From 96424c2e4c8bef2cb2c6849212762910da8d3f57 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Thu, 14 Aug 2025 18:23:49 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] Sync: Fix and extend compile-time testing of
 NUM_AUTHVALUE_PCR_GROUP

Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
---
 src/tpm2/TPMCmd/tpm/include/private/Global.h |  2 ++
 src/tpm2/TPMCmd/tpm/src/subsystem/PCR.c      | 17 ++++++++++++++++-
 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/src/tpm2/TPMCmd/tpm/include/private/Global.h b/src/tpm2/TPMCmd/tpm/include/private/Global.h
index 80d919d6..9517e08f 100644
--- a/src/tpm2/TPMCmd/tpm/include/private/Global.h
+++ b/src/tpm2/TPMCmd/tpm/include/private/Global.h
@@ -1014,12 +1014,14 @@ typedef struct state_clear_data
     // The set of PCR to be saved on Shutdown(STATE)
     PCR_SAVE pcrSave;  // default reset is 0...0
 
+#  if defined NUM_AUTHVALUE_PCR_GROUP && NUM_AUTHVALUE_PCR_GROUP > 0
     // This structure hold the authorization values for those PCR that have an
     // update authorization.
     // This implementation only supports a single group of PCR controlled by
     // authorization. If more are required, then this structure would be changed to
     // an array.
     PCR_AUTHVALUE pcrAuthValues;
+#  endif
 
 #ifndef __ACT_DISABLED	// libtpms added
 //*****************************************************************************
diff --git a/src/tpm2/TPMCmd/tpm/src/subsystem/PCR.c b/src/tpm2/TPMCmd/tpm/src/subsystem/PCR.c
index 9b8f9b55..82032ba3 100644
--- a/src/tpm2/TPMCmd/tpm/src/subsystem/PCR.c
+++ b/src/tpm2/TPMCmd/tpm/src/subsystem/PCR.c
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
 //** Includes, Defines, and Data Definitions
 #define PCR_C
 #include "Tpm.h"
+#include <tpm_public/GpMacros.h>
 
 // verify values from pcrstruct.h. not <= because group #0 is reserved
 // indicating no auth/policy support
@@ -59,7 +60,8 @@ BOOL PCRBelongsAuthGroup(TPMI_DH_PCR handle,     // IN: handle of PCR
         pAssert_BOOL(*groupIndex < NUM_AUTHVALUE_PCR_GROUP);
         return TRUE;
     }
-
+#else
+    NOT_REFERENCED(handle);
 #endif
     return FALSE;
 }
@@ -95,6 +97,8 @@ BOOL PCRBelongsPolicyGroup(
         pAssert_BOOL(*groupIndex < NUM_POLICY_PCR_GROUP);
         return TRUE;
     }
+#else
+    NOT_REFERENCED(handle);
 #endif
     return FALSE;
 }
@@ -114,6 +118,7 @@ static BOOL PCRBelongsTCBGroup(TPMI_DH_PCR handle  // IN: handle of PCR
         _platPcr__GetPcrInitializationAttributes(pcr);
     return currentPcrAttributes.doNotIncrementPcrCounter;
 #else
+    NOT_REFERENCED(handle);
     return FALSE;
 #endif
 }
@@ -137,6 +142,7 @@ BOOL PCRPolicyIsAvailable(TPMI_DH_PCR handle  // IN: PCR handle
 TPM2B_AUTH* PCRGetAuthValue(TPMI_DH_PCR handle  // IN: PCR handle
 )
 {
+#if defined NUM_AUTHVALUE_PCR_GROUP && NUM_AUTHVALUE_PCR_GROUP > 0
     UINT32 groupIndex;
 
     if(PCRBelongsAuthGroup(handle, &groupIndex))
@@ -144,6 +150,9 @@ TPM2B_AUTH* PCRGetAuthValue(TPMI_DH_PCR handle  // IN: PCR handle
         return &gc.pcrAuthValues.auth[groupIndex];
     }
     else
+#else
+    NOT_REFERENCED(handle);
+#endif
     {
         return NULL;
     }
@@ -158,6 +167,7 @@ PCRGetAuthPolicy(TPMI_DH_PCR   handle,  // IN: PCR handle
                  TPM2B_DIGEST* policy   // OUT: policy of PCR
 )
 {
+#if defined NUM_AUTHVALUE_PCR_GROUP && NUM_AUTHVALUE_PCR_GROUP > 0
     UINT32 groupIndex;
 
     if(PCRBelongsPolicyGroup(handle, &groupIndex))
@@ -166,6 +176,9 @@ PCRGetAuthPolicy(TPMI_DH_PCR   handle,  // IN: PCR handle
         return gp.pcrPolicies.hashAlg[groupIndex];
     }
     else
+#else
+    NOT_REFERENCED(handle);
+#endif
     {
         policy->t.size = 0;
         return TPM_ALG_NULL;
@@ -213,7 +226,9 @@ void PCRManufacture(void)
     }
 
     // Store the initial configuration to NV
+#if defined NUM_AUTHVALUE_PCR_GROUP && NUM_AUTHVALUE_PCR_GROUP > 0
     NV_SYNC_PERSISTENT(pcrPolicies);
+#endif
     NV_SYNC_PERSISTENT(pcrAllocated);
 
     return;