Commit Graph

423 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Sean Christopherson
1201f226c8 KVM: x86: Cache CPUID.0xD XSTATE offsets+sizes during module init
Snapshot the output of CPUID.0xD.[1..n] during kvm.ko initiliaization to
avoid the overead of CPUID during runtime.  The offset, size, and metadata
for CPUID.0xD.[1..n] sub-leaves does not depend on XCR0 or XSS values, i.e.
is constant for a given CPU, and thus can be cached during module load.

On Intel's Emerald Rapids, CPUID is *wildly* expensive, to the point where
recomputing XSAVE offsets and sizes results in a 4x increase in latency of
nested VM-Enter and VM-Exit (nested transitions can trigger
xstate_required_size() multiple times per transition), relative to using
cached values.  The issue is easily visible by running `perf top` while
triggering nested transitions: kvm_update_cpuid_runtime() shows up at a
whopping 50%.

As measured via RDTSC from L2 (using KVM-Unit-Test's CPUID VM-Exit test
and a slightly modified L1 KVM to handle CPUID in the fastpath), a nested
roundtrip to emulate CPUID on Skylake (SKX), Icelake (ICX), and Emerald
Rapids (EMR) takes:

  SKX 11650
  ICX 22350
  EMR 28850

Using cached values, the latency drops to:

  SKX 6850
  ICX 9000
  EMR 7900

The underlying issue is that CPUID itself is slow on ICX, and comically
slow on EMR.  The problem is exacerbated on CPUs which support XSAVES
and/or XSAVEC, as KVM invokes xstate_required_size() twice on each
runtime CPUID update, and because there are more supported XSAVE features
(CPUID for supported XSAVE feature sub-leafs is significantly slower).

 SKX:
  CPUID.0xD.2  = 348 cycles
  CPUID.0xD.3  = 400 cycles
  CPUID.0xD.4  = 276 cycles
  CPUID.0xD.5  = 236 cycles
  <other sub-leaves are similar>

 EMR:
  CPUID.0xD.2  = 1138 cycles
  CPUID.0xD.3  = 1362 cycles
  CPUID.0xD.4  = 1068 cycles
  CPUID.0xD.5  = 910 cycles
  CPUID.0xD.6  = 914 cycles
  CPUID.0xD.7  = 1350 cycles
  CPUID.0xD.8  = 734 cycles
  CPUID.0xD.9  = 766 cycles
  CPUID.0xD.10 = 732 cycles
  CPUID.0xD.11 = 718 cycles
  CPUID.0xD.12 = 734 cycles
  CPUID.0xD.13 = 1700 cycles
  CPUID.0xD.14 = 1126 cycles
  CPUID.0xD.15 = 898 cycles
  CPUID.0xD.16 = 716 cycles
  CPUID.0xD.17 = 748 cycles
  CPUID.0xD.18 = 776 cycles

Note, updating runtime CPUID information multiple times per nested
transition is itself a flaw, especially since CPUID is a mandotory
intercept on both Intel and AMD.  E.g. KVM doesn't need to ensure emulated
CPUID state is up-to-date while running L2.  That flaw will be fixed in a
future patch, as deferring runtime CPUID updates is more subtle than it
appears at first glance, the benefits aren't super critical to have once
the XSAVE issue is resolved, and caching CPUID output is desirable even if
KVM's updates are deferred.

Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-ID: <20241211013302.1347853-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2024-12-13 13:58:10 -05:00
Tao Su
a0423af92c x86: KVM: Advertise CPUIDs for new instructions in Clearwater Forest
Latest Intel platform Clearwater Forest has introduced new instructions
enumerated by CPUIDs of SHA512, SM3, SM4 and AVX-VNNI-INT16. Advertise
these CPUIDs to userspace so that guests can query them directly.

SHA512, SM3 and SM4 are on an expected-dense CPUID leaf and some other
bits on this leaf have kernel usages. Considering they have not truly
kernel usages, hide them in /proc/cpuinfo.

These new instructions only operate in xmm, ymm registers and have no new
VMX controls, so there is no additional host enabling required for guests
to use these instructions, i.e. advertising these CPUIDs to userspace is
safe.

