thus allow for guests to use this compacted XSTATE variant when the
hypervisor exports that support
- A variable shadowing cleanup
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Merge tag 'x86_fpu_for_v5.19_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 fpu updates from Borislav Petkov:
- Add support for XSAVEC - the Compacted XSTATE saving variant - and
thus allow for guests to use this compacted XSTATE variant when the
hypervisor exports that support
- A variable shadowing cleanup
* tag 'x86_fpu_for_v5.19_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/fpu: Cleanup variable shadowing
x86/fpu/xsave: Support XSAVEC in the kernel
Processor MMIO Stale Data is a class of vulnerabilities that may
expose data after an MMIO operation. For more details please refer to
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.rst
Add the Processor MMIO Stale Data bug enumeration. A microcode update
adds new bits to the MSR IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, define them.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
CPUID leaf 0x80000022 i.e. ExtPerfMonAndDbg advertises some
new performance monitoring features for AMD processors.
Bit 0 of EAX indicates support for Performance Monitoring
Version 2 (PerfMonV2) features. If found to be set during
PMU initialization, the EBX bits of the same CPUID function
can be used to determine the number of available PMCs for
different PMU types. Additionally, Core PMCs can be managed
using new global control and status registers.
For better utilization of feature words, PerfMonV2 is added
as a scattered feature bit.
Signed-off-by: Sandipan Das <sandipan.das@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/c70e497e22f18e7f05b025bb64ca21cc12b17792.1650515382.git.sandipan.das@amd.com
The TSC_AUX virtualization feature allows AMD SEV-ES guests to securely use
TSC_AUX (auxiliary time stamp counter data) in the RDTSCP and RDPID
instructions. The TSC_AUX value is set using the WRMSR instruction to the
TSC_AUX MSR (0xC0000103). It is read by the RDMSR, RDTSCP and RDPID
instructions. If the read/write of the TSC_AUX MSR is intercepted, then
RDTSCP and RDPID must also be intercepted when TSC_AUX virtualization
is present. However, the RDPID instruction can't be intercepted. This means
that when TSC_AUX virtualization is present, RDTSCP and TSC_AUX MSR
read/write must not be intercepted for SEV-ES (or SEV-SNP) guests.
Signed-off-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>
Message-Id: <165040164424.1399644.13833277687385156344.stgit@bmoger-ubuntu>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The TSC_AUX Virtualization feature allows AMD SEV-ES guests to securely use
TSC_AUX (auxiliary time stamp counter data) MSR in RDTSCP and RDPID
instructions.
The TSC_AUX MSR is typically initialized to APIC ID or another unique
identifier so that software can quickly associate returned TSC value
with the logical processor.
Add the feature bit and also include it in the kvm for detection.
Signed-off-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Message-Id: <165040157111.1399644.6123821125319995316.stgit@bmoger-ubuntu>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
XSAVEC is the user space counterpart of XSAVES which cannot save supervisor
state. In virtualization scenarios the hypervisor does not expose XSAVES
but XSAVEC to the guest, though the kernel does not make use of it.
That's unfortunate because XSAVEC uses the compacted format of saving the
XSTATE. This is more efficient in terms of storage space vs. XSAVE[OPT] as
it does not create holes for XSTATE components which are not supported or
enabled by the kernel but are available in hardware. There is room for
further optimizations when XSAVEC/S and XGETBV1 are supported.
In order to support XSAVEC:
- Define the XSAVEC ASM macro as it's not yet supported by the required
minimal toolchain.
- Create a software defined X86_FEATURE_XCOMPACTED to select the compacted
XSTATE buffer format for both XSAVEC and XSAVES.
- Make XSAVEC an option in the 'XSAVE' ASM alternatives
Requested-by: Andrew Cooper <Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220404104820.598704095@linutronix.de
In preparation of extending cc_platform_has() API to support TDX guest,
use CPUID instruction to detect support for TDX guests in the early
boot code (via tdx_early_init()). Since copy_bootdata() is the first
user of cc_platform_has() API, detect the TDX guest status before it.
Define a synthetic feature flag (X86_FEATURE_TDX_GUEST) and set this
bit in a valid TDX guest platform.
Signed-off-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220405232939.73860-2-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Add a cpu feature for AMD Fam19h Branch Sampling feature as bit
31 of EBX on CPUID leaf function 0x80000008.
Signed-off-by: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220322221517.2510440-3-eranian@google.com
coarse grained, hardware based, forward edge Control-Flow-Integrity mechanism
where any indirect CALL/JMP must target an ENDBR instruction or suffer #CP.
Additionally, since Alderlake (12th gen)/Sapphire-Rapids, speculation is
limited to 2 instructions (and typically fewer) on branch targets not starting
with ENDBR. CET-IBT also limits speculation of the next sequential instruction
after the indirect CALL/JMP [1].
CET-IBT is fundamentally incompatible with retpolines, but provides, as
described above, speculation limits itself.
[1] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/branch-history-injection.html
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Merge tag 'x86_core_for_5.18_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 CET-IBT (Control-Flow-Integrity) support from Peter Zijlstra:
"Add support for Intel CET-IBT, available since Tigerlake (11th gen),
which is a coarse grained, hardware based, forward edge
Control-Flow-Integrity mechanism where any indirect CALL/JMP must
target an ENDBR instruction or suffer #CP.
Additionally, since Alderlake (12th gen)/Sapphire-Rapids, speculation
is limited to 2 instructions (and typically fewer) on branch targets
not starting with ENDBR. CET-IBT also limits speculation of the next
sequential instruction after the indirect CALL/JMP [1].
CET-IBT is fundamentally incompatible with retpolines, but provides,
as described above, speculation limits itself"
[1] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/branch-history-injection.html
* tag 'x86_core_for_5.18_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (53 commits)
kvm/emulate: Fix SETcc emulation for ENDBR
x86/Kconfig: Only allow CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT with ld.lld >= 14.0.0
x86/Kconfig: Only enable CONFIG_CC_HAS_IBT for clang >= 14.0.0
kbuild: Fixup the IBT kbuild changes
x86/Kconfig: Do not allow CONFIG_X86_X32_ABI=y with llvm-objcopy
x86: Remove toolchain check for X32 ABI capability
x86/alternative: Use .ibt_endbr_seal to seal indirect calls
objtool: Find unused ENDBR instructions
objtool: Validate IBT assumptions
objtool: Add IBT/ENDBR decoding
objtool: Read the NOENDBR annotation
x86: Annotate idtentry_df()
x86,objtool: Move the ASM_REACHABLE annotation to objtool.h
x86: Annotate call_on_stack()
objtool: Rework ASM_REACHABLE
x86: Mark __invalid_creds() __noreturn
exit: Mark do_group_exit() __noreturn
x86: Mark stop_this_cpu() __noreturn
objtool: Ignore extra-symbol code
objtool: Rename --duplicate to --lto
...
- Add a new thermal driver for the Intel Hardware Feedback Interface
(HFI) including the HFI initialization, HFI notification interrupt
handling and sending CPU capabilities change messages to user
space via the thermal netlink interface (Ricardo Neri, Srinivas
Pandruvada, Nathan Chancellor, Randy Dunlap).
- Extend the intel-speed-select utility to handle out-of-band CPU
configuration changes and add support for the CPU capabilities
change messages sent over the thermal netlink interface by the new
HFI thermal driver to it (Srinivas Pandruvada).
- Convert the DT bindings to yaml format for the Exynos platform
and fix and update the MAINTAINERS file for this driver (Krzysztof
Kozlowski).
- Register the thermal zones as HWmon sensors for the QCom's
Tsens driver and TI thermal platforms (Dmitry Baryshkov, Romain
Naour).
- Add the msm8953 compatible documentation in the bindings (Luca
Weiss).
- Add the sm8150 platform support to the QCom LMh driver's DT
binding (Thara Gopinath).
- Check the command result from the IPC command to the BPMP in the
Tegra driver (Mikko Perttunen).
- Silence the error for normal configuration where the interrupt
is optionnal in the Broadcom thermal driver (Florian Fainelli).
- Remove remaining dead code from the TI thermal driver (Yue
Haibing).
- Don't use bitmap_weight() in end_power_clamp() in the powerclamp
driver (Yury Norov).
- Update the OS policy capabilities handshake in the int340x thermal
driver (Srinivas Pandruvada).
- Increase the policies bitmap size in int340x (Srinivas Pandruvada).
- Replace acpi_bus_get_device() with acpi_fetch_acpi_dev() in the
int340x thermal driver (Rafael Wysocki).
- Check for NULL after calling kmemdup() in int340x (Jiasheng Jiang).
- Add Intel Dynamic Power and Thermal Framework (DPTF) kernel interface
documentation (Srinivas Pandruvada).
- Fix bullet list warning in the thermal documentation (Randy Dunlap).
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Merge tag 'thermal-5.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rafael/linux-pm
Pull thermal control updates from Rafael Wysocki:
"As far as new functionality is concerned, there is a new thermal
driver for the Intel Hardware Feedback Interface (HFI) along with some
intel-speed-select utility changes to support it. There are also new
DT compatible strings for a couple of platforms, and thermal zones on
some platforms will be registered as HWmon sensors now.
Apart from the above, some drivers are updated (fixes mostly) and
there is a new piece of documentation for the Intel DPTF (Dynamic
Power and Thermal Framework) sysfs interface.
Specifics:
- Add a new thermal driver for the Intel Hardware Feedback Interface
(HFI) including the HFI initialization, HFI notification interrupt
handling and sending CPU capabilities change messages to user space
via the thermal netlink interface (Ricardo Neri, Srinivas
Pandruvada, Nathan Chancellor, Randy Dunlap).
- Extend the intel-speed-select utility to handle out-of-band CPU
configuration changes and add support for the CPU capabilities
change messages sent over the thermal netlink interface by the new
HFI thermal driver to it (Srinivas Pandruvada).
- Convert the DT bindings to yaml format for the Exynos platform and
fix and update the MAINTAINERS file for this driver (Krzysztof
Kozlowski).
- Register the thermal zones as HWmon sensors for the QCom's Tsens
driver and TI thermal platforms (Dmitry Baryshkov, Romain Naour).
- Add the msm8953 compatible documentation in the bindings (Luca
Weiss).
- Add the sm8150 platform support to the QCom LMh driver's DT binding
(Thara Gopinath).
- Check the command result from the IPC command to the BPMP in the
Tegra driver (Mikko Perttunen).
- Silence the error for normal configuration where the interrupt is
optionnal in the Broadcom thermal driver (Florian Fainelli).
- Remove remaining dead code from the TI thermal driver (Yue
Haibing).
- Don't use bitmap_weight() in end_power_clamp() in the powerclamp
driver (Yury Norov).
- Update the OS policy capabilities handshake in the int340x thermal
driver (Srinivas Pandruvada).
- Increase the policies bitmap size in int340x (Srinivas Pandruvada).
- Replace acpi_bus_get_device() with acpi_fetch_acpi_dev() in the
int340x thermal driver (Rafael Wysocki).
- Check for NULL after calling kmemdup() in int340x (Jiasheng Jiang).
- Add Intel Dynamic Power and Thermal Framework (DPTF) kernel
interface documentation (Srinivas Pandruvada).
- Fix bullet list warning in the thermal documentation (Randy
Dunlap)"
* tag 'thermal-5.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rafael/linux-pm: (30 commits)
thermal: int340x: Update OS policy capability handshake
thermal: int340x: Increase bitmap size
Documentation: thermal: DPTF Documentation
MAINTAINERS: thermal: samsung: update Krzysztof Kozlowski's email
thermal/drivers/ti-soc-thermal: Remove unused function ti_thermal_get_temp()
thermal/drivers/brcmstb_thermal: Interrupt is optional
thermal: tegra-bpmp: Handle errors in BPMP response
drivers/thermal/ti-soc-thermal: Add hwmon support
dt-bindings: thermal: tsens: Add msm8953 compatible
dt-bindings: thermal: Add sm8150 compatible string for LMh
thermal/drivers/qcom/lmh: Add support for sm8150
thermal/drivers/tsens: register thermal zones as hwmon sensors
MAINTAINERS: thermal: samsung: Drop obsolete properties
dt-bindings: thermal: samsung: Convert to dtschema
tools/power/x86/intel-speed-select: v1.12 release
tools/power/x86/intel-speed-select: HFI support
tools/power/x86/intel-speed-select: OOB daemon mode
thermal: intel: hfi: INTEL_HFI_THERMAL depends on NET
thermal: netlink: Fix parameter type of thermal_genl_cpu_capability_event() stub
thermal: Replace acpi_bus_get_device()
...
Add the PPIN number to sysfs so that sockets can be identified when
replacement is needed
- Minor fixes and cleanups
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Merge tag 'x86_cpu_for_v5.18_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 cpu feature updates from Borislav Petkov:
- Merge the AMD and Intel PPIN code into a shared one by both vendors.
Add the PPIN number to sysfs so that sockets can be identified when
replacement is needed
- Minor fixes and cleanups
* tag 'x86_cpu_for_v5.18_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/cpu: Clear SME feature flag when not in use
x86/cpufeatures: Put the AMX macros in the word 18 block
topology/sysfs: Add PPIN in sysfs under cpu topology
topology/sysfs: Add format parameter to macro defining "show" functions for proc
x86/cpu: Read/save PPIN MSR during initialization
x86/cpu: X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN finally has a CPUID bit
x86/cpu: Merge Intel and AMD ppin_init() functions
x86/CPU/AMD: Use default_groups in kobj_type
The bits required to make the hardware go.. Of note is that, provided
the syscall entry points are covered with ENDBR, #CP doesn't need to
be an IST because we'll never hit the syscall gap.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220308154318.582331711@infradead.org
The RETPOLINE_AMD name is unfortunate since it isn't necessarily
AMD only, in fact Hygon also uses it. Furthermore it will likely be
sufficient for some Intel processors. Therefore rename the thing to
RETPOLINE_LFENCE to better describe what it is.
Add the spectre_v2=retpoline,lfence option as an alias to
spectre_v2=retpoline,amd to preserve existing setups. However, the output
of /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2 will be changed.
[ bp: Fix typos, massage. ]
Co-developed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
These macros are for bits in CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):EDX, not for bits in
CPUID(EAX=7,ECX=1):EAX. Put them with their brethren.
[ bp: Sort word 18 bits properly, as caught by Like Xu
<like.xu.linux@gmail.com> ]
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220203194308.2469117-1-jmattson@google.com
Add the CPUID feature bit and the model-specific registers needed to
identify and configure the Intel Hardware Feedback Interface.
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
- Use common KVM implementation of MMU memory caches
- SBI v0.2 support for Guest
- Initial KVM selftests support
- Fix to avoid spurious virtual interrupts after clearing hideleg CSR
- Update email address for Anup and Atish
ARM:
- Simplification of the 'vcpu first run' by integrating it into
KVM's 'pid change' flow
- Refactoring of the FP and SVE state tracking, also leading to
a simpler state and less shared data between EL1 and EL2 in
the nVHE case
- Tidy up the header file usage for the nvhe hyp object
- New HYP unsharing mechanism, finally allowing pages to be
unmapped from the Stage-1 EL2 page-tables
- Various pKVM cleanups around refcounting and sharing
- A couple of vgic fixes for bugs that would trigger once
the vcpu xarray rework is merged, but not sooner
- Add minimal support for ARMv8.7's PMU extension
- Rework kvm_pgtable initialisation ahead of the NV work
- New selftest for IRQ injection
- Teach selftests about the lack of default IPA space and
page sizes
- Expand sysreg selftest to deal with Pointer Authentication
- The usual bunch of cleanups and doc update
s390:
- fix sigp sense/start/stop/inconsistency
- cleanups
x86:
- Clean up some function prototypes more
- improved gfn_to_pfn_cache with proper invalidation, used by Xen emulation
- add KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_XEN_EVTCHN and event channel delivery
- completely remove potential TOC/TOU races in nested SVM consistency checks
- update some PMCs on emulated instructions
- Intel AMX support (joint work between Thomas and Intel)
- large MMU cleanups
- module parameter to disable PMU virtualization
- cleanup register cache
- first part of halt handling cleanups
- Hyper-V enlightened MSR bitmap support for nested hypervisors
Generic:
- clean up Makefiles
- introduce CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_DIRTY_RING
- optimize memslot lookup using a tree
- optimize vCPU array usage by converting to xarray
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Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm
Pull kvm updates from Paolo Bonzini:
"RISCV:
- Use common KVM implementation of MMU memory caches
- SBI v0.2 support for Guest
- Initial KVM selftests support
- Fix to avoid spurious virtual interrupts after clearing hideleg CSR
- Update email address for Anup and Atish
ARM:
- Simplification of the 'vcpu first run' by integrating it into KVM's
'pid change' flow
- Refactoring of the FP and SVE state tracking, also leading to a
simpler state and less shared data between EL1 and EL2 in the nVHE
case
- Tidy up the header file usage for the nvhe hyp object
- New HYP unsharing mechanism, finally allowing pages to be unmapped
from the Stage-1 EL2 page-tables
- Various pKVM cleanups around refcounting and sharing
- A couple of vgic fixes for bugs that would trigger once the vcpu
xarray rework is merged, but not sooner
- Add minimal support for ARMv8.7's PMU extension
- Rework kvm_pgtable initialisation ahead of the NV work
- New selftest for IRQ injection
- Teach selftests about the lack of default IPA space and page sizes
- Expand sysreg selftest to deal with Pointer Authentication
- The usual bunch of cleanups and doc update
s390:
- fix sigp sense/start/stop/inconsistency
- cleanups
x86:
- Clean up some function prototypes more
- improved gfn_to_pfn_cache with proper invalidation, used by Xen
emulation
- add KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_XEN_EVTCHN and event channel delivery
- completely remove potential TOC/TOU races in nested SVM consistency
checks
- update some PMCs on emulated instructions
- Intel AMX support (joint work between Thomas and Intel)
- large MMU cleanups
- module parameter to disable PMU virtualization
- cleanup register cache
- first part of halt handling cleanups
- Hyper-V enlightened MSR bitmap support for nested hypervisors
Generic:
- clean up Makefiles
- introduce CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_DIRTY_RING
- optimize memslot lookup using a tree
- optimize vCPU array usage by converting to xarray"
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (268 commits)
x86/fpu: Fix inline prefix warnings
selftest: kvm: Add amx selftest
selftest: kvm: Move struct kvm_x86_state to header
selftest: kvm: Reorder vcpu_load_state steps for AMX
kvm: x86: Disable interception for IA32_XFD on demand
x86/fpu: Provide fpu_sync_guest_vmexit_xfd_state()
kvm: selftests: Add support for KVM_CAP_XSAVE2
kvm: x86: Add support for getting/setting expanded xstate buffer
x86/fpu: Add uabi_size to guest_fpu
kvm: x86: Add CPUID support for Intel AMX
kvm: x86: Add XCR0 support for Intel AMX
kvm: x86: Disable RDMSR interception of IA32_XFD_ERR
kvm: x86: Emulate IA32_XFD_ERR for guest
kvm: x86: Intercept #NM for saving IA32_XFD_ERR
x86/fpu: Prepare xfd_err in struct fpu_guest
kvm: x86: Add emulation for IA32_XFD
x86/fpu: Provide fpu_update_guest_xfd() for IA32_XFD emulation
kvm: x86: Enable dynamic xfeatures at KVM_SET_CPUID2
x86/fpu: Provide fpu_enable_guest_xfd_features() for KVM
x86/fpu: Add guest support to xfd_enable_feature()
...
Extend CPUID emulation to support XFD, AMX_TILE, AMX_INT8 and
AMX_BF16. Adding those bits into kvm_cpu_caps finally activates all
previous logics in this series.
Hide XFD on 32bit host kernels. Otherwise it leads to a weird situation
where KVM tells userspace to migrate MSR_IA32_XFD and then rejects
attempts to read/write the MSR.
Signed-off-by: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20220105123532.12586-17-yang.zhong@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Add Collaborative Processor Performance Control feature flag for AMD
processors.
This feature flag will be used on the following AMD P-State driver. The
AMD P-State driver has two approaches to implement the frequency control
behavior. That depends on the CPU hardware implementation. One is "Full
MSR Support" and another is "Shared Memory Support". The feature flag
indicates the current processors with "Full MSR Support".
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Huang Rui <ray.huang@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
The XSTATE initialization uses check_xstate_against_struct() to sanity
check the size of XSTATE-enabled features. AMX is a XSAVE-enabled feature,
and its size is not hard-coded but discoverable at run-time via CPUID.
The AMX state is composed of state components 17 and 18, which are all user
state components. The first component is the XTILECFG state of a 64-byte
tile-related control register. The state component 18, called XTILEDATA,
contains the actual tile data, and the state size varies on
implementations. The architectural maximum, as defined in the CPUID(0x1d,
1): EAX[15:0], is a byte less than 64KB. The first implementation supports
8KB.
Check the XTILEDATA state size dynamically. The feature introduces the new
tile register, TMM. Define one register struct only and read the number of
registers from CPUID. Cross-check the overall size with CPUID again.
Signed-off-by: Chang S. Bae <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211021225527.10184-21-chang.seok.bae@intel.com
Intel's eXtended Feature Disable (XFD) feature is an extension of the XSAVE
architecture. XFD allows the kernel to enable a feature state in XCR0 and
to receive a #NM trap when a task uses instructions accessing that state.
This is going to be used to postpone the allocation of a larger XSTATE
buffer for a task to the point where it is actually using a related
instruction after the permission to use that facility has been granted.
XFD is not used by the kernel, but only applied to userspace. This is a
matter of policy as the kernel knows how a fpstate is reallocated and the
XFD state.
The compacted XSAVE format is adjustable for dynamic features. Make XFD
depend on XSAVES.
Signed-off-by: Chang S. Bae <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Chang S. Bae <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211021225527.10184-13-chang.seok.bae@intel.com
Intel client processors that support the IA32_TSX_FORCE_ABORT MSR
related to perf counter interaction [1] received a microcode update that
deprecates the Transactional Synchronization Extension (TSX) feature.
The bit FORCE_ABORT_RTM now defaults to 1, writes to this bit are
ignored. A new bit TSX_CPUID_CLEAR clears the TSX related CPUID bits.
The summary of changes to the IA32_TSX_FORCE_ABORT MSR are:
Bit 0: FORCE_ABORT_RTM (legacy bit, new default=1) Status bit that
indicates if RTM transactions are always aborted. This bit is
essentially !SDV_ENABLE_RTM(Bit 2). Writes to this bit are ignored.
Bit 1: TSX_CPUID_CLEAR (new bit, default=0) When set, CPUID.HLE = 0
and CPUID.RTM = 0.
Bit 2: SDV_ENABLE_RTM (new bit, default=0) When clear, XBEGIN will
always abort with EAX code 0. When set, XBEGIN will not be forced to
abort (but will always abort in SGX enclaves). This bit is intended to
be used on developer systems. If this bit is set, transactional
atomicity correctness is not certain. SDV = Software Development
Vehicle (SDV), i.e. developer systems.
Performance monitoring counter 3 is usable in all cases, regardless of
the value of above bits.
