mirror of
https://gitlab.uni-freiburg.de/opensourcevdi/spice-common
synced 2025-12-29 16:35:58 +00:00
A full copy can keep both the key and the value instead of allocating twice the memory. We are parsing key1=val1,key2=val2,... and in doing that, we currently store 'key1' in key, and 'val1' in val, and then 'key2', 'val2', and so on. After this patch, we store 'key1\0val1\0' in key, which fits and saves some memory. Also this removes a warning produced by Coverity that is assuming that allocating strlen(string_variable) is wrong. Signed-off-by: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@redhat.com> Acked-by: Christophe Fergeau <cfergeau@redhat.com>
557 lines
16 KiB
C
557 lines
16 KiB
C
/* -*- Mode: C; c-basic-offset: 4; indent-tabs-mode: nil -*- */
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/*
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Copyright (C) 2011 Red Hat, Inc.
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This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
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modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
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License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
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version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
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This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
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Lesser General Public License for more details.
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You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
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License along with this library; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
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*/
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#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
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#include <config.h>
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#endif
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#include "mem.h"
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#include "ssl_verify.h"
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#include "log.h"
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#ifndef WIN32
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#include <sys/socket.h>
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#include <netinet/in.h>
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#include <arpa/inet.h>
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#endif
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#include <ctype.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <gio/gio.h>
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#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000 || \
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(defined (LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x20700000)
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static const unsigned char *ASN1_STRING_get0_data(const ASN1_STRING *asn1)
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{
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return M_ASN1_STRING_data(asn1);
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}
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#endif
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static int verify_pubkey(X509* cert, const char *key, size_t key_size)
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{
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EVP_PKEY* cert_pubkey = NULL;
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EVP_PKEY* orig_pubkey = NULL;
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BIO* bio = NULL;
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int ret = 0;
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if (!key || key_size == 0)
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return 0;
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if (!cert) {
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spice_debug("warning: no cert!");
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return 0;
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}
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cert_pubkey = X509_get_pubkey(cert);
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if (!cert_pubkey) {
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spice_debug("warning: reading public key from certificate failed");
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goto finish;
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}
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bio = BIO_new_mem_buf((void*)key, key_size);
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if (!bio) {
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spice_debug("creating BIO failed");
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goto finish;
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}
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orig_pubkey = d2i_PUBKEY_bio(bio, NULL);
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if (!orig_pubkey) {
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spice_debug("reading pubkey from bio failed");
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goto finish;
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}
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ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(orig_pubkey, cert_pubkey);
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if (ret == 1) {
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spice_debug("public keys match");
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} else if (ret == 0) {
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spice_debug("public keys mismatch");
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} else {
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spice_debug("public keys types mismatch");
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}
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finish:
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if (bio)
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BIO_free(bio);
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if (orig_pubkey)
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EVP_PKEY_free(orig_pubkey);
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if (cert_pubkey)
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EVP_PKEY_free(cert_pubkey);
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return ret;
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}
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/* from gnutls
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* compare hostname against certificate, taking account of wildcards
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* return 1 on success or 0 on error
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*
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* note: certnamesize is required as X509 certs can contain embedded NULs in
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* the strings such as CN or subjectAltName
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*/
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static int _gnutls_hostname_compare(const char *certname,
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size_t certnamesize, const char *hostname)
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{
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/* find the first different character */
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for (; *certname && *hostname && toupper (*certname) == toupper (*hostname);
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certname++, hostname++, certnamesize--)
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;
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/* the strings are the same */
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if (certnamesize == 0 && *hostname == '\0')
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return 1;
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if (*certname == '*')
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{
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/* a wildcard certificate */
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certname++;
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certnamesize--;
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while (1)
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{
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/* Use a recursive call to allow multiple wildcards */
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if (_gnutls_hostname_compare (certname, certnamesize, hostname))
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return 1;
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/* wildcards are only allowed to match a single domain
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component or component fragment */
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if (*hostname == '\0' || *hostname == '.')