Tested-by: Jiaan Lu <jiaan.lu@intel.com>
Tested-by: Xuelian Guo <xuelian.guo@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tao Su <tao1.su@linux.intel.com>
Message-ID: <20241105054825.870939-1-tao1.su@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2024-11-13 14:40:40 -05:00
Jim Mattson
de572491a9 KVM: x86: AMD's IBPB is not equivalent to Intel's IBPB
From Intel's documentation [1], "CPUID.(EAX=07H,ECX=0):EDX[26]
enumerates support for indirect branch restricted speculation (IBRS)
and the indirect branch predictor barrier (IBPB)." Further, from [2],
"Software that executed before the IBPB command cannot control the
predicted targets of indirect branches (4) executed after the command
on the same logical processor," where footnote 4 reads, "Note that
indirect branches include near call indirect, near jump indirect and
near return instructions. Because it includes near returns, it follows
that **RSB entries created before an IBPB command cannot control the
predicted targets of returns executed after the command on the same
logical processor.**" [emphasis mine]

On the other hand, AMD's IBPB "may not prevent return branch
predictions from being specified by pre-IBPB branch targets" [3].

However, some AMD processors have an "enhanced IBPB" [terminology
mine] which does clear the return address predictor. This feature is
enumerated by CPUID.80000008:EDX.IBPB_RET[bit 30] [4].

Adjust the cross-vendor features enumerated by KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID
accordingly.

[1] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/cpuid-enumeration-and-architectural-msrs.html
[2] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/speculative-execution-side-channel-mitigations.html#Footnotes
[3] https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-1040.html
[4] https://www.amd.com/content/dam/amd/en/documents/processor-tech-docs/programmer-references/24594.pdf

Fixes: 0c54914d0c ("KVM: x86: use Intel speculation bugs and features as derived in generic x86 code")
Suggested-by: Venkatesh Srinivas <venkateshs@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241011214353.1625057-5-jmattson@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2024-11-01 09:22:20 -07:00
Jim Mattson
71dd5d5300 KVM: x86: Advertise AMD_IBPB_RET to userspace
This is an inherent feature of IA32_PRED_CMD[0], so it is trivially
virtualizable (as long as IA32_PRED_CMD[0] is virtualized).

Suggested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241011214353.1625057-4-jmattson@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2024-11-01 09:22:19 -07:00
Tao Su
1c450ffef5 KVM: x86: Advertise AVX10.1 CPUID to userspace
Advertise AVX10.1 related CPUIDs, i.e. report AVX10 support bit via
CPUID.(EAX=07H, ECX=01H):EDX[bit 19] and new CPUID leaf 0x24H so that
guest OS and applications can query the AVX10.1 CPUIDs directly. Intel
AVX10 represents the first major new vector ISA since the introduction of
Intel AVX512, which will establish a common, converged vector instruction
set across all Intel architectures[1].

AVX10.1 is an early version of AVX10, that enumerates the Intel AVX512
instruction set at 128, 256, and 512 bits which is enabled on
Granite Rapids. I.e., AVX10.1 is only a new CPUID enumeration with no
new functionality.   New features, e.g. Embedded Rounding and Suppress
All Exceptions (SAE) will be introduced in AVX10.2.

Advertising AVX10.1 is safe because there is nothing to enable for AVX10.1,
i.e. it's purely a new way to enumerate support, thus there will never be
anything for the kernel to enable. Note just the CPUID checking is changed
when using AVX512 related instructions, e.g. if using one AVX512
instruction needs to check (AVX512 AND AVX512DQ), it can check
((AVX512 AND AVX512DQ) OR AVX10.1) after checking XCR0[7:5].

The versions of AVX10 are expected to be inclusive, e.g. version N+1 is
a superset of version N. Per the spec, the version can never be 0, just
advertise AVX10.1 if it's supported in hardware. Moreover, advertising
AVX10_{128,256,512} needs to land in the same commit as advertising basic
AVX10.1 support, otherwise KVM would advertise an impossible CPU model.
E.g. a CPU with AVX512 but not AVX10.1/512 is impossible per the SDM.

As more and more AVX related CPUIDs are added (it would have resulted in
around 40-50 CPUID flags when developing AVX10), the versioning approach
is introduced. But incrementing version numbers are bad for virtualization.
E.g. if AVX10.2 has a feature that shouldn't be enumerated to guests for
whatever reason, then KVM can't enumerate any "later" features either,
because the only way to hide the problematic AVX10.2 feature is to set the
version to AVX10.1 or lower[2]. But most AVX features are just passed
through and don't have virtualization controls, so AVX10 should not be
problematic in practice, so long as Intel honors their promise that future
versions will be supersets of past versions.