Add support for a new CPUID bit - CPUID.RTM_ALWAYS_ABORT (CPUID 7.EDX[11])
- to indicate the status of always abort behavior.
[1] [ bp: Look for document ID 604224, "Performance Monitoring Impact
of Intel Transactional Synchronization Extension Memory". Since
there's no way for us to have stable links to documents... ]
[ bp: Massage and extend commit message. ]
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Tested-by: Neelima Krishnan <neelima.krishnan@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/9add61915b4a4eedad74fbd869107863a28b428e.1623704845.git-series.pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com
AMD and Hygon CPUs have a CPUID bit for RAPL. Drop the fam17h suffix as
it is stale already.
Make use of this instead of a model check to work more nicely in virtual
environments where RAPL typically isn't available.
[ bp: drop the ../cpu/powerflags.c hunk which is superfluous as the
"rapl" bit name appears already in flags. ]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210514135920.16093-1-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com
- Stage-2 isolation for the host kernel when running in protected mode
- Guest SVE support when running in nVHE mode
- Force W^X hypervisor mappings in nVHE mode
- ITS save/restore for guests using direct injection with GICv4.1
- nVHE panics now produce readable backtraces
- Guest support for PTP using the ptp_kvm driver
- Performance improvements in the S2 fault handler
x86:
- Optimizations and cleanup of nested SVM code
- AMD: Support for virtual SPEC_CTRL
- Optimizations of the new MMU code: fast invalidation,
zap under read lock, enable/disably dirty page logging under
read lock
- /dev/kvm API for AMD SEV live migration (guest API coming soon)
- support SEV virtual machines sharing the same encryption context
- support SGX in virtual machines
- add a few more statistics
- improved directed yield heuristics
- Lots and lots of cleanups
Generic:
- Rework of MMU notifier interface, simplifying and optimizing
the architecture-specific code
- Some selftests improvements
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Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm
Pull kvm updates from Paolo Bonzini:
"This is a large update by KVM standards, including AMD PSP (Platform
Security Processor, aka "AMD Secure Technology") and ARM CoreSight
(debug and trace) changes.
ARM:
- CoreSight: Add support for ETE and TRBE
- Stage-2 isolation for the host kernel when running in protected
mode
- Guest SVE support when running in nVHE mode
- Force W^X hypervisor mappings in nVHE mode
- ITS save/restore for guests using direct injection with GICv4.1
- nVHE panics now produce readable backtraces
- Guest support for PTP using the ptp_kvm driver
- Performance improvements in the S2 fault handler
x86:
- AMD PSP driver changes
- Optimizations and cleanup of nested SVM code
- AMD: Support for virtual SPEC_CTRL
- Optimizations of the new MMU code: fast invalidation, zap under
read lock, enable/disably dirty page logging under read lock
- /dev/kvm API for AMD SEV live migration (guest API coming soon)
- support SEV virtual machines sharing the same encryption context
- support SGX in virtual machines
- add a few more statistics
- improved directed yield heuristics
- Lots and lots of cleanups
Generic:
- Rework of MMU notifier interface, simplifying and optimizing the
architecture-specific code
- a handful of "Get rid of oprofile leftovers" patches
- Some selftests improvements"
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (379 commits)
KVM: selftests: Speed up set_memory_region_test
selftests: kvm: Fix the check of return value
KVM: x86: Take advantage of kvm_arch_dy_has_pending_interrupt()
KVM: SVM: Skip SEV cache flush if no ASIDs have been used
KVM: SVM: Remove an unnecessary prototype declaration of sev_flush_asids()
KVM: SVM: Drop redundant svm_sev_enabled() helper
KVM: SVM: Move SEV VMCB tracking allocation to sev.c
KVM: SVM: Explicitly check max SEV ASID during sev_hardware_setup()
KVM: SVM: Unconditionally invoke sev_hardware_teardown()
KVM: SVM: Enable SEV/SEV-ES functionality by default (when supported)
KVM: SVM: Condition sev_enabled and sev_es_enabled on CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=y
KVM: SVM: Append "_enabled" to module-scoped SEV/SEV-ES control variables
KVM: SEV: Mask CPUID[0x8000001F].eax according to supported features
KVM: SVM: Move SEV module params/variables to sev.c
KVM: SVM: Disable SEV/SEV-ES if NPT is disabled
KVM: SVM: Free sev_asid_bitmap during init if SEV setup fails
KVM: SVM: Zero out the VMCB array used to track SEV ASID association
x86/sev: Drop redundant and potentially misleading 'sev_enabled'
KVM: x86: Move reverse CPUID helpers to separate header file
KVM: x86: Rename GPR accessors to make mode-aware variants the defaults
...
- Improve Intel uncore PMU support:
- Parse uncore 'discovery tables' - a new hardware capability enumeration method
introduced on the latest Intel platforms. This table is in a well-defined PCI
namespace location and is read via MMIO. It is organized in an rbtree.
These uncore tables will allow the discovery of standard counter blocks, but
fancier counters still need to be enumerated explicitly.
- Add Alder Lake support
- Improve IIO stacks to PMON mapping support on Skylake servers
- Add Intel Alder Lake PMU support - which requires the introduction of 'hybrid' CPUs
and PMUs. Alder Lake is a mix of Golden Cove ('big') and Gracemont ('small' - Atom derived)
cores.
The CPU-side feature set is entirely symmetrical - but on the PMU side there's
core type dependent PMU functionality.
- Reduce data loss with CPU level hardware tracing on Intel PT / AUX profiling, by
fixing the AUX allocation watermark logic.
- Improve ring buffer allocation on NUMA systems
- Put 'struct perf_event' into their separate kmem_cache pool
- Add support for synchronous signals for select perf events. The immediate motivation
is to support low-overhead sampling-based race detection for user-space code. The
feature consists of the following main changes:
- Add thread-only event inheritance via perf_event_attr::inherit_thread, which limits
inheritance of events to CLONE_THREAD.
- Add the ability for events to not leak through exec(), via perf_event_attr::remove_on_exec.
- Allow the generation of SIGTRAP via perf_event_attr::sigtrap, extend siginfo with an u64
::si_perf, and add the breakpoint information to ::si_addr and ::si_perf if the event is
PERF_TYPE_BREAKPOINT.
The siginfo support is adequate for breakpoints right now - but the new field can be used
to introduce support for other types of metadata passed over siginfo as well.
- Misc fixes, cleanups and smaller updates.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Merge tag 'perf-core-2021-04-28' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull perf event updates from Ingo Molnar:
- Improve Intel uncore PMU support:
- Parse uncore 'discovery tables' - a new hardware capability
enumeration method introduced on the latest Intel platforms. This
table is in a well-defined PCI namespace location and is read via
MMIO. It is organized in an rbtree.
These uncore tables will allow the discovery of standard counter
blocks, but fancier counters still need to be enumerated
explicitly.
- Add Alder Lake support
- Improve IIO stacks to PMON mapping support on Skylake servers
- Add Intel Alder Lake PMU support - which requires the introduction of
'hybrid' CPUs and PMUs. Alder Lake is a mix of Golden Cove ('big')
and Gracemont ('small' - Atom derived) cores.
The CPU-side feature set is entirely symmetrical - but on the PMU
side there's core type dependent PMU functionality.
- Reduce data loss with CPU level hardware tracing on Intel PT / AUX
profiling, by fixing the AUX allocation watermark logic.
- Improve ring buffer allocation on NUMA systems
- Put 'struct perf_event' into their separate kmem_cache pool
- Add support for synchronous signals for select perf events. The
immediate motivation is to support low-overhead sampling-based race
detection for user-space code. The feature consists of the following
main changes:
- Add thread-only event inheritance via
perf_event_attr::inherit_thread, which limits inheritance of
events to CLONE_THREAD.
- Add the ability for events to not leak through exec(), via
perf_event_attr::remove_on_exec.
- Allow the generation of SIGTRAP via perf_event_attr::sigtrap,
extend siginfo with an u64 ::si_perf, and add the breakpoint
information to ::si_addr and ::si_perf if the event is
PERF_TYPE_BREAKPOINT.
The siginfo support is adequate for breakpoints right now - but the
new field can be used to introduce support for other types of
metadata passed over siginfo as well.
- Misc fixes, cleanups and smaller updates.
* tag 'perf-core-2021-04-28' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (53 commits)
signal, perf: Add missing TRAP_PERF case in siginfo_layout()
signal, perf: Fix siginfo_t by avoiding u64 on 32-bit architectures
perf/x86: Allow for 8<num_fixed_counters<16
perf/x86/rapl: Add support for Intel Alder Lake
perf/x86/cstate: Add Alder Lake CPU support
perf/x86/msr: Add Alder Lake CPU support
perf/x86/intel/uncore: Add Alder Lake support
perf: Extend PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE and PERF_TYPE_HW_CACHE
perf/x86/intel: Add Alder Lake Hybrid support
perf/x86: Support filter_match callback
perf/x86/intel: Add attr_update for Hybrid PMUs
perf/x86: Add structures for the attributes of Hybrid PMUs
perf/x86: Register hybrid PMUs
perf/x86: Factor out x86_pmu_show_pmu_cap
perf/x86: Remove temporary pmu assignment in event_init
perf/x86/intel: Factor out intel_pmu_check_extra_regs
perf/x86/intel: Factor out intel_pmu_check_event_constraints
perf/x86/intel: Factor out intel_pmu_check_num_counters
perf/x86: Hybrid PMU support for extra_regs
perf/x86: Hybrid PMU support for event constraints
...
gets rid of the LAZY_GS stuff and a lot of code.
- Add an insn_decode() API which all users of the instruction decoder
should preferrably use. Its goal is to keep the details of the
instruction decoder away from its users and simplify and streamline how
one decodes insns in the kernel. Convert its users to it.
- kprobes improvements and fixes
- Set the maximum DIE per package variable on Hygon
- Rip out the dynamic NOP selection and simplify all the machinery around
selecting NOPs. Use the simplified NOPs in objtool now too.
- Add Xeon Sapphire Rapids to list of CPUs that support PPIN
- Simplify the retpolines by folding the entire thing into an
alternative now that objtool can handle alternatives with stack
ops. Then, have objtool rewrite the call to the retpoline with the
alternative which then will get patched at boot time.
- Document Intel uarch per models in intel-family.h
- Make Sub-NUMA Clustering topology the default and Cluster-on-Die the
exception on Intel.
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Merge tag 'x86_core_for_v5.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 updates from Borislav Petkov:
- Turn the stack canary into a normal __percpu variable on 32-bit which
gets rid of the LAZY_GS stuff and a lot of code.
- Add an insn_decode() API which all users of the instruction decoder
should preferrably use. Its goal is to keep the details of the
instruction decoder away from its users and simplify and streamline
how one decodes insns in the kernel. Convert its users to it.
- kprobes improvements and fixes
- Set the maximum DIE per package variable on Hygon
- Rip out the dynamic NOP selection and simplify all the machinery
around selecting NOPs. Use the simplified NOPs in objtool now too.
- Add Xeon Sapphire Rapids to list of CPUs that support PPIN
- Simplify the retpolines by folding the entire thing into an
alternative now that objtool can handle alternatives with stack ops.
Then, have objtool rewrite the call to the retpoline with the
alternative which then will get patched at boot time.
- Document Intel uarch per models in intel-family.h
- Make Sub-NUMA Clustering topology the default and Cluster-on-Die the
exception on Intel.
* tag 'x86_core_for_v5.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (53 commits)
x86, sched: Treat Intel SNC topology as default, COD as exception
x86/cpu: Comment Skylake server stepping too
x86/cpu: Resort and comment Intel models
objtool/x86: Rewrite retpoline thunk calls
objtool: Skip magical retpoline .altinstr_replacement
objtool: Cache instruction relocs
objtool: Keep track of retpoline call sites
objtool: Add elf_create_undef_symbol()
objtool: Extract elf_symbol_add()
objtool: Extract elf_strtab_concat()
objtool: Create reloc sections implicitly
objtool: Add elf_create_reloc() helper
objtool: Rework the elf_rebuild_reloc_section() logic
objtool: Fix static_call list generation
objtool: Handle per arch retpoline naming
objtool: Correctly handle retpoline thunk calls
x86/retpoline: Simplify retpolines
x86/alternatives: Optimize optimize_nops()
x86: Add insn_decode_kernel()
x86/kprobes: Move 'inline' to the beginning of the kprobe_is_ss() declaration
...
Newer CPUs provide a second mechanism to detect operations with lock
prefix which go accross a cache line boundary. Such operations have to
take bus lock which causes a system wide performance degradation when
these operations happen frequently.
The new mechanism is not using the #AC exception. It triggers #DB and is
restricted to operations in user space. Kernel side split lock access can
only be detected by the #AC based variant. Contrary to the #AC based
mechanism the #DB based variant triggers _after_ the instruction was
executed. The mechanism is CPUID enumerated and contrary to the #AC
version which is based on the magic TEST_CTRL_MSR and model/family based
enumeration on the way to become architectural.
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Merge tag 'x86-splitlock-2021-04-26' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 bus lock detection updates from Thomas Gleixner:
"Support for enhanced split lock detection:
Newer CPUs provide a second mechanism to detect operations with lock
prefix which go accross a cache line boundary. Such operations have to
take bus lock which causes a system wide performance degradation when
these operations happen frequently.
The new mechanism is not using the #AC exception. It triggers #DB and
is restricted to operations in user space. Kernel side split lock
access can only be detected by the #AC based variant.
Contrary to the #AC based mechanism the #DB based variant triggers
_after_ the instruction was executed. The mechanism is CPUID
enumerated and contrary to the #AC version which is based on the magic
TEST_CTRL_MSR and model/family based enumeration on the way to become
architectural"
* tag 'x86-splitlock-2021-04-26' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
Documentation/admin-guide: Change doc for split_lock_detect parameter
x86/traps: Handle #DB for bus lock
x86/cpufeatures: Enumerate #DB for bus lock detection
Christopherson, Kai Huang and Jarkko Sakkinen. Along with the usual
fixes, cleanups and improvements.
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Merge tag 'x86_sgx_for_v5.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 SGX updates from Borislav Petkov:
"Add the guest side of SGX support in KVM guests. Work by Sean
Christopherson, Kai Huang and Jarkko Sakkinen.
Along with the usual fixes, cleanups and improvements"
* tag 'x86_sgx_for_v5.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (21 commits)
x86/sgx: Mark sgx_vepc_vm_ops static
x86/sgx: Do not update sgx_nr_free_pages in sgx_setup_epc_section()
x86/sgx: Move provisioning device creation out of SGX driver
x86/sgx: Add helpers to expose ECREATE and EINIT to KVM
x86/sgx: Add helper to update SGX_LEPUBKEYHASHn MSRs
x86/sgx: Add encls_faulted() helper
x86/sgx: Add SGX2 ENCLS leaf definitions (EAUG, EMODPR and EMODT)
x86/sgx: Move ENCLS leaf definitions to sgx.h
x86/sgx: Expose SGX architectural definitions to the kernel
x86/sgx: Initialize virtual EPC driver even when SGX driver is disabled
x86/cpu/intel: Allow SGX virtualization without Launch Control support
x86/sgx: Introduce virtual EPC for use by KVM guests
x86/sgx: Add SGX_CHILD_PRESENT hardware error code
x86/sgx: Wipe out EREMOVE from sgx_free_epc_page()
x86/cpufeatures: Add SGX1 and SGX2 sub-features
x86/cpufeatures: Make SGX_LC feature bit depend on SGX bit
x86/sgx: Remove unnecessary kmap() from sgx_ioc_enclave_init()
selftests/sgx: Use getauxval() to simplify test code
selftests/sgx: Improve error detection and messages
x86/sgx: Add a basic NUMA allocation scheme to sgx_alloc_epc_page()
...
Add feature enumeration to identify a processor with Intel Hybrid
Technology: one in which CPUs of more than one type are the same package.
On a hybrid processor, all CPUs support the same homogeneous (i.e.,
symmetric) instruction set. All CPUs enumerate the same features in CPUID.
Thus, software (user space and kernel) can run and migrate to any CPU in
the system as well as utilize any of the enumerated features without any
change or special provisions. The main difference among CPUs in a hybrid
processor are power and performance properties.
Signed-off-by: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1618237865-33448-2-git-send-email-kan.liang@linux.intel.com
A bus lock is acquired through either a split locked access to writeback
(WB) memory or any locked access to non-WB memory. This is typically >1000
cycles slower than an atomic operation within a cache line. It also
disrupts performance on other cores.
Some CPUs have the ability to notify the kernel by a #DB trap after a user
instruction acquires a bus lock and is executed. This allows the kernel to
enforce user application throttling or mitigation. Both breakpoint and bus
lock can trigger the #DB trap in the same instruction and the ordering of
handling them is the kernel #DB handler's choice.
The CPU feature flag to be shown in /proc/cpuinfo will be "bus_lock_detect".
Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210322135325.682257-2-fenghua.yu@intel.com
Add SGX1 and SGX2 feature flags, via CPUID.0x12.0x0.EAX, as scattered
features, since adding a new leaf for only two bits would be wasteful.
As part of virtualizing SGX, KVM will expose the SGX CPUID leafs to its
guest, and to do so correctly needs to query hardware and kernel support
for SGX1 and SGX2.
Suppress both SGX1 and SGX2 from /proc/cpuinfo. SGX1 basically means
SGX, and for SGX2 there is no concrete use case of using it in
/proc/cpuinfo.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/d787827dbfca6b3210ac3e432e3ac1202727e786.1616136308.git.kai.huang@intel.com
This ensures that a NOP is a NOP and not a random other instruction that
is also a NOP. It allows simplification of dynamic code patching that
wants to verify existing code before writing new instructions (ftrace,
jump_label, static_call, etc..).
Differentiating on NOPs is not a feature.
This pessimises 32bit (DONTCARE) and 32bit on 64bit CPUs (CARELESS).
32bit is not a performance target.
Everything x86_64 since AMD K10 (2007) and Intel IvyBridge (2012) is
fine with using NOPL (as opposed to prefix NOP). And per FEATURE_NOPL
being required for x86_64, all x86_64 CPUs can use NOPL. So stop
caring about NOPs, simplify things and get on with life.
[ The problem seems to be that some uarchs can only decode NOPL on a
single front-end port while others have severe decode penalties for
excessive prefixes. All modern uarchs can handle both, except Atom,
which has prefix penalties. ]
[ Also, much doubt you can actually measure any of this on normal
workloads. ]
After this, FEATURE_NOPL is unused except for required-features for
x86_64. FEATURE_K8 is only used for PTI.
[ bp: Kernel build measurements showed ~0.3s slowdown on Sandybridge
which is hardly a slowdown. Get rid of X86_FEATURE_K7, while at it. ]
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com> # bpf
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linuxfoundation.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210312115749.065275711@infradead.org
Newer AMD processors have a feature to virtualize the use of the
SPEC_CTRL MSR. Presence of this feature is indicated via CPUID
function 0x8000000A_EDX[20]: GuestSpecCtrl. When present, the
SPEC_CTRL MSR is automatically virtualized.
Signed-off-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Message-Id: <161188100272.28787.4097272856384825024.stgit@bmoger-ubuntu>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
For being able to switch paravirt patching from special cased custom
code sequences to ALTERNATIVE handling some X86_FEATURE_* are needed
as new features. This enables to have the standard indirect pv call
as the default code and to patch that with the non-Xen custom code
sequence via ALTERNATIVE patching later.
Make sure paravirt patching is performed before alternatives patching.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210311142319.4723-9-jgross@suse.com
- Support for userspace to emulate Xen hypercalls
- Raise the maximum number of user memslots
- Scalability improvements for the new MMU. Instead of the complex
"fast page fault" logic that is used in mmu.c, tdp_mmu.c uses an
rwlock so that page faults are concurrent, but the code that can run
against page faults is limited. Right now only page faults take the
lock for reading; in the future this will be extended to some
cases of page table destruction. I hope to switch the default MMU
around 5.12-rc3 (some testing was delayed due to Chinese New Year).
- Cleanups for MAXPHYADDR checks
- Use static calls for vendor-specific callbacks
- On AMD, use VMLOAD/VMSAVE to save and restore host state
- Stop using deprecated jump label APIs
- Workaround for AMD erratum that made nested virtualization unreliable
- Support for LBR emulation in the guest
- Support for communicating bus lock vmexits to userspace
- Add support for SEV attestation command
- Miscellaneous cleanups
PPC:
- Support for second data watchpoint on POWER10
- Remove some complex workarounds for buggy early versions of POWER9
- Guest entry/exit fixes
ARM64
- Make the nVHE EL2 object relocatable
- Cleanups for concurrent translation faults hitting the same page
- Support for the standard TRNG hypervisor call
- A bunch of small PMU/Debug fixes
- Simplification of the early init hypercall handling
Non-KVM changes (with acks):
- Detection of contended rwlocks (implemented only for qrwlocks,
because KVM only needs it for x86)
- Allow __DISABLE_EXPORTS from assembly code
- Provide a saner follow_pfn replacements for modules
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Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm
Pull KVM updates from Paolo Bonzini:
"x86:
- Support for userspace to emulate Xen hypercalls
- Raise the maximum number of user memslots
- Scalability improvements for the new MMU.
Instead of the complex "fast page fault" logic that is used in
mmu.c, tdp_mmu.c uses an rwlock so that page faults are concurrent,
but the code that can run against page faults is limited. Right now
only page faults take the lock for reading; in the future this will
be extended to some cases of page table destruction. I hope to
switch the default MMU around 5.12-rc3 (some testing was delayed
due to Chinese New Year).
- Cleanups for MAXPHYADDR checks
- Use static calls for vendor-specific callbacks
- On AMD, use VMLOAD/VMSAVE to save and restore host state
- Stop using deprecated jump label APIs
- Workaround for AMD erratum that made nested virtualization
unreliable
- Support for LBR emulation in the guest
- Support for communicating bus lock vmexits to userspace
- Add support for SEV attestation command
- Miscellaneous cleanups
PPC:
- Support for second data watchpoint on POWER10
- Remove some complex workarounds for buggy early versions of POWER9
- Guest entry/exit fixes
ARM64:
- Make the nVHE EL2 object relocatable
- Cleanups for concurrent translation faults hitting the same page
- Support for the standard TRNG hypervisor call
- A bunch of small PMU/Debug fixes
- Simplification of the early init hypercall handling
Non-KVM changes (with acks):
- Detection of contended rwlocks (implemented only for qrwlocks,
because KVM only needs it for x86)
- Allow __DISABLE_EXPORTS from assembly code
- Provide a saner follow_pfn replacements for modules"
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (192 commits)
KVM: x86/xen: Explicitly pad struct compat_vcpu_info to 64 bytes
KVM: selftests: Don't bother mapping GVA for Xen shinfo test
KVM: selftests: Fix hex vs. decimal snafu in Xen test
KVM: selftests: Fix size of memslots created by Xen tests
KVM: selftests: Ignore recently added Xen tests' build output
KVM: selftests: Add missing header file needed by xAPIC IPI tests
KVM: selftests: Add operand to vmsave/vmload/vmrun in svm.c
KVM: SVM: Make symbol 'svm_gp_erratum_intercept' static
locking/arch: Move qrwlock.h include after qspinlock.h
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Fix host radix SLB optimisation with hash guests
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Ensure radix guest has no SLB entries
KVM: PPC: Don't always report hash MMU capability for P9 < DD2.2
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Save and restore FSCR in the P9 path
KVM: PPC: remove unneeded semicolon
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Use POWER9 SLBIA IH=6 variant to clear SLB
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: No need to clear radix host SLB before loading HPT guest
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Fix radix guest SLB side channel
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Remove support for running HPT guest on RPT host without mixed mode support
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Introduce new capability for 2nd DAWR
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Add infrastructure to support 2nd DAWR
...
