The format code is for a 32-bit int, but the argument, keyid, is declared as
a 64 bit int. The comment above says keyid is 32-bit. I'm not sure if the
comment or declaration is wrong, so force the display of a 64-bit int for now.
Signed-off-by: Glenn Washburn <development@efficientek.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
UEFI specification 2.8 errata B introduced the EFI_RT_PROPERTIES_TABLE
describing the services available at runtime.
The lsefisystab command is used to display installed EFI configuration
tables. Currently it only shows the GUID but not a short text for the
new table.
Provide a short text for the EFI_RT_PROPERTIES_TABLE_GUID.
Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
The commit f1957dc8a (RISC-V: Add to build system) added two entries to
the options array, but only 1 entry to the enum. This resulted in
everything after the insertion point being off by one.
This broke at least the "file --is-hibernated-hiberfil" command.
Bring the two back in sync by splitting the IS_RISCV_EFI enum entry into
two, as is done for other architectures.
Signed-off-by: Derek Foreman <derek@endlessos.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Commit 9acdcbf325 (use single quotes in menuentry setparams command)
says that expressing a quoted single quote will require 3 characters. It
actually requires (and always did require!) 4 characters:
str: a'b => a'\''b
len: 3 => 6 (2 for the letters + 4 for the quote)
This leads to not allocating enough memory and thus out of bounds writes
that have been observed to cause heap corruption.
Allocate 4 bytes for each single quote.
Commit 22e7dbb2bb (Fix quoting in legacy parser.) does the same
quoting, but it adds 3 as extra overhead on top of the single byte that
the quote already needs. So it's correct.
Fixes: 9acdcbf325 (use single quotes in menuentry setparams command)
Fixes: CVE-2021-20233
Reported-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
This can be triggered with:
ls -l (0 0*)
and causes a NULL deref in grub_normal_print_device_info().
I'm not sure if there's any implication with the IEEE 1275 platform.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Every other return statement in this code is calling grub_device_close()
to clean up dev before returning. This one should do that too.
Fixes: CID 292443
Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
check_list() uses grub_file_getline(), which allocates a buffer.
If the hash list file contains invalid lines, the function leaks
this buffer when it returns an error.
Fixes: CID 176635
Signed-off-by: Chris Coulson <chris.coulson@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
When a module is attempted to be removed its reference counter is always
decremented. This means that repeated rmmod invocations will cause the
module to be unloaded even if another module depends on it.
This may lead to a use-after-free scenario allowing an attacker to execute
arbitrary code and by-pass the UEFI Secure Boot protection.
While being there, add the extern keyword to some function declarations in
that header file.
Fixes: CVE-2020-25632
Reported-by: Chris Coulson <chris.coulson@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
The command can be used to get/set ATA disk parameters. Some of these can
be dangerous since change the disk behavior. Restrict it when locked down.
Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
This command can set PCI devices register values, which makes it dangerous
in a locked down configuration. Restrict it so can't be used on this setup.
Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
There are some more commands that should be restricted when the GRUB is
locked down. Following is the list of commands and reasons to restrict:
* fakebios: creates BIOS-like structures for backward compatibility with
existing OSes. This should not be allowed when locked down.
* loadbios: reads a BIOS dump from storage and loads it. This action
should not be allowed when locked down.
* devicetree: loads a Device Tree blob and passes it to the OS. It replaces
any Device Tree provided by the firmware. This also should
not be allowed when locked down.
Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
The command is not allowed when lockdown is enforced. Otherwise an
attacker can instruct the GRUB to load an SSDT table to overwrite
the kernel lockdown configuration and later load and execute
unsigned code.
Fixes: CVE-2020-14372
Reported-by: Máté Kukri <km@mkukri.xyz>
Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Now the GRUB can check if it has been locked down and this can be used to
prevent executing commands that can be utilized to circumvent the UEFI
Secure Boot mechanisms. So, instead of hardcoding a list of modules that
have to be disabled, prevent the usage of commands that can be dangerous.
This not only allows the commands to be disabled on other platforms, but
also properly separate the concerns. Since the shim_lock verifier logic
should be only about preventing to run untrusted binaries and not about
defining these kind of policies.
Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
When the GRUB starts on a secure boot platform, some commands can be
used to subvert the protections provided by the verification mechanism and
could lead to booting untrusted system.
