mirror of
https://git.proxmox.com/git/pve-access-control
synced 2025-10-04 05:09:24 +00:00
9590c6bdfe
using the new top-level `make tidy` target, which calls perltidy via our wrapper to enforce the desired style as closely as possible. Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
2099 lines
61 KiB
Perl
2099 lines
61 KiB
Perl
package PVE::AccessControl;
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use strict;
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use warnings;
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use Encode;
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use Crypt::OpenSSL::Random;
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use Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA;
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use Net::SSLeay;
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use Net::IP;
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use MIME::Base32;
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use MIME::Base64;
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use Digest::SHA;
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use IO::File;
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use File::stat;
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use JSON;
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use Scalar::Util 'weaken';
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use URI::Escape;
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use PVE::Exception qw(raise_perm_exc raise_param_exc);
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use PVE::OTP;
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use PVE::Ticket;
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use PVE::Tools qw(run_command lock_file file_get_contents split_list safe_print);
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use PVE::Cluster qw(cfs_register_file cfs_read_file cfs_write_file cfs_lock_file);
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use PVE::JSONSchema qw(register_standard_option get_standard_option);
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use PVE::RS::TFA;
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use PVE::Auth::Plugin;
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use PVE::Auth::AD;
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use PVE::Auth::LDAP;
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use PVE::Auth::PVE;
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use PVE::Auth::PAM;
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use PVE::Auth::OpenId;
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# load and initialize all plugins
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PVE::Auth::AD->register();
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PVE::Auth::LDAP->register();
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PVE::Auth::PVE->register();
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PVE::Auth::PAM->register();
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PVE::Auth::OpenId->register();
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PVE::Auth::Plugin->init();
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# $authdir must be writable by root only!
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my $confdir = "/etc/pve";
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my $authdir = "$confdir/priv";
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my $pve_www_key_fn = "$confdir/pve-www.key";
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my $pve_auth_key_files = {
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priv => "$authdir/authkey.key",
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pub => "$confdir/authkey.pub",
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pubold => "$confdir/authkey.pub.old",
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};
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my $pve_auth_key_cache = {};
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my $ticket_lifetime = 3600 * 2; # 2 hours
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my $auth_graceperiod = 60 * 5; # 5 minutes
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my $authkey_lifetime = 3600 * 24; # rotate every 24 hours
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Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA->import_random_seed();
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cfs_register_file('user.cfg', \&parse_user_config, \&write_user_config);
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cfs_register_file('priv/tfa.cfg', \&parse_priv_tfa_config, \&write_priv_tfa_config);
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sub verify_username {
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PVE::Auth::Plugin::verify_username(@_);
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}
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sub pve_verify_realm {
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PVE::Auth::Plugin::pve_verify_realm(@_);
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}
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# Locking both config files together is only ever allowed in one order:
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# 1) tfa config
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# 2) user config
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# If we permit the other way round, too, we might end up deadlocking!
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my $user_config_locked;
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sub lock_user_config {
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my ($code, $errmsg) = @_;
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my $locked = 1;
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$user_config_locked = \$locked;
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weaken $user_config_locked; # make this scope guard signal safe...
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cfs_lock_file("user.cfg", undef, $code);
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$user_config_locked = undef;
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if (my $err = $@) {
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$errmsg ? die "$errmsg: $err" : die $err;
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}
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}
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sub lock_tfa_config {
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my ($code, $errmsg) = @_;
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die "tfa config lock cannot be acquired while holding user config lock\n"
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if ($user_config_locked && $$user_config_locked);
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my $res = cfs_lock_file("priv/tfa.cfg", undef, $code);
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if (my $err = $@) {
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$errmsg ? die "$errmsg: $err" : die $err;
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}
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return $res;
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}
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my $cache_read_key = sub {
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my ($type) = @_;
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my $path = $pve_auth_key_files->{$type};
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my $read_key_and_mtime = sub {
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my $fh = IO::File->new($path, "r");
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return undef if !defined($fh);
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my $st = stat($fh);
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my $pem = PVE::Tools::safe_read_from($fh, 0, 0, $path);
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close $fh;
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my $key;
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if ($type eq 'pub' || $type eq 'pubold') {
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$key = eval { Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA->new_public_key($pem); };
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} elsif ($type eq 'priv') {
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$key = eval { Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA->new_private_key($pem); };
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} else {
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die "Invalid authkey type '$type'\n";
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}
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return { key => $key, mtime => $st->mtime };
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};
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if (!defined($pve_auth_key_cache->{$type})) {
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$pve_auth_key_cache->{$type} = $read_key_and_mtime->();
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} else {
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my $st = stat($path);
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if (!$st || $st->mtime != $pve_auth_key_cache->{$type}->{mtime}) {
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$pve_auth_key_cache->{$type} = $read_key_and_mtime->();
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}
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}
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return $pve_auth_key_cache->{$type};
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};
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sub get_pubkey {
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my ($old) = @_;
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my $type = $old ? 'pubold' : 'pub';
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my $res = $cache_read_key->($type);
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return undef if !defined($res);
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return wantarray ? ($res->{key}, $res->{mtime}) : $res->{key};
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}
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sub get_privkey {
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my $res = $cache_read_key->('priv');
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if (!defined($res) || !check_authkey(1)) {
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rotate_authkey();
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$res = $cache_read_key->('priv');
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}
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return wantarray ? ($res->{key}, $res->{mtime}) : $res->{key};
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}
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sub check_authkey {
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my ($quiet) = @_;
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# skip check if non-quorate, as rotation is not possible anyway
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return 1 if !PVE::Cluster::check_cfs_quorum(1);
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my ($pub_key, $mtime) = get_pubkey();
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if (!$pub_key) {
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warn "auth key pair missing, generating new one..\n" if !$quiet;
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return 0;
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} else {
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my $now = time();
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if ($now - $mtime >= $authkey_lifetime) {
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warn "auth key pair too old, rotating..\n" if !$quiet;
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return 0;
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} elsif ($mtime > $now + $auth_graceperiod) {
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# a nodes RTC had a time set in the future during key generation -> ticket
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# validity is clamped to 0+5 min grace period until now >= mtime again
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my (undef, $old_mtime) = get_pubkey(1);
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if ($old_mtime && $mtime >= $old_mtime && $mtime - $old_mtime < $ticket_lifetime) {
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warn "auth key pair generated in the future (key $mtime > host $now),"
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. " but old key still exists and in valid grace period so avoid automatic"
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. " fixup. Cluster time not in sync?\n"
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if !$quiet;
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return 1;
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}
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warn "auth key pair generated in the future (key $mtime > host $now), rotating..\n"
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if !$quiet;
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return 0;
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} else {
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warn "auth key new enough, skipping rotation\n" if !$quiet;
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return 1;
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}
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}
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}
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sub rotate_authkey {
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return if $authkey_lifetime == 0;
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PVE::Cluster::cfs_lock_authkey(
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undef,
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sub {
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# stat() calls might be answered from the kernel page cache for up to
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# 1s, so this special dance is needed to avoid a double rotation in
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# clusters *despite* the cfs_lock context..
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# drop in-process cache hash
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$pve_auth_key_cache = {};
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# force open/close of file to invalidate page cache entry
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get_pubkey();
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# now re-check with lock held and page cache invalidated so that stat()
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# does the right thing, and any key updates by other nodes are visible.