New AMD CPUs have a change that checks #VMEXIT intercept on special SVM
instructions before checking their EAX against reserved memory region.
This change is indicated by CPUID_0x8000000A_EDX[28]. If it is 1, #VMEXIT
is triggered before #GP. KVM doesn't need to intercept and emulate #GP
faults as #GP is supposed to be triggered.
Co-developed-by: Bandan Das <bsd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Bandan Das <bsd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei Huang <wei.huang2@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210126081831.570253-4-wei.huang2@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Add AVX version of the Vector Neural Network (VNNI) Instructions.
A processor supports AVX VNNI instructions if CPUID.0x07.0x1:EAX[4] is
present. The following instructions are available when this feature is
present.
1. VPDPBUS: Multiply and Add Unsigned and Signed Bytes
2. VPDPBUSDS: Multiply and Add Unsigned and Signed Bytes with Saturation
3. VPDPWSSD: Multiply and Add Signed Word Integers
4. VPDPWSSDS: Multiply and Add Signed Integers with Saturation
The only in-kernel usage of this is kvm passthrough. The CPU feature
flag is shown as "avx_vnni" in /proc/cpuinfo.
This instruction is currently documented in the latest "extensions"
manual (ISE). It will appear in the "main" manual (SDM) in the future.
Signed-off-by: Kyung Min Park <kyung.min.park@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20210105004909.42000-2-yang.zhong@intel.com>
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Collect the scattered SME/SEV related feature flags into a dedicated
word. There are now five recognized features in CPUID.0x8000001F.EAX,
with at least one more on the horizon (SEV-SNP). Using a dedicated word
allows KVM to use its automagic CPUID adjustment logic when reporting
the set of supported features to userspace.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210122204047.2860075-2-seanjc@google.com
* PSCI relay at EL2 when "protected KVM" is enabled
* New exception injection code
* Simplification of AArch32 system register handling
* Fix PMU accesses when no PMU is enabled
* Expose CSV3 on non-Meltdown hosts
* Cache hierarchy discovery fixes
* PV steal-time cleanups
* Allow function pointers at EL2
* Various host EL2 entry cleanups
* Simplification of the EL2 vector allocation
s390:
* memcg accouting for s390 specific parts of kvm and gmap
* selftest for diag318
* new kvm_stat for when async_pf falls back to sync
x86:
* Tracepoints for the new pagetable code from 5.10
* Catch VFIO and KVM irqfd events before userspace
* Reporting dirty pages to userspace with a ring buffer
* SEV-ES host support
* Nested VMX support for wait-for-SIPI activity state
* New feature flag (AVX512 FP16)
* New system ioctl to report Hyper-V-compatible paravirtualization features
Generic:
* Selftest improvements
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Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm
Pull KVM updates from Paolo Bonzini:
"Much x86 work was pushed out to 5.12, but ARM more than made up for it.
ARM:
- PSCI relay at EL2 when "protected KVM" is enabled
- New exception injection code
- Simplification of AArch32 system register handling
- Fix PMU accesses when no PMU is enabled
- Expose CSV3 on non-Meltdown hosts
- Cache hierarchy discovery fixes
- PV steal-time cleanups
- Allow function pointers at EL2
- Various host EL2 entry cleanups
- Simplification of the EL2 vector allocation
s390:
- memcg accouting for s390 specific parts of kvm and gmap
- selftest for diag318
- new kvm_stat for when async_pf falls back to sync
x86:
- Tracepoints for the new pagetable code from 5.10
- Catch VFIO and KVM irqfd events before userspace
- Reporting dirty pages to userspace with a ring buffer
- SEV-ES host support
- Nested VMX support for wait-for-SIPI activity state
- New feature flag (AVX512 FP16)
- New system ioctl to report Hyper-V-compatible paravirtualization features
Generic:
- Selftest improvements"
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (171 commits)
KVM: SVM: fix 32-bit compilation
KVM: SVM: Add AP_JUMP_TABLE support in prep for AP booting
KVM: SVM: Provide support to launch and run an SEV-ES guest
KVM: SVM: Provide an updated VMRUN invocation for SEV-ES guests
KVM: SVM: Provide support for SEV-ES vCPU loading
KVM: SVM: Provide support for SEV-ES vCPU creation/loading
KVM: SVM: Update ASID allocation to support SEV-ES guests
KVM: SVM: Set the encryption mask for the SVM host save area
KVM: SVM: Add NMI support for an SEV-ES guest
KVM: SVM: Guest FPU state save/restore not needed for SEV-ES guest
KVM: SVM: Do not report support for SMM for an SEV-ES guest
KVM: x86: Update __get_sregs() / __set_sregs() to support SEV-ES
KVM: SVM: Add support for CR8 write traps for an SEV-ES guest
KVM: SVM: Add support for CR4 write traps for an SEV-ES guest
KVM: SVM: Add support for CR0 write traps for an SEV-ES guest
KVM: SVM: Add support for EFER write traps for an SEV-ES guest
KVM: SVM: Support string IO operations for an SEV-ES guest
KVM: SVM: Support MMIO for an SEV-ES guest
KVM: SVM: Create trace events for VMGEXIT MSR protocol processing
KVM: SVM: Create trace events for VMGEXIT processing
...
On systems that do not have hardware enforced cache coherency between
encrypted and unencrypted mappings of the same physical page, the
hypervisor can use the VM page flush MSR (0xc001011e) to flush the cache
contents of an SEV guest page. When a small number of pages are being
flushed, this can be used in place of issuing a WBINVD across all CPUs.
CPUID 0x8000001f_eax[2] is used to determine if the VM page flush MSR is
available. Add a CPUID feature to indicate it is supported and define the
MSR.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <f1966379e31f9b208db5257509c4a089a87d33d0.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Enumerate AVX512 Half-precision floating point (FP16) CPUID feature
flag. Compared with using FP32, using FP16 cut the number of bits
required for storage in half, reducing the exponent from 8 bits to 5,
and the mantissa from 23 bits to 10. Using FP16 also enables developers
to train and run inference on deep learning models fast when all
precision or magnitude (FP32) is not needed.
A processor supports AVX512 FP16 if CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):EDX[bit 23]
is present. The AVX512 FP16 requires AVX512BW feature be implemented
since the instructions for manipulating 32bit masks are associated with
AVX512BW.
The only in-kernel usage of this is kvm passthrough. The CPU feature
flag is shown as "avx512_fp16" in /proc/cpuinfo.
Signed-off-by: Kyung Min Park <kyung.min.park@intel.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20201208033441.28207-2-kyung.min.park@intel.com>
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The SGX Launch Control hardware helps restrict which enclaves the
hardware will run. Launch control is intended to restrict what software
can run with enclave protections, which helps protect the overall system
from bad enclaves.
For the kernel's purposes, there are effectively two modes in which the
launch control hardware can operate: rigid and flexible. In its rigid
mode, an entity other than the kernel has ultimate authority over which
enclaves can be run (firmware, Intel, etc...). In its flexible mode, the
kernel has ultimate authority over which enclaves can run.
Enable X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC to enumerate when the CPU supports SGX Launch
Control in general.
Add MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH{0, 1, 2, 3}, which when combined contain a
SHA256 hash of a 3072-bit RSA public key. The hardware allows SGX enclaves
signed with this public key to initialize and run [*]. Enclaves not signed
with this key can not initialize and run.
Add FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED, which informs whether the SGXLEPUBKEYHASH MSRs
can be written by the kernel.
If the MSRs do not exist or are read-only, the launch control hardware is
operating in rigid mode. Linux does not and will not support creating
enclaves when hardware is configured in rigid mode because it takes away
the authority for launch decisions from the kernel. Note, this does not
preclude KVM from virtualizing/exposing SGX to a KVM guest when launch
control hardware is operating in rigid mode.
[*] Intel SDM: 38.1.4 Intel SGX Launch Control Configuration
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-5-jarkko@kernel.org
Populate X86_FEATURE_SGX feature from CPUID and tie it to the Kconfig
option with disabled-features.h.
IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL.SGX_ENABLE must be examined in addition to the CPUID
bits to enable full SGX support. The BIOS must both set this bit and lock
IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL for SGX to be supported (Intel SDM section 36.7.1).
The setting or clearing of this bit has no impact on the CPUID bits above,
which is why it needs to be detected separately.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-4-jarkko@kernel.org
called SEV by also encrypting the guest register state, making the
registers inaccessible to the hypervisor by en-/decrypting them on world
switches. Thus, it adds additional protection to Linux guests against
exfiltration, control flow and rollback attacks.
With SEV-ES, the guest is in full control of what registers the
hypervisor can access. This is provided by a guest-host exchange
mechanism based on a new exception vector called VMM Communication
Exception (#VC), a new instruction called VMGEXIT and a shared
Guest-Host Communication Block which is a decrypted page shared between
the guest and the hypervisor.
Intercepts to the hypervisor become #VC exceptions in an SEV-ES guest so
in order for that exception mechanism to work, the early x86 init code
needed to be made able to handle exceptions, which, in itself, brings
a bunch of very nice cleanups and improvements to the early boot code
like an early page fault handler, allowing for on-demand building of the
identity mapping. With that, !KASLR configurations do not use the EFI
page table anymore but switch to a kernel-controlled one.
The main part of this series adds the support for that new exchange
mechanism. The goal has been to keep this as much as possibly
separate from the core x86 code by concentrating the machinery in two
SEV-ES-specific files:
arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c
arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
Other interaction with core x86 code has been kept at minimum and behind
static keys to minimize the performance impact on !SEV-ES setups.
Work by Joerg Roedel and Thomas Lendacky and others.
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Merge tag 'x86_seves_for_v5.10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 SEV-ES support from Borislav Petkov:
"SEV-ES enhances the current guest memory encryption support called SEV
by also encrypting the guest register state, making the registers
inaccessible to the hypervisor by en-/decrypting them on world
switches. Thus, it adds additional protection to Linux guests against
exfiltration, control flow and rollback attacks.
With SEV-ES, the guest is in full control of what registers the
hypervisor can access. This is provided by a guest-host exchange
mechanism based on a new exception vector called VMM Communication
Exception (#VC), a new instruction called VMGEXIT and a shared
Guest-Host Communication Block which is a decrypted page shared
between the guest and the hypervisor.
Intercepts to the hypervisor become #VC exceptions in an SEV-ES guest
so in order for that exception mechanism to work, the early x86 init
code needed to be made able to handle exceptions, which, in itself,
brings a bunch of very nice cleanups and improvements to the early
boot code like an early page fault handler, allowing for on-demand
building of the identity mapping. With that, !KASLR configurations do
not use the EFI page table anymore but switch to a kernel-controlled
one.
The main part of this series adds the support for that new exchange
mechanism. The goal has been to keep this as much as possibly separate
from the core x86 code by concentrating the machinery in two
SEV-ES-specific files:
arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c
arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
Other interaction with core x86 code has been kept at minimum and
behind static keys to minimize the performance impact on !SEV-ES
setups.
Work by Joerg Roedel and Thomas Lendacky and others"
* tag 'x86_seves_for_v5.10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (73 commits)
x86/sev-es: Use GHCB accessor for setting the MMIO scratch buffer
x86/sev-es: Check required CPU features for SEV-ES
x86/efi: Add GHCB mappings when SEV-ES is active
x86/sev-es: Handle NMI State
x86/sev-es: Support CPU offline/online
x86/head/64: Don't call verify_cpu() on starting APs
x86/smpboot: Load TSS and getcpu GDT entry before loading IDT
x86/realmode: Setup AP jump table
x86/realmode: Add SEV-ES specific trampoline entry point
x86/vmware: Add VMware-specific handling for VMMCALL under SEV-ES
x86/kvm: Add KVM-specific VMMCALL handling under SEV-ES
x86/paravirt: Allow hypervisor-specific VMMCALL handling under SEV-ES
x86/sev-es: Handle #DB Events
x86/sev-es: Handle #AC Events
x86/sev-es: Handle VMMCALL Events
x86/sev-es: Handle MWAIT/MWAITX Events
x86/sev-es: Handle MONITOR/MONITORX Events
x86/sev-es: Handle INVD Events
x86/sev-es: Handle RDPMC Events
x86/sev-es: Handle RDTSC(P) Events
...
James Morse.
* Add support for controlling per-thread memory bandwidth throttling
delay values on hw which supports it, by Fenghua Yu.
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Merge tag 'x86_cache_for_v5.10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 cache resource control updates from Borislav Petkov:
- Misc cleanups to the resctrl code in preparation for the ARM side
(James Morse)
- Add support for controlling per-thread memory bandwidth throttling
delay values on hw which supports it (Fenghua Yu)
* tag 'x86_cache_for_v5.10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/resctrl: Enable user to view thread or core throttling mode
x86/resctrl: Enumerate per-thread MBA controls
cacheinfo: Move resctrl's get_cache_id() to the cacheinfo header file
x86/resctrl: Add struct rdt_cache::arch_has_{sparse, empty}_bitmaps
x86/resctrl: Merge AMD/Intel parse_bw() calls
x86/resctrl: Add struct rdt_membw::arch_needs_linear to explain AMD/Intel MBA difference
x86/resctrl: Use is_closid_match() in more places
x86/resctrl: Include pid.h
x86/resctrl: Use container_of() in delayed_work handlers
x86/resctrl: Fix stale comment
x86/resctrl: Remove struct rdt_membw::max_delay
x86/resctrl: Remove unused struct mbm_state::chunks_bw
devices which doesn't need pinning of pages for DMA anymore. Add support
for the command submission to devices using new x86 instructions like
ENQCMD{,S} and MOVDIR64B. In addition, add support for process address
space identifiers (PASIDs) which are referenced by those command
submission instructions along with the handling of the PASID state on
context switch as another extended state. Work by Fenghua Yu, Ashok Raj,
Yu-cheng Yu and Dave Jiang.
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Merge tag 'x86_pasid_for_5.10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 PASID updates from Borislav Petkov:
"Initial support for sharing virtual addresses between the CPU and
devices which doesn't need pinning of pages for DMA anymore.
Add support for the command submission to devices using new x86
instructions like ENQCMD{,S} and MOVDIR64B. In addition, add support
for process address space identifiers (PASIDs) which are referenced by
those command submission instructions along with the handling of the
PASID state on context switch as another extended state.
Work by Fenghua Yu, Ashok Raj, Yu-cheng Yu and Dave Jiang"
* tag 'x86_pasid_for_5.10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/asm: Add an enqcmds() wrapper for the ENQCMDS instruction
x86/asm: Carve out a generic movdir64b() helper for general usage
x86/mmu: Allocate/free a PASID
x86/cpufeatures: Mark ENQCMD as disabled when configured out
mm: Add a pasid member to struct mm_struct
x86/msr-index: Define an IA32_PASID MSR
x86/fpu/xstate: Add supervisor PASID state for ENQCMD
x86/cpufeatures: Enumerate ENQCMD and ENQCMDS instructions
Documentation/x86: Add documentation for SVA (Shared Virtual Addressing)
iommu/vt-d: Change flags type to unsigned int in binding mm
drm, iommu: Change type of pasid to u32
In some hardware implementations, coherency between the encrypted and
unencrypted mappings of the same physical page is enforced. In such a system,
it is not required for software to flush the page from all CPU caches in the
system prior to changing the value of the C-bit for a page. This hardware-
enforced cache coherency is indicated by EAX[10] in CPUID leaf 0x8000001f.
[ bp: Use one of the free slots in word 3. ]
Suggested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Krish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200917212038.5090-2-krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com
Work submission instruction comes in two flavors. ENQCMD can be called
both in ring 3 and ring 0 and always uses the contents of a PASID MSR
when shipping the command to the device. ENQCMDS allows a kernel driver
to submit commands on behalf of a user process. The driver supplies the
PASID value in ENQCMDS. There isn't any usage of ENQCMD in the kernel as
of now.
The CPU feature flag is shown as "enqcmd" in /proc/cpuinfo.
Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1600187413-163670-5-git-send-email-fenghua.yu@intel.com
Add CPU feature detection for Secure Encrypted Virtualization with
Encrypted State. This feature enhances SEV by also encrypting the
guest register state, making it in-accessible to the hypervisor.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200907131613.12703-6-joro@8bytes.org
Intel TSX suspend load tracking instructions aim to give a way to choose
which memory accesses do not need to be tracked in the TSX read set. Add
TSX suspend load tracking CPUID feature flag TSXLDTRK for enumeration.
A processor supports Intel TSX suspend load address tracking if
CPUID.0x07.0x0:EDX[16] is present. Two instructions XSUSLDTRK, XRESLDTRK
are available when this feature is present.
The CPU feature flag is shown as "tsxldtrk" in /proc/cpuinfo.
Signed-off-by: Kyung Min Park <kyung.min.park@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Cathy Zhang <cathy.zhang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1598316478-23337-2-git-send-email-cathy.zhang@intel.com
Some systems support per-thread Memory Bandwidth Allocation (MBA) which
applies a throttling delay value to each hardware thread instead of to
a core. Per-thread MBA is enumerated by CPUID.
No feature flag is shown in /proc/cpuinfo. User applications need to
check a resctrl throttling mode info file to know if the feature is
supported.
Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1598296281-127595-2-git-send-email-fenghua.yu@intel.com
- Prepare for Intel's new SERIALIZE instruction
- Enable split-lock debugging on more CPUs
- Add more Intel CPU models
- Optimize stack canary initialization a bit
- Simplify the Spectre logic a bit
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Merge tag 'x86-cpu-2020-08-03' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 cpu updates from Ingo Molar:
- prepare for Intel's new SERIALIZE instruction
- enable split-lock debugging on more CPUs
- add more Intel CPU models
- optimize stack canary initialization a bit
- simplify the Spectre logic a bit
* tag 'x86-cpu-2020-08-03' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/cpu: Refactor sync_core() for readability
x86/cpu: Relocate sync_core() to sync_core.h
x86/cpufeatures: Add enumeration for SERIALIZE instruction
x86/split_lock: Enable the split lock feature on Sapphire Rapids and Alder Lake CPUs
x86/cpu: Add Lakefield, Alder Lake and Rocket Lake models to the to Intel CPU family
x86/stackprotector: Pre-initialize canary for secondary CPUs
x86/speculation: Merge one test in spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation()
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Merge tag 'x86-cleanups-2020-08-03' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 cleanups from Ingo Molnar:
"Misc cleanups all around the place"
* tag 'x86-cleanups-2020-08-03' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/ioperm: Initialize pointer bitmap with NULL rather than 0
x86: uv: uv_hub.h: Delete duplicated word
x86: cmpxchg_32.h: Delete duplicated word
x86: bootparam.h: Delete duplicated word
x86/mm: Remove the unused mk_kernel_pgd() #define
x86/tsc: Remove unused "US_SCALE" and "NS_SCALE" leftover macros
x86/ioapic: Remove unused "IOAPIC_AUTO" define
x86/mm: Drop unused MAX_PHYSADDR_BITS
x86/msr: Move the F15h MSRs where they belong
x86/idt: Make idt_descr static
initrd: Remove erroneous comment
x86/mm/32: Fix -Wmissing prototypes warnings for init.c
cpu/speculation: Add prototype for cpu_show_srbds()
x86/mm: Fix -Wmissing-prototypes warnings for arch/x86/mm/init.c
x86/asm: Unify __ASSEMBLY__ blocks
x86/cpufeatures: Mark two free bits in word 3
x86/msr: Lift AMD family 0x15 power-specific MSRs
The Intel architecture defines a set of Serializing Instructions (a
detailed definition can be found in Vol.3 Section 8.3 of the Intel "main"
manual, SDM). However, these instructions do more than what is required,
have side effects and/or may be rather invasive. Furthermore, some of
these instructions are only available in kernel mode or may cause VMExits.
Thus, software using these instructions only to serialize execution (as
defined in the manual) must handle the undesired side effects.
As indicated in the name, SERIALIZE is a new Intel architecture
Serializing Instruction. Crucially, it does not have any of the mentioned
side effects. Also, it does not cause VMExit and can be used in user mode.
This new instruction is currently documented in the latest "extensions"
manual (ISE). It will appear in the "main" manual in the future.
Signed-off-by: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200727043132.15082-2-ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com
CPUID.(EAX=07H, ECX=0):EDX[19] indicates whether an Intel CPU supports
Architectural LBRs.
The "X86_FEATURE_..., word 18" is already mirrored from CPUID
"0x00000007:0 (EDX)". Add X86_FEATURE_ARCH_LBR under the "word 18"
section.
The feature will appear as "arch_lbr" in /proc/cpuinfo.
The Architectural Last Branch Records (LBR) feature enables recording
of software path history by logging taken branches and other control
flows. The feature will be supported in the perf_events subsystem.
Signed-off-by: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1593780569-62993-2-git-send-email-kan.liang@linux.intel.com
SRBDS is an MDS-like speculative side channel that can leak bits from the
random number generator (RNG) across cores and threads. New microcode
serializes the processor access during the execution of RDRAND and
RDSEED. This ensures that the shared buffer is overwritten before it is
released for reuse.
While it is present on all affected CPU models, the microcode mitigation
is not needed on models that enumerate ARCH_CAPABILITIES[MDS_NO] in the
cases where TSX is not supported or has been disabled with TSX_CTRL.
The mitigation is activated by default on affected processors and it
increases latency for RDRAND and RDSEED instructions. Among other
effects this will reduce throughput from /dev/urandom.
* Enable administrator to configure the mitigation off when desired using
either mitigations=off or srbds=off.
* Export vulnerability status via sysfs
* Rename file-scoped macros to apply for non-whitelist table initializations.
[ bp: Massage,
- s/VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPING/VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS/g,
- do not read arch cap MSR a second time in tsx_fused_off() - just pass it in,
- flip check in cpu_set_bug_bits() to save an indentation level,
- reflow comments.
jpoimboe: s/Mitigated/Mitigation/ in user-visible strings
tglx: Dropped the fused off magic for now
]
Signed-off-by: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Neelima Krishnan <neelima.krishnan@intel.com>
- Atomic operations (lock prefixed instructions) which span two cache
lines have to acquire the global bus lock. This is at least 1k cycles
slower than an atomic operation within a cache line and disrupts
performance on other cores. Aside of performance disruption this is
a unpriviledged form of DoS.
Some newer CPUs have the capability to raise an #AC trap when such an
operation is attempted. The detection is by default enabled in warning
mode which will warn once when a user space application is caught. A
command line option allows to disable the detection or to select fatal
mode which will terminate offending applications with SIGBUS.