To prevent that situation, allow GRUB to be locked down. That way the code
may check if GRUB has been locked down and further restrict the commands
that are registered or what subset of their functionality could be used.
The lockdown support adds the following components:
* The grub_lockdown() function which can be used to lockdown GRUB if,
e.g., UEFI Secure Boot is enabled.
* The grub_is_lockdown() function which can be used to check if the GRUB
was locked down.
* A verifier that flags OS kernels, the GRUB modules, Device Trees and ACPI
tables as GRUB_VERIFY_FLAGS_DEFER_AUTH to defer verification to other
verifiers. These files are only successfully verified if another registered
verifier returns success. Otherwise, the whole verification process fails.
For example, PE/COFF binaries verification can be done by the shim_lock
verifier which validates the signatures using the shim_lock protocol.
However, the verification is not deferred directly to the shim_lock verifier.
The shim_lock verifier is hooked into the verification process instead.
* A set of grub_{command,extcmd}_lockdown functions that can be used by
code registering command handlers, to only register unsafe commands if
the GRUB has not been locked down.
Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Move the shim_lock verifier from its own module into the core image. The
Secure Boot lockdown mechanism has the intent to prevent the load of any
unsigned code or binary when Secure Boot is enabled.
The reason is that GRUB must be able to prevent executing untrusted code
if UEFI Secure Boot is enabled, without depending on external modules.
Signed-off-by: Marco A Benatto <mbenatto@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Move verifiers API from a module to the kernel image, so it can be
used there as well. There are no functional changes in this patch.
Signed-off-by: Marco A Benatto <mbenatto@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Part of the code logic for processing the return value of efi
log_extend_event is repetitive and complicated. Extract the
repetitive code into an independent function.
Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Add a number of debug logs to the tpm module. The condition tag
for opening debugging is "tpm". On TPM machines, this will bring
great convenience to diagnosis and debugging.
Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
The shim_lock module registers a verifier to call shim's verify, but the
handler is registered even when the shim_lock protocol was not installed.
This doesn't cause a NULL pointer dereference in shim_lock_write() because
the shim_lock_init() function just returns GRUB_ERR_NONE if sl isn't set.
But in that case there's no point to even register the shim_lock verifier
since won't do anything. Additionally, it is only useful when Secure Boot
is enabled.
Finally, don't assume that the shim_lock protocol will always be present
when the shim_lock_write() function is called, and check for it on every
call to this function.
Reported-by: Michael Chang <mchang@suse.com>
Reported-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
This is needed to properly detect and report UEFI Secure Boot status
to the x86 Linux kernel. The functionality will be added by subsequent
patches.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Marco A Benatto <mbenatto@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
The GUID will be used to properly detect and report UEFI Secure Boot
status to the x86 Linux kernel. The functionality will be added by
subsequent patches. The shim_lock protocol type is made public for
completeness.
Additionally, fix formatting of four preceding GUIDs.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Marco A Benatto <mbenatto@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Although the tpm_execute() series of functions are defined they are not
used anywhere. Several structures in the include/grub/efi/tpm.h header
file are not used too. There is even nonexistent grub_tpm_init()
declaration in this header. Delete all that unneeded stuff.
If somebody needs the functionality implemented in the dropped code then
he/she can re-add it later. Now it needlessly increases the GRUB
code/image size.
Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
This attempts to fix the places where we do the following where
arithmetic_expr may include unvalidated data:
X = grub_malloc(arithmetic_expr);
It accomplishes this by doing the arithmetic ahead of time using grub_add(),
grub_sub(), grub_mul() and testing for overflow before proceeding.
Among other issues, this fixes:
- allocation of integer overflow in grub_video_bitmap_create()
reported by Chris Coulson,
- allocation of integer overflow in grub_png_decode_image_header()
reported by Chris Coulson,
- allocation of integer overflow in grub_squash_read_symlink()
reported by Chris Coulson,
- allocation of integer overflow in grub_ext2_read_symlink()
reported by Chris Coulson,
- allocation of integer overflow in read_section_as_string()
reported by Chris Coulson.
Fixes: CVE-2020-14309, CVE-2020-14310, CVE-2020-14311
Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
This modifies most of the places we do some form of:
X = malloc(Y * Z);
to use calloc(Y, Z) instead.