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return if check_authkey();
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my $old = get_pubkey();
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my $new = Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA->generate_key(2048);
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if ($old) {
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eval {
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my $pem = $old->get_public_key_x509_string();
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# mtime is used for caching and ticket age range calculation
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PVE::Tools::file_set_contents($pve_auth_key_files->{pubold}, $pem);
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};
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die "Failed to store old auth key: $@\n" if $@;
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}
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eval {
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my $pem = $new->get_public_key_x509_string();
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# mtime is used for caching and ticket age range calculation,
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# should be close to that of pubold above
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PVE::Tools::file_set_contents($pve_auth_key_files->{pub}, $pem);
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};
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if ($@) {
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if ($old) {
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warn "Failed to store new auth key - $@\n";
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warn "Reverting to previous auth key\n";
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eval {
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my $pem = $old->get_public_key_x509_string();
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PVE::Tools::file_set_contents($pve_auth_key_files->{pub}, $pem);
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};
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die "Failed to restore old auth key: $@\n" if $@;
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} else {
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die "Failed to store new auth key - $@\n";
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}
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}
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eval {
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my $pem = $new->get_private_key_string();
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PVE::Tools::file_set_contents($pve_auth_key_files->{priv}, $pem);
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};
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if ($@) {
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warn "Failed to store new auth key - $@\n";
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warn "Deleting auth key to force regeneration\n";
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unlink $pve_auth_key_files->{pub};
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unlink $pve_auth_key_files->{priv};
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}
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},
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);
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die $@ if $@;
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}
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PVE::JSONSchema::register_standard_option(
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'tokenid',
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{
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description => "API token identifier.",
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type => "string",
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format => "pve-tokenid",
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},
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);
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our $token_subid_regex = $PVE::Auth::Plugin::realm_regex;
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# username@realm username realm tokenid
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our $token_full_regex =
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qr/((${PVE::Auth::Plugin::user_regex})\@(${PVE::Auth::Plugin::realm_regex}))!(${token_subid_regex})/;
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our $userid_or_token_regex =
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qr/^$PVE::Auth::Plugin::user_regex\@$PVE::Auth::Plugin::realm_regex(?:!$token_subid_regex)?$/;
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sub split_tokenid {
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my ($tokenid, $noerr) = @_;
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if ($tokenid =~ /^${token_full_regex}$/) {
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return ($1, $4);
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}
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die "'$tokenid' is not a valid token ID - not able to split into user and token parts\n"
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if !$noerr;
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return undef;
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}
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sub join_tokenid {
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my ($username, $tokensubid) = @_;
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my $joined = "${username}!${tokensubid}";
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return pve_verify_tokenid($joined);
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}
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PVE::JSONSchema::register_format('pve-tokenid', \&pve_verify_tokenid);
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sub pve_verify_tokenid {
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my ($tokenid, $noerr) = @_;
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if ($tokenid =~ /^${token_full_regex}$/) {
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return wantarray ? ($tokenid, $2, $3, $4) : $tokenid;
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}
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die "value '$tokenid' does not look like a valid token ID\n" if !$noerr;
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return undef;
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}
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my $csrf_prevention_secret;
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my $csrf_prevention_secret_legacy;
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my $get_csrfr_secret = sub {
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if (!$csrf_prevention_secret) {
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my $input = PVE::Tools::file_get_contents($pve_www_key_fn);
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$csrf_prevention_secret = Digest::SHA::hmac_sha256_base64($input);
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$csrf_prevention_secret_legacy = Digest::SHA::sha1_base64($input);
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}
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return $csrf_prevention_secret;
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};
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sub assemble_csrf_prevention_token {
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my ($username) = @_;
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my $secret = &$get_csrfr_secret();
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return PVE::Ticket::assemble_csrf_prevention_token($secret, $username);
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}
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sub verify_csrf_prevention_token {
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my ($username, $token, $noerr) = @_;
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my $secret = $get_csrfr_secret->();
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# FIXME: remove with PVE 7 and/or refactor all into PVE::Ticket ?
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if ($token =~ m/^([A-Z0-9]{8}):(\S+)$/) {
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my $sig = $2;
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if (length($sig) == 27) {
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# the legacy secret got populated by above get_csrfr_secret call
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$secret = $csrf_prevention_secret_legacy;
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}
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}
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return PVE::Ticket::verify_csrf_prevention_token(
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$secret, $username, $token, -$auth_graceperiod, $ticket_lifetime, $noerr,
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);
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}
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my $get_ticket_age_range = sub {
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my ($now, $mtime, $rotated) = @_;
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my $key_age = $now - $mtime;
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$key_age = 0 if $key_age < 0;
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my $min = -$auth_graceperiod;
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my $max = $ticket_lifetime;
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if ($rotated) {
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# ticket creation after rotation is not allowed
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$min = $key_age - $auth_graceperiod;
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} else {
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if ($key_age > $authkey_lifetime && $authkey_lifetime > 0) {
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if (PVE::Cluster::check_cfs_quorum(1)) {
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# key should have been rotated, clamp range accordingly
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$min = $key_age - $authkey_lifetime;
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} else {
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warn "Cluster not quorate - extending auth key lifetime!\n";
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}
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}
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$max = $key_age + $auth_graceperiod if $key_age < $ticket_lifetime;
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}
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return undef if $min > $ticket_lifetime;
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return ($min, $max);
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};
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sub assemble_ticket : prototype($;$) {
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my ($data, $aad) = @_;
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my $rsa_priv = get_privkey();
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return PVE::Ticket::assemble_rsa_ticket($rsa_priv, 'PVE', $data, $aad);
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}
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# Returns the username, "age" and tfa info.
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#
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# Note that for the new-style outh, tfa info is never set, as it only uses the `/ticket` api call
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# via the new 'tfa-challenge' parameter, so this part can go with PVE-8.
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#
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# New-style auth still uses this function, but sets `$tfa_ticket` to true when validating the tfa
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# ticket.
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sub verify_ticket : prototype($;$$) {
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my ($ticket, $noerr, $tfa_ticket_aad) = @_;
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my $now = time();
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my $check = sub {
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my ($old) = @_;
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my ($rsa_pub, $rsa_mtime) = get_pubkey($old);
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return undef if !$rsa_pub;
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my ($min, $max) = $get_ticket_age_range->($now, $rsa_mtime, $old);
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return undef if !defined($min);
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return PVE::Ticket::verify_rsa_ticket($rsa_pub, 'PVE', $ticket, $tfa_ticket_aad, $min,
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$max, 1);
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};
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my ($data, $age) = $check->();
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# check with old, rotated key if current key failed
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($data, $age) = $check->(1) if !defined($data);
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my $auth_failure = sub {
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if ($noerr) {
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return undef;
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} else {