[1] https://cdrdv2.intel.com/v1/dl/getContent/784267
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/all/Zkz5Ak0PQlAN8DxK@google.com/

Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Tao Su <tao1.su@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240819062327.3269720-1-tao1.su@linux.intel.com
[sean: minor changelog tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2024-08-22 11:25:25 -07:00
Wei Wang
896046474f KVM: x86: Introduce kvm_x86_call() to simplify static calls of kvm_x86_ops
Introduces kvm_x86_call(), to streamline the usage of static calls of
kvm_x86_ops. The current implementation of these calls is verbose and
could lead to alignment challenges. This makes the code susceptible to
exceeding the "80 columns per single line of code" limit as defined in
the coding-style document. Another issue with the existing implementation
is that the addition of kvm_x86_ prefix to hooks at the static_call sites
hinders code readability and navigation. kvm_x86_call() is added to
improve code readability and maintainability, while adhering to the coding
style guidelines.

Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <wei.w.wang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240507133103.15052-3-wei.w.wang@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2024-07-16 12:14:12 -04:00
Sean Christopherson
1028893a73 KVM: x86: Bury guest_cpuid_is_amd_or_hygon() in cpuid.c
Move guest_cpuid_is_amd_or_hygon() into cpuid.c now that, except for one
Intel quirk in the emulator, KVM checks for AMD vs. Intel *compatible*
vCPUs, not exact vendors, i.e. now that there should not be any reason for
KVM at-large to care about the exact vendor.

Opportunistically refactor the guts of the helper to use "entry" instead
of "best", and short circuit the !entry path to make the common case more
readable.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240405235603.1173076-11-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2024-06-10 14:29:39 -07:00
Paolo Bonzini
7d41e24da2 KVM x86 misc changes for 6.10:
- Advertise the max mappable GPA in the "guest MAXPHYADDR" CPUID field, which
    is unused by hardware, so that KVM can communicate its inability to map GPAs
    that set bits 51:48 due to lack of 5-level paging.  Guest firmware is
    expected to use the information to safely remap BARs in the uppermost GPA
    space, i.e to avoid placing a BAR at a legal, but unmappable, GPA.
 
  - Use vfree() instead of kvfree() for allocations that always use vcalloc()
    or __vcalloc().
 
  - Don't completely ignore same-value writes to immutable feature MSRs, as
    doing so results in KVM failing to reject accesses to MSR that aren't
    supposed to exist given the vCPU model and/or KVM configuration.
 
  - Don't mark APICv as being inhibited due to ABSENT if APICv is disabled
    KVM-wide to avoid confusing debuggers (KVM will never bother clearing the
    ABSENT inhibit, even if userspace enables in-kernel local APIC).
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Merge tag 'kvm-x86-misc-6.10' of https://github.com/kvm-x86/linux into HEAD

KVM x86 misc changes for 6.10:

 - Advertise the max mappable GPA in the "guest MAXPHYADDR" CPUID field, which
   is unused by hardware, so that KVM can communicate its inability to map GPAs
   that set bits 51:48 due to lack of 5-level paging.  Guest firmware is
   expected to use the information to safely remap BARs in the uppermost GPA
   space, i.e to avoid placing a BAR at a legal, but unmappable, GPA.

 - Use vfree() instead of kvfree() for allocations that always use vcalloc()
   or __vcalloc().

 - Don't completely ignore same-value writes to immutable feature MSRs, as
   doing so results in KVM failing to reject accesses to MSR that aren't
   supposed to exist given the vCPU model and/or KVM configuration.