Among other issues, this fixes:
- allocation of integer overflow in grub_png_decode_image_header()
reported by Chris Coulson,
- allocation of integer overflow in luks_recover_key()
reported by Chris Coulson,
- allocation of integer overflow in grub_lvm_detect()
reported by Chris Coulson.
Fixes: CVE-2020-14308
Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
grub_tpm_log_event() and grub_tpm_measure() are two functions that
have the same effect. So, keep grub_tpm_log_event() and rename it
to grub_tpm_measure(). This way we get also a more clear semantics.
Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Like grub_verifiers_open(), the grub_verify_string() should also
display this debug message, which is very helpful for debugging.
Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
On some devices the ESC key is the hotkey to enter the BIOS/EFI setup
screen, making it really hard to time pressing it right. Besides that
ESC is also pretty hard to discover for a user who does not know it
will unhide the menu.
This commit makes F4, which was chosen because is not used as a hotkey
to enter the BIOS setup by any vendor, also interrupt sleeps / stop the
menu countdown.
This solves the ESC gets into the BIOS setup and also somewhat solves
the discoverability issue, but leaves the timing issue unresolved.
This commit fixes the timing issue by also adding support for keeping
SHIFT pressed during boot to stop the menu countdown. This matches
what Ubuntu is doing, which should also help with discoverability.
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Move grub_getkeystatushelper() function from grub-core/commands/keystatus.c
to grub-core/kern/term.c and export it so that it can be used outside of
the keystatus command code too.
There's no logic change in this patch. The function definition is moved so
it can be called from grub-core/kern/term.c in a subsequent patch. It will
be used to determine if a SHIFT key has was held down and use that also to
interrupt the countdown, without the need to press a key at the right time.
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
The memory requested for the event is not released here,
causing memory leaks. This patch fixes this problem.
Signed-off-by: Jia Zhang <zhang.jia@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Linux creates modalias strings by filtering out non-ASCII, space,
and colon characters. Provide an option that does the same filtering
so people can create a modalias string in GRUB, and then match their
modalias patterns against it.
Signed-off-by: Julian Andres Klode <julian.klode@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Currently the string functions grub_strtol(), grub_strtoul(), and
grub_strtoull() don't declare the "end" pointer in such a way as to
require the pointer itself or the character array to be immutable to the
implementation, nor does the C standard do so in its similar functions,
though it does require us not to change any of it.
The typical declarations of these functions follow this pattern:
long
strtol(const char * restrict nptr, char ** restrict endptr, int base);
Much of the reason for this is historic, and a discussion of that
follows below, after the explanation of this change. (GRUB currently
does not include the "restrict" qualifiers, and we name the arguments a
bit differently.)
The implementation is semantically required to treat the character array
as immutable, but such accidental modifications aren't stopped by the
compiler, and the semantics for both the callers and the implementation
of these functions are sometimes also helped by adding that requirement.
This patch changes these declarations to follow this pattern instead:
long
strtol(const char * restrict nptr,
const char ** const restrict endptr,
int base);
This means that if any modification to these functions accidentally
introduces either an errant modification to the underlying character
array, or an accidental assignment to endptr rather than *endptr, the
compiler should generate an error. (The two uses of "restrict" in this
case basically mean strtol() isn't allowed to modify the character array
by going through *endptr, and endptr isn't allowed to point inside the
array.)
It also means the typical use case changes to:
char *s = ...;
const char *end;
long l;
l = strtol(s, &end, 10);
Or even:
const char *p = str;
while (p && *p) {
long l = strtol(p, &p, 10);
...
}
This fixes 26 places where we discard our attempts at treating the data
safely by doing:
const char *p = str;
long l;
l = strtol(p, (char **)&ptr, 10);
It also adds 5 places where we do:
char *p = str;
while (p && *p) {
long l = strtol(p, (const char ** const)&p, 10);
...
/* more calls that need p not to be pointer-to-const */
}
While moderately distasteful, this is a better problem to have.
With one minor exception, I have tested that all of this compiles
without relevant warnings or errors, and that /much/ of it behaves
correctly, with gcc 9 using 'gcc -W -Wall -Wextra'. The one exception
is the changes in grub-core/osdep/aros/hostdisk.c , which I have no idea
how to build.
