This allows for doing OTP TFA in two steps, first login with normal
credentials and get the half-logged-in ticket, then send the OTP
verification for full login, same as with u2f was already possible.
This allows for a nicer UI, as OTP fields can be shown on demand, and
do not need to be visible by default.
The old way of sending the OTP code immediately with the initial
credentials request still works for backward compatibility and as
some API user may prefer it.
Signed-off-by: Wolfgang Bumiller <w.bumiller@proxmox.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
to avoid a failed login if a broken corosync config is setup
Reviewed-by: Dominik Csapak <d.csapak@proxmox.com>
Tested-by: Dominik Csapak <d.csapak@proxmox.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
If a cluster is configured then return the cluster name on successful
login - if the user has Sys.Audit privileges on the '/' path (same
as for returning cluster info, like the join info path uses)
This is more for the reason that some admins do not want to expose
this to lesser privileged (API) users. While yes, you can
theoretically launch a (DDOS resembling) attack which stresses the
corosync network if you know the cluster_name (it's still encrypted
but you can back-calculate the multicast group membership info) you
need to be able to send multicast traffic on the corosync LAN -
which can be seen as a pretty big privilege anyway.
But, for now reduce permissions - we can more easily loosen them than
tighten without causing issues anyway.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
Pull out duplicated property definitions in the API into
register_standard_option/get_standard_option calls.
(All parameters, which are thus added to the API calls were optional).
Signed-off-by: Stoiko Ivanov <s.ivanov@proxmox.com>
Fixes a problem where a non root@pam system administrator does not
sees the 'Permissions' tab for a storage in our WebUI.
Fixes commit a2c18811d3
Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
We accessed methods from PVE::Storage here but did not define a
"use PVE::Storage". This thus only worked if modules if the
PVE::Storage module got pulled in by something else, by luck.
Simply including said use statement is not an option because
pve-storage is already dependent from pve-access-control, and we want
to avoid cyclic dependencies, especially on the perl module level.
The reason the offending module was used in the first place here
stems from the way how this coarse grained permissions are
calculated.
We check all permission object paths for privileges for an user.
So we got all vmids and all storage ids and computed paths from them.
This works, but is overkill and led to this "illegal" module use.
Instead I opt to not generating all possible paths, but just check
the ones configured plus a small required static set of top level
paths - this allows to generalize handling of the special root@pam
and "normal" users.
It has to be noted that this method is in general just intended for a
coarse capability check to allow hiding a few UI elements which are
not generated by backend calls (which are already permission aware).
The real checks get done by each backend call, automatically for
simple ones and semi-automatically for complex ones.