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break;
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hostname++;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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/**
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* From gnutls and spice red_peer.c
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* TODO: switch to gnutls and get rid of this
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*
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* This function will check if the given certificate's subject matches
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* the given hostname. This is a basic implementation of the matching
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* described in RFC2818 (HTTPS), which takes into account wildcards,
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* and the DNSName/IPAddress subject alternative name PKIX extension.
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*
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* Returns: 1 for a successful match, and 0 on failure.
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**/
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static int verify_hostname(X509* cert, const char *hostname)
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{
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GENERAL_NAMES* subject_alt_names;
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int found_dns_name = 0;
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int cn_match = 0;
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X509_NAME* subject;
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spice_return_val_if_fail(hostname != NULL, 0);
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if (!cert) {
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spice_debug("warning: no cert!");
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return 0;
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}
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/* try matching against:
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* 1) a DNS name as an alternative name (subjectAltName) extension
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* in the certificate
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* 2) the common name (CN) in the certificate
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*
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* either of these may be of the form: *.domain.tld
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*
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* only try (2) if there is no subjectAltName extension of
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* type dNSName
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*/
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/* Check through all included subjectAltName extensions, comparing
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* against all those of type dNSName.
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*/
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subject_alt_names = (GENERAL_NAMES*)X509_get_ext_d2i(cert, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
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if (subject_alt_names) {
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int num_alts = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(subject_alt_names);
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int i;
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for (i = 0; i < num_alts; i++) {
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const GENERAL_NAME* name = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(subject_alt_names, i);
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if (name->type == GEN_DNS) {
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found_dns_name = 1;
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if (_gnutls_hostname_compare((const char *)ASN1_STRING_get0_data(name->d.dNSName),
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ASN1_STRING_length(name->d.dNSName),
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hostname)) {
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spice_debug("alt name match=%s", ASN1_STRING_get0_data(name->d.dNSName));
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GENERAL_NAMES_free(subject_alt_names);
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return 1;
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}
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} else if (name->type == GEN_IPADD) {
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GInetAddress * ip = NULL;
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const guint8 * ip_binary = NULL;
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int alt_ip_len = 0;
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int ip_len = 0;
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found_dns_name = 1;
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ip = g_inet_address_new_from_string(hostname);
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if (ip != NULL) {
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ip_len = g_inet_address_get_native_size(ip);
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ip_binary = g_inet_address_to_bytes(ip);
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} else {
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spice_warning("Could not parse hostname: %s", hostname);
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}
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alt_ip_len = ASN1_STRING_length(name->d.iPAddress);
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if ((ip_len == alt_ip_len) &&
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(memcmp(ASN1_STRING_get0_data(name->d.iPAddress), ip_binary, ip_len)) == 0) {
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GInetAddress * alt_ip = NULL;
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gchar * alt_ip_string = NULL;
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alt_ip = g_inet_address_new_from_bytes(ASN1_STRING_get0_data(name->d.iPAddress),
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g_inet_address_get_family(ip));
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alt_ip_string = g_inet_address_to_string(alt_ip);
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spice_debug("alt name IP match=%s", alt_ip_string);
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g_free(alt_ip_string);
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g_object_unref(alt_ip);
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g_object_unref(ip);
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GENERAL_NAMES_free(subject_alt_names);
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return 1;
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}
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if (ip != NULL) {
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g_object_unref(ip);
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}
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}
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}
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GENERAL_NAMES_free(subject_alt_names);
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}
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if (found_dns_name) {
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spice_debug("warning: SubjectAltName mismatch");
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return 0;
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}
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/* extracting commonNames */
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subject = X509_get_subject_name(cert);
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if (subject) {
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int pos = -1;
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X509_NAME_ENTRY* cn_entry;
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ASN1_STRING* cn_asn1;
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while ((pos = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(subject, NID_commonName, pos)) != -1) {
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cn_entry = X509_NAME_get_entry(subject, pos);
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if (!cn_entry) {
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continue;
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}
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cn_asn1 = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(cn_entry);
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if (!cn_asn1) {
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continue;
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}