 - Don't mark APICv as being inhibited due to ABSENT if APICv is disabled
   KVM-wide to avoid confusing debuggers (KVM will never bother clearing the
   ABSENT inhibit, even if userspace enables in-kernel local APIC).
2024-05-12 03:18:44 -04:00
Paolo Bonzini
4232da23d7 Merge tag 'loongarch-kvm-6.10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/chenhuacai/linux-loongson into HEAD
LoongArch KVM changes for v6.10

1. Add ParaVirt IPI support.
2. Add software breakpoint support.
3. Add mmio trace events support.
2024-05-10 13:20:18 -04:00
Sean Christopherson
1ff3c89032 KVM: SVM: Invert handling of SEV and SEV_ES feature flags
Leave SEV and SEV_ES '0' in kvm_cpu_caps by default, and instead set them
in sev_set_cpu_caps() if SEV and SEV-ES support are fully enabled.  Aside
from the fact that sev_set_cpu_caps() is wildly misleading when it *clears*
capabilities, this will allow compiling out sev.c without falsely
advertising SEV/SEV-ES support in KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-ID: <20240404121327.3107131-2-pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2024-04-11 13:08:21 -04:00
Sean Christopherson
fd706c9b16 KVM: x86: Snapshot if a vCPU's vendor model is AMD vs. Intel compatible
Add kvm_vcpu_arch.is_amd_compatible to cache if a vCPU's vendor model is
compatible with AMD, i.e. if the vCPU vendor is AMD or Hygon, along with
helpers to check if a vCPU is compatible AMD vs. Intel.  To handle Intel
vs. AMD behavior related to masking the LVTPC entry, KVM will need to
check for vendor compatibility on every PMI injection, i.e. querying for
AMD will soon be a moderately hot path.

Note!  This subtly (or maybe not-so-subtly) makes "Intel compatible" KVM's
default behavior, both if userspace omits (or never sets) CPUID 0x0 and if
userspace sets a completely unknown vendor.  One could argue that KVM
should treat such vCPUs as not being compatible with Intel *or* AMD, but
that would add useless complexity to KVM.

KVM needs to do *something* in the face of vendor specific behavior, and
so unless KVM conjured up a magic third option, choosing to treat unknown
vendors as neither Intel nor AMD means that checks on AMD compatibility
would yield Intel behavior, and checks for Intel compatibility would yield
AMD behavior.  And that's far worse as it would effectively yield random
behavior depending on whether KVM checked for AMD vs. Intel vs. !AMD vs.
!Intel.  And practically speaking, all x86 CPUs follow either Intel or AMD
architecture, i.e. "supporting" an unknown third architecture adds no
value.

Deliberately don't convert any of the existing guest_cpuid_is_intel()
checks, as the Intel side of things is messier due to some flows explicitly
checking for exactly vendor==Intel, versus some flows assuming anything
that isn't "AMD compatible" gets Intel behavior.  The Intel code will be
cleaned up in the future.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-ID: <20240405235603.1173076-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2024-04-11 12:58:56 -04:00
Gerd Hoffmann
b628cb523c KVM: x86: Advertise max mappable GPA in CPUID.0x80000008.GuestPhysBits
Use the GuestPhysBits field in CPUID.0x80000008 to communicate the max
mappable GPA to userspace, i.e. the max GPA that is addressable by the
CPU itself.  Typically this is identical to the max effective GPA, except
in the case where the CPU supports MAXPHYADDR > 48 but does not support
5-level TDP (the CPU consults bits 51:48 of the GPA only when walking the
fifth level TDP page table entry).

Enumerating the max mappable GPA via CPUID will allow guest firmware to
map resources like PCI bars in the highest possible address space, while
ensuring that the GPA is addressable by the CPU.  Without precise
knowledge about the max mappable GPA, the guest must assume that 5-level
paging is unsupported and thus restrict its mappings to the lower 48 bits.

Advertise the max mappable GPA via KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID as userspace
doesn't have easy access to whether or not 5-level paging is supported,
and to play nice with userspace VMMs that reflect the supported CPUID
directly into the guest.

AMD's APM (3.35) defines GuestPhysBits (EAX[23:16]) as:

  Maximum guest physical address size in bits.  This number applies
  only to guests using nested paging.  When this field is zero, refer
  to the PhysAddrSize field for the maximum guest physical address size.

Tom Lendacky confirmed that the purpose of GuestPhysBits is software use
and KVM can use it as described above.  Real hardware always returns zero.

Leave GuestPhysBits as '0' when TDP is disabled in order to comply with
the APM's statement that GuestPhysBits "applies only to guest using nested
paging".  As above, guest firmware will likely create suboptimal mappings,
but that is a very minor issue and not a functional concern.

Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240313125844.912415-3-kraxel@redhat.com
[sean: massage changelog]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2024-04-09 12:18:37 -07:00
Gerd Hoffmann
6f5c960062 KVM: x86: Don't advertise guest.MAXPHYADDR as host.MAXPHYADDR in CPUID
Drop KVM's propagation of GuestPhysBits (CPUID leaf 80000008, EAX[23:16])
to HostPhysBits (same leaf, EAX[7:0]) when advertising the address widths
to userspace via KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID.

Per AMD, GuestPhysBits is intended for software use, and physical CPUs do
not set that field.  I.e. GuestPhysBits will be non-zero if and only if
KVM is running as a nested hypervisor, and in that case, GuestPhysBits is
NOT guaranteed to capture the CPU's effective MAXPHYADDR when running with
TDP enabled.

E.g. KVM will soon use GuestPhysBits to communicate the CPU's maximum
*addressable* guest physical address, which would result in KVM under-
reporting PhysBits when running as an L1 on a CPU with MAXPHYADDR=52,
but without 5-level paging.

Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240313125844.912415-2-kraxel@redhat.com
[sean: rewrite changelog with --verbose, Cc stable@]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2024-04-09 12:18:22 -07:00
Vitaly Kuznetsov
4736d85f0d KVM: x86: Use actual kvm_cpuid.base for clearing KVM_FEATURE_PV_UNHALT
Commit ee3a5f9e3d ("KVM: x86: Do runtime CPUID update before updating
vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries") moved tweaking of the supplied CPUID
data earlier in kvm_set_cpuid() but __kvm_update_cpuid_runtime() actually
uses 'vcpu->arch.kvm_cpuid' (though __kvm_find_kvm_cpuid_features()) which
gets set later in kvm_set_cpuid(). In some cases, e.g. when kvm_set_cpuid()
is called for the first time and 'vcpu->arch.kvm_cpuid' is clear,
__kvm_find_kvm_cpuid_features() fails to find KVM PV feature entry and the
logic which clears KVM_FEATURE_PV_UNHALT after enabling
KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_HLT does not work.

The logic, introduced by the commit ee3a5f9e3d ("KVM: x86: Do runtime
CPUID update before updating vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries") must stay: the
supplied CPUID data is tweaked by KVM first (__kvm_update_cpuid_runtime())
and checked later (kvm_check_cpuid()) and the actual data
(vcpu->arch.cpuid_*, vcpu->arch.kvm_cpuid, vcpu->arch.xen.cpuid,..) is only
updated on success.

Switch to searching for KVM_SIGNATURE in the supplied CPUID data to
discover KVM PV feature entry instead of using stale 'vcpu->arch.kvm_cpuid'.

While on it, drop pointless "&& (best->eax & (1 << KVM_FEATURE_PV_UNHALT)"
check when clearing KVM_FEATURE_PV_UNHALT bit.

Fixes: ee3a5f9e3d ("KVM: x86: Do runtime CPUID update before updating vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries")
Reported-and-tested-by: Li RongQing <lirongqing@baidu.com>
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240228101837.93642-3-vkuznets@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2024-03-06 09:50:15 -08:00
Vitaly Kuznetsov
92e82cf632 KVM: x86: Introduce __kvm_get_hypervisor_cpuid() helper
Similar to kvm_find_kvm_cpuid_features()/__kvm_find_kvm_cpuid_features(),
introduce a helper to search for the specific hypervisor signature in any
struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 array, not only in vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries.

No functional change intended.

Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240228101837.93642-2-vkuznets@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2024-03-06 09:50:15 -08:00
Linus Torvalds
09d1c6a80f Generic:
- Use memdup_array_user() to harden against overflow.
 
 - Unconditionally advertise KVM_CAP_DEVICE_CTRL for all architectures.
 
 - Clean up Kconfigs that all KVM architectures were selecting
 
 - New functionality around "guest_memfd", a new userspace API that
   creates an anonymous file and returns a file descriptor that refers
   to it.  guest_memfd files are bound to their owning virtual machine,
   cannot be mapped, read, or written by userspace, and cannot be resized.
   guest_memfd files do however support PUNCH_HOLE, which can be used to
   switch a memory area between guest_memfd and regular anonymous memory.
 
