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f1f73651a0
173 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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Borislav Petkov
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2632daebaf |
x86/cpu: Restore AMD's DE_CFG MSR after resume
DE_CFG contains the LFENCE serializing bit, restore it on resume too.
This is relevant to older families due to the way how they do S3.
Unify and correct naming while at it.
Fixes:
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Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
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74455fd7e4 |
tools headers cpufeatures: Sync with the kernel sources
To pick the changes from:
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Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
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a3a365655a |
tools arch x86: Sync the msr-index.h copy with the kernel sources
To pick up the changes in: |
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Ravi Bangoria
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160ae99365 |
perf amd ibs: Sync arch/x86/include/asm/amd-ibs.h header with the kernel
Although new details added into this header is currently used by kernel only, tools copy needs to be in sync with kernel file to avoid tools/perf/check-headers.sh warnings. Signed-off-by: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com> Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Ali Saidi <alisaidi@amazon.com> Cc: Ananth Narayan <ananth.narayan@amd.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Joe Mario <jmario@redhat.com> Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Cc: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com> Cc: Leo Yan <leo.yan@linaro.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sandipan Das <sandipan.das@amd.com> Cc: Santosh Shukla <santosh.shukla@amd.com> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: x86@kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221006153946.7816-3-ravi.bangoria@amd.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> |
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Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
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356edeca2e |
tools headers cpufeatures: Sync with the kernel sources
To pick the changes from:
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Nick Desaulniers
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a0a12c3ed0 |
asm goto: eradicate CC_HAS_ASM_GOTO
GCC has supported asm goto since 4.5, and Clang has since version 9.0.0. The minimum supported versions of these tools for the build according to Documentation/process/changes.rst are 5.1 and 11.0.0 respectively. Remove the feature detection script, Kconfig option, and clean up some fallback code that is no longer supported. The removed script was also testing for a GCC specific bug that was fixed in the 4.7 release. Also remove workarounds for bpftrace using clang older than 9.0.0, since other BPF backend fixes are required at this point. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAK7LNATSr=BXKfkdW8f-H5VT_w=xBpT2ZQcZ7rm6JfkdE+QnmA@mail.gmail.com/ Link: http://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=48637 Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Suggested-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org> Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
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62ed93d199 |
tools headers cpufeatures: Sync with the kernel sources
To pick the changes from: |
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Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
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7f7f86a7bd |
tools arch x86: Sync the msr-index.h copy with the kernel sources
To pick up the changes in: |
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Linus Torvalds
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5318b987fe |
More from the CPU vulnerability nightmares front:
Intel eIBRS machines do not sufficiently mitigate against RET mispredictions when doing a VM Exit therefore an additional RSB, one-entry stuffing is needed. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAABCgAdFiEEzv7L6UO9uDPlPSfHEsHwGGHeVUoFAmLqsGsACgkQEsHwGGHe VUpXGg//ZEkxhf3Ri7X9PknAWNG6eIEqigKqWcdnOw+Oq/GMVb6q7JQsqowK7KBZ AKcY5c/KkljTJNohditnfSOePyCG5nDTPgfkjzIawnaVdyJWMRCz/L4X2cv6ykDl 2l2EvQm4Ro8XAogYhE7GzDg/osaVfx93OkLCQj278VrEMWgM/dN2RZLpn+qiIkNt DyFlQ7cr5UASh/svtKLko268oT4JwhQSbDHVFLMJ52VaLXX36yx4rValZHUKFdox ZDyj+kiszFHYGsI94KAD0dYx76p6mHnwRc4y/HkVcO8vTacQ2b9yFYBGTiQatITf 0Nk1RIm9m3rzoJ82r/U0xSIDwbIhZlOVNm2QtCPkXqJZZFhopYsZUnq2TXhSWk4x GQg/2dDY6gb/5MSdyLJmvrTUtzResVyb/hYL6SevOsIRnkwe35P6vDDyp15F3TYK YvidZSfEyjtdLISBknqYRQD964dgNZu9ewrj+WuJNJr+A2fUvBzUebXjxHREsugN jWp5GyuagEKTtneVCvjwnii+ptCm6yfzgZYLbHmmV+zhinyE9H1xiwVDvo5T7DDS ZJCBgoioqMhp5qR59pkWz/S5SNGui2rzEHbAh4grANy8R/X5ASRv7UHT9uAo6ve1 xpw6qnE37CLzuLhj8IOdrnzWwLiq7qZ/lYN7m+mCMVlwRWobbOo= =a8em -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'x86_bugs_pbrsb' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 eIBRS fixes from Borislav Petkov: "More from the CPU vulnerability nightmares front: Intel eIBRS machines do not sufficiently mitigate against RET mispredictions when doing a VM Exit therefore an additional RSB, one-entry stuffing is needed" * tag 'x86_bugs_pbrsb' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/speculation: Add LFENCE to RSB fill sequence x86/speculation: Add RSB VM Exit protections |
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Daniel Sneddon
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2b12993220 |
x86/speculation: Add RSB VM Exit protections
tl;dr: The Enhanced IBRS mitigation for Spectre v2 does not work as
documented for RET instructions after VM exits. Mitigate it with a new
one-entry RSB stuffing mechanism and a new LFENCE.