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# raise error via undef ticket
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PVE::Ticket::verify_rsa_ticket(undef, 'PVE');
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}
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};
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if (!defined($data)) {
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return $auth_failure->();
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}
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if ($tfa_ticket_aad) {
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# We're validating a ticket-call's 'tfa-challenge' parameter, so just return its data.
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if ($data =~ /^!tfa!(.*)$/) {
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return $1;
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}
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die "bad ticket\n";
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}
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my ($username, $tfa_info);
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if ($data =~ /^!tfa!(.*)$/) {
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# PBS style half-authenticated ticket, contains a json string form of a `TfaChallenge`
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# object.
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# This type of ticket does not contain the user name.
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return { type => 'new', data => $1 };
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}
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if ($data =~ m{^u2f!([^!]+)!([0-9a-zA-Z/.=_\-+]+)$}) {
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# Ticket for u2f-users:
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($username, my $challenge) = ($1, $2);
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if ($challenge eq 'verified') {
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# u2f challenge was completed
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$challenge = undef;
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} elsif (!wantarray) {
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# The caller is not aware there could be an ongoing challenge,
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# so we treat this ticket as invalid:
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return $auth_failure->();
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}
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$tfa_info = {
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type => 'u2f',
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challenge => $challenge,
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};
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} elsif ($data =~ /^tfa!(.*)$/) {
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# TOTP and Yubico don't require a challenge so this is the generic
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# 'missing 2nd factor ticket'
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$username = $1;
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$tfa_info = { type => 'tfa' };
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} else {
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# Regular ticket (full access)
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$username = $data;
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}
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return undef if !PVE::Auth::Plugin::verify_username($username, $noerr);
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return wantarray ? ($username, $age, $tfa_info) : $username;
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}
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sub verify_token {
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my ($api_token) = @_;
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die "no API token specified\n" if !$api_token;
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my ($tokenid, $value);
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if ($api_token =~ /^(.*)=(.*)$/) {
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$tokenid = $1;
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$value = $2;
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} else {
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die "no tokenid specified\n";
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}
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my ($username, $token) = split_tokenid($tokenid);
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|
|
my $usercfg = cfs_read_file('user.cfg');
|
|
check_user_enabled($usercfg, $username);
|
|
check_token_exist($usercfg, $username, $token);
|
|
|
|
my $user = $usercfg->{users}->{$username};
|
|
my $token_info = $user->{tokens}->{$token};
|
|
|
|
my $ctime = time();
|
|
die "token '$token' access expired\n"
|
|
if $token_info->{expire} && ($token_info->{expire} < $ctime);
|
|
|
|
die "invalid token value!\n" if !PVE::Cluster::verify_token($tokenid, $value);
|
|
|
|
return wantarray ? ($tokenid) : $tokenid;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
my $assemble_short_lived_ticket = sub {
|
|
my ($prefix, $username, $path) = @_;
|
|
|
|
my $rsa_priv = get_privkey();
|
|
|
|
$path = normalize_path($path);
|
|
|
|
die "invalid ticket path\n" if !defined($path);
|
|
|
|
my $secret_data = "$username:$path";
|
|
|
|
return PVE::Ticket::assemble_rsa_ticket($rsa_priv, $prefix, undef, $secret_data);
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
my $verify_short_lived_ticket = sub {
|
|
my ($ticket, $prefix, $username, $path, $noerr) = @_;
|
|
|
|
$path = normalize_path($path);
|
|
|
|
die "invalid ticket path\n" if !defined($path);
|
|
|
|
my $secret_data = "$username:$path";
|
|
|
|
my ($rsa_pub, $rsa_mtime) = get_pubkey();
|
|
if (!$rsa_pub || (time() - $rsa_mtime > $authkey_lifetime && $authkey_lifetime > 0)) {
|
|
if ($noerr) {
|
|
return undef;
|
|
} else {
|
|
# raise error via undef ticket
|
|
PVE::Ticket::verify_rsa_ticket($rsa_pub, $prefix);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return PVE::Ticket::verify_rsa_ticket($rsa_pub, $prefix, $ticket, $secret_data, -20, 40,
|
|
$noerr);
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
# VNC tickets
|
|
# - they do not contain the username in plain text
|
|
# - they are restricted to a specific resource path (example: '/vms/100')
|
|
sub assemble_vnc_ticket {
|
|
my ($username, $path) = @_;
|
|
|
|
return $assemble_short_lived_ticket->('PVEVNC', $username, $path);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sub verify_vnc_ticket {
|
|
my ($ticket, $username, $path, $noerr) = @_;
|
|
|
|
return $verify_short_lived_ticket->($ticket, 'PVEVNC', $username, $path, $noerr);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Tunnel tickets
|
|
# - they do not contain the username in plain text
|
|
# - they are restricted to a specific resource path (example: '/vms/100', '/socket/run/qemu-server/123.storage')
|
|
sub assemble_tunnel_ticket {
|
|
my ($username, $path) = @_;
|
|
|
|
return $assemble_short_lived_ticket->('PVETUNNEL', $username, $path);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sub verify_tunnel_ticket {
|
|
my ($ticket, $username, $path, $noerr) = @_;
|
|
|
|
return $verify_short_lived_ticket->($ticket, 'PVETUNNEL', $username, $path, $noerr);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sub assemble_spice_ticket {
|
|
my ($username, $vmid, $node) = @_;
|
|
|
|
my $secret = &$get_csrfr_secret();
|
|
|
|
return PVE::Ticket::assemble_spice_ticket($secret, $username, $vmid, $node);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sub verify_spice_connect_url {
|
|
my ($connect_str) = @_;
|
|
|
|
my $secret = &$get_csrfr_secret();
|
|
|
|
return PVE::Ticket::verify_spice_connect_url($secret, $connect_str);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sub read_x509_subject_spice {
|
|
my ($filename) = @_;
|
|
|
|
# read x509 subject
|
|
my $bio = Net::SSLeay::BIO_new_file($filename, 'r');
|
|
die "Could not open $filename using OpenSSL\n"
|
|
if !$bio;
|
|
|
|
my $x509 = Net::SSLeay::PEM_read_bio_X509($bio);
|
|
Net::SSLeay::BIO_free($bio);
|
|
|
|
die "Could not parse X509 certificate in $filename\n"
|
|
if !$x509;
|
|
|
|
my $nameobj = Net::SSLeay::X509_get_subject_name($x509);
|
|
my $subject = Net::SSLeay::X509_NAME_oneline($nameobj);
|
|
Net::SSLeay::X509_free($x509);
|
|
|
|
# remote-viewer wants comma as separator (not '/')
|
|
$subject =~ s!^/!!;
|
|
$subject =~ s!/(\w+=)!,$1!g;
|
|
|
|
return $subject;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# helper to generate SPICE remote-viewer configuration
|
|
sub remote_viewer_config {
|
|
my ($authuser, $vmid, $node, $proxy, $title, $port) = @_;
|
|
|
|
if (!$proxy) {
|
|
my $host = `hostname -f` || PVE::INotify::nodename();
|
|
chomp $host;
|
|
$proxy = $host;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
my ($ticket, $proxyticket) = assemble_spice_ticket($authuser, $vmid, $node);
|
|
|
|
my $filename = "/etc/pve/local/pve-ssl.pem";
|
|
my $subject = read_x509_subject_spice($filename);
|
|
|
|
my $cacert = PVE::Tools::file_get_contents("/etc/pve/pve-root-ca.pem", 8192);
|
|
$cacert =~ s/\n/\\n/g;
|
|
|
|
$proxy = "[$proxy]" if Net::IP::ip_is_ipv6($proxy);
|
|
my $config = {
|
|
'secure-attention' => "Ctrl+Alt+Ins",
|
|
'toggle-fullscreen' => "Shift+F11",
|
|
'release-cursor' => "Ctrl+Alt+R",
|
|
type => 'spice',
|
|
title => $title,
|
|
host => $proxyticket, # this breaks tls hostname verification, so we need to use 'host-subject'
|
|
proxy => "http://$proxy:3128",
|
|
'tls-port' => $port,
|
|
'host-subject' => $subject,
|
|
ca => $cacert,
|
|
password => $ticket,
|
|
'delete-this-file' => 1,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
return ($ticket, $proxyticket, $config);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sub check_user_exist {
|
|
my ($usercfg, $username, $noerr) = @_;
|
|
|
|
$username = PVE::Auth::Plugin::verify_username($username, $noerr);
|
|
return undef if !$username;
|
|
|
|
return $usercfg->{users}->{$username} if $usercfg && $usercfg->{users}->{$username};
|
|
|
|
die "no such user ('$username')\n" if !$noerr;
|
|
|
|
return undef;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sub check_user_enabled {
|
|
my ($usercfg, $username, $noerr) = @_;
|
|
|
|
my $data = check_user_exist($usercfg, $username, $noerr);
|
|
return undef if !$data;
|
|
|
|
if (!$data->{enable}) {
|
|
die "user '$username' is disabled\n" if !$noerr;
|
|
return undef;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
my $ctime = time();
|
|
my $expire = $usercfg->{users}->{$username}->{expire};
|
|
|
|
if ($expire && $expire < $ctime) {
|
|
die "user '$username' access expired\n" if !$noerr;
|
|
return undef;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1; # enabled and not expired
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sub check_token_exist {
|
|
my ($usercfg, $username, $tokenid, $noerr) = @_;
|
|
|
|
my $user = check_user_exist($usercfg, $username, $noerr);
|
|
return undef if !$user;
|
|
|
|
return $user->{tokens}->{$tokenid}
|
|
if defined($user->{tokens}) && $user->{tokens}->{$tokenid};
|
|
|
|
die "no such token '$tokenid' for user '$username'\n" if !$noerr;
|
|
|
|
return undef;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# deprecated
|
|
sub verify_one_time_pw {
|
|
my ($type, $username, $keys, $tfa_cfg, $otp) = @_;
|
|
|
|
die "missing one time password for two-factor authentication '$type'\n" if !$otp;
|
|
|
|
# fixme: proxy support?
|
|
my $proxy;
|
|
|
|
if ($type eq 'yubico') {
|
|
PVE::OTP::yubico_verify_otp(
|
|
$otp, $keys, $tfa_cfg->{url}, $tfa_cfg->{id}, $tfa_cfg->{key}, $proxy,
|
|
);
|
|
} elsif ($type eq 'oath') {
|
|
PVE::OTP::oath_verify_otp($otp, $keys, $tfa_cfg->{step}, $tfa_cfg->{digits});
|
|
} else {
|
|
die "unknown tfa type '$type'\n";
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# password should be utf8 encoded
|
|
# Note: some plugins delay/sleep if auth fails
|
|
sub authenticate_user : prototype($$$;$) {
|
|
my ($username, $password, $otp, $tfa_challenge) = @_;
|
|
|
|
die "no username specified\n" if !$username;
|
|
|
|
my ($ruid, $realm);
|
|
|
|
($username, $ruid, $realm) = PVE::Auth::Plugin::verify_username($username);
|
|
|
|
my $usercfg = cfs_read_file('user.cfg');
|
|
|
|
check_user_enabled($usercfg, $username);
|
|
|
|
my $domain_cfg = cfs_read_file('domains.cfg');
|
|
|
|
my $cfg = $domain_cfg->{ids}->{$realm};
|
|
die "auth domain '$realm' does not exist\n" if !$cfg;
|
|
my $plugin = PVE::Auth::Plugin->lookup($cfg->{type});
|
|
|
|
if ($tfa_challenge) {
|
|
# This is the 2nd factor, use the password for the OTP response.
|
|
my $tfa_challenge = authenticate_2nd_new($username, $realm, $password, $tfa_challenge);
|
|
return wantarray ? ($username, $tfa_challenge) : $username;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
$plugin->authenticate_user($cfg, $realm, $ruid, $password);
|
|
|
|
# This is the first factor with an optional immediate 2nd factor for TOTP:
|
|
$tfa_challenge = authenticate_2nd_new($username, $realm, $otp, undef);
|
|
return wantarray ? ($username, $tfa_challenge) : $username;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sub authenticate_2nd_new_do : prototype($$$$) {
|
|
my ($username, $realm, $tfa_response, $tfa_challenge) = @_;
|
|
my ($tfa_cfg, $realm_tfa) = user_get_tfa($username, $realm);
|
|
|
|
# FIXME: `$tfa_cfg` is now usually never undef - use cheap check for
|
|
# whether the user has *any* entries here instead whe it is available in
|
|
# pve-rs
|
|
if (!defined($tfa_cfg)) {
|
|
return undef;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
my $realm_type = $realm_tfa && $realm_tfa->{type};