 - New ioctl KVM_SET_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES allowing userspace to specify
   per-page attributes for a given page of guest memory; right now the
   only attribute is whether the guest expects to access memory via
   guest_memfd or not, which in Confidential SVMs backed by SEV-SNP,
   TDX or ARM64 pKVM is checked by firmware or hypervisor that guarantees
   confidentiality (AMD PSP, Intel TDX module, or EL2 in the case of pKVM).
 
 x86:
 
 - Support for "software-protected VMs" that can use the new guest_memfd
   and page attributes infrastructure.  This is mostly useful for testing,
   since there is no pKVM-like infrastructure to provide a meaningfully
   reduced TCB.
 
 - Fix a relatively benign off-by-one error when splitting huge pages during
   CLEAR_DIRTY_LOG.
 
 - Fix a bug where KVM could incorrectly test-and-clear dirty bits in non-leaf
   TDP MMU SPTEs if a racing thread replaces a huge SPTE with a non-huge SPTE.
 
 - Use more generic lockdep assertions in paths that don't actually care
   about whether the caller is a reader or a writer.
 
 - let Xen guests opt out of having PV clock reported as "based on a stable TSC",
   because some of them don't expect the "TSC stable" bit (added to the pvclock
   ABI by KVM, but never set by Xen) to be set.
 
 - Revert a bogus, made-up nested SVM consistency check for TLB_CONTROL.
 
 - Advertise flush-by-ASID support for nSVM unconditionally, as KVM always
   flushes on nested transitions, i.e. always satisfies flush requests.  This
   allows running bleeding edge versions of VMware Workstation on top of KVM.
 
 - Sanity check that the CPU supports flush-by-ASID when enabling SEV support.
 
 - On AMD machines with vNMI, always rely on hardware instead of intercepting
   IRET in some cases to detect unmasking of NMIs
 
 - Support for virtualizing Linear Address Masking (LAM)
 
 - Fix a variety of vPMU bugs where KVM fail to stop/reset counters and other state
   prior to refreshing the vPMU model.
 
 - Fix a double-overflow PMU bug by tracking emulated counter events using a
   dedicated field instead of snapshotting the "previous" counter.  If the
   hardware PMC count triggers overflow that is recognized in the same VM-Exit
   that KVM manually bumps an event count, KVM would pend PMIs for both the
   hardware-triggered overflow and for KVM-triggered overflow.
 
 - Turn off KVM_WERROR by default for all configs so that it's not
   inadvertantly enabled by non-KVM developers, which can be problematic for
   subsystems that require no regressions for W=1 builds.
 
 - Advertise all of the host-supported CPUID bits that enumerate IA32_SPEC_CTRL
   "features".
 
 - Don't force a masterclock update when a vCPU synchronizes to the current TSC
   generation, as updating the masterclock can cause kvmclock's time to "jump"
   unexpectedly, e.g. when userspace hotplugs a pre-created vCPU.
 
 - Use RIP-relative address to read kvm_rebooting in the VM-Enter fault paths,
   partly as a super minor optimization, but mostly to make KVM play nice with
   position independent executable builds.
 
 - Guard KVM-on-HyperV's range-based TLB flush hooks with an #ifdef on
   CONFIG_HYPERV as a minor optimization, and to self-document the code.
 
 - Add CONFIG_KVM_HYPERV to allow disabling KVM support for HyperV "emulation"
   at build time.
 
 ARM64:
 
 - LPA2 support, adding 52bit IPA/PA capability for 4kB and 16kB
   base granule sizes. Branch shared with the arm64 tree.
 
 - Large Fine-Grained Trap rework, bringing some sanity to the
   feature, although there is more to come. This comes with
   a prefix branch shared with the arm64 tree.
 
 - Some additional Nested Virtualization groundwork, mostly
   introducing the NV2 VNCR support and retargetting the NV
   support to that version of the architecture.
 
 - A small set of vgic fixes and associated cleanups.
 
 Loongarch:
 
 - Optimization for memslot hugepage checking
 
 - Cleanup and fix some HW/SW timer issues
 
 - Add LSX/LASX (128bit/256bit SIMD) support
 
 RISC-V:
 
 - KVM_GET_REG_LIST improvement for vector registers
 
 - Generate ISA extension reg_list using macros in get-reg-list selftest
 
 - Support for reporting steal time along with selftest
 
 s390:
 
 - Bugfixes
 
 Selftests:
 
 - Fix an annoying goof where the NX hugepage test prints out garbage
   instead of the magic token needed to run the test.
 