== Background ==
Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS) was designed to help
mitigate Branch Target Injection and Speculative Store Bypass, i.e.
Spectre, attacks. IBRS prevents software run in less privileged modes
from affecting branch prediction in more privileged modes. IBRS requires
the MSR to be written on every privilege level change.
To overcome some of the performance issues of IBRS, Enhanced IBRS was
introduced. eIBRS is an "always on" IBRS, in other words, just turn
it on once instead of writing the MSR on every privilege level change.
When eIBRS is enabled, more privileged modes should be protected from
less privileged modes, including protecting VMMs from guests.
== Problem ==
Here's a simplification of how guests are run on Linux' KVM:
void run_kvm_guest(void)
{
// Prepare to run guest
VMRESUME();
// Clean up after guest runs
}
The execution flow for that would look something like this to the
processor:
1. Host-side: call run_kvm_guest()
2. Host-side: VMRESUME
3. Guest runs, does "CALL guest_function"
4. VM exit, host runs again
5. Host might make some "cleanup" function calls
6. Host-side: RET from run_kvm_guest()
Now, when back on the host, there are a couple of possible scenarios of
post-guest activity the host needs to do before executing host code:
* on pre-eIBRS hardware (legacy IBRS, or nothing at all), the RSB is not
touched and Linux has to do a 32-entry stuffing.
* on eIBRS hardware, VM exit with IBRS enabled, or restoring the host
IBRS=1 shortly after VM exit, has a documented side effect of flushing
the RSB except in this PBRSB situation where the software needs to stuff
the last RSB entry "by hand".
IOW, with eIBRS supported, host RET instructions should no longer be
influenced by guest behavior after the host retires a single CALL
instruction.
However, if the RET instructions are "unbalanced" with CALLs after a VM
exit as is the RET in #6, it might speculatively use the address for the
instruction after the CALL in #3 as an RSB prediction. This is a problem
since the (untrusted) guest controls this address.
Balanced CALL/RET instruction pairs such as in step #5 are not affected.
== Solution ==
The PBRSB issue affects a wide variety of Intel processors which
support eIBRS. But not all of them need mitigation. Today,
X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT triggers an RSB filling sequence that mitigates
PBRSB. Systems setting RSB_VMEXIT need no further mitigation - i.e.,
eIBRS systems which enable legacy IBRS explicitly.
However, such systems (X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED) do not set RSB_VMEXIT
and most of them need a new mitigation.
Therefore, introduce a new feature flag X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE
which triggers a lighter-weight PBRSB mitigation versus RSB_VMEXIT.
The lighter-weight mitigation performs a CALL instruction which is
immediately followed by a speculative execution barrier (INT3). This
steers speculative execution to the barrier -- just like a retpoline
-- which ensures that speculation can never reach an unbalanced RET.
Then, ensure this CALL is retired before continuing execution with an
LFENCE.
In other words, the window of exposure is opened at VM exit where RET
behavior is troublesome. While the window is open, force RSB predictions
sampling for RET targets to a dead end at the INT3. Close the window
with the LFENCE.
There is a subset of eIBRS systems which are not vulnerable to PBRSB.
Add these systems to the cpu_vuln_whitelist[] as NO_EIBRS_PBRSB.
Future systems that aren't vulnerable will set ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO.
[ bp: Massage, incorporate review comments from Andy Cooper. ]
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
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18808564aa |
Merge remote-tracking branch 'torvalds/master' into perf/core
To pick up the fixes that went upstream via acme/perf/urgent and to get to v5.19. Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> |
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Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
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553de6e115 |
tools headers cpufeatures: Sync with the kernel sources
To pick the changes from:
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Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
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0698461ad2 |
Merge remote-tracking branch 'torvalds/master' into perf/core
To update the perf/core codebase.