Because the C standard defined type-qualifiers in a way that can be
confusing, in the past there's been a slow but fairly regular stream of
churn within our patches, which add and remove the const qualifier in many
of the users of these functions. This change should help avoid that in
the future, and in order to help ensure this, I've added an explanation
in misc.h so that when someone does get a compiler warning about a type
error, they have the fix at hand.
The reason we don't have "const" in these calls in the standard is
purely anachronistic: C78 (de facto) did not have type qualifiers in the
syntax, and the "const" type qualifier was added for C89 (I think; it
may have been later). strtol() appears to date from 4.3BSD in 1986,
which means it could not be added to those functions in the standard
without breaking compatibility, which is usually avoided.
The syntax chosen for type qualifiers is what has led to the churn
regarding usage of const, and is especially confusing on string
functions due to the lack of a string type. Quoting from C99, the
syntax is:
declarator:
pointer[opt] direct-declarator
direct-declarator:
identifier
( declarator )
direct-declarator [ type-qualifier-list[opt] assignment-expression[opt] ]
...
direct-declarator [ type-qualifier-list[opt] * ]
...
pointer:
* type-qualifier-list[opt]
* type-qualifier-list[opt] pointer
type-qualifier-list:
type-qualifier
type-qualifier-list type-qualifier
...
type-qualifier:
const
restrict
volatile
So the examples go like:
const char foo; // immutable object
const char *foo; // mutable pointer to object
char * const foo; // immutable pointer to mutable object
const char * const foo; // immutable pointer to immutable object
const char const * const foo; // XXX extra const keyword in the middle
const char * const * const foo; // immutable pointer to immutable
// pointer to immutable object
const char ** const foo; // immutable pointer to mutable pointer
// to immutable object
Making const left-associative for * and right-associative for everything
else may not have been the best choice ever, but here we are, and the
inevitable result is people using trying to use const (as they should!),
putting it at the wrong place, fighting with the compiler for a bit, and
then either removing it or typecasting something in a bad way. I won't
go into describing restrict, but its syntax has exactly the same issue
as with const.
Anyway, the last example above actually represents the *behavior* that's
required of strtol()-like functions, so that's our choice for the "end"
pointer.
Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
The necessary check for NULL before use of function ver->close is not
taking place in the failure path. This patch simply adds the missing
check and fixes the problem that GRUB hangs indefinitely after booting
rogue image without valid signature if secure boot is turned on.
Now it displays like this for booting rogue UEFI image:
error: bad shim signature
error: you need to load the kernel first
Press any key to continue...
and then you can go back to boot menu by pressing any key or after a few
seconds expired.
Signed-off-by: Michael Chang <mchang@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Extend partition UUID probing support in GRUB core to display pseudo
partition UUIDs for MBR (MSDOS) partitions.
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Vinson <nvinson234@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
The device tree may passed by the firmware as UEFI configuration
table. Let lsefisystab display a short text and not only the GUID
for the device tree.
Here is an example output:
grub> lsefisystab
Address: 0xbff694d8
Signature: 5453595320494249 revision: 00020046
Vendor: Das U-Boot, Version=20190700
2 tables:
0xbe741000 eb9d2d31-2d88-11d3-9a160090273fc14d SMBIOS
0x87f00000 b1b621d5-f19c-41a5-830bd9152c69aae0 DEVICE TREE
Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
Reviewed-by: Leif Lindholm <leif.lindholm@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
The following are two use cases from Rajat Jain <rajatjain@juniper.net>:
1) We have a board that boots Linux and this board itself can be plugged
into one of different chassis types. We need to pass different
parameters to the kernel based on the "CHASSIS_TYPE" information
that is passed by the bios in the DMI/SMBIOS tables.
2) We may have a USB stick that can go into multiple boards, and the
exact kernel to be loaded depends on the machine information
(PRODUCT_NAME etc) passed via the DMI.
Signed-off-by: David Michael <fedora.dm0@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
This adds the GUID and includes it in lsefisystab output.
Signed-off-by: David Michael <fedora.dm0@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Leif Lindholm <leif.lindholm@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Linux supports root=PARTUUID=<partuuid> boot argument, so add
support for probing it. Compared to the fs UUID, the partition
UUID does not change when reformatting a partition.