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if (_gnutls_hostname_compare((const char*)ASN1_STRING_get0_data(cn_asn1),
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ASN1_STRING_length(cn_asn1),
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hostname)) {
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spice_debug("common name match=%s", (char*)ASN1_STRING_get0_data(cn_asn1));
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cn_match = 1;
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break;
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}
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}
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}
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if (!cn_match) {
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spice_debug("warning: common name mismatch");
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}
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return cn_match;
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}
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static X509_NAME* subject_to_x509_name(const char *subject, int *nentries)
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{
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X509_NAME* in_subject;
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const char *p;
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char *key, *val = NULL, *k, *v = NULL;
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enum {
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KEY,
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VALUE
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} state;
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spice_return_val_if_fail(subject != NULL, NULL);
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spice_return_val_if_fail(nentries != NULL, NULL);
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key = (char*)alloca(strlen(subject)+1);
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in_subject = X509_NAME_new();
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if (!in_subject || !key) {
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spice_debug("failed to allocate");
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return NULL;
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}
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*nentries = 0;
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k = key;
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state = KEY;
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for (p = subject;; ++p) {
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int escape = 0;
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if (*p == '\\') {
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++p;
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if (*p != '\\' && *p != ',') {
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spice_debug("Invalid character after \\");
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goto fail;
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}
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escape = 1;
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}
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switch (state) {
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case KEY:
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if (*p == ' ' && k == key) {
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continue; /* skip spaces before key */
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} if (*p == 0) {
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if (k == key) /* empty key, ending */
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goto success;
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goto fail;
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} else if (*p == ',' && !escape) {
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goto fail; /* assignment is missing */
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} else if (*p == '=' && !escape) {
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state = VALUE;
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*k = 0;
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val = k + 1;
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v = val;
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} else
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*k++ = *p;
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break;
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case VALUE:
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if (*p == 0 || (*p == ',' && !escape)) {
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if (v == val) /* empty value */
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goto fail;
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*v = 0;
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if (!X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(in_subject, key,
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MBSTRING_UTF8,
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(const unsigned char*)val,
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-1, -1, 0)) {
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spice_debug("warning: failed to add entry %s=%s to X509_NAME",
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key, val);
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goto fail;
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}
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*nentries += 1;
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if (*p == 0)
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goto success;
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state = KEY;
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k = key;
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} else
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*v++ = *p;
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break;
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}
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}
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success:
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return in_subject;
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fail:
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if (in_subject)
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X509_NAME_free(in_subject);
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return NULL;
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}
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static int verify_subject(X509* cert, SpiceOpenSSLVerify* verify)
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{
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X509_NAME *cert_subject = NULL;
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X509_NAME* in_subject;
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int ret;
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int in_entries;
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if (!cert) {
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spice_debug("warning: no cert!");
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return 0;
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}
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cert_subject = X509_get_subject_name(cert);
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if (!cert_subject) {
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spice_debug("warning: reading certificate subject failed");
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return 0;
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}
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in_subject = subject_to_x509_name(verify->subject, &in_entries);
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if (!in_subject) {
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spice_debug("warning: no in_subject!");
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return 0;
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}
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/* Note: this check is redundant with the pre-condition in X509_NAME_cmp */
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if (X509_NAME_entry_count(cert_subject) != in_entries) {
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spice_debug("subject mismatch: #entries cert=%d, input=%d",
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X509_NAME_entry_count(cert_subject), in_entries);
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X509_NAME_free(in_subject);
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return 0;
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}
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ret = X509_NAME_cmp(cert_subject, in_subject);