Fix conflict by moving arch__post_evsel_config(evsel, attr) to the end
of evsel__config(), after what was added in:
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Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
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91d248c3b9 |
tools arch x86: Sync the msr-index.h copy with the kernel sources
To pick up the changes from these csets: |
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Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
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f098addbdb |
tools headers cpufeatures: Sync with the kernel sources
To pick the changes from: |
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Pawan Gupta
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4ad3278df6 |
x86/speculation: Disable RRSBA behavior
Some Intel processors may use alternate predictors for RETs on RSB-underflow. This condition may be vulnerable to Branch History Injection (BHI) and intramode-BTI. Kernel earlier added spectre_v2 mitigation modes (eIBRS+Retpolines, eIBRS+LFENCE, Retpolines) which protect indirect CALLs and JMPs against such attacks. However, on RSB-underflow, RET target prediction may fallback to alternate predictors. As a result, RET's predicted target may get influenced by branch history. A new MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL bit (RRSBA_DIS_S) controls this fallback behavior when in kernel mode. When set, RETs will not take predictions from alternate predictors, hence mitigating RETs as well. Support for this is enumerated by CPUID.7.2.EDX[RRSBA_CTRL] (bit2). For spectre v2 mitigation, when a user selects a mitigation that protects indirect CALLs and JMPs against BHI and intramode-BTI, set RRSBA_DIS_S also to protect RETs for RSB-underflow case. Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> |
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Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
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4b3f7644ae |
tools headers cpufeatures: Sync with the kernel sources
To pick the changes from: |
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Ravi Bangoria
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c1f4f92b7d |
perf tool ibs: Sync AMD IBS header file
IBS support has been enhanced with two new features in upcoming uarch: 1. DataSrc extension 2. L3 miss filtering. Additional set of bits has been introduced in IBS registers to exploit these features. New bits are already defining in arch/x86/ header. Sync it with tools header file. Also rename existing ibs_op_data field 'data_src' to 'data_src_lo'. Signed-off-by: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com> Acked-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Ananth Narayan <ananth.narayan@amd.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Clark <james.clark@arm.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Cc: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com> Cc: Leo Yan <leo.yan@linaro.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Robert Richter <rrichter@amd.com> Cc: Sandipan Das <sandipan.das@amd.com> Cc: Santosh Shukla <santosh.shukla@amd.com> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: like.xu.linux@gmail.com Cc: x86@kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220604044519.594-8-ravi.bangoria@amd.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> |
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Linus Torvalds
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8e8afafb0b |
Yet another hw vulnerability with a software mitigation: Processor MMIO
Stale Data. They are a class of MMIO-related weaknesses which can expose stale data by propagating it into core fill buffers. Data which can then be leaked using the usual speculative execution methods. Mitigations include this set along with microcode updates and are similar to MDS and TAA vulnerabilities: VERW now clears those buffers too. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQJGBAABCgAxFiEEQp8+kY+LLUocC4bMphj1TA10mKEFAmKXMkMTHHRnbHhAbGlu dXRyb25peC5kZQAKCRCmGPVMDXSYoWGPD/idalLIhhV5F2+hZIKm0WSnsBxAOh9K 7y8xBxpQQ5FUfW3vm7Pg3ro6VJp7w2CzKoD4lGXzGHriusn3qst3vkza9Ay8xu8g RDwKe6hI+p+Il9BV9op3f8FiRLP9bcPMMReW/mRyYsOnJe59hVNwRAL8OG40PY4k hZgg4Psfvfx8bwiye5efjMSe4fXV7BUCkr601+8kVJoiaoszkux9mqP+cnnB5P3H zW1d1jx7d6eV1Y063h7WgiNqQRYv0bROZP5BJkufIoOHUXDpd65IRF3bDnCIvSEz KkMYJNXb3qh7EQeHS53NL+gz2EBQt+Tq1VH256qn6i3mcHs85HvC68gVrAkfVHJE QLJE3MoXWOqw+mhwzCRrEXN9O1lT/PqDWw8I4M/5KtGG/KnJs+bygmfKBbKjIVg4 2yQWfMmOgQsw3GWCRjgEli7aYbDJQjany0K/qZTq54I41gu+TV8YMccaWcXgDKrm cXFGUfOg4gBm4IRjJ/RJn+mUv6u+/3sLVqsaFTs9aiib1dpBSSUuMGBh548Ft7g2 5VbFVSDaLjB2BdlcG7enlsmtzw0ltNssmqg7jTK/L7XNVnvxwUoXw+zP7RmCLEYt UV4FHXraMKNt2ZketlomC8ui2hg73ylUp4pPdMXCp7PIXp9sVamRTbpz12h689VJ /s55bWxHkR6S =LBxT -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'x86-bugs-2022-06-01' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 MMIO stale data fixes from Thomas Gleixner: "Yet another hw vulnerability with a software mitigation: Processor MMIO Stale Data. They are a class of MMIO-related weaknesses which can expose stale data by propagating it into core fill buffers. Data which can then be leaked using the usual speculative execution methods. Mitigations include this set along with microcode updates and are similar to MDS and TAA vulnerabilities: VERW now clears those buffers too" * tag 'x86-bugs-2022-06-01' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/speculation/mmio: Print SMT warning KVM: x86/speculation: Disable Fill buffer clear within guests x86/speculation/mmio: Reuse SRBDS mitigation for SBDS x86/speculation/srbds: Update SRBDS mitigation selection x86/speculation/mmio: Add sysfs reporting for Processor MMIO Stale Data x86/speculation/mmio: Enable CPU Fill buffer clearing on idle x86/bugs: Group MDS, TAA & Processor MMIO Stale Data mitigations x86/speculation/mmio: Add mitigation for Processor MMIO Stale Data x86/speculation: Add a common function for MD_CLEAR mitigation update x86/speculation/mmio: Enumerate Processor MMIO Stale Data bug Documentation: Add documentation for Processor MMIO Stale Data |
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Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
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9dde6cadb9 |
tools arch x86: Sync the msr-index.h copy with the kernel sources
To pick up the changes in: |
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Linus Torvalds
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cfeb2522c3 |
Perf events changes for this cycle were:
Platform PMU changes:
=====================
- x86/intel:
- Add new Intel Alder Lake and Raptor Lake support
- x86/amd:
- AMD Zen4 IBS extensions support
- Add AMD PerfMonV2 support
- Add AMD Fam19h Branch Sampling support
Generic changes:
================
- signal: Deliver SIGTRAP on perf event asynchronously if blocked
Perf instrumentation can be driven via SIGTRAP, but this causes a problem
when SIGTRAP is blocked by a task & terminate the task.
