Proxmox-Port/libtpms
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/stefanberger/libtpms synced 2026-08-07 05:59:50 +00:00
Code Issues Actions Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

Sync: Fix and extend compile-time testing of NUM_AUTHVALUE_PCR_GROUP

Browse Source 
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
This commit is contained in:
Stefan Berger 2025-08-14 18:23:49 -04:00 committed by Stefan Berger
parent 8b437483c8
commit 96424c2e4c
2 changed files with 18 additions and 1 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

2
src/tpm2/TPMCmd/tpm/include/private/Global.h
View File

@ -1014,12 +1014,14 @@ typedef struct state_clear_data
// The set of PCR to be saved on Shutdown(STATE)
PCR_SAVE pcrSave; // default reset is 0...0
# if defined NUM_AUTHVALUE_PCR_GROUP && NUM_AUTHVALUE_PCR_GROUP > 0
// This structure hold the authorization values for those PCR that have an
// update authorization.
// This implementation only supports a single group of PCR controlled by
// authorization. If more are required, then this structure would be changed to
// an array.
PCR_AUTHVALUE pcrAuthValues;
# endif
#ifndef __ACT_DISABLED // libtpms added
//*****************************************************************************

17
src/tpm2/TPMCmd/tpm/src/subsystem/PCR.c
View File

@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
//** Includes, Defines, and Data Definitions
#define PCR_C
#include "Tpm.h"
#include <tpm_public/GpMacros.h>
// verify values from pcrstruct.h. not <= because group #0 is reserved
// indicating no auth/policy support
@ -59,7 +60,8 @@ BOOL PCRBelongsAuthGroup(TPMI_DH_PCR handle, // IN: handle of PCR
pAssert_BOOL(*groupIndex < NUM_AUTHVALUE_PCR_GROUP);
return TRUE;
}
#else
NOT_REFERENCED(handle);
#endif
return FALSE;
}
@ -95,6 +97,8 @@ BOOL PCRBelongsPolicyGroup(
pAssert_BOOL(*groupIndex < NUM_POLICY_PCR_GROUP);
return TRUE;
}
#else
NOT_REFERENCED(handle);
#endif
return FALSE;
}
@ -114,6 +118,7 @@ static BOOL PCRBelongsTCBGroup(TPMI_DH_PCR handle // IN: handle of PCR
_platPcr__GetPcrInitializationAttributes(pcr);
return currentPcrAttributes.doNotIncrementPcrCounter;
#else
NOT_REFERENCED(handle);
return FALSE;
#endif
}
@ -137,6 +142,7 @@ BOOL PCRPolicyIsAvailable(TPMI_DH_PCR handle // IN: PCR handle
TPM2B_AUTH* PCRGetAuthValue(TPMI_DH_PCR handle // IN: PCR handle
)
{
#if defined NUM_AUTHVALUE_PCR_GROUP && NUM_AUTHVALUE_PCR_GROUP > 0
UINT32 groupIndex;
if(PCRBelongsAuthGroup(handle, &groupIndex))
@ -144,6 +150,9 @@ TPM2B_AUTH* PCRGetAuthValue(TPMI_DH_PCR handle // IN: PCR handle
return &gc.pcrAuthValues.auth[groupIndex];
}
else
#else
NOT_REFERENCED(handle);
#endif
{
return NULL;
}
@ -158,6 +167,7 @@ PCRGetAuthPolicy(TPMI_DH_PCR handle, // IN: PCR handle
TPM2B_DIGEST* policy // OUT: policy of PCR
)
{
#if defined NUM_AUTHVALUE_PCR_GROUP && NUM_AUTHVALUE_PCR_GROUP > 0
UINT32 groupIndex;
if(PCRBelongsPolicyGroup(handle, &groupIndex))
@ -166,6 +176,9 @@ PCRGetAuthPolicy(TPMI_DH_PCR handle, // IN: PCR handle
return gp.pcrPolicies.hashAlg[groupIndex];
}
else
#else
NOT_REFERENCED(handle);
#endif
{
policy->t.size = 0;
return TPM_ALG_NULL;
@ -213,7 +226,9 @@ void PCRManufacture(void)
}
// Store the initial configuration to NV
#if defined NUM_AUTHVALUE_PCR_GROUP && NUM_AUTHVALUE_PCR_GROUP > 0
NV_SYNC_PERSISTENT(pcrPolicies);
#endif
NV_SYNC_PERSISTENT(pcrAllocated);
return;