for a better overview and to allow slightly easier tracking of any
change, like adding a new privilege.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
Restrict the acr-value regex a little bit so as to align the behavior
with PBS. The openid documentation says that the acr-value *should* be
an URI [0]. Added a regex that loosely disallows some of the reserved
URI characters specified in the RFC [1].
Values like:
* "urn:mace:incommon:iap:silver"
* "urn:comsolve.nl:idp:contract:rba:location"
SHOULD work, but values like:
* "urn:#ace:incommon:iap:silver"
* "urn:"omsolve.nl:idp:contract:rba:location"
should NOT work.
This is related to the fix [2] for bug #5190 in PBS, but different as
there we had to make the verifier more flexible, whereas here we make
it stricter – mostly to have both projects aligned to avoid confusion.
[0]: https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html
[1]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2396.txt
[2]: https://git.proxmox.com/?p=proxmox-backup.git;a=commit;h=e0222ce83c28397d493c70825e873943c1223c67
Signed-off-by: Gabriel Goller <g.goller@proxmox.com>
For email the reasoning is:
> In addition to restrictions on syntax, there is a length limit on
> email addresses. That limit is a maximum of 64 characters (octets)
> in the "local part" (before the "@") and a maximum of 255
> characters (octets) in the domain part (after the "@") for a total
> length of 320 characters. However, there is a restriction in RFC
> 2821 on the length of an address in MAIL and RCPT commands of 254
> characters. Since addresses that do not fit in those fields are
> not normally useful, the upper limit on address lengths should
> normally be considered to be 254.
-- https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata_search.php?rfc=3696&eid=1690
And for user-comments, we normally show those as single line and using
2048 bytes as maximum, while also a rather arbitrary number it allows
for about 2.5 times more users on a system (full name + comment can be
up to 4 KiB vs 10 KiB), and we can re-raise this relatively easily
again if there are somewhat reasonable complaints.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
The user.cfg file resides on the cluster filesystem where files have
a maximum allowed size (currently 1 MiB).
Signed-off-by: Fiona Ebner <f.ebner@proxmox.com>
Should not matter for now, but better to to catch explicitly, e.g., if
anybody ever adds new attributes or changes the default options names
without adapting this too.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
Build the set of valid target attributes on the fly by using the
existing ldap => ours mapping. This avoids that one needs to adapt
both lists when changing this, which even though it should be caught
on testing, is needlessly adding friction.
The is-known-target-attr check could never trigger as this was already
checked in the parent before even calling the verify method, so just
remove it.
Rename the `verify_sync_attribute` to `verify_sync_attribute_value` to
clarify that it really only checks the value of an attribute, not the
attribute (key) itself.
As a side-benefit, this also makes the code shorter and avoids a
permanent global variable using up (a tiny amount of) space.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
and skip the ones not fitting our schema, while warning the user about
them.
Also warns the user if the specified 'sync_attributes' mapping
contains entries for attributes that don't exist, e.g.
'enabled=active' (since the property on PVE side is called 'enable').
For the 'enable' property, any value coming from the server led to the
user being enabled, even "0", because it is a string. This is not
changed by this patch, by not trying to validate or parse a boolean.
In get_users(), the username is also set in the returned hash, but
without the realm. This doesn't seem to be necessary for syncing,
because the username with the realm is used as a hash key and that's
what's relied upon when updating the config. But the tests require it
to be set, so that is not changed by this patch either.
Relies on the user properties (other than username) to be standard
options called 'user-XYZ'. Could be improved by moving the schema for
user properties from the API module to a module that can be accessed
by both API and plugin here and creating a helper for accessing it.
Signed-off-by: Fiona Ebner <f.ebner@proxmox.com>
While nowadays, most entries should be just 'x', there can also still
be legacy entries with 'x!u2f', 'x!yubico' and base32 encoded secrets.
For example, some users might be syncing them from LDAP.
Signed-off-by: Fiona Ebner <f.ebner@proxmox.com>
this file is installed by a sub-dir Makefile, it does not exist in
src/PVE/API2.
the error is not fatal, but printed during build:
install: cannot stat 'RealmSync.pm': No such file or directory
Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
else it's not actually possible to define ACLs on them, which means they are
effectively root only instead of allowing their intended permission scheme.
Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
/pools is not an allowed ACL path, so this would add a bogus entry into the
effective permissions in case something got propagated from /.
Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
Removes the dreaded DN regex, instead introducing a optional
connect/bind check on creation/update, aligning it with the way PBS does
it.
Additionally, it has the benefit that instead of letting a sync fail on
the first try due to e.g. bad bind credentials, it gives the user some
direct feedback when trying to add/update a LDAP realm, if enabled.
Should be rather a corner case, but it's the easiest way for us to
accomodate and the most versatile for users needing this.
This is part of the result of a previous discussion [0], and the same
approach is already implemented for PBS [1].
[0] https://lists.proxmox.com/pipermail/pve-devel/2023-May/056839.html
[1] https://lists.proxmox.com/pipermail/pbs-devel/2023-June/006237.html
Signed-off-by: Christoph Heiss <c.heiss@proxmox.com>
Previously, if one tried to only update e.g. the bind password for an
LDAP realm, it would fail with an rather unhelpful error message:
# pveum realm modify ldap -password foo
update auth server failed: no options specified
The root cause was that the `password` parameter was removed early from
the parameter object, which than would fail the check whether it is
empty or not.
Thus, additionally check if only `password` was specified and if so,
allow it.