|
|
# verify realm type unless using recovery keys:
|
|
if (defined($realm_type)) {
|
|
$realm_type = 'totp' if $realm_type eq 'oath'; # we used to call it that
|
|
if ($realm_type eq 'yubico') {
|
|
# Yubico auth will not be supported in rust for now...
|
|
if (!defined($tfa_challenge)) {
|
|
my $challenge = { yubico => JSON::true };
|
|
# Even with yubico auth we do allow recovery keys to be used:
|
|
if (my $recovery = $tfa_cfg->recovery_state($username)) {
|
|
$challenge->{recovery} = $recovery;
|
|
}
|
|
return to_json($challenge);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ($tfa_response =~ /^yubico:(.*)$/) {
|
|
$tfa_response = $1;
|
|
# Defer to after unlocking the TFA config:
|
|
return sub {
|
|
authenticate_yubico_new(
|
|
$tfa_cfg, $username, $realm_tfa, $tfa_challenge, $tfa_response,
|
|
);
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
my $response_type;
|
|
if (defined($tfa_response)) {
|
|
if ($tfa_response !~ /^([^:]+):/) {
|
|
die "bad otp response\n";
|
|
}
|
|
$response_type = $1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
die "realm requires $realm_type authentication\n"
|
|
if $response_type && $response_type ne 'recovery' && $response_type ne $realm_type;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
configure_u2f_and_wa($tfa_cfg);
|
|
|
|
my ($result, $tfa_done);
|
|
if (defined($tfa_challenge)) {
|
|
$tfa_done = 1;
|
|
$tfa_challenge = verify_ticket($tfa_challenge, 0, $username);
|
|
$result = $tfa_cfg->authentication_verify2($username, $tfa_challenge, $tfa_response);
|
|
$tfa_challenge = undef;
|
|
} else {
|
|
$tfa_challenge = $tfa_cfg->authentication_challenge($username);
|
|
|
|
die "missing required 2nd keys\n"
|
|
if $realm_tfa && !defined($tfa_challenge);
|
|
|
|
if (defined($tfa_response)) {
|
|
if (defined($tfa_challenge)) {
|
|
$tfa_done = 1;
|
|
$result =
|
|
$tfa_cfg->authentication_verify2($username, $tfa_challenge, $tfa_response);
|
|
} else {
|
|
die "no such challenge\n";
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ($tfa_done) {
|
|
if (!$result) {
|
|
# authentication_verify2 somehow returned undef - should be unreachable
|
|
die "2nd factor failed\n";
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ($result->{'needs-saving'}) {
|
|
cfs_write_file('priv/tfa.cfg', $tfa_cfg);
|
|
}
|
|
if ($result->{'totp-limit-reached'}) {
|
|
# FIXME: send mail to the user (or admin/root if no email configured)
|
|
die "failed 2nd factor: TOTP limit reached, locked\n";
|
|
}
|
|
if ($result->{'tfa-limit-reached'}) {
|
|
# FIXME: send mail to the user (or admin/root if no email configured)
|
|
die "failed 1nd factor: TFA limit reached, user locked out\n";
|
|
}
|
|
if (!$result->{result}) {
|
|
die "failed 2nd factor\n";
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return $tfa_challenge;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Returns a tfa challenge or undef.
|
|
sub authenticate_2nd_new : prototype($$$$) {
|
|
my ($username, $realm, $tfa_response, $tfa_challenge) = @_;
|
|
|
|
my $result;
|
|
|
|
if (defined($tfa_response) && $tfa_response =~ m/^recovery:/) {
|
|
$result = lock_tfa_config(sub {
|
|
authenticate_2nd_new_do($username, $realm, $tfa_response, $tfa_challenge);
|
|
});
|
|
} else {
|
|
$result = authenticate_2nd_new_do($username, $realm, $tfa_response, $tfa_challenge);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Yubico auth returns the authentication sub:
|
|
if (ref($result) eq 'CODE') {
|
|
$result = $result->();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return $result;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sub authenticate_yubico_new : prototype($$$) {
|
|
my ($tfa_cfg, $username, $realm, $tfa_challenge, $otp) = @_;
|
|
|
|
$tfa_challenge = verify_ticket($tfa_challenge, 0, $username);
|
|
$tfa_challenge = from_json($tfa_challenge);
|
|
|
|
if (!$tfa_challenge->{yubico}) {
|
|
die "no such challenge\n";
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
my $keys = $tfa_cfg->get_yubico_keys($username);
|
|
die "no keys configured\n" if !defined($keys) || !length($keys);
|
|
|
|
authenticate_yubico_do($otp, $keys, $realm);
|
|
|
|
# return `undef` to clear the tfa challenge.
|
|
return undef;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sub authenticate_yubico_do : prototype($$$) {
|
|
my ($value, $keys, $realm) = @_;
|
|
|
|
# fixme: proxy support?
|
|
my $proxy = undef;
|
|
|
|
PVE::OTP::yubico_verify_otp($value, $keys, $realm->{url}, $realm->{id}, $realm->{key}, $proxy);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sub configure_u2f_and_wa : prototype($) {
|
|
my ($tfa_cfg) = @_;
|
|
|
|
my $rpc_origin;
|
|
my $get_origin = sub {
|
|
return $rpc_origin if defined($rpc_origin);
|
|
my $rpcenv = PVE::RPCEnvironment::get();
|
|
if (my $origin = $rpcenv->get_request_host(1)) {
|
|
$rpc_origin = "https://$origin";
|
|
return $rpc_origin;
|
|
}
|
|
die "failed to figure out origin\n";
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
my $dc = cfs_read_file('datacenter.cfg');
|
|
if (my $u2f = $dc->{u2f}) {
|
|
eval {
|
|
$tfa_cfg->set_u2f_config({
|
|
origin => $u2f->{origin} // $get_origin->(),
|
|
appid => $u2f->{appid},
|
|
});
|
|
};
|
|
warn "u2f unavailable, configuration error: $@\n" if $@;
|
|
}
|
|
if (my $wa = $dc->{webauthn}) {
|
|
$wa->{origin} //= $get_origin->();
|
|
eval { $tfa_cfg->set_webauthn_config({%$wa}) };
|
|
warn "webauthn unavailable, configuration error: $@\n" if $@;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sub domain_set_password {
|
|
my ($realm, $username, $password) = @_;
|
|
|
|
die "no auth domain specified" if !$realm;
|
|
|
|
my $domain_cfg = cfs_read_file('domains.cfg');
|
|
|
|
my $cfg = $domain_cfg->{ids}->{$realm};
|
|
die "auth domain '$realm' does not exist\n" if !$cfg;
|
|
my $plugin = PVE::Auth::Plugin->lookup($cfg->{type});
|
|
$plugin->store_password($cfg, $realm, $username, $password);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sub iterate_acl_tree {
|
|
my ($path, $node, $code) = @_;
|
|
|
|
$code->($path, $node);
|
|
|
|
$path = '' if $path eq '/'; # avoid leading '//'
|
|
|
|
my $children = $node->{children};
|
|
|
|
foreach my $child (sort keys %$children) {
|
|
iterate_acl_tree("$path/$child", $children->{$child}, $code);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# find ACL node corresponding to normalized $path under $root
|
|
sub find_acl_tree_node {
|
|
my ($root, $path) = @_;
|
|
|
|
my $split_path = [split("/", $path)];
|
|
|
|
if (!$split_path) {
|
|
return $root;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
my $node = $root;
|
|
for my $p (@$split_path) {
|
|
next if !$p;
|
|
|
|
$node->{children} = {} if !$node->{children};
|
|
$node->{children}->{$p} = {} if !$node->{children}->{$p};
|
|
|
|
$node = $node->{children}->{$p};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return $node;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sub add_user_group {
|
|
my ($username, $usercfg, $group) = @_;
|
|
|
|
$usercfg->{users}->{$username}->{groups}->{$group} = 1;
|
|
$usercfg->{groups}->{$group}->{users}->{$username} = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sub delete_user_group {
|
|
my ($username, $usercfg) = @_;
|
|
|
|
foreach my $group (keys %{ $usercfg->{groups} }) {
|
|
|
|
delete($usercfg->{groups}->{$group}->{users}->{$username})
|
|
if $usercfg->{groups}->{$group}->{users}->{$username};
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sub delete_user_acl {
|
|
my ($username, $usercfg) = @_;
|
|
|
|
my $code = sub {
|
|
my ($path, $acl_node) = @_;
|
|
|
|
delete($acl_node->{users}->{$username})
|
|
if $acl_node->{users}->{$username};
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
iterate_acl_tree("/", $usercfg->{acl_root}, $code);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sub delete_group_acl {
|
|
my ($group, $usercfg) = @_;
|
|
|
|
my $code = sub {
|
|
my ($path, $acl_node) = @_;
|
|
|
|
delete($acl_node->{groups}->{$group})
|
|
if $acl_node->{groups}->{$group};
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
iterate_acl_tree("/", $usercfg->{acl_root}, $code);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sub delete_pool_acl {