Allow user-space to request these signals asynchronously (after they get
unblocked) & also give the information to the signal handler when this
happens:
" To give user space the ability to clearly distinguish synchronous from
asynchronous signals, introduce siginfo_t::si_perf_flags and
TRAP_PERF_FLAG_ASYNC (opted for flags in case more binary information is
required in future).
The resolution to the problem is then to (a) no longer force the signal
(avoiding the terminations), but (b) tell user space via si_perf_flags
if the signal was synchronous or not, so that such signals can be
handled differently (e.g. let user space decide to ignore or consider
the data imprecise). "
- Unify/standardize the /sys/devices/cpu/events/* output format.
- Misc fixes & cleanups.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Merge tag 'perf-core-2022-05-23' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull perf events updates from Ingo Molnar:
"Platform PMU changes:
- x86/intel:
- Add new Intel Alder Lake and Raptor Lake support
- x86/amd:
- AMD Zen4 IBS extensions support
- Add AMD PerfMonV2 support
- Add AMD Fam19h Branch Sampling support
Generic changes:
- signal: Deliver SIGTRAP on perf event asynchronously if blocked
Perf instrumentation can be driven via SIGTRAP, but this causes a
problem when SIGTRAP is blocked by a task & terminate the task.
Allow user-space to request these signals asynchronously (after
they get unblocked) & also give the information to the signal
handler when this happens:
"To give user space the ability to clearly distinguish
synchronous from asynchronous signals, introduce
siginfo_t::si_perf_flags and TRAP_PERF_FLAG_ASYNC (opted for
flags in case more binary information is required in future).
The resolution to the problem is then to (a) no longer force the
signal (avoiding the terminations), but (b) tell user space via
si_perf_flags if the signal was synchronous or not, so that such
signals can be handled differently (e.g. let user space decide
to ignore or consider the data imprecise). "
- Unify/standardize the /sys/devices/cpu/events/* output format.
- Misc fixes & cleanups"
* tag 'perf-core-2022-05-23' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (32 commits)
perf/x86/amd/core: Fix reloading events for SVM
perf/x86/amd: Run AMD BRS code only on supported hw
perf/x86/amd: Fix AMD BRS period adjustment
perf/x86/amd: Remove unused variable 'hwc'
perf/ibs: Fix comment
perf/amd/ibs: Advertise zen4_ibs_extensions as pmu capability attribute
perf/amd/ibs: Add support for L3 miss filtering
perf/amd/ibs: Use ->is_visible callback for dynamic attributes
perf/amd/ibs: Cascade pmu init functions' return value
perf/x86/uncore: Add new Alder Lake and Raptor Lake support
perf/x86/uncore: Clean up uncore_pci_ids[]
perf/x86/cstate: Add new Alder Lake and Raptor Lake support
perf/x86/msr: Add new Alder Lake and Raptor Lake support
perf/x86: Add new Alder Lake and Raptor Lake support
perf/amd/ibs: Use interrupt regs ip for stack unwinding
perf/x86/amd/core: Add PerfMonV2 overflow handling
perf/x86/amd/core: Add PerfMonV2 counter control
perf/x86/amd/core: Detect available counters
perf/x86/amd/core: Detect PerfMonV2 support
x86/msr: Add PerfCntrGlobal* registers
...