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Merge tag 'x86-splitlock-2020-03-30' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 splitlock updates from Thomas Gleixner:
"Support for 'split lock' detection:
Atomic operations (lock prefixed instructions) which span two cache
lines have to acquire the global bus lock. This is at least 1k cycles
slower than an atomic operation within a cache line and disrupts
performance on other cores. Aside of performance disruption this is a
unpriviledged form of DoS.
Some newer CPUs have the capability to raise an #AC trap when such an
operation is attempted. The detection is by default enabled in warning
mode which will warn once when a user space application is caught. A
command line option allows to disable the detection or to select fatal
mode which will terminate offending applications with SIGBUS"
* tag 'x86-splitlock-2020-03-30' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/split_lock: Avoid runtime reads of the TEST_CTRL MSR
x86/split_lock: Rework the initialization flow of split lock detection
x86/split_lock: Enable split lock detection by kernel
Pull perf updates from Ingo Molnar:
"The main changes in this cycle were:
Kernel side changes:
- A couple of x86/cpu cleanups and changes were grandfathered in due
to patch dependencies. These clean up the set of CPU model/family
matching macros with a consistent namespace and C99 initializer
style.
- A bunch of updates to various low level PMU drivers:
* AMD Family 19h L3 uncore PMU
* Intel Tiger Lake uncore support
* misc fixes to LBR TOS sampling
- optprobe fixes
- perf/cgroup: optimize cgroup event sched-in processing
- misc cleanups and fixes
Tooling side changes are to:
- perf {annotate,expr,record,report,stat,test}
- perl scripting
- libapi, libperf and libtraceevent
- vendor events on Intel and S390, ARM cs-etm
- Intel PT updates
- Documentation changes and updates to core facilities
- misc cleanups, fixes and other enhancements"
* 'perf-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (89 commits)
cpufreq/intel_pstate: Fix wrong macro conversion
x86/cpu: Cleanup the now unused CPU match macros
hwrng: via_rng: Convert to new X86 CPU match macros
crypto: Convert to new CPU match macros
ASoC: Intel: Convert to new X86 CPU match macros
powercap/intel_rapl: Convert to new X86 CPU match macros
PCI: intel-mid: Convert to new X86 CPU match macros
mmc: sdhci-acpi: Convert to new X86 CPU match macros
intel_idle: Convert to new X86 CPU match macros
extcon: axp288: Convert to new X86 CPU match macros
thermal: Convert to new X86 CPU match macros
hwmon: Convert to new X86 CPU match macros
platform/x86: Convert to new CPU match macros
EDAC: Convert to new X86 CPU match macros
cpufreq: Convert to new X86 CPU match macros
ACPI: Convert to new X86 CPU match macros
x86/platform: Convert to new CPU match macros
x86/kernel: Convert to new CPU match macros
x86/kvm: Convert to new CPU match macros
x86/perf/events: Convert to new CPU match macros
...
Newer AMD CPUs support a feature called protected processor
identification number (PPIN). This feature can be detected via
CPUID_Fn80000008_EBX[23].
However, CPUID alone is not enough to read the processor identification
number - MSR_AMD_PPIN_CTL also needs to be configured properly. If, for
any reason, MSR_AMD_PPIN_CTL[PPIN_EN] can not be turned on, such as
disabled in BIOS, the CPU capability bit X86_FEATURE_AMD_PPIN needs to
be cleared.
When the X86_FEATURE_AMD_PPIN capability is available, the
identification number is issued together with the MCE error info in
order to keep track of the source of MCE errors.
[ bp: Massage. ]
Co-developed-by: Smita Koralahalli Channabasappa <smita.koralahallichannabasappa@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Smita Koralahalli Channabasappa <smita.koralahallichannabasappa@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei Huang <wei.huang2@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200321193800.3666964-1-wei.huang2@amd.com
Family 19h CPUs are Zen-based and still share most architectural
features with Family 17h CPUs, and therefore still need to call
init_amd_zn() e.g., to set the RECLAIM_DISTANCE override.
init_amd_zn() also sets X86_FEATURE_ZEN, which today is only used
in amd_set_core_ssb_state(), which isn't called on some late
model Family 17h CPUs, nor on any Family 19h CPUs:
X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD replaces X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD on those
later model CPUs, where the SSBD mitigation is done via the
SPEC_CTRL MSR instead of the LS_CFG MSR.
Family 19h CPUs also don't have the erratum where the CPB feature
bit isn't set, but that code can stay unchanged and run safely
on Family 19h.
Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200311191451.13221-1-kim.phillips@amd.com
A split-lock occurs when an atomic instruction operates on data that spans
two cache lines. In order to maintain atomicity the core takes a global bus
lock.
This is typically >1000 cycles slower than an atomic operation within a
cache line. It also disrupts performance on other cores (which must wait
for the bus lock to be released before their memory operations can
complete). For real-time systems this may mean missing deadlines. For other
systems it may just be very annoying.
Some CPUs have the capability to raise an #AC trap when a split lock is
attempted.
Provide a command line option to give the user choices on how to handle
this:
split_lock_detect=
off - not enabled (no traps for split locks)
warn - warn once when an application does a
split lock, but allow it to continue
running.
fatal - Send SIGBUS to applications that cause split lock
On systems that support split lock detection the default is "warn". Note
that if the kernel hits a split lock in any mode other than "off" it will
OOPs.
One implementation wrinkle is that the MSR to control the split lock
detection is per-core, not per thread. This might result in some short
lived races on HT systems in "warn" mode if Linux tries to enable on one
thread while disabling on the other. Race analysis by Sean Christopherson:
- Toggling of split-lock is only done in "warn" mode. Worst case
scenario of a race is that a misbehaving task will generate multiple
#AC exceptions on the same instruction. And this race will only occur
if both siblings are running tasks that generate split-lock #ACs, e.g.
a race where sibling threads are writing different values will only
occur if CPUx is disabling split-lock after an #AC and CPUy is
re-enabling split-lock after *its* previous task generated an #AC.
- Transitioning between off/warn/fatal modes at runtime isn't supported
and disabling is tracked per task, so hardware will always reach a steady
state that matches the configured mode. I.e. split-lock is guaranteed to
be enabled in hardware once all _TIF_SLD threads have been scheduled out.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Co-developed-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200126200535.GB30377@agluck-desk2.amr.corp.intel.com
Pull x86 cpu-features updates from Ingo Molnar:
"The biggest change in this cycle was a large series from Sean
Christopherson to clean up the handling of VMX features. This both
fixes bugs/inconsistencies and makes the code more coherent and
future-proof.
There are also two cleanups and a minor TSX syslog messages
enhancement"
* 'x86-cpu-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (23 commits)
x86/cpu: Remove redundant cpu_detect_cache_sizes() call
x86/cpu: Print "VMX disabled" error message iff KVM is enabled
KVM: VMX: Allow KVM_INTEL when building for Centaur and/or Zhaoxin CPUs
perf/x86: Provide stubs of KVM helpers for non-Intel CPUs
KVM: VMX: Use VMX_FEATURE_* flags to define VMCS control bits
KVM: VMX: Check for full VMX support when verifying CPU compatibility
KVM: VMX: Use VMX feature flag to query BIOS enabling
KVM: VMX: Drop initialization of IA32_FEAT_CTL MSR
x86/cpufeatures: Add flag to track whether MSR IA32_FEAT_CTL is configured
x86/cpu: Set synthetic VMX cpufeatures during init_ia32_feat_ctl()
x86/cpu: Print VMX flags in /proc/cpuinfo using VMX_FEATURES_*
x86/cpu: Detect VMX features on Intel, Centaur and Zhaoxin CPUs
x86/vmx: Introduce VMX_FEATURES_*
x86/cpu: Clear VMX feature flag if VMX is not fully enabled
x86/zhaoxin: Use common IA32_FEAT_CTL MSR initialization
x86/centaur: Use common IA32_FEAT_CTL MSR initialization
x86/mce: WARN once if IA32_FEAT_CTL MSR is left unlocked
x86/intel: Initialize IA32_FEAT_CTL MSR at boot
tools/x86: Sync msr-index.h from kernel sources
selftests, kvm: Replace manual MSR defs with common msr-index.h
...
Add a new feature flag, X86_FEATURE_MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL, to track whether
IA32_FEAT_CTL has been initialized. This will allow KVM, and any future
subsystems that depend on IA32_FEAT_CTL, to rely purely on cpufeatures
to query platform support, e.g. allows a future patch to remove KVM's
manual IA32_FEAT_CTL MSR checks.
Various features (on platforms that support IA32_FEAT_CTL) are dependent
on IA32_FEAT_CTL being configured and locked, e.g. VMX and LMCE. The
MSR is always configured during boot, but only if the CPU vendor is
recognized by the kernel. Because CPUID doesn't incorporate the current
IA32_FEAT_CTL value in its reporting of relevant features, it's possible
for a feature to be reported as supported in cpufeatures but not truly
enabled, e.g. if the CPU supports VMX but the kernel doesn't recognize
the CPU.
As a result, without the flag, KVM would see VMX as supported even if
IA32_FEAT_CTL hasn't been initialized, and so would need to manually
read the MSR and check the various enabling bits to avoid taking an
unexpected #GP on VMXON.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191221044513.21680-14-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com
>From the Intel Optimization Reference Manual:
3.7.6.1 Fast Short REP MOVSB
Beginning with processors based on Ice Lake Client microarchitecture,
REP MOVSB performance of short operations is enhanced. The enhancement
applies to string lengths between 1 and 128 bytes long. Support for
fast-short REP MOVSB is enumerated by the CPUID feature flag: CPUID
[EAX=7H, ECX=0H).EDX.FAST_SHORT_REP_MOVSB[bit 4] = 1. There is no change
in the REP STOS performance.
Add an X86_FEATURE_FSRM flag for this.
memmove() avoids REP MOVSB for short (< 32 byte) copies. Check FSRM and
use REP MOVSB for short copies on systems that support it.
[ bp: Massage and add comment. ]
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191216214254.26492-1-tony.luck@intel.com
Pull x86 cpu and fpu updates from Ingo Molnar:
- math-emu fixes
- CPUID updates
- sanity-check RDRAND output to see whether the CPU at least pretends
to produce random data
- various unaligned-access across cachelines fixes in preparation of
hardware level split-lock detection
- fix MAXSMP constraints to not allow !CPUMASK_OFFSTACK kernels with
larger than 512 NR_CPUS
- misc FPU related cleanups
* 'x86-cpu-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/cpu: Align the x86_capability array to size of unsigned long
x86/cpu: Align cpu_caps_cleared and cpu_caps_set to unsigned long
x86/umip: Make the comments vendor-agnostic
x86/Kconfig: Rename UMIP config parameter
x86/Kconfig: Enforce limit of 512 CPUs with MAXSMP and no CPUMASK_OFFSTACK
x86/cpufeatures: Add feature bit RDPRU on AMD
x86/math-emu: Limit MATH_EMULATION to 486SX compatibles
x86/math-emu: Check __copy_from_user() result
x86/rdrand: Sanity-check RDRAND output
* 'x86-fpu-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/fpu: Use XFEATURE_FP/SSE enum values instead of hardcoded numbers
x86/fpu: Shrink space allocated for xstate_comp_offsets
x86/fpu: Update stale variable name in comment
Some processors may incur a machine check error possibly resulting in an
unrecoverable CPU lockup when an instruction fetch encounters a TLB
multi-hit in the instruction TLB. This can occur when the page size is
changed along with either the physical address or cache type. The relevant
erratum can be found here:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=205195
There are other processors affected for which the erratum does not fully
disclose the impact.
This issue affects both bare-metal x86 page tables and EPT.
It can be mitigated by either eliminating the use of large pages or by
using careful TLB invalidations when changing the page size in the page
tables.
Just like Spectre, Meltdown, L1TF and MDS, a new bit has been allocated in
MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES (PSCHANGE_MC_NO) and will be set on CPUs which
are mitigated against this issue.
Signed-off-by: Vineela Tummalapalli <vineela.tummalapalli@intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
TSX Async Abort (TAA) is a side channel vulnerability to the internal
buffers in some Intel processors similar to Microachitectural Data
Sampling (MDS). In this case, certain loads may speculatively pass
invalid data to dependent operations when an asynchronous abort
condition is pending in a TSX transaction.
This includes loads with no fault or assist condition. Such loads may
speculatively expose stale data from the uarch data structures as in
MDS. Scope of exposure is within the same-thread and cross-thread. This
issue affects all current processors that support TSX, but do not have
ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO (bit 8) set in MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.
On CPUs which have their IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR bit MDS_NO=0,
CPUID.MD_CLEAR=1 and the MDS mitigation is clearing the CPU buffers
using VERW or L1D_FLUSH, there is no additional mitigation needed for
TAA. On affected CPUs with MDS_NO=1 this issue can be mitigated by
disabling the Transactional Synchronization Extensions (TSX) feature.
A new MSR IA32_TSX_CTRL in future and current processors after a
microcode update can be used to control the TSX feature. There are two
bits in that MSR:
* TSX_CTRL_RTM_DISABLE disables the TSX sub-feature Restricted
Transactional Memory (RTM).
* TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR clears the RTM enumeration in CPUID. The other
TSX sub-feature, Hardware Lock Elision (HLE), is unconditionally
disabled with updated microcode but still enumerated as present by
CPUID(EAX=7).EBX{bit4}.
The second mitigation approach is similar to MDS which is clearing the
affected CPU buffers on return to user space and when entering a guest.
Relevant microcode update is required for the mitigation to work. More
details on this approach can be found here:
https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.html
The TSX feature can be controlled by the "tsx" command line parameter.
If it is force-enabled then "Clear CPU buffers" (MDS mitigation) is
deployed. The effective mitigation state can be read from sysfs.
[ bp:
- massage + comments cleanup
- s/TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLE/TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED/g - Josh.
- remove partial TAA mitigation in update_mds_branch_idle() - Josh.
- s/tsx_async_abort_cmdline/tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline/g
]
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
AMD Zen 2 introduces a new RDPRU instruction which is used to give
access to some processor registers that are typically only accessible
when the privilege level is zero.
ECX is used as the implicit register to specify which register to read.
RDPRU places the specified register’s value into EDX:EAX.
For example, the RDPRU instruction can be used to read MPERF and APERF
at CPL > 0.
Add the feature bit so it is visible in /proc/cpuinfo.
Details are available in the AMD64 Architecture Programmer’s Manual:
https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/24594.pdf
Signed-off-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Aaron Lewis <aaronlewis@google.com>
Cc: ak@linux.intel.com
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: robert.hu@linux.intel.com
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Thomas Hellstrom <thellstrom@vmware.com>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191007204839.5727.10803.stgit@localhost.localdomain
Pull x86 vmware updates from Ingo Molnar:
"This updates the VMWARE guest driver with support for VMCALL/VMMCALL
based hypercalls"
* 'x86-vmware-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
input/vmmouse: Update the backdoor call with support for new instructions
drm/vmwgfx: Update the backdoor call with support for new instructions
x86/vmware: Add a header file for hypercall definitions
x86/vmware: Update platform detection code for VMCALL/VMMCALL hypercalls
The new header is intended to be used by drivers using the backdoor.
Follow the KVM example using alternatives self-patching to choose
between vmcall, vmmcall and io instructions.
Also define two new CPU feature flags to indicate hypervisor support
for vmcall- and vmmcall instructions. The new XF86_FEATURE_VMW_VMMCALL
flag is needed because using XF86_FEATURE_VMMCALL might break QEMU/KVM
setups using the vmmouse driver. They rely on XF86_FEATURE_VMMCALL
on AMD to get the kvm_hypercall() right. But they do not yet implement
vmmcall for the VMware hypercall used by the vmmouse driver.
[ bp: reflow hypercall %edx usage explanation comment. ]
Signed-off-by: Thomas Hellstrom <thellstrom@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Doug Covelli <dcovelli@vmware.com>
Cc: Aaron Lewis <aaronlewis@google.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-graphics-maintainer@vmware.com
Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Cc: Nicolas Ferre <nicolas.ferre@microchip.com>
Cc: Robert Hoo <robert.hu@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org
Cc: <pv-drivers@vmware.com>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190828080353.12658-3-thomas_os@shipmail.org
Intel provided the following information:
On all current Atom processors, instructions that use a segment register
value (e.g. a load or store) will not speculatively execute before the
last writer of that segment retires. Thus they will not use a
speculatively written segment value.
That means on ATOMs there is no speculation through SWAPGS, so the SWAPGS
entry paths can be excluded from the extra LFENCE if PTI is disabled.
Create a separate bug flag for the through SWAPGS speculation and mark all
out-of-order ATOMs and AMD/HYGON CPUs as not affected. The in-order ATOMs
are excluded from the whole mitigation mess anyway.
Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
AMD and Intel both have serializing lfence (X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC).
They've both had it for a long time, and AMD has had it enabled in Linux
since Spectre v1 was announced.
Back then, there was a proposal to remove the serializing mfence feature
bit (X86_FEATURE_MFENCE_RDTSC), since both AMD and Intel have
serializing lfence. At the time, it was (ahem) speculated that some
hypervisors might not yet support its removal, so it remained for the
time being.
Now a year-and-a-half later, it should be safe to remove.
I asked Andrew Cooper about whether it's still needed:
So if you're virtualised, you've got no choice in the matter. lfence
is either dispatch-serialising or not on AMD, and you won't be able to
change it.
Furthermore, you can't accurately tell what state the bit is in, because
the MSR might not be virtualised at all, or may not reflect the true
state in hardware. Worse still, attempting to set the bit may not be
successful even if there isn't a fault for doing so.
Xen sets the DE_CFG bit unconditionally, as does Linux by the looks of
things (see MSR_F10H_DECFG_LFENCE_SERIALIZE_BIT). ISTR other hypervisor
vendors saying the same, but I don't have any information to hand.
If you are running under a hypervisor which has been updated, then
lfence will almost certainly be dispatch-serialising in practice, and
you'll almost certainly see the bit already set in DE_CFG. If you're
running under a hypervisor which hasn't been patched since Spectre,
you've already lost in many more ways.
I'd argue that X86_FEATURE_MFENCE_RDTSC is not worth keeping.
So remove it. This will reduce some code rot, and also make it easier
to hook barrier_nospec() up to a cmdline disable for performance
raisins, without having to need an alternative_3() macro.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/d990aa51e40063acb9888e8c1b688e41355a9588.1562255067.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Add a new AVX512 instruction group/feature for enumeration in
/proc/cpuinfo: AVX512_VP2INTERSECT.
CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):EDX[bit 8] AVX512_VP2INTERSECT
Detailed information of CPUID bits for this feature can be found in
the Intel Architecture Intsruction Set Extensions Programming Reference
document (refer to Table 1-2). A copy of this document is available at
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=204215.
Signed-off-by: Gayatri Kammela <gayatri.kammela@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190717234632.32673-3-gayatri.kammela@intel.com
Spectre v1 isn't only about array bounds checks. It can affect any
conditional checks. The kernel entry code interrupt, exception, and NMI
handlers all have conditional swapgs checks. Those may be problematic in
the context of Spectre v1, as kernel code can speculatively run with a user
GS.
For example:
if (coming from user space)
swapgs
mov %gs:<percpu_offset>, %reg
mov (%reg), %reg1
When coming from user space, the CPU can speculatively skip the swapgs, and
then do a speculative percpu load using the user GS value. So the user can
speculatively force a read of any kernel value. If a gadget exists which
uses the percpu value as an address in another load/store, then the
contents of the kernel value may become visible via an L1 side channel
attack.
A similar attack exists when coming from kernel space. The CPU can
speculatively do the swapgs, causing the user GS to get used for the rest
of the speculative window.
The mitigation is similar to a traditional Spectre v1 mitigation, except:
a) index masking isn't possible; because the index (percpu offset)
isn't user-controlled; and
b) an lfence is needed in both the "from user" swapgs path and the
"from kernel" non-swapgs path (because of the two attacks described
above).
The user entry swapgs paths already have SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3, which has a
CR3 write when PTI is enabled. Since CR3 writes are serializing, the
lfences can be skipped in those cases.
On the other hand, the kernel entry swapgs paths don't depend on PTI.
To avoid unnecessary lfences for the user entry case, create two separate
features for alternative patching:
X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_USER
X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL
Use these features in entry code to patch in lfences where needed.
The features aren't enabled yet, so there's no functional change.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
umonitor, umwait, and tpause are a set of user wait instructions.
umonitor arms address monitoring hardware using an address. The
address range is determined by using CPUID.0x5. A store to
an address within the specified address range triggers the
monitoring hardware to wake up the processor waiting in umwait.
umwait instructs the processor to enter an implementation-dependent
optimized state while monitoring a range of addresses. The optimized
state may be either a light-weight power/performance optimized state
(C0.1 state) or an improved power/performance optimized state
(C0.2 state).
tpause instructs the processor to enter an implementation-dependent
optimized state C0.1 or C0.2 state and wake up when time-stamp counter
reaches specified timeout.
The three instructions may be executed at any privilege level.
The instructions provide power saving method while waiting in
user space. Additionally, they can allow a sibling hyperthread to
make faster progress while this thread is waiting. One example of an
application usage of umwait is when waiting for input data from another
application, such as a user level multi-threaded packet processing
engine.
Availability of the user wait instructions is indicated by the presence
of the CPUID feature flag WAITPKG CPUID.0x07.0x0:ECX[5].
Detailed information on the instructions and CPUID feature WAITPKG flag
can be found in the latest Intel Architecture Instruction Set Extensions
and Future Features Programming Reference and Intel 64 and IA-32
Architectures Software Developer's Manual.
Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: "Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: "H Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: "Peter Zijlstra" <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: "Tony Luck" <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: "Ravi V Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1560994438-235698-2-git-send-email-fenghua.yu@intel.com
AVX512 BFLOAT16 instructions support 16-bit BFLOAT16 floating-point
format (BF16) for deep learning optimization.
BF16 is a short version of 32-bit single-precision floating-point
format (FP32) and has several advantages over 16-bit half-precision
floating-point format (FP16). BF16 keeps FP32 accumulation after
multiplication without loss of precision, offers more than enough
range for deep learning training tasks, and doesn't need to handle
hardware exception.
AVX512 BFLOAT16 instructions are enumerated in CPUID.7.1:EAX[bit 5]
AVX512_BF16.
CPUID.7.1:EAX contains only feature bits. Reuse the currently empty
word 12 as a pure features word to hold the feature bits including
AVX512_BF16.
Detailed information of the CPUID bit and AVX512 BFLOAT16 instructions
can be found in the latest Intel Architecture Instruction Set Extensions
and Future Features Programming Reference.
[ bp: Check CPUID(7) subleaf validity before accessing subleaf 1. ]
Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: "Chang S. Bae" <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@oracle.com>
Cc: Peter Feiner <pfeiner@google.com>
Cc: Radim Krcmar <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Cc: "Ravi V Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>
Cc: Robert Hoo <robert.hu@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "Sean J Christopherson" <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Thomas Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: x86 <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1560794416-217638-3-git-send-email-fenghua.yu@intel.com
It's a waste for the four X86_FEATURE_CQM_* feature bits to occupy two
whole feature bits words. To better utilize feature words, re-define
word 11 to host scattered features and move the four X86_FEATURE_CQM_*
features into Linux defined word 11. More scattered features can be
added in word 11 in the future.