|
|
my ($pool, $usercfg) = @_;
|
|
|
|
delete($usercfg->{acl_root}->{children}->{pool}->{children}->{$pool});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# we automatically create some predefined roles by splitting privs
|
|
# into 3 groups (per category)
|
|
# root: only root is allowed to do that
|
|
# admin: an administrator can to that
|
|
# user: a normal user/customer can to that
|
|
my $privgroups = {
|
|
VM => {
|
|
root => [],
|
|
admin => [
|
|
'VM.Config.Disk',
|
|
'VM.Config.CPU',
|
|
'VM.Config.Memory',
|
|
'VM.Config.Network',
|
|
'VM.Config.HWType',
|
|
'VM.Config.Options', # covers all other things
|
|
'VM.Allocate',
|
|
'VM.Clone',
|
|
'VM.Migrate',
|
|
'VM.Monitor',
|
|
'VM.Snapshot',
|
|
'VM.Snapshot.Rollback',
|
|
],
|
|
user => [
|
|
'VM.Config.CDROM', # change CDROM media
|
|
'VM.Config.Cloudinit',
|
|
'VM.Console',
|
|
'VM.Backup',
|
|
'VM.PowerMgmt',
|
|
],
|
|
audit => [
|
|
'VM.Audit',
|
|
],
|
|
},
|
|
Sys => {
|
|
root => [
|
|
'Sys.PowerMgmt',
|
|
'Sys.Modify', # edit/change node settings
|
|
'Sys.Incoming', # incoming storage/guest migrations
|
|
'Sys.AccessNetwork', # for, e.g., downloading ISOs from any URL
|
|
],
|
|
admin => [
|
|
'Sys.Console', 'Sys.Syslog',
|
|
],
|
|
user => [],
|
|
audit => [
|
|
'Sys.Audit',
|
|
],
|
|
},
|
|
Datastore => {
|
|
root => [],
|
|
admin => [
|
|
'Datastore.Allocate', 'Datastore.AllocateTemplate',
|
|
],
|
|
user => [
|
|
'Datastore.AllocateSpace',
|
|
],
|
|
audit => [
|
|
'Datastore.Audit',
|
|
],
|
|
},
|
|
SDN => {
|
|
root => [],
|
|
admin => [
|
|
'SDN.Allocate', 'SDN.Audit',
|
|
],
|
|
user => [
|
|
'SDN.Use',
|
|
],
|
|
audit => [
|
|
'SDN.Audit',
|
|
],
|
|
},
|
|
User => {
|
|
root => [
|
|
'Realm.Allocate',
|
|
],
|
|
admin => [
|
|
'User.Modify',
|
|
'Group.Allocate', # edit/change group settings
|
|
'Realm.AllocateUser',
|
|
],
|
|
user => [],
|
|
audit => [],
|
|
},
|
|
Pool => {
|
|
root => [],
|
|
admin => [
|
|
'Pool.Allocate', # create/delete pools
|
|
],
|
|
user => [
|
|
'Pool.Audit',
|
|
],
|
|
audit => [
|
|
'Pool.Audit',
|
|
],
|
|
},
|
|
Mapping => {
|
|
root => [],
|
|
admin => [
|
|
'Mapping.Modify',
|
|
],
|
|
user => [
|
|
'Mapping.Use',
|
|
],
|
|
audit => [
|
|
'Mapping.Audit',
|
|
],
|
|
},
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
my $valid_privs = {
|
|
'Permissions.Modify' => 1, # not contained in a group
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
my $special_roles = {
|
|
'NoAccess' => {}, # no privileges
|
|
'Administrator' => $valid_privs, # all privileges
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
sub create_roles {
|
|
|
|
for my $cat (keys %$privgroups) {
|
|
my $cd = $privgroups->{$cat};
|
|
# create map to easily check if a privilege is valid
|
|
for my $priv (@{ $cd->{root} }, @{ $cd->{admin} }, @{ $cd->{user} }, @{ $cd->{audit} }) {
|
|
$valid_privs->{$priv} = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
# create grouped admin roles and PVEAdmin
|
|
for my $priv (@{ $cd->{admin} }, @{ $cd->{user} }, @{ $cd->{audit} }) {
|
|
$special_roles->{"PVE${cat}Admin"}->{$priv} = 1;
|
|
$special_roles->{"PVEAdmin"}->{$priv} = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
# create grouped user and audit roles
|
|
if (scalar(@{ $cd->{user} })) {
|
|
for my $priv (@{ $cd->{user} }, @{ $cd->{audit} }) {
|
|
$special_roles->{"PVE${cat}User"}->{$priv} = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
for my $priv (@{ $cd->{audit} }) {
|
|
$special_roles->{"PVEAuditor"}->{$priv} = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# remove Mapping.Modify from PVEAdmin, only Administrator, root@pam and
|
|
# PVEMappingAdmin should be able to use that for now
|
|
delete $special_roles->{"PVEAdmin"}->{"Mapping.Modify"};
|
|
|
|
$special_roles->{"PVETemplateUser"} = { 'VM.Clone' => 1, 'VM.Audit' => 1 };
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
create_roles();
|
|
|
|
sub create_priv_properties {
|
|
my $properties = {};
|
|
foreach my $priv (keys %$valid_privs) {
|
|
$properties->{$priv} = {
|
|
type => 'boolean',
|
|
optional => 1,
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
return $properties;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sub role_is_special {
|
|
my ($role) = @_;
|
|
return (exists $special_roles->{$role}) ? 1 : 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sub add_role_privs {
|
|
my ($role, $usercfg, $privs) = @_;
|
|
|
|
return if !$privs;
|
|
|
|
die "role '$role' does not exist\n" if !$usercfg->{roles}->{$role};
|
|
|
|
foreach my $priv (split_list($privs)) {
|
|
if (defined($valid_privs->{$priv})) {
|
|
$usercfg->{roles}->{$role}->{$priv} = 1;
|
|
} else {
|
|
die "invalid privilege '$priv'\n";
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sub lookup_username {
|
|
my ($username, $noerr) = @_;
|
|
|
|
$username =~ m!^(${PVE::Auth::Plugin::user_regex})\@(${PVE::Auth::Plugin::realm_regex})$!;
|
|
|
|
my $realm = $2;
|
|
my $domain_cfg = cfs_read_file("domains.cfg");
|
|
my $casesensitive = $domain_cfg->{ids}->{$realm}->{'case-sensitive'} // 1;
|
|
|
|
if (!$casesensitive) {
|
|
my $usercfg = cfs_read_file('user.cfg');
|
|
my @matches = grep { lc $username eq lc $_ } (keys %{ $usercfg->{users} });
|
|
|
|
die
|
|
"ambiguous case insensitive match of username '$username', cannot safely grant access!\n"
|
|
if scalar @matches > 1 && !$noerr;
|
|
|
|
return $matches[0] if defined($matches[0]);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return $username;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sub normalize_path {
|
|
my $path = shift;
|
|
|
|
return undef if !$path;
|
|
|
|
$path =~ s|/+|/|g;
|
|
|
|
$path =~ s|/$||;
|
|
|
|
$path = '/' if !$path;
|
|
|
|
$path = "/$path" if $path !~ m|^/|;
|
|
|
|
return undef if $path !~ m|^[[:alnum:]\.\-\_\/]+$|;
|
|
|
|
return $path;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sub check_path {
|
|
my ($path) = @_;
|
|
return $path =~ m!^(
|
|
/
|
|
|/access
|
|
|/access/groups
|
|
|/access/groups/[[:alnum:]\.\-\_]+
|
|
|/access/realm
|
|
|/access/realm/[[:alnum:]\.\-\_]+
|
|
|/nodes
|
|
|/nodes/[[:alnum:]\.\-\_]+
|
|
|/pool
|
|
|/pool/[A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+(?:/[A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+){0,2}
|
|
|/sdn
|
|
|/sdn/controllers
|
|
|/sdn/controllers/[[:alnum:]\_\-]+
|
|
|/sdn/dns
|
|
|/sdn/dns/[[:alnum:]]+
|
|
|/sdn/ipams
|
|
|/sdn/ipams/[[:alnum:]]+
|
|
|/sdn/zones
|
|
|/sdn/zones/[[:alnum:]\.\-\_]+
|
|
|/sdn/zones/[[:alnum:]\.\-\_]+/[[:alnum:]\.\-\_]+
|
|
|/sdn/zones/[[:alnum:]\.\-\_]+/[[:alnum:]\.\-\_]+/[1-9][0-9]{0,3}
|
|
|/storage
|
|
|/storage/[[:alnum:]\.\-\_]+
|
|
|/vms
|
|
|/vms/[1-9][0-9]{2,}
|
|
|/mapping
|
|
|/mapping/[[:alnum:]\.\-\_]+
|
|
|/mapping/[[:alnum:]\.\-\_]+/[[:alnum:]\.\-\_]+
|
|
)$!xs;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
PVE::JSONSchema::register_format('pve-groupid', \&verify_groupname);
|
|
|
|
sub verify_groupname {
|
|
my ($groupname, $noerr) = @_;
|
|
|
|
if ($groupname !~ m/^[$PVE::Auth::Plugin::groupname_regex_chars]+$/) {
|
|
|
|
die "group name '$groupname' contains invalid characters\n" if !$noerr;
|
|
|
|
return undef;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return $groupname;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
PVE::JSONSchema::register_format('pve-roleid', \&verify_rolename);
|
|
|
|
sub verify_rolename {
|
|
my ($rolename, $noerr) = @_;
|
|
|
|
if ($rolename !~ m/^[A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+$/) {
|
|
|
|
die "role name '$rolename' contains invalid characters\n" if !$noerr;
|
|
|
|
return undef;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return $rolename;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
PVE::JSONSchema::register_format('pve-poolid', \&verify_poolname);
|
|
|
|
sub verify_poolname {
|
|
my ($poolname, $noerr) = @_;
|
|
|
|
if (split("/", $poolname) > 3) {
|
|
die "pool name '$poolname' nested too deeply (max levels = 3)\n" if !$noerr;
|
|
|
|
return undef;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# also adapt check_path above if changed!