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Linus Torvalds
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c5a3d3c01e |
- Remove a bunch of chicken bit options to turn off CPU features which
are not really needed anymore - Misc fixes and cleanups -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAABCgAdFiEEzv7L6UO9uDPlPSfHEsHwGGHeVUoFAmKLdfgACgkQEsHwGGHe VUpB5Q//TIGVgmnSd0YYxY2cIe047lfcd34D+3oEGk0d2FidtirP/tjgBqIXRuY5 UncoveqBuI/6/7bodP/ANg9DNVXv2489eFYyZtEOLSGnfzV2AU10aw95cuQQG+BW YIc6bGSsgfiNo8Vtj4L3xkVqxOrqaCYnh74GTSNNANht3i8KH8Qq9n3qZTuMiF6R fH9xWak3TZB2nMzHdYrXh0sSR6eBHN3KYSiT0DsdlU9PUlavlSPFYQRiAlr6FL6J BuYQdlUaCQbINvaviGW4SG7fhX32RfF/GUNaBajB40TO6H98KZLpBBvstWQ841xd /o44o5wbghoGP1ne8OKwP+SaAV2bE6twd5eO1lpwcpXnQfATvjQ2imxvOiRhy5LY pFPt/hko9gKWJ6SI0SQ4tiKJALFPLWD6561scHU6PoriFhv0SRIaPmJyEsDYynMz bCXaPPsoovRwwwBfAxxQjljIlhQSBVt3gWZ8NWD1tYbNaqM+WK7xKBaONGh3OCw3 iK7lsbbljtM0zmANImYyeo7+Hr1NVOmMiK2WZYbxhxgzH3l8v/6EbDt3I70WU57V 9apCU3/nk/HFpX65SdW5qmuiWLVdH9NXrEqbvaUB4ApT18MdUUugewBhcGnf3Umu wEtltzziqcIkxzDoXXpBGWpX31S7PsM2XVDqYC7dwuNttgEw2Fc= =7AUX -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'x86_cpu_for_v5.19_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 CPU feature updates from Borislav Petkov: - Remove a bunch of chicken bit options to turn off CPU features which are not really needed anymore - Misc fixes and cleanups * tag 'x86_cpu_for_v5.19_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/speculation: Add missing prototype for unpriv_ebpf_notify() x86/pm: Fix false positive kmemleak report in msr_build_context() x86/speculation/srbds: Do not try to turn mitigation off when not supported x86/cpu: Remove "noclflush" x86/cpu: Remove "noexec" x86/cpu: Remove "nosmep" x86/cpu: Remove CONFIG_X86_SMAP and "nosmap" x86/cpu: Remove "nosep" x86/cpu: Allow feature bit names from /proc/cpuinfo in clearcpuid= |
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Pawan Gupta
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027bbb884b |
KVM: x86/speculation: Disable Fill buffer clear within guests
The enumeration of MD_CLEAR in CPUID(EAX=7,ECX=0).EDX{bit 10} is not an
accurate indicator on all CPUs of whether the VERW instruction will
overwrite fill buffers. FB_CLEAR enumeration in
IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES{bit 17} covers the case of CPUs that are not
vulnerable to MDS/TAA, indicating that microcode does overwrite fill
buffers.
Guests running in VMM environments may not be aware of all the
capabilities/vulnerabilities of the host CPU. Specifically, a guest may
apply MDS/TAA mitigations when a virtual CPU is enumerated as vulnerable
to MDS/TAA even when the physical CPU is not. On CPUs that enumerate
FB_CLEAR_CTRL the VMM may set FB_CLEAR_DIS to skip overwriting of fill
buffers by the VERW instruction. This is done by setting FB_CLEAR_DIS
during VMENTER and resetting on VMEXIT. For guests that enumerate
FB_CLEAR (explicitly asking for fill buffer clear capability) the VMM
will not use FB_CLEAR_DIS.