For now, only disks using a GPT partition table are supported.
Signed-off-by: Jacob Kroon <jacob.kroon@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Menzel <pmenzel@molgen.mpg.de>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Disable the -Wadress-of-packaed-member diagnostic for the
grub_usb_get_string function since the result is false postive. The
descstrp->str is found to be aligned in the buffer allocated for 'struct
grub_usb_desc_str'.
[ 229s] ../../grub-core/commands/usbtest.c: In function 'grub_usb_get_string':
[ 229s] ../../grub-core/commands/usbtest.c:104:58: error: taking address of packed member of 'struct grub_usb_desc_str' may result in an unaligned pointer value [-Werror=address-of-packed-member]
[ 229s] 104 | *grub_utf16_to_utf8 ((grub_uint8_t *) *string, descstrp->str,
[ 229s] | ~~~~~~~~^~~~~
Signed-off-by: Michael Chang <mchang@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
In order to be able to read from and write to model-specific registers,
two new modules are added. They are i386 specific, as the cpuid module.
rdmsr module registers the command rdmsr that allows reading from a MSR.
wrmsr module registers the command wrmsr that allows writing to a MSR.
wrmsr module is disabled if UEFI secure boot is enabled.
Please note that on SMP systems, interacting with a MSR that has a scope
per hardware thread, implies that the value only applies to the
particular cpu/core/thread that ran the command.
Also, if you specify a reserved or unimplemented MSR address, it will
cause a general protection exception (which is not currently being
handled) and the system will reboot.
Signed-off-by: Jesús Diéguez Fernández <jesusdf@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Add a new disk driver called obdisk for IEEE1275 platforms. Currently
the only platform using this disk driver is SPARC, however other IEEE1275
platforms could start using it if they so choose. While the functionality
within the current IEEE1275 ofdisk driver may be suitable for PPC and x86, it
presented too many problems on SPARC hardware.
Within the old ofdisk, there is not a way to determine the true canonical
name for the disk. Within Open Boot, the same disk can have multiple names
but all reference the same disk. For example the same disk can be referenced
by its SAS WWN, using this form:
/pci@302/pci@2/pci@0/pci@17/LSI,sas@0/disk@w5000cca02f037d6d,0
It can also be referenced by its PHY identifier using this form:
/pci@302/pci@2/pci@0/pci@17/LSI,sas@0/disk@p0
It can also be referenced by its Target identifier using this form:
/pci@302/pci@2/pci@0/pci@17/LSI,sas@0/disk@0
Also, when the LUN=0, it is legal to omit the ,0 from the device name. So with
the disk above, before taking into account the device aliases, there are 6 ways
to reference the same disk.
Then it is possible to have 0 .. n device aliases all representing the same disk.
Within this new driver the true canonical name is determined using the the
IEEE1275 encode-unit and decode-unit commands when address_cells == 4. This
will determine the true single canonical name for the device so multiple ihandles
are not opened for the same device. This is what frequently happens with the old
ofdisk driver. With some devices when they are opened multiple times it causes
the entire system to hang.
Another problem solved with this driver is devices that do not have a device
alias can be booted and used within GRUB. Within the old ofdisk, this was not
possible, unless it was the original boot device. All devices behind a SAS
or SCSI parent can be found. Within the old ofdisk, finding these disks
relied on there being an alias defined. The alias requirement is not
necessary with this new driver. It can also find devices behind a parent
after they have been hot-plugged. This is something that is not possible
with the old ofdisk driver.
The old ofdisk driver also incorrectly assumes that the device pointing to by a
device alias is in its true canonical form. This assumption is never made with
this new driver.
Another issue solved with this driver is that it properly caches the ihandle
for all open devices. The old ofdisk tries to do this by caching the last
opened ihandle. However this does not work properly because the layer above
does not use a consistent device name for the same disk when calling into the
driver. This is because the upper layer uses the bootpath value returned within
/chosen, other times it uses the device alias, and other times it uses the
value within grub.cfg. It does not have a way to figure out that these devices
are the same disk. This is not a problem with this new driver.