|
|
if ($poolname !~ m!^[A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+(?:/[A-Za-z0-9\.\-_]+){0,2}$!) {
|
|
die "pool name '$poolname' contains invalid characters\n" if !$noerr;
|
|
|
|
return undef;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return $poolname;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
PVE::JSONSchema::register_format('pve-priv', \&verify_privname);
|
|
|
|
sub verify_privname {
|
|
my ($priv, $noerr) = @_;
|
|
|
|
if (!$valid_privs->{$priv}) {
|
|
die "invalid privilege '$priv'\n" if !$noerr;
|
|
|
|
return undef;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return $priv;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sub userconfig_force_defaults {
|
|
my ($cfg) = @_;
|
|
|
|
foreach my $r (keys %$special_roles) {
|
|
$cfg->{roles}->{$r} = $special_roles->{$r};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# add root user if not exists
|
|
if (!$cfg->{users}->{'root@pam'}) {
|
|
$cfg->{users}->{'root@pam'}->{enable} = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# add (empty) ACL tree root node
|
|
if (!$cfg->{acl_root}) {
|
|
$cfg->{acl_root} = {};
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sub parse_user_config {
|
|
my ($filename, $raw) = @_;
|
|
|
|
my $cfg = {};
|
|
|
|
userconfig_force_defaults($cfg);
|
|
|
|
$raw = '' if !defined($raw);
|
|
while ($raw =~ /^\s*(.+?)\s*$/gm) {
|
|
my $line = $1;
|
|
my @data;
|
|
|
|
foreach my $d (split(/:/, $line)) {
|
|
$d =~ s/^\s+//;
|
|
$d =~ s/\s+$//;
|
|
push @data, $d;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
my $et = shift @data;
|
|
|
|
if ($et eq 'user') {
|
|
my ($user, $enable, $expire, $firstname, $lastname, $email, $comment, $keys) = @data;
|
|
|
|
my (undef, undef, $realm) = PVE::Auth::Plugin::verify_username($user, 1);
|
|
if (!$realm) {
|
|
warn "user config - ignore user '$user' - invalid user name\n";
|
|
next;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
$enable = $enable ? 1 : 0;
|
|
|
|
$expire = 0 if !$expire;
|
|
|
|
if ($expire !~ m/^\d+$/) {
|
|
warn
|
|
"user config - ignore user '$user' - (illegal characters in expire '$expire')\n";
|
|
next;
|
|
}
|
|
$expire = int($expire);
|
|
|
|
#if (!verify_groupname ($group, 1)) {
|
|
# warn "user config - ignore user '$user' - invalid characters in group name\n";
|
|
# next;
|
|
#}
|
|
|
|
$cfg->{users}->{$user} = {
|
|
enable => $enable,
|
|
# group => $group,
|
|
};
|
|
$cfg->{users}->{$user}->{firstname} = PVE::Tools::decode_text($firstname) if $firstname;
|
|
$cfg->{users}->{$user}->{lastname} = PVE::Tools::decode_text($lastname) if $lastname;
|
|
$cfg->{users}->{$user}->{email} = $email;
|
|
$cfg->{users}->{$user}->{comment} = PVE::Tools::decode_text($comment) if $comment;
|
|
$cfg->{users}->{$user}->{expire} = $expire;
|
|
# keys: allowed yubico key ids or oath secrets (base32 encoded)
|
|
$cfg->{users}->{$user}->{keys} = $keys if $keys;
|
|
|
|
#$cfg->{users}->{$user}->{groups}->{$group} = 1;
|
|
#$cfg->{groups}->{$group}->{$user} = 1;
|
|
|
|
} elsif ($et eq 'group') {
|
|
my ($group, $userlist, $comment) = @data;
|
|
|
|
if (!verify_groupname($group, 1)) {
|
|
warn "user config - ignore group '$group' - invalid characters in group name\n";
|
|
next;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# make sure to add the group (even if there are no members)
|
|
$cfg->{groups}->{$group} = { users => {} } if !$cfg->{groups}->{$group};
|
|
|
|
$cfg->{groups}->{$group}->{comment} = PVE::Tools::decode_text($comment) if $comment;
|
|
|
|
foreach my $user (split_list($userlist)) {
|
|
|
|
if (!PVE::Auth::Plugin::verify_username($user, 1)) {
|
|
warn "user config - ignore invalid group member '$user'\n";
|
|
next;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ($cfg->{users}->{$user}) { # user exists
|
|
$cfg->{users}->{$user}->{groups}->{$group} = 1;
|
|
} else {
|
|
warn "user config - ignore invalid group member '$user'\n";
|
|
}
|
|
$cfg->{groups}->{$group}->{users}->{$user} = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} elsif ($et eq 'role') {
|
|
my ($role, $privlist) = @data;
|
|
|
|
if (!verify_rolename($role, 1)) {
|
|
warn "user config - ignore role '$role' - invalid characters in role name\n";
|
|
next;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# make sure to add the role (even if there are no privileges)
|
|
$cfg->{roles}->{$role} = {} if !$cfg->{roles}->{$role};
|
|
|
|
foreach my $priv (split_list($privlist)) {
|
|
if (defined($valid_privs->{$priv})) {
|
|
$cfg->{roles}->{$role}->{$priv} = 1;
|
|
} else {
|
|
warn "user config - ignore invalid privilege '$priv'\n";
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} elsif ($et eq 'acl') {
|
|
my ($propagate, $pathtxt, $uglist, $rolelist) = @data;
|
|
|
|
$propagate = $propagate ? 1 : 0;
|
|
|
|
if (my $path = normalize_path($pathtxt)) {
|
|
my $acl_node;
|
|
foreach my $role (split_list($rolelist)) {
|
|
|
|
if (!verify_rolename($role, 1)) {
|
|
warn "user config - ignore invalid role name '$role' in acl\n";
|
|
next;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!$cfg->{roles}->{$role}) {
|
|
warn "user config - ignore invalid acl role '$role'\n";
|
|
next;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
foreach my $ug (split_list($uglist)) {
|
|
my ($group) = $ug =~ m/^@(\S+)$/;
|
|
|
|
if ($group && verify_groupname($group, 1)) {
|
|
if (!$cfg->{groups}->{$group}) { # group does not exist
|
|
warn "user config - ignore invalid acl group '$group'\n";
|
|
}
|
|
$acl_node = find_acl_tree_node($cfg->{acl_root}, $path) if !$acl_node;
|
|
$acl_node->{groups}->{$group}->{$role} = $propagate;
|
|
} elsif (PVE::Auth::Plugin::verify_username($ug, 1)) {
|
|
if (!$cfg->{users}->{$ug}) { # user does not exist
|
|
warn "user config - ignore invalid acl member '$ug'\n";
|
|
}
|
|
$acl_node = find_acl_tree_node($cfg->{acl_root}, $path) if !$acl_node;
|
|
$acl_node->{users}->{$ug}->{$role} = $propagate;
|
|
} elsif (my ($user, $token) = split_tokenid($ug, 1)) {
|
|
if (check_token_exist($cfg, $user, $token, 1)) {
|
|
$acl_node = find_acl_tree_node($cfg->{acl_root}, $path)
|
|
if !$acl_node;
|
|
$acl_node->{tokens}->{$ug}->{$role} = $propagate;
|
|
} else {
|
|
warn "user config - ignore invalid acl token '$ug'\n";
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
warn "user config - invalid user/group '$ug' in acl\n";
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
warn "user config - ignore invalid path in acl '$pathtxt'\n";
|
|
}
|
|
} elsif ($et eq 'pool') {
|
|
my ($pool, $comment, $vmlist, $storelist) = @data;
|
|
|
|
if (!verify_poolname($pool, 1)) {
|
|
warn "user config - ignore pool '$pool' - invalid characters in pool name\n";
|
|
next;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# make sure to add the pool (even if there are no members)
|
|
$cfg->{pools}->{$pool} = { vms => {}, storage => {}, pools => {} }
|
|
if !$cfg->{pools}->{$pool};
|
|
|
|
if ($pool =~ m!/!) {
|
|
my $curr = $pool;
|
|
while ($curr =~ m!^(.+)/[^/]+$!) {
|
|
