_bug.cgi?id=5254
Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
for a better overview and to allow slightly easier tracking of any
change, like adding a new privilege.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
Restrict the acr-value regex a little bit so as to align the behavior
with PBS. The openid documentation says that the acr-value *should* be
an URI [0]. Added a regex that loosely disallows some of the reserved
URI characters specified in the RFC [1].
Values like:
* "urn:mace:incommon:iap:silver"
* "urn:comsolve.nl:idp:contract:rba:location"
SHOULD work, but values like:
* "urn:#ace:incommon:iap:silver"
* "urn:"omsolve.nl:idp:contract:rba:location"
should NOT work.
This is related to the fix [2] for bug #5190 in PBS, but different as
there we had to make the verifier more flexible, whereas here we make
it stricter – mostly to have both projects aligned to avoid confusion.
[0]: https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html
[1]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2396.txt
[2]: https://git.proxmox.com/?p=proxmox-backup.git;a=commit;h=e0222ce83c28397d493c70825e873943c1223c67
Signed-off-by: Gabriel Goller <g.goller@proxmox.com>
For email the reasoning is:
> In addition to restrictions on syntax, there is a length limit on
> email addresses. That limit is a maximum of 64 characters (octets)
> in the "local part" (before the "@") and a maximum of 255
> characters (octets) in the domain part (after the "@") for a total
> length of 320 characters. However, there is a restriction in RFC
> 2821 on the length of an address in MAIL and RCPT commands of 254
> characters. Since addresses that do not fit in those fields are
> not normally useful, the upper limit on address lengths should
> normally be considered to be 254.
-- https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata_search.php?rfc=3696&eid=1690
And for user-comments, we normally show those as single line and using
2048 bytes as maximum, while also a rather arbitrary number it allows
for about 2.5 times more users on a system (full name + comment can be
up to 4 KiB vs 10 KiB), and we can re-raise this relatively easily
again if there are somewhat reasonable complaints.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
The user.cfg file resides on the cluster filesystem where files have
a maximum allowed size (currently 1 MiB).
Signed-off-by: Fiona Ebner <f.ebner@proxmox.com>
Should not matter for now, but better to to catch explicitly, e.g., if
anybody ever adds new attributes or changes the default options names
without adapting this too.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
Build the set of valid target attributes on the fly by using the
existing ldap => ours mapping. This avoids that one needs to adapt
both lists when changing this, which even though it should be caught
on testing, is needlessly adding friction.
The is-known-target-attr check could never trigger as this was already
checked in the parent before even calling the verify method, so just
remove it.
Rename the `verify_sync_attribute` to `verify_sync_attribute_value` to
clarify that it really only checks the value of an attribute, not the
attribute (key) itself.
As a side-benefit, this also makes the code shorter and avoids a
permanent global variable using up (a tiny amount of) space.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
and skip the ones not fitting our schema, while warning the user about
them.
Also warns the user if the specified 'sync_attributes' mapping
contains entries for attributes that don't exist, e.g.
'enabled=active' (since the property on PVE side is called 'enable').
For the 'enable' property, any value coming from the server led to the
user being enabled, even "0", because it is a string. This is not
changed by this patch, by not trying to validate or parse a boolean.
In get_users(), the username is also set in the returned hash, but
without the realm. This doesn't seem to be necessary for syncing,
because the username with the realm is used as a hash key and that's
what's relied upon when updating the config. But the tests require it
to be set, so that is not changed by this patch either.
Relies on the user properties (other than username) to be standard
options called 'user-XYZ'. Could be improved by moving the schema for
user properties from the API module to a module that can be accessed
by both API and plugin here and creating a helper for accessing it.
Signed-off-by: Fiona Ebner <f.ebner@proxmox.com>
While nowadays, most entries should be just 'x', there can also still
be legacy entries with 'x!u2f', 'x!yubico' and base32 encoded secrets.
For example, some users might be syncing them from LDAP.
Signed-off-by: Fiona Ebner <f.ebner@proxmox.com>
this file is installed by a sub-dir Makefile, it does not exist in
src/PVE/API2.
the error is not fatal, but printed during build:
install: cannot stat 'RealmSync.pm': No such file or directory
Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