Rename leaf 11 in cpuid_leafs to CPUID_LNX_4 to reflect it's a
Linux-defined leaf.
Rename leaf 12 as CPUID_DUMMY which will be replaced by a meaningful
name in the next patch when CPUID.7.1:EAX occupies world 12.
Maximum number of RMID and cache occupancy scale are retrieved from
CPUID.0xf.1 after scattered CQM features are enumerated. Carve out the
code into a separate function.
KVM doesn't support resctrl now. So it's safe to move the
X86_FEATURE_CQM_* features to scattered features word 11 for KVM.
Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Aaron Lewis <aaronlewis@google.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>
Cc: "Chang S. Bae" <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
Cc: "Sean J Christopherson" <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: kvm ML <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@oracle.com>
Cc: Peter Feiner <pfeiner@google.com>
Cc: "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Cc: Ravi V Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>
Cc: Sherry Hurwitz <sherry.hurwitz@amd.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Thomas Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: x86 <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1560794416-217638-2-git-send-email-fenghua.yu@intel.com
Add the CPUID enumeration for Intel's de-feature bits to accommodate
passing these de-features through to kvm guests.
These de-features are (from SDM vol 1, section 8.1.8):
- X86_FEATURE_FDP_EXCPTN_ONLY: If CPUID.(EAX=07H,ECX=0H):EBX[bit 6] = 1, the
data pointer (FDP) is updated only for the x87 non-control instructions that
incur unmasked x87 exceptions.
- X86_FEATURE_ZERO_FCS_FDS: If CPUID.(EAX=07H,ECX=0H):EBX[bit 13] = 1, the
processor deprecates FCS and FDS; it saves each as 0000H.
Signed-off-by: Aaron Lewis <aaronlewis@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: marcorr@google.com
Cc: Peter Feiner <pfeiner@google.com>
Cc: pshier@google.com
Cc: Robert Hoo <robert.hu@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Thomas Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190605220252.103406-1-aaronlewis@google.com
Pull x86 MDS mitigations from Thomas Gleixner:
"Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS) is a hardware vulnerability
which allows unprivileged speculative access to data which is
available in various CPU internal buffers. This new set of misfeatures
has the following CVEs assigned:
CVE-2018-12126 MSBDS Microarchitectural Store Buffer Data Sampling
CVE-2018-12130 MFBDS Microarchitectural Fill Buffer Data Sampling
CVE-2018-12127 MLPDS Microarchitectural Load Port Data Sampling
CVE-2019-11091 MDSUM Microarchitectural Data Sampling Uncacheable Memory
MDS attacks target microarchitectural buffers which speculatively
forward data under certain conditions. Disclosure gadgets can expose
this data via cache side channels.
Contrary to other speculation based vulnerabilities the MDS
vulnerability does not allow the attacker to control the memory target
address. As a consequence the attacks are purely sampling based, but
as demonstrated with the TLBleed attack samples can be postprocessed
successfully.
The mitigation is to flush the microarchitectural buffers on return to
user space and before entering a VM. It's bolted on the VERW
instruction and requires a microcode update. As some of the attacks
exploit data structures shared between hyperthreads, full protection
requires to disable hyperthreading. The kernel does not do that by
default to avoid breaking unattended updates.
The mitigation set comes with documentation for administrators and a
deeper technical view"
* 'x86-mds-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (23 commits)
x86/speculation/mds: Fix documentation typo
Documentation: Correct the possible MDS sysfs values
x86/mds: Add MDSUM variant to the MDS documentation
x86/speculation/mds: Add 'mitigations=' support for MDS
x86/speculation/mds: Print SMT vulnerable on MSBDS with mitigations off
x86/speculation/mds: Fix comment
x86/speculation/mds: Add SMT warning message
x86/speculation: Move arch_smt_update() call to after mitigation decisions
x86/speculation/mds: Add mds=full,nosmt cmdline option
Documentation: Add MDS vulnerability documentation
Documentation: Move L1TF to separate directory
x86/speculation/mds: Add mitigation mode VMWERV
x86/speculation/mds: Add sysfs reporting for MDS
x86/speculation/mds: Add mitigation control for MDS
x86/speculation/mds: Conditionally clear CPU buffers on idle entry
x86/kvm/vmx: Add MDS protection when L1D Flush is not active
x86/speculation/mds: Clear CPU buffers on exit to user
x86/speculation/mds: Add mds_clear_cpu_buffers()
x86/kvm: Expose X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR to guests
x86/speculation/mds: Add BUG_MSBDS_ONLY
...
This bug bit is set on CPUs which are only affected by Microarchitectural
Store Buffer Data Sampling (MSBDS) and not by any other MDS variant.
This is important because the Store Buffers are partitioned between
Hyper-Threads so cross thread forwarding is not possible. But if a thread
enters or exits a sleep state the store buffer is repartitioned which can
expose data from one thread to the other. This transition can be mitigated.
That means that for CPUs which are only affected by MSBDS SMT can be
enabled, if the CPU is not affected by other SMT sensitive vulnerabilities,
e.g. L1TF. The XEON PHI variants fall into that category. Also the
Silvermont/Airmont ATOMs, but for them it's not really relevant as they do
not support SMT, but mark them for completeness sake.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS), is a class of side channel attacks
on internal buffers in Intel CPUs. The variants are:
- Microarchitectural Store Buffer Data Sampling (MSBDS) (CVE-2018-12126)
- Microarchitectural Fill Buffer Data Sampling (MFBDS) (CVE-2018-12130)
- Microarchitectural Load Port Data Sampling (MLPDS) (CVE-2018-12127)
MSBDS leaks Store Buffer Entries which can be speculatively forwarded to a
dependent load (store-to-load forwarding) as an optimization. The forward
can also happen to a faulting or assisting load operation for a different
memory address, which can be exploited under certain conditions. Store
buffers are partitioned between Hyper-Threads so cross thread forwarding is
not possible. But if a thread enters or exits a sleep state the store
buffer is repartitioned which can expose data from one thread to the other.
MFBDS leaks Fill Buffer Entries. Fill buffers are used internally to manage
L1 miss situations and to hold data which is returned or sent in response
to a memory or I/O operation. Fill buffers can forward data to a load
operation and also write data to the cache. When the fill buffer is
deallocated it can retain the stale data of the preceding operations which
can then be forwarded to a faulting or assisting load operation, which can
be exploited under certain conditions. Fill buffers are shared between
Hyper-Threads so cross thread leakage is possible.
MLDPS leaks Load Port Data. Load ports are used to perform load operations
from memory or I/O. The received data is then forwarded to the register
file or a subsequent operation. In some implementations the Load Port can
contain stale data from a previous operation which can be forwarded to
faulting or assisting loads under certain conditions, which again can be
exploited eventually. Load ports are shared between Hyper-Threads so cross
thread leakage is possible.
All variants have the same mitigation for single CPU thread case (SMT off),
so the kernel can treat them as one MDS issue.
Add the basic infrastructure to detect if the current CPU is affected by
MDS.
[ tglx: Rewrote changelog ]
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Skylake systems will receive a microcode update to address a TSX
errata. This microcode will (by default) clobber PMC3 when TSX
instructions are (speculatively or not) executed.
It also provides an MSR to cause all TSX transaction to abort and
preserve PMC3.
Add the CPUID enumeration and MSR definition.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
single-stepping fixes, improved tracing, various timer and vGIC
fixes
* x86: Processor Tracing virtualization, STIBP support, some correctness fixes,
refactorings and splitting of vmx.c, use the Hyper-V range TLB flush hypercall,
reduce order of vcpu struct, WBNOINVD support, do not use -ftrace for __noclone
functions, nested guest support for PAUSE filtering on AMD, more Hyper-V
enlightenments (direct mode for synthetic timers)
* PPC: nested VFIO
* s390: bugfixes only this time
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Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm
Pull KVM updates from Paolo Bonzini:
"ARM:
- selftests improvements
- large PUD support for HugeTLB
- single-stepping fixes
- improved tracing
- various timer and vGIC fixes
x86:
- Processor Tracing virtualization
- STIBP support
- some correctness fixes
- refactorings and splitting of vmx.c
- use the Hyper-V range TLB flush hypercall
- reduce order of vcpu struct
- WBNOINVD support
- do not use -ftrace for __noclone functions
- nested guest support for PAUSE filtering on AMD
- more Hyper-V enlightenments (direct mode for synthetic timers)
PPC:
- nested VFIO
s390:
- bugfixes only this time"
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (171 commits)
KVM: x86: Add CPUID support for new instruction WBNOINVD
kvm: selftests: ucall: fix exit mmio address guessing
Revert "compiler-gcc: disable -ftracer for __noclone functions"
KVM: VMX: Move VM-Enter + VM-Exit handling to non-inline sub-routines
KVM: VMX: Explicitly reference RCX as the vmx_vcpu pointer in asm blobs
KVM: x86: Use jmp to invoke kvm_spurious_fault() from .fixup
MAINTAINERS: Add arch/x86/kvm sub-directories to existing KVM/x86 entry
KVM/x86: Use SVM assembly instruction mnemonics instead of .byte streams
KVM/MMU: Flush tlb directly in the kvm_zap_gfn_range()
KVM/MMU: Flush tlb directly in kvm_set_pte_rmapp()
KVM/MMU: Move tlb flush in kvm_set_pte_rmapp() to kvm_mmu_notifier_change_pte()
KVM: Make kvm_set_spte_hva() return int
KVM: Replace old tlb flush function with new one to flush a specified range.
KVM/MMU: Add tlb flush with range helper function
KVM/VMX: Add hv tlb range flush support
x86/hyper-v: Add HvFlushGuestAddressList hypercall support
KVM: Add tlb_remote_flush_with_range callback in kvm_x86_ops
KVM: x86: Disable Intel PT when VMXON in L1 guest
KVM: x86: Set intercept for Intel PT MSRs read/write
KVM: x86: Implement Intel PT MSRs read/write emulation
...
Different AMD processors may have different implementations of STIBP.
When STIBP is conditionally enabled, some implementations would benefit
from having STIBP always on instead of toggling the STIBP bit through MSR
writes. This preference is advertised through a CPUID feature bit.
When conditional STIBP support is requested at boot and the CPU advertises
STIBP always-on mode as preferred, switch to STIBP "on" support. To show
that this transition has occurred, create a new spectre_v2_user_mitigation
value and a new spectre_v2_user_strings message. The new mitigation value
is used in spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation() to print the new mitigation
message as well as to return a new string from stibp_state().
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181213230352.6937.74943.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net
MOVDIR64B moves 64-bytes as direct-store with 64-bytes write atomicity.
Direct store is implemented by using write combining (WC) for writing
data directly into memory without caching the data.
In low latency offload (e.g. Non-Volatile Memory, etc), MOVDIR64B writes
work descriptors (and data in some cases) to device-hosted work-queues
atomically without cache pollution.
Availability of the MOVDIR64B instruction is indicated by the
presence of the CPUID feature flag MOVDIR64B (CPUID.0x07.0x0:ECX[bit 28]).
Please check the latest Intel Architecture Instruction Set Extensions
and Future Features Programming Reference for more details on the CPUID
feature MOVDIR64B flag.
Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ravi V Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1540418237-125817-3-git-send-email-fenghua.yu@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
MOVDIRI moves doubleword or quadword from register to memory through
direct store which is implemented by using write combining (WC) for
writing data directly into memory without caching the data.
Programmable agents can handle streaming offload (e.g. high speed packet
processing in network). Hardware implements a doorbell (tail pointer)
register that is updated by software when adding new work-elements to
the streaming offload work-queue.
MOVDIRI can be used as the doorbell write which is a 4-byte or 8-byte
uncachable write to MMIO. MOVDIRI has lower overhead than other ways
to write the doorbell.
Availability of the MOVDIRI instruction is indicated by the presence of
the CPUID feature flag MOVDIRI(CPUID.0x07.0x0:ECX[bit 27]).
Please check the latest Intel Architecture Instruction Set Extensions
and Future Features Programming Reference for more details on the CPUID
feature MOVDIRI flag.
Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ravi V Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1540418237-125817-2-git-send-email-fenghua.yu@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Merge L1 Terminal Fault fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
"L1TF, aka L1 Terminal Fault, is yet another speculative hardware
engineering trainwreck. It's a hardware vulnerability which allows
unprivileged speculative access to data which is available in the
Level 1 Data Cache when the page table entry controlling the virtual
address, which is used for the access, has the Present bit cleared or
other reserved bits set.
If an instruction accesses a virtual address for which the relevant
page table entry (PTE) has the Present bit cleared or other reserved
bits set, then speculative execution ignores the invalid PTE and loads
the referenced data if it is present in the Level 1 Data Cache, as if
the page referenced by the address bits in the PTE was still present
and accessible.
While this is a purely speculative mechanism and the instruction will
raise a page fault when it is retired eventually, the pure act of
loading the data and making it available to other speculative
instructions opens up the opportunity for side channel attacks to
unprivileged malicious code, similar to the Meltdown attack.
While Meltdown breaks the user space to kernel space protection, L1TF
allows to attack any physical memory address in the system and the
attack works across all protection domains. It allows an attack of SGX
and also works from inside virtual machines because the speculation
bypasses the extended page table (EPT) protection mechanism.
The assoicated CVEs are: CVE-2018-3615, CVE-2018-3620, CVE-2018-3646
The mitigations provided by this pull request include:
- Host side protection by inverting the upper address bits of a non
present page table entry so the entry points to uncacheable memory.
- Hypervisor protection by flushing L1 Data Cache on VMENTER.
- SMT (HyperThreading) control knobs, which allow to 'turn off' SMT
by offlining the sibling CPU threads. The knobs are available on
the kernel command line and at runtime via sysfs
- Control knobs for the hypervisor mitigation, related to L1D flush
and SMT control. The knobs are available on the kernel command line
and at runtime via sysfs
- Extensive documentation about L1TF including various degrees of
mitigations.
Thanks to all people who have contributed to this in various ways -
patches, review, testing, backporting - and the fruitful, sometimes
heated, but at the end constructive discussions.
There is work in progress to provide other forms of mitigations, which
might be less horrible performance wise for a particular kind of
workloads, but this is not yet ready for consumption due to their
complexity and limitations"
* 'l1tf-final' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (75 commits)
x86/microcode: Allow late microcode loading with SMT disabled
tools headers: Synchronise x86 cpufeatures.h for L1TF additions
x86/mm/kmmio: Make the tracer robust against L1TF
x86/mm/pat: Make set_memory_np() L1TF safe
x86/speculation/l1tf: Make pmd/pud_mknotpresent() invert
x86/speculation/l1tf: Invert all not present mappings
cpu/hotplug: Fix SMT supported evaluation
KVM: VMX: Tell the nested hypervisor to skip L1D flush on vmentry
x86/speculation: Use ARCH_CAPABILITIES to skip L1D flush on vmentry
x86/speculation: Simplify sysfs report of VMX L1TF vulnerability
Documentation/l1tf: Remove Yonah processors from not vulnerable list
x86/KVM/VMX: Don't set l1tf_flush_l1d from vmx_handle_external_intr()
x86/irq: Let interrupt handlers set kvm_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d
x86: Don't include linux/irq.h from asm/hardirq.h
x86/KVM/VMX: Introduce per-host-cpu analogue of l1tf_flush_l1d
x86/irq: Demote irq_cpustat_t::__softirq_pending to u16
x86/KVM/VMX: Move the l1tf_flush_l1d test to vmx_l1d_flush()
x86/KVM/VMX: Replace 'vmx_l1d_flush_always' with 'vmx_l1d_flush_cond'
x86/KVM/VMX: Don't set l1tf_flush_l1d to true from vmx_l1d_flush()
cpu/hotplug: detect SMT disabled by BIOS
...
Pull x86 PTI updates from Thomas Gleixner:
"The Speck brigade sadly provides yet another large set of patches
destroying the perfomance which we carefully built and preserved
- PTI support for 32bit PAE. The missing counter part to the 64bit
PTI code implemented by Joerg.
- A set of fixes for the Global Bit mechanics for non PCID CPUs which
were setting the Global Bit too widely and therefore possibly
exposing interesting memory needlessly.
- Protection against userspace-userspace SpectreRSB
- Support for the upcoming Enhanced IBRS mode, which is preferred
over IBRS. Unfortunately we dont know the performance impact of
this, but it's expected to be less horrible than the IBRS
hammering.
- Cleanups and simplifications"
* 'x86/pti' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (60 commits)
x86/mm/pti: Move user W+X check into pti_finalize()
x86/relocs: Add __end_rodata_aligned to S_REL
x86/mm/pti: Clone kernel-image on PTE level for 32 bit
x86/mm/pti: Don't clear permissions in pti_clone_pmd()
x86/mm/pti: Fix 32 bit PCID check
x86/mm/init: Remove freed kernel image areas from alias mapping
x86/mm/init: Add helper for freeing kernel image pages
x86/mm/init: Pass unconverted symbol addresses to free_init_pages()
mm: Allow non-direct-map arguments to free_reserved_area()
x86/mm/pti: Clear Global bit more aggressively
x86/speculation: Support Enhanced IBRS on future CPUs
x86/speculation: Protect against userspace-userspace spectreRSB
x86/kexec: Allocate 8k PGDs for PTI
Revert "perf/core: Make sure the ring-buffer is mapped in all page-tables"
x86/mm: Remove in_nmi() warning from vmalloc_fault()
x86/entry/32: Check for VM86 mode in slow-path check
perf/core: Make sure the ring-buffer is mapped in all page-tables
x86/pti: Check the return value of pti_user_pagetable_walk_pmd()
x86/pti: Check the return value of pti_user_pagetable_walk_p4d()
x86/entry/32: Add debug code to check entry/exit CR3
...
Future Intel processors will support "Enhanced IBRS" which is an "always
on" mode i.e. IBRS bit in SPEC_CTRL MSR is enabled once and never
disabled.
From the specification [1]:
"With enhanced IBRS, the predicted targets of indirect branches
executed cannot be controlled by software that was executed in a less
privileged predictor mode or on another logical processor. As a
result, software operating on a processor with enhanced IBRS need not
use WRMSR to set IA32_SPEC_CTRL.IBRS after every transition to a more
privileged predictor mode. Software can isolate predictor modes
effectively simply by setting the bit once. Software need not disable
enhanced IBRS prior to entering a sleep state such as MWAIT or HLT."
If Enhanced IBRS is supported by the processor then use it as the
preferred spectre v2 mitigation mechanism instead of Retpoline. Intel's
Retpoline white paper [2] states:
"Retpoline is known to be an effective branch target injection (Spectre
variant 2) mitigation on Intel processors belonging to family 6
(enumerated by the CPUID instruction) that do not have support for
enhanced IBRS. On processors that support enhanced IBRS, it should be
used for mitigation instead of retpoline."
The reason why Enhanced IBRS is the recommended mitigation on processors
which support it is that these processors also support CET which
provides a defense against ROP attacks. Retpoline is very similar to ROP
techniques and might trigger false positives in the CET defense.
If Enhanced IBRS is selected as the mitigation technique for spectre v2,
the IBRS bit in SPEC_CTRL MSR is set once at boot time and never
cleared. Kernel also has to make sure that IBRS bit remains set after
VMEXIT because the guest might have cleared the bit. This is already
covered by the existing x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest() and
x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host() speculation control functions.
Enhanced IBRS still requires IBPB for full mitigation.
[1] Speculative-Execution-Side-Channel-Mitigations.pdf
[2] Retpoline-A-Branch-Target-Injection-Mitigation.pdf
Both documents are available at:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199511
Originally-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tim C Chen <tim.c.chen@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1533148945-24095-1-git-send-email-sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com
Some Intel processors have an EPT feature whereby the accessed & dirty bits
in EPT entries can be updated by HW. MSR IA32_VMX_EPT_VPID_CAP exposes the
presence of this capability.
There is no point in trying to use that new feature bit in the VMX code as
VMX needs to read the MSR anyway to access other bits, but having the
feature bit for EPT_AD in place helps virtualization management as it
exposes "ept_ad" in /proc/cpuinfo/$proc/flags if the feature is present.
[ tglx: Amended changelog ]
Signed-off-by: Peter Feiner <pfeiner@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Shier <pshier@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180801180657.138051-1-pshier@google.com
336996-Speculative-Execution-Side-Channel-Mitigations.pdf defines a new MSR
(IA32_FLUSH_CMD) which is detected by CPUID.7.EDX[28]=1 bit being set.
This new MSR "gives software a way to invalidate structures with finer
granularity than other architectual methods like WBINVD."
A copy of this document is available at
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199511
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
L1TF core kernel workarounds are cheap and normally always enabled, However
they still should be reported in sysfs if the system is vulnerable or
mitigated. Add the necessary CPU feature/bug bits.
- Extend the existing checks for Meltdowns to determine if the system is
vulnerable. All CPUs which are not vulnerable to Meltdown are also not
vulnerable to L1TF
- Check for 32bit non PAE and emit a warning as there is no practical way
for mitigation due to the limited physical address bits
- If the system has more than MAX_PA/2 physical memory the invert page
workarounds don't protect the system against the L1TF attack anymore,
because an inverted physical address will also point to valid
memory. Print a warning in this case and report that the system is
vulnerable.
Add a function which returns the PFN limit for the L1TF mitigation, which
will be used in follow up patches for sanity and range checks.
[ tglx: Renamed the CPU feature bit to L1TF_PTEINV ]
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
The AMD document outlining the SSBD handling
124441_AMD64_SpeculativeStoreBypassDisable_Whitepaper_final.pdf
mentions that if CPUID 8000_0008.EBX[24] is set we should be using
the SPEC_CTRL MSR (0x48) over the VIRT SPEC_CTRL MSR (0xC001_011f)
for speculative store bypass disable.
This in effect means we should clear the X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD
flag so that we would prefer the SPEC_CTRL MSR.
See the document titled:
124441_AMD64_SpeculativeStoreBypassDisable_Whitepaper_final.pdf
A copy of this document is available at
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199889
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Janakarajan Natarajan <Janakarajan.Natarajan@amd.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de>
Cc: andrew.cooper3@citrix.com
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180601145921.9500-3-konrad.wilk@oracle.com
The AMD document outlining the SSBD handling
124441_AMD64_SpeculativeStoreBypassDisable_Whitepaper_final.pdf
mentions that the CPUID 8000_0008.EBX[26] will mean that the
speculative store bypass disable is no longer needed.
A copy of this document is available at:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199889
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Janakarajan Natarajan <Janakarajan.Natarajan@amd.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: andrew.cooper3@citrix.com
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180601145921.9500-2-konrad.wilk@oracle.com
Some AMD processors only support a non-architectural means of enabling
speculative store bypass disable (SSBD). To allow a simplified view of
this to a guest, an architectural definition has been created through a new
CPUID bit, 0x80000008_EBX[25], and a new MSR, 0xc001011f. With this, a
hypervisor can virtualize the existence of this definition and provide an
architectural method for using SSBD to a guest.
Add the new CPUID feature, the new MSR and update the existing SSBD
support to use this MSR when present.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Add a ZEN feature bit so family-dependent static_cpu_has() optimizations
can be built for ZEN.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
The SSBD enumeration is similarly to the other bits magically shared
between Intel and AMD though the mechanisms are different.