Irrespective of guest state, host overwrites CPU buffers before VMENTER
to protect itself from an MMIO capable guest, as part of mitigation for
MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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Pawan Gupta
|
5180218615 |
x86/speculation/mmio: Enumerate Processor MMIO Stale Data bug
Processor MMIO Stale Data is a class of vulnerabilities that may expose data after an MMIO operation. For more details please refer to Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.rst Add the Processor MMIO Stale Data bug enumeration. A microcode update adds new bits to the MSR IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, define them. Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> |
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Ravi Bangoria
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9cb23f598c |
perf/ibs: Fix comment
s/IBS Op Data 2/IBS Op Data 1/ for MSR 0xc0011035. Signed-off-by: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220509044914.1473-9-ravi.bangoria@amd.com |
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Pawan Gupta
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400331f8ff |
x86/tsx: Disable TSX development mode at boot
A microcode update on some Intel processors causes all TSX transactions to always abort by default[*]. Microcode also added functionality to re-enable TSX for development purposes. With this microcode loaded, if tsx=on was passed on the cmdline, and TSX development mode was already enabled before the kernel boot, it may make the system vulnerable to TSX Asynchronous Abort (TAA). To be on safer side, unconditionally disable TSX development mode during boot. If a viable use case appears, this can be revisited later. [*]: Intel TSX Disable Update for Selected Processors, doc ID: 643557 [ bp: Drop unstable web link, massage heavily. ] Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Tested-by: Neelima Krishnan <neelima.krishnan@intel.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/347bd844da3a333a9793c6687d4e4eb3b2419a3e.1646943780.git.pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com |
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Borislav Petkov
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dbae0a934f |
x86/cpu: Remove CONFIG_X86_SMAP and "nosmap"
Those were added as part of the SMAP enablement but SMAP is currently an integral part of kernel proper and there's no need to disable it anymore. Rip out that functionality. Leave --uaccess default on for objtool as this is what objtool should do by default anyway. If still needed - clearcpuid=smap. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220127115626.14179-4-bp@alien8.de |
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Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
|
5ced812435 |
tools headers cpufeatures: Sync with the kernel sources
To pick the changes from:
|
||
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Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
|
672b259fed |
tools arch x86: Sync the msr-index.h copy with the kernel sources
To pick up the changes in:
|
||
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Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
|
d16d30f48c |
tools headers cpufeatures: Sync with the kernel sources
To pick the changes from: |
||
|
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
|
1efe4cbd7a |
tools headers cpufeatures: Sync with the kernel sources
To pick the changes in:
|
||
|
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
|
61726144c9 |
tools arch x86: Sync the msr-index.h copy with the kernel sources
To pick up the changes from these csets:
|
||
|
Linus Torvalds
|
2268735045 |
- Add support for a couple new insn sets to the insn decoder: AVX512-FP16,
AMX, other misc insns. - Update VMware-specific MAINTAINERS entries -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAABCgAdFiEEzv7L6UO9uDPlPSfHEsHwGGHeVUoFAmI4URIACgkQEsHwGGHe VUob3A/9GFyqt9bBKrSaq9Rt1UVkq6dQhG3kO7dW5d0YDvy8JmR9is4rNDV9GGx6 A1OAue/gDlZFIz/829oS1qwjB7GZ4Rfb0gRo33bytDLLmd0BRXW7ioZ54jBRnWvy 8dZ2WruMmazK6uJxoHvtOA+Pt3ukb074CZZ1SfW344clWK6FJZeptyRclWaT1Py2 QOIJOxMraCdNAay/1ZvOdIqqdIPx5+JyzbHIYOWUFzwT4y+Q8kFNbigrJnqxe5Ij aqRjzMIvt6MeLwbq9CfLsPFA3gaSzYeOkuXQPcqRgd5LU5ZyXBLStUrGEv1fsMvd 9Kh7VFycZPS7MKzxoEcbuJTTOR4cBsINOlbo9iWr7UD5pm5h7c3vc+nCyia+U+Xo 5XRpf8nitt4a3r1f6HxwXJS0OlBkS4CqexE2OejY4yhWRlxhMcIvRyquU+Z0J4Bp mgDJuXSzfJfFcBzp4jjOBxGPNEjXXOdy/qc/1jR97eMmTKrk3gk/74NWUx9hw4oN 5RGeC+khAD13TL0yVQfKBe5HuLK5tHppAzXAnT2xi6qUn+VJjLxNWgg3iV9tbShM 4q5vJp3BmvNOY8HQv1R3IDFfN0IAL09Q9v6EzEroNuVUhEOzBdH7JSzWkvBBveZb FVgD3I+wNBE1nQD3cP/6DGbRe1JG3ULDF95WJshB8gNJwavlZGs= =f7VZ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'x86_misc_for_v5.18_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull misc x86 updates from Borislav Petkov: - Add support for a couple new insn sets to the insn decoder: AVX512-FP16, AMX, other misc insns. - Update VMware-specific MAINTAINERS entries * tag 'x86_misc_for_v5.18_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: MAINTAINERS: Mark VMware mailing list entries as email aliases MAINTAINERS: Add Zack as maintainer of vmmouse driver MAINTAINERS: Update maintainers for paravirt ops and VMware hypervisor interface x86/insn: Add AVX512-FP16 instructions to the x86 instruction decoder perf/tests: Add AVX512-FP16 instructions to x86 instruction decoder test x86/insn: Add misc instructions to x86 instruction decoder perf/tests: Add misc instructions to the x86 instruction decoder test x86/insn: Add AMX instructions to the x86 instruction decoder perf/tests: Add AMX instructions to x86 instruction decoder test |