# ensure nested pool info is correctly recorded
|
|
my $parent = $1;
|
|
$cfg->{pools}->{$curr}->{parent} = $parent;
|
|
$cfg->{pools}->{$parent} = { vms => {}, storage => {}, pools => {} }
|
|
if !$cfg->{pools}->{$parent};
|
|
$cfg->{pools}->{$parent}->{pools}->{$curr} = 1;
|
|
$curr = $parent;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
$cfg->{pools}->{$pool}->{comment} = PVE::Tools::decode_text($comment) if $comment;
|
|
|
|
foreach my $vmid (split_list($vmlist)) {
|
|
if ($vmid !~ m/^\d+$/) {
|
|
warn "user config - ignore invalid vmid '$vmid' in pool '$pool'\n";
|
|
next;
|
|
}
|
|
$vmid = int($vmid);
|
|
|
|
if ($cfg->{vms}->{$vmid}) {
|
|
warn "user config - ignore duplicate vmid '$vmid' in pool '$pool'\n";
|
|
next;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
$cfg->{pools}->{$pool}->{vms}->{$vmid} = 1;
|
|
|
|
# record vmid ==> pool relation
|
|
$cfg->{vms}->{$vmid} = $pool;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
foreach my $storeid (split_list($storelist)) {
|
|
if ($storeid !~ m/^[a-z][a-z0-9\-\_\.]*[a-z0-9]$/i) {
|
|
warn "user config - ignore invalid storage '$storeid' in pool '$pool'\n";
|
|
next;
|
|
}
|
|
$cfg->{pools}->{$pool}->{storage}->{$storeid} = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
} elsif ($et eq 'token') {
|
|
my ($tokenid, $expire, $privsep, $comment) = @data;
|
|
|
|
my ($user, $token) = split_tokenid($tokenid, 1);
|
|
if (!($user && $token)) {
|
|
warn "user config - ignore invalid tokenid '$tokenid'\n";
|
|
next;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
$privsep = $privsep ? 1 : 0;
|
|
|
|
$expire = 0 if !$expire;
|
|
|
|
if ($expire !~ m/^\d+$/) {
|
|
warn
|
|
"user config - ignore token '$tokenid' - (illegal characters in expire '$expire')\n";
|
|
next;
|
|
}
|
|
$expire = int($expire);
|
|
|
|
if (my $user_cfg = $cfg->{users}->{$user}) { # user exists
|
|
$user_cfg->{tokens}->{$token} = {} if !$user_cfg->{tokens}->{$token};
|
|
my $token_cfg = $user_cfg->{tokens}->{$token};
|
|
$token_cfg->{privsep} = $privsep;
|
|
$token_cfg->{expire} = $expire;
|
|
$token_cfg->{comment} = PVE::Tools::decode_text($comment) if $comment;
|
|
} else {
|
|
warn "user config - ignore token '$tokenid' - user does not exist\n";
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
warn "user config - ignore config line: $line\n";
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
userconfig_force_defaults($cfg);
|
|
|
|
return $cfg;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sub write_user_config {
|
|
my ($filename, $cfg) = @_;
|
|
|
|
my $data = '';
|
|
|
|
foreach my $user (sort keys %{ $cfg->{users} }) {
|
|
my $d = $cfg->{users}->{$user};
|
|
my $firstname = $d->{firstname} ? PVE::Tools::encode_text($d->{firstname}) : '';
|
|
my $lastname = $d->{lastname} ? PVE::Tools::encode_text($d->{lastname}) : '';
|
|
my $email = $d->{email} || '';
|
|
my $comment = $d->{comment} ? PVE::Tools::encode_text($d->{comment}) : '';
|
|
my $expire = int($d->{expire} || 0);
|
|
my $enable = $d->{enable} ? 1 : 0;
|
|
my $keys = $d->{keys} ? $d->{keys} : '';
|
|
$data .= "user:$user:$enable:$expire:$firstname:$lastname:$email:$comment:$keys:\n";
|
|
|
|
my $user_tokens = $d->{tokens};
|
|
foreach my $token (sort keys %$user_tokens) {
|
|
my $td = $user_tokens->{$token};
|
|
my $full_tokenid = join_tokenid($user, $token);
|
|
my $comment = $td->{comment} ? PVE::Tools::encode_text($td->{comment}) : '';
|
|
my $expire = int($td->{expire} || 0);
|
|
my $privsep = $td->{privsep} ? 1 : 0;
|
|
$data .= "token:$full_tokenid:$expire:$privsep:$comment:\n";
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
$data .= "\n";
|
|
|
|
foreach my $group (sort keys %{ $cfg->{groups} }) {
|
|
my $d = $cfg->{groups}->{$group};
|
|
my $list = join(',', sort keys %{ $d->{users} });
|
|
my $comment = $d->{comment} ? PVE::Tools::encode_text($d->{comment}) : '';
|
|
$data .= "group:$group:$list:$comment:\n";
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
$data .= "\n";
|
|
|
|
foreach my $pool (sort keys %{ $cfg->{pools} }) {
|
|
my $d = $cfg->{pools}->{$pool};
|
|
my $vmlist = join(',', sort keys %{ $d->{vms} });
|
|
my $storelist = join(',', sort keys %{ $d->{storage} });
|
|
my $comment = $d->{comment} ? PVE::Tools::encode_text($d->{comment}) : '';
|
|
$data .= "pool:$pool:$comment:$vmlist:$storelist:\n";
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
$data .= "\n";
|
|
|
|
foreach my $role (sort keys %{ $cfg->{roles} }) {
|
|
next if $special_roles->{$role};
|
|
|
|
my $d = $cfg->{roles}->{$role};
|
|
my $list = join(',', sort keys %$d);
|
|
$data .= "role:$role:$list:\n";
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
$data .= "\n";
|
|
|
|
my $collect_rolelist_members = sub {
|
|
my ($acl_members, $result, $prefix, $exclude) = @_;
|
|
|
|
foreach my $member (keys %$acl_members) {
|
|
next if $exclude && $member eq $exclude;
|
|
|
|
my $l0 = '';
|
|
my $l1 = '';
|
|
foreach my $role (sort keys %{ $acl_members->{$member} }) {
|
|
my $propagate = $acl_members->{$member}->{$role};
|
|
if ($propagate) {
|
|
$l1 .= ',' if $l1;
|
|
$l1 .= $role;
|
|
} else {
|
|
$l0 .= ',' if $l0;
|
|
$l0 .= $role;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
$result->{0}->{$l0}->{"${prefix}${member}"} = 1 if $l0;
|
|
$result->{1}->{$l1}->{"${prefix}${member}"} = 1 if $l1;
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
iterate_acl_tree(
|
|
"/",
|
|
$cfg->{acl_root},
|
|
sub {
|
|
my ($path, $d) = @_;
|
|
|
|
my $rolelist_members = {};
|
|
|
|
$collect_rolelist_members->($d->{'groups'}, $rolelist_members, '@');
|
|
|
|
# no need to save 'root@pam', it is always 'Administrator'
|
|
$collect_rolelist_members->($d->{'users'}, $rolelist_members, '', 'root@pam');
|
|
|
|
$collect_rolelist_members->($d->{'tokens'}, $rolelist_members, '');
|
|
|
|
foreach my $propagate (0, 1) {
|
|
my $filtered = $rolelist_members->{$propagate};
|
|
foreach my $rolelist (sort keys %$filtered) {
|
|
my $uglist = join(',', sort keys %{ $filtered->{$rolelist} });
|
|
$data .= "acl:$propagate:$path:$uglist:$rolelist:\n";
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
return $data;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Creates a `PVE::RS::TFA` instance from the raw config data.
|
|
# Its contained hash will also support the legacy functionality.
|
|
sub parse_priv_tfa_config {
|
|
my ($filename, $raw) = @_;
|
|
|
|
$raw = '' if !defined($raw);
|
|
my $cfg = PVE::RS::TFA->new($raw);
|
|
|
|
# Purge invalid users:
|
|
foreach my $user ($cfg->users()->@*) {
|
|
my (undef, undef, $realm) = PVE::Auth::Plugin::verify_username($user, 1);
|
|
if (!$realm) {
|
|
warn "user tfa config - ignore user '$user' - invalid user name\n";
|
|
$cfg->remove_user($user);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return $cfg;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sub write_priv_tfa_config {
|
|
my ($filename, $cfg) = @_;
|
|
|
|
return $cfg->write();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sub roles {
|
|
my ($cfg, $user, $path) = @_;