Make X86_FEATURE_SSBD synthetic and set it depending on the vendor specific
features or family dependent setup.
Change the Intel bit to X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD to denote that SSBD is
controlled via MSR_SPEC_CTRL and fix up the usage sites.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
The availability of the SPEC_CTRL MSR is enumerated by a CPUID bit on
Intel and implied by IBRS or STIBP support on AMD. That's just confusing
and in case an AMD CPU has IBRS not supported because the underlying
problem has been fixed but has another bit valid in the SPEC_CTRL MSR,
the thing falls apart.
Add a synthetic feature bit X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL to denote the
availability on both Intel and AMD.
While at it replace the boot_cpu_has() checks with static_cpu_has() where
possible. This prevents late microcode loading from exposing SPEC_CTRL, but
late loading is already very limited as it does not reevaluate the
mitigation options and other bits and pieces. Having static_cpu_has() is
the simplest and least fragile solution.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Intel and AMD have different CPUID bits hence for those use synthetic bits
which get set on the respective vendor's in init_speculation_control(). So
that debacles like what the commit message of
c65732e4f7 ("x86/cpu: Restore CPUID_8000_0008_EBX reload")
talks about don't happen anymore.
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Jörg Otte <jrg.otte@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180504161815.GG9257@pd.tnic
Intel collateral will reference the SSB mitigation bit in IA32_SPEC_CTL[2]
as SSBD (Speculative Store Bypass Disable).
Hence changing it.
It is unclear yet what the MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES (0x10a) Bit(4) name
is going to be. Following the rename it would be SSBD_NO but that rolls out
to Speculative Store Bypass Disable No.
Also fixed the missing space in X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD.
[ tglx: Fixup x86_amd_rds_enable() and rds_tif_to_amd_ls_cfg() as well ]
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
AMD does not need the Speculative Store Bypass mitigation to be enabled.
The parameters for this are already available and can be done via MSR
C001_1020. Each family uses a different bit in that MSR for this.
[ tglx: Expose the bit mask via a variable and move the actual MSR fiddling
into the bugs code as that's the right thing to do and also required
to prepare for dynamic enable/disable ]
Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Contemporary high performance processors use a common industry-wide
optimization known as "Speculative Store Bypass" in which loads from
addresses to which a recent store has occurred may (speculatively) see an
older value. Intel refers to this feature as "Memory Disambiguation" which
is part of their "Smart Memory Access" capability.
Memory Disambiguation can expose a cache side-channel attack against such
speculatively read values. An attacker can create exploit code that allows
them to read memory outside of a sandbox environment (for example,
malicious JavaScript in a web page), or to perform more complex attacks
against code running within the same privilege level, e.g. via the stack.
As a first step to mitigate against such attacks, provide two boot command
line control knobs:
nospec_store_bypass_disable
spec_store_bypass_disable=[off,auto,on]
By default affected x86 processors will power on with Speculative
Store Bypass enabled. Hence the provided kernel parameters are written
from the point of view of whether to enable a mitigation or not.
The parameters are as follows:
- auto - Kernel detects whether your CPU model contains an implementation
of Speculative Store Bypass and picks the most appropriate
mitigation.
- on - disable Speculative Store Bypass
- off - enable Speculative Store Bypass
[ tglx: Reordered the checks so that the whole evaluation is not done
when the CPU does not support RDS ]
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Add the CPU feature bit CPUID.7.0.EDX[31] which indicates whether the CPU
supports Reduced Data Speculation.
[ tglx: Split it out from a later patch ]
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Add the sysfs file for the new vulerability. It does not do much except
show the words 'Vulnerable' for recent x86 cores.
Intel cores prior to family 6 are known not to be vulnerable, and so are
some Atoms and some Xeon Phi.
It assumes that older Cyrix, Centaur, etc. cores are immune.
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
cldemote is a new instruction in future x86 processors. It hints
to hardware that a specified cache line should be moved ("demoted")
from the cache(s) closest to the processor core to a level more
distant from the processor core. This instruction is faster than
snooping to make the cache line available for other cores.
cldemote instruction is indicated by the presence of the CPUID
feature flag CLDEMOTE (CPUID.(EAX=0x7, ECX=0):ECX[bit25]).
More details on cldemote instruction can be found in the latest
Intel Architecture Instruction Set Extensions and Future Features
Programming Reference.
Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "Ravi V Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "Ashok Raj" <ashok.raj@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1524508162-192587-1-git-send-email-fenghua.yu@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Pull x86/pti updates from Thomas Gleixner:
"Another set of melted spectrum related changes:
- Code simplifications and cleanups for RSB and retpolines.
- Make the indirect calls in KVM speculation safe.
- Whitelist CPUs which are known not to speculate from Meltdown and
prepare for the new CPUID flag which tells the kernel that a CPU is
not affected.
- A less rigorous variant of the module retpoline check which merily
warns when a non-retpoline protected module is loaded and reflects
that fact in the sysfs file.
- Prepare for Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier support.
- Prepare for exposure of the Speculation Control MSRs to guests, so
guest OSes which depend on those "features" can use them. Includes
a blacklist of the broken microcodes. The actual exposure of the
MSRs through KVM is still being worked on"
* 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/speculation: Simplify indirect_branch_prediction_barrier()
x86/retpoline: Simplify vmexit_fill_RSB()
x86/cpufeatures: Clean up Spectre v2 related CPUID flags
x86/cpu/bugs: Make retpoline module warning conditional
x86/bugs: Drop one "mitigation" from dmesg
x86/nospec: Fix header guards names
x86/alternative: Print unadorned pointers
x86/speculation: Add basic IBPB (Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier) support
x86/cpufeature: Blacklist SPEC_CTRL/PRED_CMD on early Spectre v2 microcodes
x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on CPUs which are not vulnerable to Meltdown
x86/msr: Add definitions for new speculation control MSRs
x86/cpufeatures: Add AMD feature bits for Speculation Control
x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel feature bits for Speculation Control
x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUID_7_EDX CPUID leaf
module/retpoline: Warn about missing retpoline in module
KVM: VMX: Make indirect call speculation safe
KVM: x86: Make indirect calls in emulator speculation safe
We want to expose the hardware features simply in /proc/cpuinfo as "ibrs",
"ibpb" and "stibp". Since AMD has separate CPUID bits for those, use them
as the user-visible bits.
When the Intel SPEC_CTRL bit is set which indicates both IBRS and IBPB
capability, set those (AMD) bits accordingly. Likewise if the Intel STIBP
bit is set, set the AMD STIBP that's used for the generic hardware
capability.
Hide the rest from /proc/cpuinfo by putting "" in the comments. Including
RETPOLINE and RETPOLINE_AMD which shouldn't be visible there. There are
patches to make the sysfs vulnerabilities information non-readable by
non-root, and the same should apply to all information about which
mitigations are actually in use. Those *shouldn't* appear in /proc/cpuinfo.
The feature bit for whether IBPB is actually used, which is needed for
ALTERNATIVEs, is renamed to X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB.
Originally-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: ak@linux.intel.com
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: karahmed@amazon.de
Cc: arjan@linux.intel.com
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com
Cc: tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com
Cc: gregkh@linux-foundation.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1517070274-12128-2-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Processor tracing is already enumerated in word 9 (CPUID[7,0].EBX),
so do not duplicate it in the scattered features word.
Besides being more tidy, this will be useful for KVM when it presents
processor tracing to the guests. KVM selects host features that are
supported by both the host kernel (depending on command line options,
CPU errata, or whatever) and KVM. Whenever a full feature word exists,
KVM's code is written in the expectation that the CPUID bit number
matches the X86_FEATURE_* bit number, but this is not the case for
X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Luwei Kang <luwei.kang@intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1516117345-34561-1-git-send-email-pbonzini@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
This part of Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) patch series focuses on KVM
changes required to create and manage SEV guests.
SEV is an extension to the AMD-V architecture which supports running encrypted
virtual machine (VMs) under the control of a hypervisor. Encrypted VMs have their
pages (code and data) secured such that only the guest itself has access to
unencrypted version. Each encrypted VM is associated with a unique encryption key;
if its data is accessed to a different entity using a different key the encrypted
guest's data will be incorrectly decrypted, leading to unintelligible data.
This security model ensures that hypervisor will no longer able to inspect or
alter any guest code or data.
The key management of this feature is handled by a separate processor known as
the AMD Secure Processor (AMD-SP) which is present on AMD SOCs. The SEV Key
Management Specification (see below) provides a set of commands which can be
used by hypervisor to load virtual machine keys through the AMD-SP driver.
The patch series adds a new ioctl in KVM driver (KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP). The
ioctl will be used by qemu to issue SEV guest-specific commands defined in Key
Management Specification.
The following links provide additional details:
AMD Memory Encryption white paper:
http://amd-dev.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wordpress/media/2013/12/AMD_Memory_Encryption_Whitepaper_v7-Public.pdf
AMD64 Architecture Programmer's Manual:
http://support.amd.com/TechDocs/24593.pdf
SME is section 7.10
SEV is section 15.34
SEV Key Management:
http://support.amd.com/TechDocs/55766_SEV-KM API_Specification.pdf
KVM Forum Presentation:
http://www.linux-kvm.org/images/7/74/02x08A-Thomas_Lendacky-AMDs_Virtualizatoin_Memory_Encryption_Technology.pdf
SEV Guest BIOS support:
SEV support has been add to EDKII/OVMF BIOS
https://github.com/tianocore/edk2
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
On context switch from a shallow call stack to a deeper one, as the CPU
does 'ret' up the deeper side it may encounter RSB entries (predictions for
where the 'ret' goes to) which were populated in userspace.
This is problematic if neither SMEP nor KPTI (the latter of which marks
userspace pages as NX for the kernel) are active, as malicious code in
userspace may then be executed speculatively.
Overwrite the CPU's return prediction stack with calls which are predicted
to return to an infinite loop, to "capture" speculation if this
happens. This is required both for retpoline, and also in conjunction with
IBRS for !SMEP && !KPTI.
On Skylake+ the problem is slightly different, and an *underflow* of the
RSB may cause errant branch predictions to occur. So there it's not so much
overwrite, as *filling* the RSB to attempt to prevent it getting
empty. This is only a partial solution for Skylake+ since there are many
other conditions which may result in the RSB becoming empty. The full
solution on Skylake+ is to use IBRS, which will prevent the problem even
when the RSB becomes empty. With IBRS, the RSB-stuffing will not be
required on context switch.
[ tglx: Added missing vendor check and slighty massaged comments and
changelog ]
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515779365-9032-1-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Enable the use of -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern in newer GCC, and provide
the corresponding thunks. Provide assembler macros for invoking the thunks
in the same way that GCC does, from native and inline assembler.
This adds X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE and sets it by default on all CPUs. In
some circumstances, IBRS microcode features may be used instead, and the
retpoline can be disabled.
On AMD CPUs if lfence is serialising, the retpoline can be dramatically
simplified to a simple "lfence; jmp *\reg". A future patch, after it has
been verified that lfence really is serialising in all circumstances, can
enable this by setting the X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD feature bit in addition
to X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE.
Do not align the retpoline in the altinstr section, because there is no
guarantee that it stays aligned when it's copied over the oldinstr during
alternative patching.
[ Andi Kleen: Rename the macros, add CONFIG_RETPOLINE option, export thunks]
[ tglx: Put actual function CALL/JMP in front of the macros, convert to
symbolic labels ]
[ dwmw2: Convert back to numeric labels, merge objtool fixes ]
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-4-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Add the bug bits for spectre v1/2 and force them unconditionally for all
cpus.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515239374-23361-2-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Use the name associated with the particular attack which needs page table
isolation for mitigation.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: Jiri Koshina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1801051525300.1724@nanos
This uses INVPCID to shoot down individual lines of the user mapping
instead of marking the entire user map as invalid. This
could/might/possibly be faster.
This for sure needs tlb_single_page_flush_ceiling to be redetermined;
esp. since INVPCID is _slow_.
A detailed performance analysis is available here:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/3062e486-3539-8a1f-5724-16199420be71@intel.com
[ Peterz: Split out from big combo patch ]
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Many x86 CPUs leak information to user space due to missing isolation of
user space and kernel space page tables. There are many well documented
ways to exploit that.
The upcoming software migitation of isolating the user and kernel space
page tables needs a misfeature flag so code can be made runtime
conditional.
Add the BUG bits which indicates that the CPU is affected and add a feature
bit which indicates that the software migitation is enabled.
Assume for now that _ALL_ x86 CPUs are affected by this. Exceptions can be
made later.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
[ Note, this is a Git cherry-pick of the following commit:
2b67799bdf25 ("x86: Make X86_BUG_FXSAVE_LEAK detectable in CPUID on AMD")
... for easier x86 PTI code testing and back-porting. ]
The latest AMD AMD64 Architecture Programmer's Manual
adds a CPUID feature XSaveErPtr (CPUID_Fn80000008_EBX[2]).
If this feature is set, the FXSAVE, XSAVE, FXSAVEOPT, XSAVEC, XSAVES
/ FXRSTOR, XRSTOR, XRSTORS always save/restore error pointers,
thus making the X86_BUG_FXSAVE_LEAK workaround obsolete on such CPUs.
Signed-Off-By: Rudolf Marek <r.marek@assembler.cz>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/bdcebe90-62c5-1f05-083c-eba7f08b2540@assembler.cz
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
[ Note, this is a Git cherry-pick of the following commit: (limited to the cpufeatures.h file)
3522c2a6a4 ("x86/cpufeature: Add User-Mode Instruction Prevention definitions")
... for easier x86 PTI code testing and back-porting. ]
User-Mode Instruction Prevention is a security feature present in new
Intel processors that, when set, prevents the execution of a subset of
instructions if such instructions are executed in user mode (CPL > 0).
Attempting to execute such instructions causes a general protection
exception.
The subset of instructions comprises:
* SGDT - Store Global Descriptor Table
* SIDT - Store Interrupt Descriptor Table
* SLDT - Store Local Descriptor Table
* SMSW - Store Machine Status Word
* STR - Store Task Register
This feature is also added to the list of disabled-features to allow
a cleaner handling of build-time configuration.
Signed-off-by: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Chen Yucong <slaoub@gmail.com>
Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Huang Rui <ray.huang@amd.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ravi V. Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: ricardo.neri@intel.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509935277-22138-7-git-send-email-ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
The latest AMD AMD64 Architecture Programmer's Manual
adds a CPUID feature XSaveErPtr (CPUID_Fn80000008_EBX[2]).
If this feature is set, the FXSAVE, XSAVE, FXSAVEOPT, XSAVEC, XSAVES
/ FXRSTOR, XRSTOR, XRSTORS always save/restore error pointers,
thus making the X86_BUG_FXSAVE_LEAK workaround obsolete on such CPUs.
Signed-off-by: Rudolf Marek <r.marek@assembler.cz>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/bdcebe90-62c5-1f05-083c-eba7f08b2540@assembler.cz
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Update the CPU features to include identifying and reporting on the
Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) feature. SEV is identified by
CPUID 0x8000001f, but requires BIOS support to enable it (set bit 23 of
MSR_K8_SYSCFG and set bit 0 of MSR_K7_HWCR). Only show the SEV feature
as available if reported by CPUID and enabled by BIOS.
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
User-Mode Instruction Prevention is a security feature present in new
Intel processors that, when set, prevents the execution of a subset of
instructions if such instructions are executed in user mode (CPL > 0).
Attempting to execute such instructions causes a general protection
exception.
The subset of instructions comprises:
* SGDT - Store Global Descriptor Table
* SIDT - Store Interrupt Descriptor Table
* SLDT - Store Local Descriptor Table
* SMSW - Store Machine Status Word
* STR - Store Task Register
This feature is also added to the list of disabled-features to allow
a cleaner handling of build-time configuration.
Signed-off-by: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Chen Yucong <slaoub@gmail.com>
Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Huang Rui <ray.huang@amd.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ravi V. Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: ricardo.neri@intel.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509935277-22138-7-git-send-email-ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Kept this commit separate from the re-tabulation changes, to make
the changes easier to review:
- add better explanation for entries with no explanation
- fix/enhance the text of some of the entries
- fix the vertical alignment of some of the feature number definitions
- fix inconsistent capitalization
- ... and lots of other small details
i.e. make it all more of a coherent unit, instead of a patchwork of years of additions.
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171031121723.28524-4-mingo@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Over the years asm/cpufeatures.h has become somewhat of a mess: the original
tabulation style was too narrow, while x86 feature names also kept growing
in length, creating frequent field width overflows.
Re-tabulate it to make it wider and easier to read/modify. Also harmonize
the tabulation of the other defines in this file to match it.
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171031121723.28524-3-mingo@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Add a few new SSE/AVX/AVX512 instruction groups/features for enumeration
in /proc/cpuinfo: AVX512_VBMI2, GFNI, VAES, VPCLMULQDQ, AVX512_VNNI,
AVX512_BITALG.
CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):ECX[bit 6] AVX512_VBMI2
CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):ECX[bit 8] GFNI
CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):ECX[bit 9] VAES
CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):ECX[bit 10] VPCLMULQDQ
CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):ECX[bit 11] AVX512_VNNI
CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):ECX[bit 12] AVX512_BITALG
Detailed information of CPUID bits for these features can be found
in the Intel Architecture Instruction Set Extensions and Future Features
Programming Interface document (refer to Table 1-1. and Table 1-2.).
A copy of this document is available at
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=197239
Signed-off-by: Gayatri Kammela <gayatri.kammela@intel.com>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi.kleen@intel.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>
Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri@intel.com>
Cc: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509412829-23380-1-git-send-email-gayatri.kammela@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Some CPUID features depend on other features. Currently it's
possible to to clear dependent features, but not clear the base features,
which can cause various interesting problems.
This patch implements a generic table to describe dependencies
between CPUID features, to be used by all code that clears
CPUID.
Some subsystems (like XSAVE) had an own implementation of this,
but it's better to do it all in a single place for everyone.
Then clear_cpu_cap and setup_clear_cpu_cap always look up
this table and clear all dependencies too.
This is intended to be a practical table: only for features
that make sense to clear. If someone for example clears FPU,
or other features that are essentially part of the required
base feature set, not much is going to work. Handling
that is right now out of scope. We're only handling
features which can be usefully cleared.
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Jonathan McDowell <noodles@earth.li>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171013215645.23166-3-andi@firstfloor.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Common:
- improve heuristic for boosting preempted spinlocks by ignoring VCPUs
in user mode
ARM:
- fix for decoding external abort types from guests
- added support for migrating the active priority of interrupts when
running a GICv2 guest on a GICv3 host
- minor cleanup
PPC:
- expose storage keys to userspace
- merge powerpc/topic/ppc-kvm branch that contains
find_linux_pte_or_hugepte and POWER9 thread management cleanup
- merge kvm-ppc-fixes with a fix that missed 4.13 because of vacations
- fixes
s390:
- merge of topic branch tlb-flushing from the s390 tree to get the
no-dat base features
- merge of kvm/master to avoid conflicts with additional sthyi fixes
- wire up the no-dat enhancements in KVM
- multiple epoch facility (z14 feature)
- Configuration z/Architecture Mode
- more sthyi fixes
- gdb server range checking fix
- small code cleanups
x86:
- emulate Hyper-V TSC frequency MSRs
- add nested INVPCID
- emulate EPTP switching VMFUNC
- support Virtual GIF
- support 5 level page tables
- speedup nested VM exits by packing byte operations
- speedup MMIO by using hardware provided physical address
- a lot of fixes and cleanups, especially nested
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Merge tag 'kvm-4.14-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm
Pull KVM updates from Radim Krčmář:
"First batch of KVM changes for 4.14
Common:
- improve heuristic for boosting preempted spinlocks by ignoring
VCPUs in user mode
ARM:
- fix for decoding external abort types from guests
- added support for migrating the active priority of interrupts when
running a GICv2 guest on a GICv3 host
- minor cleanup
PPC:
- expose storage keys to userspace
- merge kvm-ppc-fixes with a fix that missed 4.13 because of
vacations
- fixes
s390:
- merge of kvm/master to avoid conflicts with additional sthyi fixes
- wire up the no-dat enhancements in KVM
- multiple epoch facility (z14 feature)
- Configuration z/Architecture Mode
- more sthyi fixes
- gdb server range checking fix
- small code cleanups
x86:
- emulate Hyper-V TSC frequency MSRs
- add nested INVPCID
- emulate EPTP switching VMFUNC
- support Virtual GIF
- support 5 level page tables
- speedup nested VM exits by packing byte operations
- speedup MMIO by using hardware provided physical address
- a lot of fixes and cleanups, especially nested"
* tag 'kvm-4.14-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (67 commits)
KVM: arm/arm64: Support uaccess of GICC_APRn
KVM: arm/arm64: Extract GICv3 max APRn index calculation
KVM: arm/arm64: vITS: Drop its_ite->lpi field
KVM: arm/arm64: vgic: constify seq_operations and file_operations
KVM: arm/arm64: Fix guest external abort matching
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Fix memory leak in kvm_vm_ioctl_get_htab_fd
KVM: s390: vsie: cleanup mcck reinjection
KVM: s390: use WARN_ON_ONCE only for checking
KVM: s390: guestdbg: fix range check
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Report storage key support to userspace
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Fix case where HDEC is treated as 32-bit on POWER9
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Fix invalid use of register expression
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Fix H_REGISTER_VPA VPA size validation
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Fix setting of storage key in H_ENTER
KVM: PPC: e500mc: Fix a NULL dereference
KVM: PPC: e500: Fix some NULL dereferences on error
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Protect updates to spapr_tce_tables list
KVM: s390: we are always in czam mode
KVM: s390: expose no-DAT to guest and migration support
KVM: s390: sthyi: remove invalid guest write access
...
This fix was intended for 4.13, but didn't get in because both
maintainers were on vacation.
Paul Mackerras:
"It adds mutual exclusion between list_add_rcu and list_del_rcu calls
on the kvm->arch.spapr_tce_tables list. Without this, userspace could
potentially trigger corruption of the list and cause a host crash or
worse."
Pull x86 mm changes from Ingo Molnar:
"PCID support, 5-level paging support, Secure Memory Encryption support
The main changes in this cycle are support for three new, complex
hardware features of x86 CPUs:
- Add 5-level paging support, which is a new hardware feature on
upcoming Intel CPUs allowing up to 128 PB of virtual address space
and 4 PB of physical RAM space - a 512-fold increase over the old
limits. (Supercomputers of the future forecasting hurricanes on an
ever warming planet can certainly make good use of more RAM.)
Many of the necessary changes went upstream in previous cycles,
v4.14 is the first kernel that can enable 5-level paging.
This feature is activated via CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL=y - disabled by
default.
(By Kirill A. Shutemov)
- Add 'encrypted memory' support, which is a new hardware feature on
upcoming AMD CPUs ('Secure Memory Encryption', SME) allowing system
RAM to be encrypted and decrypted (mostly) transparently by the
CPU, with a little help from the kernel to transition to/from
encrypted RAM. Such RAM should be more secure against various
attacks like RAM access via the memory bus and should make the
radio signature of memory bus traffic harder to intercept (and
decrypt) as well.