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Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
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ec9d50ace3 |
tools headers cpufeatures: Sync with the kernel sources
To pick the changes from:
|
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Linus Torvalds
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4a01e748a5 |
- Mitigate Spectre v2-type Branch History Buffer attacks on machines
which support eIBRS, i.e., the hardware-assisted speculation restriction after it has been shown that such machines are vulnerable even with the hardware mitigation. - Do not use the default LFENCE-based Spectre v2 mitigation on AMD as it is insufficient to mitigate such attacks. Instead, switch to retpolines on all AMD by default. - Update the docs and add some warnings for the obviously vulnerable cmdline configurations. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAABCgAdFiEEzv7L6UO9uDPlPSfHEsHwGGHeVUoFAmIkktUACgkQEsHwGGHe VUo7ZQ/+O4hzL/tHY0V/ekkDxCrJ3q3Hp+DcxUl2ee5PC3Qgxv1Z1waH6ppK8jQs marAGr7FYbvzY039ON7irxhpSIckBCpx9tM2F43zsPxxY8EdxGojkHbmaqso5HtW l3/O28AcZYoKN/fF8rRAIJy4hrTVascKrNJ2fOiYWYBT62ZIoPm0FusgXbKTZPD+ gT7iUMoyPjBnKdWDT9L6kKOxDF9TivX1Y6JdDHbnnBsgRkeFatkeq9BJ93M73q63 Ziq9c8ZcEXyKez+cGFCfXM7+pNYmfsiL48lilTyf+v+GXahDJQOkFw39j5zXEALm Nk6yB3PRQ74pEwm5WbK7KO8iwPpblmnDB978mfUcpk+9xWJD8pyoUcItAmCBsXh1 LjIImYPqL6YihUb9udh+PEDISsfzWNzr4T+kgW9/yXXG4ZmGy3TLInhTK+rNAxJa EshWZExEZj6yJvt83Vu08W9fppYJq976tJvl8LWOYthaxqY7IQz0q7mYd799yxk0 MLPqvZP1+4pHzqn2c9yeHgrwHwMmoqcyMx6B3EA5maYQPdlT7Fk9RCBeCdIA/ieF OgGxy1WwMH+cvUa5MaBy3Y32LeYU3bUJh0yPFq/7BxEYGG9PJtLhg2xTo1Ui8F1d fKrcSFcjZKVJ9UE5HaqOcp4ka+Q220I9IDGURXkAFQlnOU7X7CE= =Athd -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'x86_bugs_for_v5.17' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 spectre fixes from Borislav Petkov: - Mitigate Spectre v2-type Branch History Buffer attacks on machines which support eIBRS, i.e., the hardware-assisted speculation restriction after it has been shown that such machines are vulnerable even with the hardware mitigation. - Do not use the default LFENCE-based Spectre v2 mitigation on AMD as it is insufficient to mitigate such attacks. Instead, switch to retpolines on all AMD by default. - Update the docs and add some warnings for the obviously vulnerable cmdline configurations. * tag 'x86_bugs_for_v5.17' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/speculation: Warn about eIBRS + LFENCE + Unprivileged eBPF + SMT x86/speculation: Warn about Spectre v2 LFENCE mitigation x86/speculation: Update link to AMD speculation whitepaper x86/speculation: Use generic retpoline by default on AMD x86/speculation: Include unprivileged eBPF status in Spectre v2 mitigation reporting Documentation/hw-vuln: Update spectre doc x86/speculation: Add eIBRS + Retpoline options x86/speculation: Rename RETPOLINE_AMD to RETPOLINE_LFENCE |
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Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
|
5b061a322b |
tools arch x86: Sync the msr-index.h copy with the kernel sources
To pick up the changes in:
|
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Peter Zijlstra (Intel)
|
d45476d983 |
x86/speculation: Rename RETPOLINE_AMD to RETPOLINE_LFENCE
The RETPOLINE_AMD name is unfortunate since it isn't necessarily AMD only, in fact Hygon also uses it. Furthermore it will likely be sufficient for some Intel processors. Therefore rename the thing to RETPOLINE_LFENCE to better describe what it is. Add the spectre_v2=retpoline,lfence option as an alias to spectre_v2=retpoline,amd to preserve existing setups. However, the output of /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2 will be changed. [ bp: Fix typos, massage. ] Co-developed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> |
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Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
|
d5381cc9f1 |
tools headers cpufeatures: Sync with the kernel sources
To pick the changes from:
|
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Adrian Hunter
|
16273fa4f3 |
x86/insn: Add AVX512-FP16 instructions to the x86 instruction decoder
The x86 instruction decoder is used for both kernel instructions and user space instructions (e.g. uprobes, perf tools Intel PT), so it is good to update it with new instructions. Add AVX512-FP16 instructions to x86 instruction decoder. Note the EVEX map field is extended by 1 bit, and most instructions are in map 5 and map 6. Reference: Intel AVX512-FP16 Architecture Specification June 2021 Revision 1.0 Document Number: 347407-001US Example using perf tools' x86 instruction decoder test: $ perf test -v "x86 instruction decoder" |& grep vfcmaddcph | head -2 Decoded ok: 62 f6 6f 48 56 cb vfcmaddcph %zmm3,%zmm2,%zmm1 Decoded ok: 62 f6 6f 48 56 8c c8 78 56 34 12 vfcmaddcph 0x12345678(%eax,%ecx,8),%zmm2,%zmm1 Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211202095029.2165714-7-adrian.hunter@intel.com |
