Upstream GNU-EFI contains changes to efistdarg.h resulting in the va_start,
va_arg and va_end macros to be #defined unconditionally. Make sure we #undef
them before overriding the definitions.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
MokSBState and MokDBState are just 1 byte variables, so a UINT8
local variable is sufficient to include the content.
Signed-off-by: Gary Ching-Pang Lin <glin@suse.com>
Conflicts:
shim.c
There are functions defined in lib to check the secure variables.
Use the functions to shun the duplicate code.
Signed-off-by: Gary Ching-Pang Lin <glin@suse.com>
Conflicts:
shim.c
When grub2 invokes the functions of shim protocol in gfx mode,
OutputString in shim could distort the screen.
Signed-off-by: Gary Ching-Pang Lin <glin@suse.com>
Conflicts:
shim.c
(modified by pjones to include some newer Prints that weren't there when
Gary did the initial work here.)
If ca.crt was added into the certificate database, ca.crt would be the first
certificate in the signature. Because shim couldn't verify ca.crt with the
embedded shim.cer, it failed to load MokManager.efi.signed and
fallback.efi.signed.
Signed-off-by: Gary Ching-Pang Lin <glin@suse.com>
On some machines, even though the key event was signaled, ReadKeyStroke
still got EFI_NOT_READY. This commit handles the error status to avoid
console_get_keystroke from returning unexpected keys.
Signed-off-by: Gary Ching-Pang Lin <glin@suse.com>
Conflicts:
MokManager.c
A non-DER encoding x509 certificate may be mistakenly enrolled into
db or MokList. This commit checks the first 4 bytes of the certificate
to ensure that it's DER encoding.
This commit also removes the iteration of the x509 signature list.
Per UEFI SPEC, each x509 signature list contains only one x509 certificate.
Besides, the size of certificate is incorrect. The size of the header must
be substracted from the signature size.
Signed-off-by: Gary Ching-Pang Lin <glin@suse.com>
The previous strategy is to locate the first available PXE_BASE_CODE
protocol and to fetch the second stage image from it, and this may
cause shim to fetch the wrong second stage image, i.e. grub.efi.
Consider the machine with the following boot order:
1. PXE Boot
2. Hard Drive
Assume that the EFI image, e.g. bootx64.efi, in the PXE server is
broken, then "PXE Boot" will fail and fallback to "Hard Drive". While
shim.efi in "Hard Drive" is loaded, it will find the PXE protocol is
available and fetch grub.efi from the PXE server, not grub.efi in the
disk.
This commit checks the DeviceHandle from Loaded Image. If the device
supports PXE, then shim fetches grub.efi with the PXE protocol. Otherwise,
shim loads grub.efi from the disk.
Signed-off-by: Gary Ching-Pang Lin <glin@suse.com>
Some UEFI implementations never care the boot options, so the
restored boot options could be just ignored and this results in
endless reboot. To avoid this situation, this commit makes
fallback.efi to load the first matched boot option even if there
is no boot option to be restored. It may not be perfect, but at
least the bootloader is loaded...
Signed-off-by: Gary Ching-Pang Lin <glin@suse.com>
set_boot_order() already copies the old BootOrder to the variable,
bootorder. Besides, we can adjust BootOrder when adding the newly
generated boot option. So, we don't have to copy the old one again
in update_boot_order(). This avoid the duplicate entries in BootOrder.
Signed-off-by: Gary Ching-Pang Lin <glin@suse.com>
In read_header, we adjust context->PEHdr's address by doshdr->e_lfanew.
If we're going to recompute that address, we have to adjust it here
too.
Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
This adds additional bounds-checking on the section sizes. Also adds
-Wsign-compare to the Makefile and replaces some signed variables with
unsigned counteparts for robustness.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
Track use of the system's LoadImage(), and when the next StartImage()
call is for an image the system verified, allow that to count as
participating, since it has been verified by the system's db.
Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
Because you know you wanted a test plan. You feel it deeply inside.
Note that none of the /negative/ cases are tested yet.
Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
Some firmwares seem to ignore our boot entries and put their fallback
entries back on top. Right now that results in a lot of boot entries
for our stuff, a la https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=995834 .
Instead of that happening, if we simply find existing entries that match
the entry we would create and move them to the top of the boot order,
the machine will continue to operate in failure mode (which we can't
avoid), but at least we won't create thousands of extra entries.
Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
UEFI 2.x section 3.1.2 provides for "short-form device path", where the
first element specified is a "hard drive media device path", so that you
can move a disk around on different buses without invalidating your
device path. Fallback has not been using this option, though in most
cases efibootmgr has.
Note that we still keep the full device path, because LoadImage()
isn't necessarily the layer where HD() works - one some systems BDS is
responsible for resolving the full path and passes that to LoadImage()
instead. So we have to do LoadImage() with the full path.
The things we do for our tools. In this case, make the AllocatePool()
happen outside of a conditional, even though that conditional will
always bee satisfied. This way coverity won't think we're setting fi
to NULL and passing it to StrCaseCmp.
Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
Right now we always look for e.g. "\grubx64.efi", which is completely
wrong. This makes it look for the path shim was loaded from and modify
that to end in a sanitized version of our default loader name.
Resolves: rhbz#1032583
Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
Shim should only need to enforce its security policy when its launching
binaries signed with its built-in key. Binaries signed by keys in db or
Mokdb should be able to rely on their own security policy.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
insecure_mode was intended to indicate that the user had explicity disabled
checks with mokutil, which means it wasn't the opposite of secure_mode().
Change the names to clarify this and don't show the insecure mode message
unless the user has explicitly enabled that mode.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
%r when used in Print() will show a string representation of
an EFI_STATUS code.
Change-Id: I6db47f5213454603bd66177aca378ad01e9f0bd4
Signed-off-by: Andrew Boie <andrew.p.boie@intel.com>
Also removed unused LIB_PATH from some Makefiles.
Change-Id: I7d28d18f7531b51b6121a2ffb88bcaedec57c467
Signed-off-by: Andrew Boie <andrew.p.boie@intel.com>
If these are overridden on the command line, pass them along to
the sub-makes.
Change-Id: I531ccb5d2f5e4be8e99d4892cdcfffffc1ad9877
Signed-off-by: Andrew Boie <andrew.p.boie@intel.com>
fh->Read expects pointer to 32-bit int, use UINTN
Change-Id: If1a728efd51a9a24dfcd8123e84bf4c0713491fe
Signed-off-by: Andrew Boie <andrew.p.boie@intel.com>
() Fix the return value semantics. If the MokList doesn't
exist, we are OK. If the MokList was compromised but we
were able to erase it, that is OK too. Only if the list
can't be nuked do we return an error.
() Fix use of potentially uninitialized attribute variable
() Actually use the return value when called from verify_buffer.
Change-Id: If16df21d79c52a1726928df96d133390cde4cb7e
Signed-off-by: Andrew Boie <andrew.p.boie@intel.com>
After going back and inspecting this further, the logic for "SetupMode"
being present at all was incorrect. Also initialize our state earlier
so it's sure to always be set.
Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