This feature is activated via CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT=y - disabled
by default.
(By Tom Lendacky)
- Enable PCID optimized TLB flushing on newer Intel CPUs: PCID is a
hardware feature that attaches an address space tag to TLB entries
and thus allows to skip TLB flushing in many cases, even if we
switch mm's.
(By Andy Lutomirski)
All three of these features were in the works for a long time, and
it's coincidence of the three independent development paths that they
are all enabled in v4.14 at once"
* 'x86-mm-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (65 commits)
x86/mm: Enable RCU based page table freeing (CONFIG_HAVE_RCU_TABLE_FREE=y)
x86/mm: Use pr_cont() in dump_pagetable()
x86/mm: Fix SME encryption stack ptr handling
kvm/x86: Avoid clearing the C-bit in rsvd_bits()
x86/CPU: Align CR3 defines
x86/mm, mm/hwpoison: Clear PRESENT bit for kernel 1:1 mappings of poison pages
acpi, x86/mm: Remove encryption mask from ACPI page protection type
x86/mm, kexec: Fix memory corruption with SME on successive kexecs
x86/mm/pkeys: Fix typo in Documentation/x86/protection-keys.txt
x86/mm/dump_pagetables: Speed up page tables dump for CONFIG_KASAN=y
x86/mm: Implement PCID based optimization: try to preserve old TLB entries using PCID
x86: Enable 5-level paging support via CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL=y
x86/mm: Allow userspace have mappings above 47-bit
x86/mm: Prepare to expose larger address space to userspace
x86/mpx: Do not allow MPX if we have mappings above 47-bit
x86/mm: Rename tasksize_32bit/64bit to task_size_32bit/64bit()
x86/xen: Redefine XEN_ELFNOTE_INIT_P2M using PUD_SIZE * PTRS_PER_PUD
x86/mm/dump_pagetables: Fix printout of p4d level
x86/mm/dump_pagetables: Generalize address normalization
x86/boot: Fix memremap() related build failure
...
Add a new cpufeature definition for Virtual GIF.
Signed-off-by: Janakarajan Natarajan <Janakarajan.Natarajan@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
"virtual_vmload_vmsave" is what is going to land in /proc/cpuinfo now
as per v4.13-rc4, for a single feature bit which is clearly too long.
So rename it to what it is called in the processor manual.
"v_vmsave_vmload" is a bit shorter, after all.
We could go more aggressively here but having it the same as in the
processor manual is advantageous.
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Janakarajan Natarajan <Janakarajan.Natarajan@amd.com>
Cc: Jörg Rödel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: kvm-ML <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170801185552.GA3743@nazgul.tnic
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
In Family 17h, L3 is the last level cache as opposed to L2 in previous
families. Avoid this name confusion and rename X86_FEATURE_PERFCTR_L2 to
X86_FEATURE_PERFCTR_LLC to indicate the performance counter on the last
level of cache.
Signed-off-by: Janakarajan Natarajan <Janakarajan.Natarajan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/016311029fdecdc3fdc13b7ed865c6cbf48b2f15.1497452002.git.Janakarajan.Natarajan@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Update the CPU features to include identifying and reporting on the
Secure Memory Encryption (SME) feature. SME is identified by CPUID
0x8000001f, but requires BIOS support to enable it (set bit 23 of
MSR_K8_SYSCFG). Only show the SME feature as available if reported by
CPUID, enabled by BIOS and not configured as CONFIG_X86_32=y.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/85c17ff450721abccddc95e611ae8df3f4d9718b.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Pull x86 cpu updates from Ingo Molnar:
"The biggest changes are an extension of the Intel RDT code to extend
it with Intel Memory Bandwidth Allocation CPU support: MBA allows
bandwidth allocation between cores, while CBM (already upstream)
allows CPU cache partitioning.
There's also misc smaller fixes and updates"
* 'x86-cpu-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (23 commits)
x86/intel_rdt: Return error for incorrect resource names in schemata
x86/intel_rdt: Trim whitespace while parsing schemata input
x86/intel_rdt: Fix padding when resource is enabled via mount
x86/intel_rdt: Get rid of anon union
x86/cpu: Keep model defines sorted by model number
x86/intel_rdt/mba: Add schemata file support for MBA
x86/intel_rdt: Make schemata file parsers resource specific
x86/intel_rdt/mba: Add info directory files for Memory Bandwidth Allocation
x86/intel_rdt: Make information files resource specific
x86/intel_rdt/mba: Add primary support for Memory Bandwidth Allocation (MBA)
x86/intel_rdt/mba: Memory bandwith allocation feature detect
x86/intel_rdt: Add resource specific msr update function
x86/intel_rdt: Move CBM specific data into a struct
x86/intel_rdt: Cleanup namespace to support multiple resource types
Documentation, x86: Intel Memory bandwidth allocation
x86/intel_rdt: Organize code properly
x86/intel_rdt: Init padding only if a device exists
x86/intel_rdt: Add cpus_list rdtgroup file
x86/intel_rdt: Cleanup kernel-doc
x86/intel_rdt: Update schemata read to show data in tabular format
...
Intel supports faulting on the CPUID instruction beginning with Ivy Bridge.
When enabled, the processor will fault on attempts to execute the CPUID
instruction with CPL>0. This will allow a ptracer to emulate the CPUID
instruction.
Bit 31 of MSR_PLATFORM_INFO advertises support for this feature. It is
documented in detail in Section 2.3.2 of
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/attachment.cgi?id=243991
Detect support for this feature and expose it as X86_FEATURE_CPUID_FAULT.
Signed-off-by: Kyle Huey <khuey@kylehuey.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Grzegorz Andrejczuk <grzegorz.andrejczuk@intel.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>
Cc: Robert O'Callahan <robert@ocallahan.org>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: user-mode-linux-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: user-mode-linux-user@lists.sourceforge.net
Cc: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Dmitry Safonov <dsafonov@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170320081628.18952-8-khuey@kylehuey.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Look for 'la57' in /proc/cpuinfo to see if your machine supports 5-level
paging.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull x86 fpu updates from Ingo Molnar:
"The main changes relate to fixes between (lack of) CPUID and FPU
detection that should only affect old or weird CPUs, by Andy
Lutomirski"
* 'x86-fpu-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/fpu: Fix the "Giving up, no FPU found" test
x86/fpu: Fix CPUID-less FPU detection
x86/fpu: Fix "x86/fpu: Legacy x87 FPU detected" message
x86/cpu: Re-apply forced caps every time CPU caps are re-read
x86/cpu: Factor out application of forced CPU caps
x86/cpu: Add X86_FEATURE_CPUID
x86/fpu/xstate: Move XSAVES state init to a function
Add a synthetic CPUID flag denoting whether the CPU sports the CPUID
instruction or not. This will come useful later when accomodating
CPUID-less CPUs.
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
[ Slightly prettified. ]
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matthew Whitehead <tedheadster@gmail.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: One Thousand Gnomes <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/dcb355adae3ab812c79397056a61c212f1a0c7cc.1484705016.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Vector population count instructions for dwords and qwords are going to be
available in future Intel Xeon & Xeon Phi processors. Bit 14 of
CPUID[level:0x07, ECX] indicates that the instructions are supported by a
processor.
The specification can be found in the Intel Software Developer Manual (SDM)
and in the Instruction Set Extensions Programming Reference (ISE).
Populate the feature bit and clear it when xsave is disabled.
Signed-off-by: Piotr Luc <piotr.luc@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170110173403.6010-2-piotr.luc@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Pull x86 cache allocation interface from Thomas Gleixner:
"This provides support for Intel's Cache Allocation Technology, a cache
partitioning mechanism.
The interface is odd, but the hardware interface of that CAT stuff is
odd as well.
We tried hard to come up with an abstraction, but that only allows
rather simple partitioning, but no way of sharing and dealing with the
per package nature of this mechanism.
In the end we decided to expose the allocation bitmaps directly so all
combinations of the hardware can be utilized.
There are two ways of associating a cache partition:
- Task
A task can be added to a resource group. It uses the cache
partition associated to the group.
- CPU
All tasks which are not member of a resource group use the group to
which the CPU they are running on is associated with.
That allows for simple CPU based partitioning schemes.
The main expected user sare:
- Virtualization so a VM can only trash only the associated part of
the cash w/o disturbing others
- Real-Time systems to seperate RT and general workloads.
- Latency sensitive enterprise workloads
- In theory this also can be used to protect against cache side
channel attacks"
[ Intel RDT is "Resource Director Technology". The interface really is
rather odd and very specific, which delayed this pull request while I
was thinking about it. The pull request itself came in early during
the merge window, I just delayed it until things had calmed down and I
had more time.
But people tell me they'll use this, and the good news is that it is
_so_ specific that it's rather independent of anything else, and no
user is going to depend on the interface since it's pretty rare. So if
push comes to shove, we can just remove the interface and nothing will
break ]
* 'x86-cache-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (31 commits)
x86/intel_rdt: Implement show_options() for resctrlfs
x86/intel_rdt: Call intel_rdt_sched_in() with preemption disabled
x86/intel_rdt: Update task closid immediately on CPU in rmdir and unmount
x86/intel_rdt: Fix setting of closid when adding CPUs to a group
x86/intel_rdt: Update percpu closid immeditately on CPUs affected by changee
x86/intel_rdt: Reset per cpu closids on unmount
x86/intel_rdt: Select KERNFS when enabling INTEL_RDT_A
x86/intel_rdt: Prevent deadlock against hotplug lock
x86/intel_rdt: Protect info directory from removal
x86/intel_rdt: Add info files to Documentation
x86/intel_rdt: Export the minimum number of set mask bits in sysfs
x86/intel_rdt: Propagate error in rdt_mount() properly
x86/intel_rdt: Add a missing #include
MAINTAINERS: Add maintainer for Intel RDT resource allocation
x86/intel_rdt: Add scheduler hook
x86/intel_rdt: Add schemata file
x86/intel_rdt: Add tasks files
x86/intel_rdt: Add cpus file
x86/intel_rdt: Add mkdir to resctrl file system
x86/intel_rdt: Add "info" files to resctrl file system
...
Pull timer updates from Thomas Gleixner:
"This is the last functional update from the tip tree for 4.10. It got
delayed due to a newly reported and anlyzed variant of BIOS bug and
the resulting wreckage:
- Seperation of TSC being marked realiable and the fact that the
platform provides the TSC frequency via CPUID/MSRs and making use
for it for GOLDMONT.
- TSC adjust MSR validation and sanitizing:
The TSC adjust MSR contains the offset to the hardware counter. The
sum of the adjust MSR and the counter is the TSC value which is
read via RDTSC.
On at least two machines from different vendors the BIOS sets the
TSC adjust MSR to negative values. This happens on cold and warm
boot. While on cold boot the offset is a few milliseconds, on warm
boot it basically compensates the power on time of the system. The
BIOSes are not even using the adjust MSR to set all CPUs in the
package to the same offset. The offsets are different which renders
the TSC unusable,
What's worse is that the TSC deadline timer has a HW feature^Wbug.
It malfunctions when the TSC adjust value is negative or greater
equal 0x80000000 resulting in silent boot failures, hard lockups or
non firing timers. This looks like some hardware internal 32/64bit
issue with a sign extension problem. Intel has been silent so far
on the issue.
The update contains sanity checks and keeps the adjust register
within working limits and in sync on the package.
As it looks like this disease is spreading via BIOS crapware, we
need to address this urgently as the boot failures are hard to
debug for users"
* 'x86-timers-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/tsc: Limit the adjust value further
x86/tsc: Annotate printouts as firmware bug
x86/tsc: Force TSC_ADJUST register to value >= zero
x86/tsc: Validate TSC_ADJUST after resume
x86/tsc: Validate cpumask pointer before accessing it
x86/tsc: Fix broken CONFIG_X86_TSC=n build
x86/tsc: Try to adjust TSC if sync test fails
x86/tsc: Prepare warp test for TSC adjustment
x86/tsc: Move sync cleanup to a safe place
x86/tsc: Sync test only for the first cpu in a package
x86/tsc: Verify TSC_ADJUST from idle
x86/tsc: Store and check TSC ADJUST MSR
x86/tsc: Detect random warps
x86/tsc: Use X86_FEATURE_TSC_ADJUST in detect_art()
x86/tsc: Finalize the split of the TSC_RELIABLE flag
x86/tsc: Set TSC_KNOWN_FREQ and TSC_RELIABLE flags on Intel Atom SoCs
x86/tsc: Mark Intel ATOM_GOLDMONT TSC reliable
x86/tsc: Mark TSC frequency determined by CPUID as known
x86/tsc: Add X86_FEATURE_TSC_KNOWN_FREQ flag
Pull x86 idle updates from Ingo Molnar:
"There were two bigger changes in this development cycle:
- remove idle notifiers:
32 files changed, 74 insertions(+), 803 deletions(-)
These notifiers were of questionable value and the main usecase,
the i7300 driver, was essentially unmaintained and can be removed,
plus modern power management concepts don't need the callback - so
use this golden opportunity and get rid of this opaque and fragile
callback from a latency sensitive code path.
(Len Brown, Thomas Gleixner)
- improve the AMD Erratum 400 workaround that used high overhead MSR
polling in the idle loop (Borisla Petkov, Thomas Gleixner)"
* 'x86-idle-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86: Remove empty idle.h header
x86/amd: Simplify AMD E400 aware idle routine
x86/amd: Check for the C1E bug post ACPI subsystem init
x86/bugs: Separate AMD E400 erratum and C1E bug
x86/cpufeature: Provide helper to set bugs bits
x86/idle: Remove enter_idle(), exit_idle()
x86: Remove x86_test_and_clear_bit_percpu()
x86/idle: Remove is_idle flag
x86/idle: Remove idle_notifier
i7300_idle: Remove this driver
Pull x86 FPU updates from Ingo Molnar:
"The main changes in this cycle were:
- do a large round of simplifications after all CPUs do 'eager' FPU
context switching in v4.9: remove CR0 twiddling, remove leftover
eager/lazy bts, etc (Andy Lutomirski)
- more FPU code simplifications: remove struct fpu::counter, clarify
nomenclature, remove unnecessary arguments/functions and better
structure the code (Rik van Riel)"
* 'x86-fpu-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/fpu: Remove clts()
x86/fpu: Remove stts()
x86/fpu: Handle #NM without FPU emulation as an error
x86/fpu, lguest: Remove CR0.TS support
x86/fpu, kvm: Remove host CR0.TS manipulation
x86/fpu: Remove irq_ts_save() and irq_ts_restore()
x86/fpu: Stop saving and restoring CR0.TS in fpu__init_check_bugs()
x86/fpu: Get rid of two redundant clts() calls
x86/fpu: Finish excising 'eagerfpu'
x86/fpu: Split old_fpu & new_fpu handling into separate functions
x86/fpu: Remove 'cpu' argument from __cpu_invalidate_fpregs_state()
x86/fpu: Split old & new FPU code paths
x86/fpu: Remove __fpregs_(de)activate()
x86/fpu: Rename lazy restore functions to "register state valid"
x86/fpu, kvm: Remove KVM vcpu->fpu_counter
x86/fpu: Remove struct fpu::counter
x86/fpu: Remove use_eager_fpu()
x86/fpu: Remove the XFEATURE_MASK_EAGER/LAZY distinction
x86/fpu: Hard-disable lazy FPU mode
x86/crypto, x86/fpu: Remove X86_FEATURE_EAGER_FPU #ifdef from the crc32c code
Pull x86 asm updates from Ingo Molnar:
"The main changes in this development cycle were:
- a large number of call stack dumping/printing improvements: higher
robustness, better cross-context dumping, improved output, etc.
(Josh Poimboeuf)
- vDSO getcpu() performance improvement for future Intel CPUs with
the RDPID instruction (Andy Lutomirski)
- add two new Intel AVX512 features and the CPUID support
infrastructure for it: AVX512IFMA and AVX512VBMI. (Gayatri Kammela,
He Chen)
- more copy-user unification (Borislav Petkov)
- entry code assembly macro simplifications (Alexander Kuleshov)
- vDSO C/R support improvements (Dmitry Safonov)
- misc fixes and cleanups (Borislav Petkov, Paul Bolle)"
* 'x86-asm-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (40 commits)
scripts/decode_stacktrace.sh: Fix address line detection on x86
x86/boot/64: Use defines for page size
x86/dumpstack: Make stack name tags more comprehensible
selftests/x86: Add test_vdso to test getcpu()
x86/vdso: Use RDPID in preference to LSL when available
x86/dumpstack: Handle NULL stack pointer in show_trace_log_lvl()
x86/cpufeatures: Enable new AVX512 cpu features
x86/cpuid: Provide get_scattered_cpuid_leaf()
x86/cpuid: Cleanup cpuid_regs definitions
x86/copy_user: Unify the code by removing the 64-bit asm _copy_*_user() variants
x86/unwind: Ensure stack grows down
x86/vdso: Set vDSO pointer only after success
x86/prctl/uapi: Remove #ifdef for CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
x86/unwind: Detect bad stack return address
x86/dumpstack: Warn on stack recursion
x86/unwind: Warn on bad frame pointer
x86/decoder: Use stderr if insn sanity test fails
x86/decoder: Use stdout if insn decoder test is successful
mm/page_alloc: Remove kernel address exposure in free_reserved_area()
x86/dumpstack: Remove raw stack dump
...
The workaround for the AMD Erratum E400 (Local APIC timer stops in C1E
state) is a two step process:
- Selection of the E400 aware idle routine
- Detection whether the platform is affected
The idle routine selection happens for possibly affected CPUs depending on
family/model/stepping information. These range of CPUs is not necessarily
affected as the decision whether to enable the C1E feature is made by the
firmware. Unfortunately there is no way to query this at early boot.
The current implementation polls a MSR in the E400 aware idle routine to
detect whether the CPU is affected. This is inefficient on non affected
CPUs because every idle entry has to do the MSR read.
There is a better way to detect this before going idle for the first time
which requires to seperate the bug flags:
X86_BUG_AMD_E400 - Selects the E400 aware idle routine and
enables the detection
X86_BUG_AMD_APIC_C1E - Set when the platform is affected by E400
Replace the current X86_BUG_AMD_APIC_C1E usage by the new X86_BUG_AMD_E400
bug bit to select the idle routine which currently does an unconditional
detection poll. X86_BUG_AMD_APIC_C1E is going to be used in later patches
to remove the MSR polling and simplify the handling of this misfeature.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161209182912.2726-3-bp@alien8.de
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Intel Xeons from Ivy Bridge onwards support a processor identification
number set in the factory. To the user this is a handy unique number to
identify a particular CPU. Intel can decode this to the fab/production
run to track errors. On systems that have it, include it in the machine
check record. I'm told that this would be helpful for users that run
large data centers with multi-socket servers to keep track of which CPUs
are seeing errors.
Boris:
* Add some clarifying comments and spacing.
* Mask out [63:2] in the disabled-but-not-locked case
* Call the MSR variable "val" for more readability.
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com>
Cc: linux-edac <linux-edac@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161123114855.njguoaygp3qnbkia@pd.tnic
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
The X86_FEATURE_TSC_RELIABLE flag in Linux kernel implies both reliable
(at runtime) and trustable (at calibration). But reliable running and
trustable calibration independent of each other.
Add a new flag X86_FEATURE_TSC_KNOWN_FREQ, which denotes that the frequency
is known (via MSR/CPUID). This flag is only meant to skip the long term
calibration on systems which have a known frequency.
Add X86_FEATURE_TSC_KNOWN_FREQ to the skip the delayed calibration and
leave X86_FEATURE_TSC_RELIABLE in place.
After converting the existing users of X86_FEATURE_TSC_RELIABLE to use
either both flags or just X86_FEATURE_TSC_KNOWN_FREQ we can seperate the
functionality.
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Bin Gao <bin.gao@intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1479241644-234277-2-git-send-email-bin.gao@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
RDPID is a new instruction that reads MSR_TSC_AUX quickly. This
should be considerably faster than reading the GDT. Add a
cpufeature for it and use it from __vdso_getcpu() when available.
Tested-by: Megha Dey <megha.dey@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/4f6c3a22012d10f1c65b9ca15800e01b42c7d39d.1479320367.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Add a few new AVX512 instruction groups/features for enumeration in
/proc/cpuinfo: AVX512IFMA and AVX512VBMI.
Clear the flags in fpu_xstate_clear_all_cpu_caps().
CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):EBX[bit 21] AVX512IFMA
CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):ECX[bit 1] AVX512VBMI
Detailed information of cpuid bits for the features can be found at
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=187891
Signed-off-by: Gayatri Kammela <gayatri.kammela@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: mingo@elte.hu
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1479327060-18668-1-git-send-email-gayatri.kammela@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
AVX512_4VNNIW - Vector instructions for deep learning enhanced word
variable precision.
AVX512_4FMAPS - Vector instructions for deep learning floating-point
single precision.
These new instructions are to be used in future Intel Xeon & Xeon Phi
processors. The bits 2&3 of CPUID[level:0x07, EDX] inform that new
instructions are supported by a processor.
The spec can be found in the Intel Software Developer Manual (SDM) or in
the Instruction Set Extensions Programming Reference (ISE).
Define new feature flags to enumerate the new instructions in /proc/cpuinfo
accordingly to CPUID bits and add the required xsave extensions which are
required for proper operation.
Signed-off-by: Piotr Luc <piotr.luc@intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161018150111.29926-1-piotr.luc@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Now that eagerfpu= is gone, remove it from the docs and some
comments. Also sync the changes to tools/.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/cf430dd4481d41280e93ac6cf0def1007a67fc8e.1476740397.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Since commit:
58122bf1d8 ("x86/fpu: Default eagerfpu=on on all CPUs")
... in Linux 4.6, eager FPU mode has been the default on all x86
systems, and no one has reported any regressions.
This patch removes the ability to enable lazy mode: use_eager_fpu()
becomes "return true" and all of the FPU mode selection machinery is
removed.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1475627678-20788-3-git-send-email-riel@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
We now have a better way to determine if we are running on a cpu that
supports machine check recovery. Free up this feature bit.
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Boris Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/d5db39e08d46cf1012d94d3902275d08ba931926.1472754712.git.tony.luck@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Pull x86 cpufeature updates from Thomas Gleixner:
- a workaround for the MONITOR instruction erratum of Goldmont CPUs
- small fixes and cleanups here and there
* 'x86-cpu-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/cpu: Add workaround for MONITOR instruction erratum on Goldmont based CPUs
x86/cpu: Rename "WESTMERE2" family to "NEHALEM_G"
x86/amd_nb: Clean up init path
x86/cpufeature: Add helper macro for mask check macros
x86/cpufeature: Make sure DISABLED/REQUIRED macros are updated
x86/cpufeature: Update cpufeaure macros
1/ Replace pcommit with ADR / directed-flushing:
The pcommit instruction, which has not shipped on any product, is
deprecated. Instead, the requirement is that platforms implement either
ADR, or provide one or more flush addresses per nvdimm. ADR
(Asynchronous DRAM Refresh) flushes data in posted write buffers to the
memory controller on a power-fail event. Flush addresses are defined in
ACPI 6.x as an NVDIMM Firmware Interface Table (NFIT) sub-structure:
"Flush Hint Address Structure". A flush hint is an mmio address that
when written and fenced assures that all previous posted writes
targeting a given dimm have been flushed to media.