|
|
|
|
# NOTE: we do not consider pools here.
|
|
# NOTE: for privsep tokens, this does not filter roles by those that the
|
|
# corresponding user has.
|
|
# Use $rpcenv->permission() for any actual permission checks!
|
|
|
|
return 'Administrator' if $user eq 'root@pam'; # root can do anything
|
|
|
|
if (!defined($path)) {
|
|
# this shouldn't happen!
|
|
warn "internal error: ACL check called for undefined ACL path!\n";
|
|
return {};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (pve_verify_tokenid($user, 1)) {
|
|
my $tokenid = $user;
|
|
my ($username, $token) = split_tokenid($tokenid);
|
|
|
|
my $token_info = $cfg->{users}->{$username}->{tokens}->{$token};
|
|
return () if !$token_info;
|
|
|
|
my $user_roles = roles($cfg, $username, $path);
|
|
|
|
# return full user privileges
|
|
return $user_roles if !$token_info->{privsep};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
my $roles = {};
|
|
|
|
my $split = [split("/", $path)];
|
|
if ($path eq '/') {
|
|
$split = [''];
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
my $acl = $cfg->{acl_root};
|
|
my $i = 0;
|
|
|
|
while (@$split) {
|
|
my $p = shift @$split;
|
|
my $final = !@$split;
|
|
if ($p ne '') {
|
|
$acl = $acl->{children}->{$p};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#print "CHECKACL $path $p\n";
|
|
#print "ACL $path = " . Dumper ($acl);
|
|
if (my $ri = $acl->{tokens}->{$user}) {
|
|
my $new;
|
|
foreach my $role (keys %$ri) {
|
|
my $propagate = $ri->{$role};
|
|
if ($final || $propagate) {
|
|
#print "APPLY ROLE $p $user $role\n";
|
|
$new = {} if !$new;
|
|
$new->{$role} = $propagate;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if ($new) {
|
|
$roles = $new; # overwrite previous settings
|
|
next;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (my $ri = $acl->{users}->{$user}) {
|
|
my $new;
|
|
foreach my $role (keys %$ri) {
|
|
my $propagate = $ri->{$role};
|
|
if ($final || $propagate) {
|
|
#print "APPLY ROLE $p $user $role\n";
|
|
$new = {} if !$new;
|
|
$new->{$role} = $propagate;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if ($new) {
|
|
$roles = $new; # overwrite previous settings
|
|
next; # user privs always override group privs
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
my $new;
|
|
foreach my $g (keys %{ $acl->{groups} }) {
|
|
next if !$cfg->{groups}->{$g}->{users}->{$user};
|
|
if (my $ri = $acl->{groups}->{$g}) {
|
|
foreach my $role (keys %$ri) {
|
|
my $propagate = $ri->{$role};
|
|
if ($final || $propagate) {
|
|
#print "APPLY ROLE $p \@$g $role\n";
|
|
$new = {} if !$new;
|
|
$new->{$role} = $propagate;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if ($new) {
|
|
$roles = $new; # overwrite previous settings
|
|
next;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return { 'NoAccess' => $roles->{NoAccess} } if defined($roles->{NoAccess});
|
|
#return () if defined ($roles->{NoAccess});
|
|
|
|
#print "permission $user $path = " . Dumper ($roles);
|
|
|
|
#print "roles $user $path = " . join (',', @ra) . "\n";
|
|
|
|
return $roles;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sub remove_vm_access {
|
|
my ($vmid) = @_;
|
|
my $delVMaccessFn = sub {
|
|
my $usercfg = cfs_read_file("user.cfg");
|
|
my $modified;
|
|
|
|
if (my $acl = $usercfg->{acl_root}->{children}->{vms}->{children}->{$vmid}) {
|
|
delete $usercfg->{acl_root}->{children}->{vms}->{children}->{$vmid};
|
|
$modified = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (my $pool = $usercfg->{vms}->{$vmid}) {
|
|
if (my $data = $usercfg->{pools}->{$pool}) {
|
|
delete $data->{vms}->{$vmid};
|
|
delete $usercfg->{vms}->{$vmid};
|
|
$modified = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
cfs_write_file("user.cfg", $usercfg) if $modified;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
lock_user_config($delVMaccessFn, "access permissions cleanup for VM $vmid failed");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sub remove_storage_access {
|
|
my ($storeid) = @_;
|
|
|
|
my $deleteStorageAccessFn = sub {
|
|
my $usercfg = cfs_read_file("user.cfg");
|
|
my $modified;
|
|
|
|
if (my $acl = $usercfg->{acl_root}->{children}->{storage}->{children}->{$storeid}) {
|
|
delete $usercfg->{acl_root}->{children}->{storage}->{children}->{$storeid};
|
|
$modified = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
foreach my $pool (keys %{ $usercfg->{pools} }) {
|
|
delete $usercfg->{pools}->{$pool}->{storage}->{$storeid};
|
|
$modified = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
cfs_write_file("user.cfg", $usercfg) if $modified;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
lock_user_config(
|
|
$deleteStorageAccessFn,
|
|
"access permissions cleanup for storage $storeid failed",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sub add_vm_to_pool {
|
|
my ($vmid, $pool) = @_;
|
|
|
|
my $addVMtoPoolFn = sub {
|
|
my $usercfg = cfs_read_file("user.cfg");
|
|
if (my $data = $usercfg->{pools}->{$pool}) {
|
|
$data->{vms}->{$vmid} = 1;
|
|
$usercfg->{vms}->{$vmid} = $pool;
|
|
cfs_write_file("user.cfg", $usercfg);
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
lock_user_config($addVMtoPoolFn, "can't add VM $vmid to pool '$pool'");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sub remove_vm_from_pool {
|
|
my ($vmid) = @_;
|
|
|
|
my $delVMfromPoolFn = sub {
|
|
my $usercfg = cfs_read_file("user.cfg");
|
|
if (my $pool = $usercfg->{vms}->{$vmid}) {
|
|
if (my $data = $usercfg->{pools}->{$pool}) {
|
|
delete $data->{vms}->{$vmid};
|
|
delete $usercfg->{vms}->{$vmid};
|
|
cfs_write_file("user.cfg", $usercfg);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
lock_user_config($delVMfromPoolFn, "pool cleanup for VM $vmid failed");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
my $USER_CONTROLLED_TFA_TYPES = {
|
|
u2f => 1,
|
|
oath => 1,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
sub user_remove_tfa : prototype($) {
|
|
my ($userid) = @_;
|
|
|
|
my $tfa_cfg = cfs_read_file('priv/tfa.cfg');
|
|
$tfa_cfg->remove_user($userid);
|
|
cfs_write_file('priv/tfa.cfg', $tfa_cfg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
my sub add_old_yubico_keys : prototype($$$) {
|
|
my ($userid, $tfa_cfg, $keys) = @_;
|
|
|
|
my $count = 0;
|
|
foreach my $key (split_list($keys)) {
|
|
my $description = "<old userconfig key $count>";
|
|
++$count;
|
|
$tfa_cfg->add_yubico_entry($userid, $description, $key);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
my sub normalize_totp_secret : prototype($) {
|
|
my ($key) = @_;
|
|
|
|
my $binkey;
|
|
# See PVE::OTP::oath_verify_otp:
|
|
if ($key =~ /^v2-0x([0-9a-fA-F]+)$/) {
|
|
# v2, hex
|
|
$binkey = pack('H*', $1);
|
|
} elsif ($key =~ /^v2-([A-Z2-7=]+)$/) {
|
|
# v2, base32
|
|
$binkey = MIME::Base32::decode_rfc3548($1);
|
|
} elsif ($key =~ /^[A-Z2-7=]{16}$/) {
|
|
$binkey = MIME::Base32::decode_rfc3548($key);
|
|
} elsif ($key =~ /^[A-Fa-f0-9]{40}$/) {
|
|
$binkey = pack('H*', $key);
|
|
} else {
|
|
return undef;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return MIME::Base32::encode_rfc3548($binkey);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
my sub add_old_totp_keys : prototype($$$$) {
|
|
my ($userid, $tfa_cfg, $realm_tfa, $keys) = @_;
|
|
|
|
my $issuer = 'Proxmox%20VE';
|
|
my $account = uri_escape("Old key for $userid");
|
|
my $digits = $realm_tfa->{digits} || 6;
|
|
my $step = $realm_tfa->{step} || 30;
|
|
my $uri = "otpauth://totp/$issuer:$account?digits=$digits&period=$step&algorithm=SHA1&secret=";
|
|
|
|
my $count = 0;
|
|
foreach my $key (split_list($keys)) {
|
|
$key = normalize_totp_secret($key);
|
|
# and just skip invalid keys:
|
|
next if !defined($key);
|
|
|
|
my $description = "<old userconfig key $count>";
|
|
++$count;
|
|
eval { $tfa_cfg->add_totp_entry($userid, $description, $uri . $key) };
|
|
warn $@ if $@;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sub add_old_keys_to_realm_tfa : prototype($$$$) {
|
|
my ($userid, $tfa_cfg, $realm_tfa, $keys) = @_;
|
|
|
|
# if there's no realm tfa configured, we don't know what the keys mean, so we just ignore
|
|
# them...
|
|
return if !$realm_tfa;
|
|
|
|
my $type = $realm_tfa->{type};
|
|
if ($type eq 'oath') {
|
|
add_old_totp_keys($userid, $tfa_cfg, $realm_tfa, $keys);
|
|
} elsif ($type eq 'yubico') {
|
|
add_old_yubico_keys($userid, $tfa_cfg, $keys);
|
|
} else {
|
|
# invalid keys, we'll just drop them now...
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sub user_get_tfa : prototype($$$) {
|
|
my ($username, $realm) = @_;
|
|
|
|
my $user_cfg = cfs_read_file('user.cfg');
|
|
my $user = $user_cfg->{users}->{$username}
|
|
or die "user '$username' not found\n";
|
|
|
|
my $keys = $user->{keys};
|
|
|
|
my $domain_cfg = cfs_read_file('domains.cfg');
|
|
my $realm_cfg = $domain_cfg->{ids}->{$realm};
|
|
die "auth domain '$realm' does not exist\n" if !$realm_cfg;
|
|
|
|
my $realm_tfa = $realm_cfg->{tfa};
|
|
$realm_tfa = PVE::Auth::Plugin::parse_tfa_config($realm_tfa)
|
|
if $realm_tfa;
|
|
|
|
my $tfa_cfg = cfs_read_file('priv/tfa.cfg');
|
|
if (defined($keys) && $keys !~ /^x(?:!.*)$/) {
|
|
add_old_keys_to_realm_tfa($username, $tfa_cfg, $realm_tfa, $keys);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ($tfa_cfg, $realm_tfa);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# bash completion helpers
|
|
|
|
register_standard_option(
|
|
'userid-completed',
|
|
get_standard_option('userid', { completion => \&complete_username }),
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
sub complete_username {
|
|
|
|
my $user_cfg = cfs_read_file('user.cfg');
|
|
|
|
return [keys %{ $user_cfg->{users} }];
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sub complete_group {
|
|
|
|
my $user_cfg = cfs_read_file('user.cfg');
|
|
|
|
return [keys %{ $user_cfg->{groups} }];
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sub complete_realm {
|
|
|
|
my $domain_cfg = cfs_read_file('domains.cfg');
|
|
|
|
return [keys %{ $domain_cfg->{ids} }];
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
1;
|