Reported-by: Friedrich Weber <f.weber@proxmox.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Heiss <c.heiss@proxmox.com>
Before 0f3d14d6 ("auth: tfa: read tfa.cfg also if the user.cfg entry
has no "x" marker"), `user_get_tfa` failed if the realm required TFA,
but the user's `keys` attribute was empty. Since 0f3d14d6,
`user_get_tfa` fails if the realm requires TFA, but neither user.cfg
nor tfa.cfg define any second factors for that user.
However, both before and after 0f3d14d6, a realm that requires TOTP
allows a user to login without a second factor if they have at least
one configured factor in tfa.cfg and all factors are disabled -- for
example if they have only a disabled TOTP factor. This behavior is
unwanted, as users can then circumvent the realm-mandated TFA
requirement by disabling their own TOTP factor.
This happens because a user with a disabled TOTP factor in tfa.cfg
passes the check in `user_get_tfa`. Hence, `authenticate_2nd_new_do`
proceeds to call `authentication_challenge`, which does not generate a
challenge (and returns undef) because the user has no enabled factors.
Consequently, `authenticate_2nd_new_do` returns undef and allows login
without a second factor.
Note that this does not happen for realms that require Yubico TFA,
because for these realms, `authenticate_2nd_new_do` does not call
`authentication_challenge` and instead generates a challenge in any
case, regardless of whether the user has enabled Yubico factors or
not.
This patch fixes the issue by moving the check out of `user_get_tfa`,
and instead letting `authenticate_2nd_new_do` fail if the realm
requires TFA but `authentication_challenge` generates no challenge
(returns undef). This also saves a call to `api_list_user_tfa` that
was introduced in 0f3d14d6.
This patch still allows users to login with a recovery key to a realm
that requires TFA , which is the intended behavior.
Suggested-by: Wolfgang Bumiller <w.bumiller@proxmox.com>
Signed-off-by: Friedrich Weber <f.weber@proxmox.com>
Alternatively we could potentially move the realm-tfa check to after
`authentication_challenge`.
Signed-off-by: Wolfgang Bumiller <w.bumiller@proxmox.com>
Previously, `user_get_tfa` read the `keys` user attribute from
user.cfg to determine whether a user has second factors configured.
`keys` could contain TOTP secrets or Yubico key IDs (for realms that
require TFA), or the marker "x" to signify that second factors are
defined in tfa.cfg, in which case `user_get_tfa` would additionally
read tfa.cfg.
However, syncing an LDAP realm with `remove-vanished=properties`
erases the `keys` attribute, and thus the "x" marker (unless custom
`sync_attributes` with a mapping for `keys` are defined). This would
allow TFA-enabled users to log in without a second factor after a
realm sync. This issue was first reported in the forum [1].
To fix this issue, `user_get_tfa` now reads tfa.cfg unconditionally,
and thus independently of the value of `keys`. In other words, the "x"
marker is now irrelevant for authentication. The reasoning for this
change is that most current setups define second factors in tfa.cfg
anyway.
Special care is needed to avoid breaking realms that require TFA: In
that case, `user_get_tfa` must fail authentication if neither user.cfg
nor tfa.cfg define any second factors.
This patch changes the behavior of a hypothetical (and not officially
supported) LDAP realm setup in which `sync_attributes: keys=attr` and
`remove-vanished=properties` is used to maintain `keys` in the LDAP
directory. In such a setup, an admin could enable/disable TFA for a
user who has an enabled second factor in tfa.cfg by editing their LDAP
entry and switching between "x" and "". With this patch, TFA is always
enabled for that user.
This patch makes the "x" marker irrelevant for authentication, but PVE
still *writes* it if the user has second factors configured in
tfa.cfg. This behavior is kept for now to avoid issues in cluster
upgrade scenarios, where some nodes that still rely on the "x" marker
could allow logins without a second factor.
[1] https://forum.proxmox.com/threads/130440/
Suggested-by: Wolfgang Bumiller <w.bumiller@proxmox.com>
Signed-off-by: Friedrich Weber <f.weber@proxmox.com>
All nodes should be new enough, especially as this is understood
since pve-manager 7.0-15 and users must upgrade to 7.4 before
upgrading to Proxmox VE 8
Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
The `allowtoken` property is a total, unconditional block on using
API tokens on an endpoint. We reserve those only for a limited set of
security critical endpoints like changing passwords or second
factors, or creating a (cookie) ticket, which are exempt from this
limitations, so require to have limited access to them too.
Anyhow, listing and getting TFA entries for users, where the API
token has the correct permissions granted, is not critical, as the
API token cannot gain more permissions than they have from that
info, so drop the total block on those GET methods.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
makes our reasoning when adding new top-level privileges way easier
in the future.
We already had two major upgrades with role additions where we had to
add special checks in the upgrade script and breaking changes, so
let's reserve any role starting with PVE (case-insensitive to avoid
confusion potential) and forbid creating those via API.
We might also think about letting the config parser choke on that, as
otherwise one could still create them via editing the config
manually.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
uses the privileges:
Mapping.Use
Mapping.Modify
Mapping.Audit
on /mapping/{TYPE}/{id}
so that we can assign privileges on resource level
this will generate new roles (PVEMappingUser, PVEMappingAdmin,
PVEMappingAuditor)
note that every user with Permissions.Modify on '/' and propagate can add these
new roles to themselves
Signed-off-by: Dominik Csapak <d.csapak@proxmox.com>