2/ On-demand ARS (address range scrub):
Linux uses the results of the ACPI ARS commands to track bad blocks
in pmem devices. When latent errors are detected we re-scrub the media
to refresh the bad block list, userspace can also request a re-scrub at
any time.
3/ Support for the Microsoft DSM (device specific method) command format.
4/ Support for EDK2/OVMF virtual disk device memory ranges.
5/ Various fixes and cleanups across the subsystem.
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Merge tag 'libnvdimm-for-4.8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/nvdimm/nvdimm
Pull libnvdimm updates from Dan Williams:
- Replace pcommit with ADR / directed-flushing.
The pcommit instruction, which has not shipped on any product, is
deprecated. Instead, the requirement is that platforms implement
either ADR, or provide one or more flush addresses per nvdimm.
ADR (Asynchronous DRAM Refresh) flushes data in posted write buffers
to the memory controller on a power-fail event.
Flush addresses are defined in ACPI 6.x as an NVDIMM Firmware
Interface Table (NFIT) sub-structure: "Flush Hint Address Structure".
A flush hint is an mmio address that when written and fenced assures
that all previous posted writes targeting a given dimm have been
flushed to media.
- On-demand ARS (address range scrub).
Linux uses the results of the ACPI ARS commands to track bad blocks
in pmem devices. When latent errors are detected we re-scrub the
media to refresh the bad block list, userspace can also request a
re-scrub at any time.
- Support for the Microsoft DSM (device specific method) command
format.
- Support for EDK2/OVMF virtual disk device memory ranges.
- Various fixes and cleanups across the subsystem.
* tag 'libnvdimm-for-4.8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/nvdimm/nvdimm: (41 commits)
libnvdimm-btt: Delete an unnecessary check before the function call "__nd_device_register"
nfit: do an ARS scrub on hitting a latent media error
nfit: move to nfit/ sub-directory
nfit, libnvdimm: allow an ARS scrub to be triggered on demand
libnvdimm: register nvdimm_bus devices with an nd_bus driver
pmem: clarify a debug print in pmem_clear_poison
x86/insn: remove pcommit
Revert "KVM: x86: add pcommit support"
nfit, tools/testing/nvdimm/: unify shutdown paths
libnvdimm: move ->module to struct nvdimm_bus_descriptor
nfit: cleanup acpi_nfit_init calling convention
nfit: fix _FIT evaluation memory leak + use after free
tools/testing/nvdimm: add manufacturing_{date|location} dimm properties
tools/testing/nvdimm: add virtual ramdisk range
acpi, nfit: treat virtual ramdisk SPA as pmem region
pmem: kill __pmem address space
pmem: kill wmb_pmem()
libnvdimm, pmem: use nvdimm_flush() for namespace I/O writes
fs/dax: remove wmb_pmem()
libnvdimm, pmem: flush posted-write queues on shutdown
...
The pcommit instruction is being deprecated in favor of either ADR
(asynchronous DRAM refresh: flush-on-power-fail) at the platform level, or
posted-write-queue flush addresses as defined by the ACPI 6.x NFIT (NVDIMM
Firmware Interface Table).
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Xiao Guangrong <guangrong.xiao@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Monitored cached line may not wake up from mwait on certain
Goldmont based CPUs. This patch will avoid calling
current_set_polling_and_test() and thereby not set the TIF_ flag.
The result is that we'll always send IPIs for wakeups.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Len Brown <lenb@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1468867270-18493-1-git-send-email-jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
cpufeatures.h currently defines X86_BUG(9) twice on 32-bit:
#define X86_BUG_NULL_SEG X86_BUG(9) /* Nulling a selector preserves the base */
...
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
#define X86_BUG_ESPFIX X86_BUG(9) /* "" IRET to 16-bit SS corrupts ESP/RSP high bits */
#endif
I think what happened was that this added the X86_BUG_ESPFIX, but
in an #ifdef below most of the bugs:
58a5aac533 x86/entry/32: Introduce and use X86_BUG_ESPFIX instead of paravirt_enabled
Then this came along and added X86_BUG_NULL_SEG, but collided
with the earlier one that did the bug below the main block
defining all the X86_BUG()s.
7a5d670487 x86/cpu: Probe the behavior of nulling out a segment at boot time
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160618001503.CEE1B141@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Pull x86 asm updates from Ingo Molnar:
"The main changes in this cycle were:
- MSR access API fixes and enhancements (Andy Lutomirski)
- early exception handling improvements (Andy Lutomirski)
- user-space FS/GS prctl usage fixes and improvements (Andy
Lutomirski)
- Remove the cpu_has_*() APIs and replace them with equivalents
(Borislav Petkov)
- task switch micro-optimization (Brian Gerst)
- 32-bit entry code simplification (Denys Vlasenko)
- enhance PAT handling in enumated CPUs (Toshi Kani)
... and lots of other cleanups/fixlets"
* 'x86-asm-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (70 commits)
x86/arch_prctl/64: Restore accidentally removed put_cpu() in ARCH_SET_GS
x86/entry/32: Remove asmlinkage_protect()
x86/entry/32: Remove GET_THREAD_INFO() from entry code
x86/entry, sched/x86: Don't save/restore EFLAGS on task switch
x86/asm/entry/32: Simplify pushes of zeroed pt_regs->REGs
selftests/x86/ldt_gdt: Test set_thread_area() deletion of an active segment
x86/tls: Synchronize segment registers in set_thread_area()
x86/asm/64: Rename thread_struct's fs and gs to fsbase and gsbase
x86/arch_prctl/64: Remove FSBASE/GSBASE < 4G optimization
x86/segments/64: When load_gs_index fails, clear the base
x86/segments/64: When loadsegment(fs, ...) fails, clear the base
x86/asm: Make asm/alternative.h safe from assembly
x86/asm: Stop depending on ptrace.h in alternative.h
x86/entry: Rename is_{ia32,x32}_task() to in_{ia32,x32}_syscall()
x86/asm: Make sure verify_cpu() has a good stack
x86/extable: Add a comment about early exception handlers
x86/msr: Set the return value to zero when native_rdmsr_safe() fails
x86/paravirt: Make "unsafe" MSR accesses unsafe even if PARAVIRT=y
x86/paravirt: Add paravirt_{read,write}_msr()
x86/msr: Carry on after a non-"safe" MSR access fails
...
Pull RAS updates from Ingo Molnar:
"Main changes in this cycle were:
- AMD MCE/RAS handling updates (Yazen Ghannam, Aravind
Gopalakrishnan)
- Cleanups (Borislav Petkov)
- logging fix (Tony Luck)"
* 'ras-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/RAS: Add SMCA support to AMD Error Injector
EDAC, mce_amd: Detect SMCA using X86_FEATURE_SMCA
x86/mce: Update AMD mcheck init to use cpu_has() facilities
x86/cpu: Add detection of AMD RAS Capabilities
x86/mce/AMD: Save an indentation level in prepare_threshold_block()
x86/mce/AMD: Disable LogDeferredInMcaStat for SMCA systems
x86/mce/AMD: Log Deferred Errors using SMCA MCA_DE{STAT,ADDR} registers
x86/mce: Detect local MCEs properly
x86/mce: Look in genpool instead of mcelog for pending error records
x86/mce: Detect and use SMCA-specific msr_ops
x86/mce: Define vendor-specific MSR accessors
x86/mce: Carve out writes to MCx_STATUS and MCx_CTL
x86/mce: Grade uncorrected errors for SMCA-enabled systems
x86/mce: Log MCEs after a warm rest on AMD, Fam17h and later
x86/mce: Remove explicit smp_rmb() when starting CPUs sync
x86/RAS: Rename AMD MCE injector config item
Add a new CPUID leaf to hold the contents of CPUID 0x80000007_EBX (RasCap).
Define bits that are currently in use:
Bit 0: McaOverflowRecov
Bit 1: SUCCOR
Bit 3: ScalableMca
Signed-off-by: Yazen Ghannam <Yazen.Ghannam@amd.com>
[ Shorten comment. ]
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: linux-edac <linux-edac@vger.kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1462971509-3856-5-git-send-email-bp@alien8.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Erratum 88 affects old AMD K8s, where a SWAPGS fails to cause an input
dependency on GS. Therefore, we need to MFENCE before it.
But that MFENCE is expensive and unnecessary on the remaining x86 CPUs
out there so patch it out on the CPUs which don't require it.
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rudolf Marek <r.marek@assembler.cz>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/aec6b2df1bfc56101d4e9e2e5d5d570bf41663c6.1460075211.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
AMD and Intel do different things when writing zero to a segment
selector. Since neither vendor documents the behavior well and it's
easy to test the behavior, try nulling fs to see what happens.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rudolf Marek <r.marek@assembler.cz>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/61588ba0e0df35beafd363dc8b68a4c5878ef095.1460075211.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
AMD Carrizo (Family 15h, Model 60h) introduces a time-stamp counter
which is indicated by CPUID.8000_0001H:ECX[27]. It increments at a 100
MHz rate in all P-states, and C states, S0, or S1. The frequency is
about 100MHz. This counter will be used to calculate processor power
and other parts. So add an interface into the MSR PMU to get the PTSC
counter value.
Signed-off-by: Huang Rui <ray.huang@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Aravind Gopalakrishnan <Aravind.Gopalakrishnan@amd.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Cc: Jacob Shin <jacob.w.shin@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Robert Richter <rric@kernel.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1454056197-5893-2-git-send-email-ray.huang@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Pull perf fixes from Ingo Molnar:
"This tree contains various perf fixes on the kernel side, plus three
hw/event-enablement late additions:
- Intel Memory Bandwidth Monitoring events and handling
- the AMD Accumulated Power Mechanism reporting facility
- more IOMMU events
... and a final round of perf tooling updates/fixes"
* 'perf-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (44 commits)
perf llvm: Use strerror_r instead of the thread unsafe strerror one
perf llvm: Use realpath to canonicalize paths
perf tools: Unexport some methods unused outside strbuf.c
perf probe: No need to use formatting strbuf method
perf help: Use asprintf instead of adhoc equivalents
perf tools: Remove unused perf_pathdup, xstrdup functions
perf tools: Do not include stringify.h from the kernel sources
tools include: Copy linux/stringify.h from the kernel
tools lib traceevent: Remove redundant CPU output
perf tools: Remove needless 'extern' from function prototypes
perf tools: Simplify die() mechanism
perf tools: Remove unused DIE_IF macro
perf script: Remove lots of unused arguments
perf thread: Rename perf_event__preprocess_sample_addr to thread__resolve
perf machine: Rename perf_event__preprocess_sample to machine__resolve
perf tools: Add cpumode to struct perf_sample
perf tests: Forward the perf_sample in the dwarf unwind test
perf tools: Remove misplaced __maybe_unused
perf list: Fix documentation of :ppp
perf bench numa: Fix assertion for nodes bitfield
...
AMD CPU family 15h model 0x60 introduces a mechanism for measuring
accumulated power. It is used to report the processor power consumption
and support for it is indicated by CPUID Fn8000_0007_EDX[12].
Signed-off-by: Huang Rui <ray.huang@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Aaron Lu <aaron.lu@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andreas Herrmann <herrmann.der.user@googlemail.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Aravind Gopalakrishnan <Aravind.Gopalakrishnan@amd.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Cc: Frédéric Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es>
Cc: Jacob Shin <jacob.w.shin@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Kristen Carlson Accardi <kristen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Robert Richter <rric@kernel.org>
Cc: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Cc: Wan Zongshun <Vincent.Wan@amd.com>
Cc: spg_linux_kernel@amd.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1452739808-11871-4-git-send-email-ray.huang@amd.com
[ Resolved conflict and moved the synthetic CPUID slot to 19. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
The MBM init patch enumerates the Intel MBM (Memory b/w monitoring)
and initializes the perf events and datastructures for monitoring the
memory b/w.
Its based on original patch series by Tony Luck and Kanaka Juvva.
Memory bandwidth monitoring (MBM) provides OS/VMM a way to monitor
bandwidth from one level of cache to another. The current patches
support L3 external bandwidth monitoring. It supports both 'local
bandwidth' and 'total bandwidth' monitoring for the socket. Local
bandwidth measures the amount of data sent through the memory controller
on the socket and total b/w measures the total system bandwidth.
Extending the cache quality of service monitoring (CQM) we add two
more events to the perf infrastructure:
intel_cqm_llc/local_bytes - bytes sent through local socket memory controller
intel_cqm_llc/total_bytes - total L3 external bytes sent
The tasks are associated with a Resouce Monitoring ID (RMID) just like
in CQM and OS uses a MSR write to indicate the RMID of the task during
scheduling.
Signed-off-by: Vikas Shivappa <vikas.shivappa@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Cc: fenghua.yu@intel.com
Cc: h.peter.anvin@intel.com
Cc: ravi.v.shankar@intel.com
Cc: vikas.shivappa@intel.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1457652732-4499-4-git-send-email-vikas.shivappa@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Pull x86 protection key support from Ingo Molnar:
"This tree adds support for a new memory protection hardware feature
that is available in upcoming Intel CPUs: 'protection keys' (pkeys).
There's a background article at LWN.net:
https://lwn.net/Articles/643797/
The gist is that protection keys allow the encoding of
user-controllable permission masks in the pte. So instead of having a
fixed protection mask in the pte (which needs a system call to change
and works on a per page basis), the user can map a (handful of)
protection mask variants and can change the masks runtime relatively
cheaply, without having to change every single page in the affected
virtual memory range.
This allows the dynamic switching of the protection bits of large
amounts of virtual memory, via user-space instructions. It also
allows more precise control of MMU permission bits: for example the
executable bit is separate from the read bit (see more about that
below).
This tree adds the MM infrastructure and low level x86 glue needed for
that, plus it adds a high level API to make use of protection keys -
if a user-space application calls:
mmap(..., PROT_EXEC);
or
mprotect(ptr, sz, PROT_EXEC);
(note PROT_EXEC-only, without PROT_READ/WRITE), the kernel will notice
this special case, and will set a special protection key on this
memory range. It also sets the appropriate bits in the Protection
Keys User Rights (PKRU) register so that the memory becomes unreadable
and unwritable.
So using protection keys the kernel is able to implement 'true'
PROT_EXEC on x86 CPUs: without protection keys PROT_EXEC implies
PROT_READ as well. Unreadable executable mappings have security
advantages: they cannot be read via information leaks to figure out
ASLR details, nor can they be scanned for ROP gadgets - and they
cannot be used by exploits for data purposes either.
We know about no user-space code that relies on pure PROT_EXEC
mappings today, but binary loaders could start making use of this new
feature to map binaries and libraries in a more secure fashion.
There is other pending pkeys work that offers more high level system
call APIs to manage protection keys - but those are not part of this
pull request.
Right now there's a Kconfig that controls this feature
(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS) that is default enabled
(like most x86 CPU feature enablement code that has no runtime
overhead), but it's not user-configurable at the moment. If there's
any serious problem with this then we can make it configurable and/or
flip the default"
* 'mm-pkeys-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (38 commits)
x86/mm/pkeys: Fix mismerge of protection keys CPUID bits
mm/pkeys: Fix siginfo ABI breakage caused by new u64 field
x86/mm/pkeys: Fix access_error() denial of writes to write-only VMA
mm/core, x86/mm/pkeys: Add execute-only protection keys support
x86/mm/pkeys: Create an x86 arch_calc_vm_prot_bits() for VMA flags
x86/mm/pkeys: Allow kernel to modify user pkey rights register
x86/fpu: Allow setting of XSAVE state
x86/mm: Factor out LDT init from context init
mm/core, x86/mm/pkeys: Add arch_validate_pkey()
mm/core, arch, powerpc: Pass a protection key in to calc_vm_flag_bits()
x86/mm/pkeys: Actually enable Memory Protection Keys in the CPU
x86/mm/pkeys: Add Kconfig prompt to existing config option
x86/mm/pkeys: Dump pkey from VMA in /proc/pid/smaps
x86/mm/pkeys: Dump PKRU with other kernel registers
mm/core, x86/mm/pkeys: Differentiate instruction fetches
x86/mm/pkeys: Optimize fault handling in access_error()
mm/core: Do not enforce PKEY permissions on remote mm access
um, pkeys: Add UML arch_*_access_permitted() methods
mm/gup, x86/mm/pkeys: Check VMAs and PTEs for protection keys
x86/mm/gup: Simplify get_user_pages() PTE bit handling
...
Pull timer updates from Thomas Gleixner:
"The timer department delivers this time:
- Support for cross clock domain timestamps in the core code plus a
first user. That allows more precise timestamping for PTP and
later for audio and other peripherals.
The ptp/e1000e patches have been acked by the relevant maintainers
and are carried in the timer tree to avoid merge ordering issues.
- Support for unregistering the current clocksource watchdog. That
lifts a limitation for switching clocksources which has been there
from day 1
- The usual pile of fixes and updates to the core and the drivers.
Nothing outstanding and exciting"
* 'timers-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (26 commits)
time/timekeeping: Work around false positive GCC warning
e1000e: Adds hardware supported cross timestamp on e1000e nic
ptp: Add PTP_SYS_OFFSET_PRECISE for driver crosstimestamping
x86/tsc: Always Running Timer (ART) correlated clocksource
hrtimer: Revert CLOCK_MONOTONIC_RAW support
time: Add history to cross timestamp interface supporting slower devices
time: Add driver cross timestamp interface for higher precision time synchronization
time: Remove duplicated code in ktime_get_raw_and_real()
time: Add timekeeping snapshot code capturing system time and counter
time: Add cycles to nanoseconds translation
jiffies: Use CLOCKSOURCE_MASK instead of constant
clocksource: Introduce clocksource_freq2mult()
clockevents/drivers/exynos_mct: Implement ->set_state_oneshot_stopped()
clockevents/drivers/arm_global_timer: Implement ->set_state_oneshot_stopped()
clockevents/drivers/arm_arch_timer: Implement ->set_state_oneshot_stopped()
clocksource/drivers/arm_global_timer: Register delay timer
clocksource/drivers/lpc32xx: Support timer-based ARM delay
clocksource/drivers/lpc32xx: Support periodic mode
clocksource/drivers/lpc32xx: Don't use the prescaler counter for clockevents
clocksource/drivers/rockchip: Add err handle for rk_timer_init
...
A few new AVX-512 instruction groups/features are added in cpufeatures.h
for enuermation: AVX512DQ, AVX512BW, and AVX512VL.
Clear the flags in fpu__xstate_clear_all_cpu_caps().
The specification for latest AVX-512 including the features can be found at:
https://software.intel.com/sites/default/files/managed/07/b7/319433-023.pdf
Note, I didn't enable the flags in KVM. Hopefully the KVM guys can pick up
the flags and enable them in KVM.
Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Cc: Ravi V Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1457667498-37357-1-git-send-email-fenghua.yu@intel.com
[ Added more detailed feature descriptions. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Kirill Shutemov pointed this out to me.
The tip tree currently has commit:
dfb4a70f2 [x86/cpufeature, x86/mm/pkeys: Add protection keys related CPUID definitions]
whioch added support for two new CPUID bits: X86_FEATURE_PKU and
X86_FEATURE_OSPKE. But, those bits were mis-merged and put in
cpufeature.h instead of cpufeatures.h.
This didn't cause any breakage *except* it keeps the "ospke" and
"pku" bits from showing up in cpuinfo.
Now cpuinfo has the two new flags:
flags : ... pku ospke
BTW, is it really wise to have cpufeature.h and cpufeatures.h?
It seems like they can only cause confusion and mahem with tab
completion.
Reported-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160310221213.06F9DB53@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
x86_64 has very clean espfix handling on paravirt: espfix64 is set
up in native_iret, so paravirt systems that override iret bypass
espfix64 automatically. This is robust and straightforward.
x86_32 is messier. espfix is set up before the IRET paravirt patch
point, so it can't be directly conditionalized on whether we use
native_iret. We also can't easily move it into native_iret without
regressing performance due to a bizarre consideration. Specifically,
on 64-bit kernels, the logic is:
if (regs->ss & 0x4)
setup_espfix;
On 32-bit kernels, the logic is:
if ((regs->ss & 0x4) && (regs->cs & 0x3) == 3 &&
(regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_VM) == 0)
setup_espfix;
The performance of setup_espfix itself is essentially irrelevant, but
the comparison happens on every IRET so its performance matters. On
x86_64, there's no need for any registers except flags to implement
the comparison, so we fold the whole thing into native_iret. On
x86_32, we don't do that because we need a free register to
implement the comparison efficiently. We therefore do espfix setup
before restoring registers on x86_32.
This patch gets rid of the explicit paravirt_enabled check by
introducing X86_BUG_ESPFIX on 32-bit systems and using an ALTERNATIVE
to skip espfix on paravirt systems where iret != native_iret. This is
also messy, but it's at least in line with other things we do.
This improves espfix performance by removing a branch, but no one
cares. More importantly, it removes a paravirt_enabled user, which is
good because paravirt_enabled is ill-defined and is going away.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com
Cc: david.vrabel@citrix.com
Cc: konrad.wilk@oracle.com
Cc: lguest@lists.ozlabs.org
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xensource.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
The Intel Software Developer Manual describes bit 24 in the MCG_CAP
MSR:
MCG_SER_P (software error recovery support present) flag,
bit 24 — Indicates (when set) that the processor supports
software error recovery
But only some models with this capability bit set will actually
generate recoverable machine checks.
Check the model name and set a synthetic capability bit. Provide
a command line option to set this bit anyway in case the kernel
doesn't recognise the model name.
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/2e5bfb23c89800a036fb8a45fa97a74bb16bc362.1455732970.git.tony.luck@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
There are two CPUID bits for protection keys. One is for whether
the CPU contains the feature, and the other will appear set once
the OS enables protection keys. Specifically:
Bit 04: OSPKE. If 1, OS has set CR4.PKE to enable
Protection keys (and the RDPKRU/WRPKRU instructions)
This is because userspace can not see CR4 contents, but it can
see CPUID contents.
X86_FEATURE_PKU is referred to as "PKU" in the hardware documentation:
CPUID.(EAX=07H,ECX=0H):ECX.PKU [bit 3]
X86_FEATURE_OSPKE is "OSPKU":
CPUID.(EAX=07H,ECX=0H):ECX.OSPKE [bit 4]
These are the first CPU features which need to look at the
ECX word in CPUID leaf 0x7, so this patch also includes
fetching that word in to the cpuinfo->x86_capability[] array.
Add it to the disabled-features mask when its config option is
off. Even though we are not using it here, we also extend the
REQUIRED_MASK_BIT_SET() macro to keep it mirroring the
DISABLED_MASK_BIT_SET() version.
This means that in almost all code, you should use:
cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_PKU)
and *not* the CONFIG option.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160212210201.7714C250@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Move them to a separate header and have the following
dependency:
x86/cpufeatures.h <- x86/processor.h <- x86/cpufeature.h
This makes it easier to use the header in asm code and not
include the whole cpufeature.h and add guards for asm.
Suggested-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1453842730-28463-5-git-send-email-bp@alien8.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