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|
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
|
e652ab64e5 |
tools arch x86: Sync the msr-index.h copy with the kernel sources
To pick up the changes in:
|
||
|
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
|
486e5ed888 |
tools headers cpufeatures: Sync with the kernel sources
To pick the changes from:
|
||
|
Peter Zijlstra
|
c6dbd3e5e6 |
x86/mmx_32: Remove X86_USE_3DNOW
This code puts an exception table entry on the PREFETCH instruction to overwrite it with a JMP.d8 when it triggers an exception. Except of course, our code is no longer writable, also SMP. Instead of fixing this broken mess, simply take it out. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/YZKQzUmeNuwyvZpk@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net |
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|
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
|
b075c1d81e |
tools headers cpufeatures: Sync with the kernel sources
To pick the changes from:
|
||
|
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
|
3442b5e05a |
tools arch x86: Sync the msr-index.h copy with the kernel sources
To pick up the changes in:
|
||
|
Oliver Upton
|
5000653934 |
tools: arch: x86: pull in pvclock headers
Copy over approximately clean versions of the pvclock headers into tools. Reconcile headers/symbols missing in tools that are unneeded. Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com> Message-Id: <20210916181555.973085-2-oupton@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> |
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Sean Christopherson
|
de5f4213da |
tools: Move x86 syscall number fallbacks to .../uapi/
Move unistd_{32,64}.h from x86/include/asm to x86/include/uapi/asm so
that tools/selftests that install kernel headers, e.g. KVM selftests, can
include non-uapi tools headers, e.g. to get 'struct list_head', without
effectively overriding the installed non-tool uapi headers.
Swapping KVM's search order, e.g. to search the kernel headers before
tool headers, is not a viable option as doing results in linux/type.h and
other core headers getting pulled from the kernel headers, which do not
have the kernel-internal typedefs that are used through tools, including
many files outside of selftests/kvm's control.
Prior to commit
|
||
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Kim Phillips
|
dde994dd54 |
perf report: Add tools/arch/x86/include/asm/amd-ibs.h
This is a tools/-side patch for the patch that adds the original copy of the IBS header file, in arch/x86/include/asm/. We also add an entry to check-headers.sh, so future changes continue to be copied. Committer notes: Had to add this -#include <asm/msr-index.h> +#include "msr-index.h" And change the check-headers.sh entry to ignore this line when diffing with the original kernel header. This is needed so that we can use 'perf report' on a perf.data with IBS data on a !x86 system, i.e. building on ARM fails without this as there is no asm/msr-index.h there. This was done on the next patch in this series and is done for things like Intel PT and ARM CoreSight. Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Joao Martins <joao.m.martins@oracle.com> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Michael Petlan <mpetlan@redhat.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Robert Richter <robert.richter@amd.com> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Link: https //lore.kernel.org/r/20210817221509.88391-3-kim.phillips@amd.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> |
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|
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
|
cc200a7de9 |
tools headers cpufeatures: Sync with the kernel sources
To pick the changes from: |
||
|
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
|
04df0dc118 |
tools arch x86: Sync the msr-index.h copy with the kernel sources
To pick up the changes from these csets:
|
||
|
Linus Torvalds
|
a22c3f615a |
X86 interrupt related changes:
- Consolidate the VECTOR defines and the usage sites.
- Cleanup GDT/IDT related code and replace open coded ASM with proper
native helfper functions.
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Merge tag 'x86-irq-2021-06-29' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 interrupt related updates from Thomas Gleixner:
- Consolidate the VECTOR defines and the usage sites.
- Cleanup GDT/IDT related code and replace open coded ASM with proper
native helper functions.
* tag 'x86-irq-2021-06-29' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/kexec: Set_[gi]dt() -> native_[gi]dt_invalidate() in machine_kexec_*.c
x86: Add native_[ig]dt_invalidate()
x86/idt: Remove address argument from idt_invalidate()
x86/irq: Add and use NR_EXTERNAL_VECTORS and NR_SYSTEM_VECTORS
x86/irq: Remove unused vectors defines
|