Due to the way GRUB repeatedly opens and closes the same disk. Caching the
ihandle is important on SPARC. Without caching, some SAS devices can take
15 - 20 minutes to get to the GRUB menu. This ihandle caching is not possible
without correctly having the canonical disk name.
When available, this driver also tries to use the deblocker #blocks and
a way of determining the disk size.
Finally and probably most importantly, this new driver is also capable of
seeing all partitions on a GPT disk. With the old driver, the GPT
partition table can not be read and only the first partition on the disk
can be seen.
Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
We now have signature check logic in grub which allows us to treat
files differently depending on their file type.
Treat a loaded device tree like an overlayed ACPI table.
Both describe hardware, so I suppose their threat level is the same.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
This patch adds support for RISC-V to the grub build system. With this
patch, I can successfully build grub on RISC-V as a UEFI application.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Bin Meng <bmeng.cn@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Bin Meng <bmeng.cn@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
The value of tpm_handle changes between successive calls to grub_tpm_handle_find(),
as instead of simply copying the stored pointer we end up taking the address of
said pointer when using the cached value of grub_tpm_handle.
This causes grub_efi_open_protocol() to return a nullptr in grub_tpm2_execute()
and grub_tpm2_log_event(). Said nullptr goes unchecked and
efi_call_5(tpm->hash_log_extend_event,...) ends up jumping to 0x0, Qemu crashes
once video ROM is reached at 0xb0000.
This patch seems to do the trick of fixing that bug, but we should also ensure
that all calls to grub_efi_open_protocol() are checked so that we don't start
executing low memory.
Signed-off-by: Max Tottenham <mtottenh@akamai.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Commit b07feb8746 (verifiers: Rename
verify module to pgp module) renamed the "verify" module to "pgp", but
the GRUB_MOD_INIT and GRUB_MOD_FINI macros were left as "verify", which
broke the emu target build; and file_filter_test still referred to the
now non-existent "verify" module. Fix both of these.
Signed-off-by: Colin Watson <cjwatson@ubuntu.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Add support for performing basic TPM measurements. Right now this only
supports extending PCRs statically and only on UEFI. In future we might
want to have some sort of mechanism for choosing which events get logged
to which PCRs, but this seems like a good default policy and we can wait
to see whether anyone has a use case before adding more complexity.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
An error emerged as when I was testing the verifiers branch, so instead
of putting it in pgp prefix, the verifiers is used to reflect what the
patch is based on.
While running verify_detached, grub aborts with error.
verify_detached /@/.snapshots/1/snapshot/boot/grub/grub.cfg
/@/.snapshots/1/snapshot/boot/grub/grub.cfg.sig
alloc magic is broken at 0x7beea660: 0
Aborted. Press any key to exit.
The error is caused by sig file descriptor been closed twice, first time
in grub_verify_signature() to which it is passed as parameter. Second in
grub_cmd_verify_signature() or in whichever opens the sig file
descriptor. The second close is not consider as bug to me either, as in
common rule of what opens a file has to close it to avoid file
descriptor leakage.
After all the design of grub_verify_signature() makes it difficult to keep
a good trace on opened file descriptor from it's caller. Let's refine
the application interface to accept file path rather than descriptor, in
this way the caller doesn't have to care about closing the descriptor by
delegating it to grub_verify_signature() with full tracing to opened
file descriptor by itself.
Also making it clear that sig descriptor is not referenced in error
returning path of grub_verify_signature_init(), so it can be closed
directly by it's caller. This also makes delegating it to
grub_pubkey_close() infeasible to help in relieving file descriptor
leakage as it has to depend on uncertainty of ctxt fields in error
returning path.
Signed-off-by: Michael Chang <mchang@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
This module provides shim lock verification for various kernels
if UEFI secure boot is enabled on a machine.
It is recommended to put this module into GRUB2 standalone image
(avoid putting iorw and memrw modules into it; they are disallowed
if UEFI secure boot is enabled). However, it is also possible to use
it as a normal module. Though such configurations are more fragile
and less secure due to various limitations.
If the module is loaded and UEFI secure boot is enabled then:
- module itself cannot be unloaded (persistent module),
- the iorw and memrw modules cannot be loaded,
- if the iorw and memrw modules are loaded then
machine boot is disabled,
- GRUB2 defers modules and ACPI tables verification to
other verifiers.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
