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docs: ransomeware: rework structure and expand
Signed-off-by: Thomas Lamprecht <t.lamprecht@proxmox.com>
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Thomas Lamprecht
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docs/storage.rst
127
docs/storage.rst
@ -377,50 +377,92 @@ with a comma, like this:
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.. _ransomware_protection:
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Ransomware Protection
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---------------------
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Prevention by Proxmox Backup Server
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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Ransomware Protection & Recovery
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--------------------------------
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`Ransomware <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ransomware>`_ is a type of malware
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that encrypts files until a ransom is paid. Proxmox Backup Server includes
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features to mitigate ransomware attacks by offering easy restoration from
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backups.
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features that help mitigate and recover from ransomware attacks by offering
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off-server and off-site synchronizations and easy restoration from backups.
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As a best practice, you should keep multiple backups, including outside of your
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network and on different media. Proxmox Backup Server provides the tools to do
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both.
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By setting up a remote Proxmox Backup Server you can take advantage of the
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:ref:`remote sync jobs <backup_remote>`; feature and create off-site copies of
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your backups.
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This is recommended, since offsite instances are less likely to be infected by
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ransomware in your local network. It is also possible to create :ref:`tape
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backups <tape_backup>` as a second storage medium.
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This way you get an additional copy of your data which can easily be moved
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off-site.
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Built-in Protection
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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Proxmox Backup Server does not rewrite data for existing blocks. This means
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that a compromised Proxmox VE host, or any other compromised system using the
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client to back up data, cannot corrupt existing backups.
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that a compromised Proxmox VE host or any other compromised system that uses
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the client to back up data cannot corrupt or modify existing backups in any
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way.
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Furthermore, comprehensive :ref:`user management <user_mgmt>` is offered by
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Proxmox Backup Server.
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By limiting a sync user's or an access token's right to only write backups, not
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delete them, compromised clients cannot delete existing backups.
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Following this best practice, backup pruning should be done by the Proxmox
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Backup Server using prune jobs.
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While your Proxmox Backup Server can still be compromised, if your backup is
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encrypted by ransomware, the SHA-256 checksums of the backups will not match
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the previously recorded ones anymore. Hence, restoring the backup will fail.
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The 3-2-1 Rule with Proxmox Backup Server
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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The `3-2-1 rule <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Backup#Storage>`_ is simple but
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effective in protecting important data from all sorts of threats, be it fires,
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natural disasters or attacks on your infrastructure by adversaries .
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In short, the rule states that one should create *3* backups on at least *2*
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different types of storage media, of which *1* copy is kept off-site.
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Proxmox Backup Server provides tools for storing extra copies of backups in
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remote locations and on various types of media.
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By setting up a remote Proxmox Backup Server you can take advantage of the
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:ref:`remote sync jobs <backup_remote>` feature and easily create off-site
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copies of your backups.
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This is recommended, since off-site instances are less likely to be infected by
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ransomware in your local network.
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You can configure sync jobs to not removed snapshots if they vanished on the
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remote-source to avoid that an attacker that took over the source can cause
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deletions of backups on the target hosts.
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If the source-host became victim of a ransomware attack, there's a good chance
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that sync jobs will fail triggering an :ref:`error notification
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<maintenance_notification>`.
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It is also possible to create :ref:`tape backups <tape_backup>` as a second
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storage medium. This way you get an additional copy of your data on a
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different, for long-term storage designed medium type which can easily be moved
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around, be it to and off-site location or, for example into an on-site fire
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proof vault for quicker access.
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Restrictive User & Access Management
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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Proxmox Backup Server offers a comprehensive and fine grained :ref:`user and
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access management <user_mgmt>` system. The `Datastore.Backup` privilege, for
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example, allows only to create, but not to delete or alter existing backups.
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The best way to leverage this access control system is to:
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- Use separate API tokens for each host or Proxmox VE Cluster that should be
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able to back data up to a Proxmox Backup Server.
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- Configure only minimal permissions for such API tokens. They should only have
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a single permission that grants the `DataStore` access role on a very narrow
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ACL path that is restricted to a specific namespace on a specific datastore,
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for example `/datastore/tank/pve-abc-cluster`.
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.. tip:: One best practice to protect against ransomware is not to grant delete
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permissions, but to perform backup pruning directly on Proxmox Backup Server
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using :ref:`prune jobs <maintenance_prune_jobs>`.
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Please note that same also applies for sync jobs. By limiting a sync user's or
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an access token's right to only write backups, not delete them, compromised
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clients cannot delete existing backups.
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Ransomware Detection
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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A Proxmox Backup Server might still get compromised within insecure networks,
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if physical access to the server is attained, or due to weak or insufficiently
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protected credentials.
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If that happens, and your on-site backups are encrypted by ransomware, the
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SHA-256 checksums of the backups will not match the previously recorded ones
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anymore, hence, restoring the backup will fail.
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To detect ransomware inside a compromised guest, it is recommended to
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frequently test restoring and booting backups. Make sure to restore to a new
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guest and not to overwrite your current guest.
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In the case of many backed-up guests, it is recommended to automate this
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restore testing or, if this is not possible, to restore random samples from the
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backups.
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backups periodically (for example, once a week or month).
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In order to be able to react quickly in case of a ransomware attack, it is
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recommended to regularly test restoring from your backups. Make sure to restore
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@ -433,8 +475,8 @@ important. This ensures that you are able to react quickly in case of an
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emergency and keeps disruption of your services to a minimum.
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Other Prevention Methods and Best Practices
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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General Prevention Methods and Best Practices
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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It is recommended to take additional security measures, apart from the ones
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offered by Proxmox Backup Server. These recommendations include, but are not
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@ -445,15 +487,16 @@ limited to:
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`Spectre <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)>`_ or
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`Meltdown <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)>`_).
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* Following safe and secure network practices, for example using logging and
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monitoring tools and setting up VLANs.
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* Making plenty of backups using the
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`3-2-1 rule <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Backup#Storage>`_: creating
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3 backups on 2 storage media, of which 1 copy is kept off-site.
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* Retention. Since some ransomware might lay dormant a couple of days or weeks
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before starting to encrypt data, it can be that older, existing backups are
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compromised. Thus, it is important to keep at least a few backups over longer
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periods of time.
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monitoring tools and dividing your network so that infrastructure traffic and
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user or even public traffic are separated, for example by setting up VLANs.
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* Set up a long term retention. Since some ransomware might lay dormant a
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couple of days or weeks before starting to encrypt data, it can be that
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older, existing backups are compromised. Thus, it is important to keep at
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least a few backups over longer periods of time.
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For more information on how to avoid ransomware attacks and what to do in case
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of a ransomware infection, see CISA and
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`their guide <https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide>`_.
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of a ransomware infection, see official goverment recommendations like `CISA's
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(USA) guide <https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide>`_ or EU
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resources like ENSIA's `Threat Landscape for Ransomware Attacks
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<https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa-threat-landscape-for-ransomware-attacks>`_
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or `nomoreransom.org <https://www.nomoreransom.org/en/index.html>`_.
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