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if (ret == 0) {
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spice_debug("subjects match");
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} else {
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char *p;
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spice_debug("subjects mismatch");
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p = X509_NAME_oneline(cert_subject, NULL, 0);
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spice_debug("cert_subject: %s", p);
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free(p);
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p = X509_NAME_oneline(in_subject, NULL, 0);
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spice_debug("in_subject: %s", p);
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free(p);
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}
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X509_NAME_free(in_subject);
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return !ret;
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}
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static int openssl_verify(int preverify_ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
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{
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int depth, err;
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SpiceOpenSSLVerify *v;
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SSL *ssl;
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X509* cert;
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char buf[256];
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unsigned int failed_verifications;
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ssl = (SSL*)X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx());
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v = (SpiceOpenSSLVerify*)SSL_get_app_data(ssl);
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cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
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X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), buf, 256);
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depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx);
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err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
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if (depth > 0) {
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if (!preverify_ok) {
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spice_warning("Error in certificate chain verification: %s (num=%d:depth%d:%s)",
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X509_verify_cert_error_string(err), err, depth, buf);
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v->all_preverify_ok = 0;
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/* if certificate verification failed, we can still authorize the server */
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/* if its public key matches the one we hold in the peer_connect_options. */
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if (err == X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN &&
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v->verifyop & SPICE_SSL_VERIFY_OP_PUBKEY)
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return 1;
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if (err == X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN)
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spice_debug("server certificate not being signed by the provided CA");
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return 0;
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} else
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return 1;
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}
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/* depth == 0 */
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if (!cert) {
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spice_debug("failed to get server certificate");
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return 0;
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}
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failed_verifications = 0;
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if (v->verifyop & SPICE_SSL_VERIFY_OP_PUBKEY) {
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if (verify_pubkey(cert, v->pubkey, v->pubkey_size))
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return 1;
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else
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failed_verifications |= SPICE_SSL_VERIFY_OP_PUBKEY;
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}
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if (!preverify_ok) {
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err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
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depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx);
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spice_warning("Error in server certificate verification: %s (num=%d:depth%d:%s)",
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X509_verify_cert_error_string(err), err, depth, buf);
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return 0;
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}
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if (!v->all_preverify_ok) {
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return 0;
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}
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if (v->verifyop & SPICE_SSL_VERIFY_OP_SUBJECT) {
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if (verify_subject(cert, v))
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return 1;
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else
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failed_verifications |= SPICE_SSL_VERIFY_OP_SUBJECT;
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} else if (v->verifyop & SPICE_SSL_VERIFY_OP_HOSTNAME) {
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if (verify_hostname(cert, v->hostname))
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return 1;
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else
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failed_verifications |= SPICE_SSL_VERIFY_OP_HOSTNAME;
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}
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/* If we reach this code, this means all the tests failed, thus
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* verification failed
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*/
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if (failed_verifications & SPICE_SSL_VERIFY_OP_PUBKEY)
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spice_warning("ssl: pubkey verification failed");
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if (failed_verifications & SPICE_SSL_VERIFY_OP_HOSTNAME)
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spice_warning("ssl: hostname '%s' verification failed", v->hostname);
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if (failed_verifications & SPICE_SSL_VERIFY_OP_SUBJECT)
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spice_warning("ssl: subject '%s' verification failed", v->subject);
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spice_warning("ssl: verification failed");
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return 0;
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}
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SpiceOpenSSLVerify* spice_openssl_verify_new(SSL *ssl, SPICE_SSL_VERIFY_OP verifyop,
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const char *hostname,
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const char *pubkey, size_t pubkey_size,
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|
const char *subject)
|
|
{
|
|
SpiceOpenSSLVerify *v;
|
|
|
|
if (!verifyop)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
v = spice_new0(SpiceOpenSSLVerify, 1);
|
|
|
|
v->ssl = ssl;
|
|
v->verifyop = verifyop;
|
|
v->hostname = spice_strdup(hostname);
|
|
v->pubkey = (char*)spice_memdup(pubkey, pubkey_size);
|
|
v->pubkey_size = pubkey_size;
|
|
v->subject = spice_strdup(subject);
|
|
|
|
v->all_preverify_ok = 1;
|
|
|
|
SSL_set_app_data(ssl, v);
|
|
SSL_set_verify(ssl,
|
|
SSL_VERIFY_PEER, openssl_verify);
|
|
|
|
return v;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void spice_openssl_verify_free(SpiceOpenSSLVerify* verify)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!verify)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
free(verify->pubkey);
|
|
free(verify->subject);
|
|
free(verify->hostname);
|
|
|
|
if (verify->ssl)
|
|
SSL_set_app_data(verify->ssl, NULL);
|
|
free(verify);
|
|
}
|