 - Fix build errors when a header is delete/moved due to a missing flag
   in the Makefile.
 
 - Detect if KVM bugged/killed a selftest's VM and print out a helpful
   message instead of complaining that a random ioctl() failed.
 
 - Annotate the guest printf/assert helpers with __printf(), and fix the
   various bugs that were lurking due to lack of said annotation.
 
 There are two non-KVM patches buried in the middle of guest_memfd support:
 
   fs: Rename anon_inode_getfile_secure() and anon_inode_getfd_secure()
   mm: Add AS_UNMOVABLE to mark mapping as completely unmovable
 
 The first is small and mostly suggested-by Christian Brauner; the second
 a bit less so but it was written by an mm person (Vlastimil Babka).
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Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm

Pull kvm updates from Paolo Bonzini:
 "Generic:

   - Use memdup_array_user() to harden against overflow.

   - Unconditionally advertise KVM_CAP_DEVICE_CTRL for all
     architectures.

   - Clean up Kconfigs that all KVM architectures were selecting

   - New functionality around "guest_memfd", a new userspace API that
     creates an anonymous file and returns a file descriptor that refers
     to it. guest_memfd files are bound to their owning virtual machine,
     cannot be mapped, read, or written by userspace, and cannot be
     resized. guest_memfd files do however support PUNCH_HOLE, which can
     be used to switch a memory area between guest_memfd and regular
     anonymous memory.

   - New ioctl KVM_SET_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES allowing userspace to specify
     per-page attributes for a given page of guest memory; right now the
     only attribute is whether the guest expects to access memory via
     guest_memfd or not, which in Confidential SVMs backed by SEV-SNP,
     TDX or ARM64 pKVM is checked by firmware or hypervisor that
     guarantees confidentiality (AMD PSP, Intel TDX module, or EL2 in
     the case of pKVM).

  x86:

   - Support for "software-protected VMs" that can use the new
     guest_memfd and page attributes infrastructure. This is mostly
     useful for testing, since there is no pKVM-like infrastructure to
     provide a meaningfully reduced TCB.

   - Fix a relatively benign off-by-one error when splitting huge pages
     during CLEAR_DIRTY_LOG.

   - Fix a bug where KVM could incorrectly test-and-clear dirty bits in
     non-leaf TDP MMU SPTEs if a racing thread replaces a huge SPTE with
     a non-huge SPTE.

   - Use more generic lockdep assertions in paths that don't actually
     care about whether the caller is a reader or a writer.

   - let Xen guests opt out of having PV clock reported as "based on a
     stable TSC", because some of them don't expect the "TSC stable" bit
     (added to the pvclock ABI by KVM, but never set by Xen) to be set.

   - Revert a bogus, made-up nested SVM consistency check for
     TLB_CONTROL.

   - Advertise flush-by-ASID support for nSVM unconditionally, as KVM
     always flushes on nested transitions, i.e. always satisfies flush
     requests. This allows running bleeding edge versions of VMware
     Workstation on top of KVM.

   - Sanity check that the CPU supports flush-by-ASID when enabling SEV
     support.

   - On AMD machines with vNMI, always rely on hardware instead of
     intercepting IRET in some cases to detect unmasking of NMIs

   - Support for virtualizing Linear Address Masking (LAM)

   - Fix a variety of vPMU bugs where KVM fail to stop/reset counters
     and other state prior to refreshing the vPMU model.

   - Fix a double-overflow PMU bug by tracking emulated counter events
     using a dedicated field instead of snapshotting the "previous"
     counter. If the hardware PMC count triggers overflow that is
     recognized in the same VM-Exit that KVM manually bumps an event
     count, KVM would pend PMIs for both the hardware-triggered overflow
     and for KVM-triggered overflow.

   - Turn off KVM_WERROR by default for all configs so that it's not
     inadvertantly enabled by non-KVM developers, which can be
     problematic for subsystems that require no regressions for W=1
     builds.

   - Advertise all of the host-supported CPUID bits that enumerate
     IA32_SPEC_CTRL "features".

   - Don't force a masterclock update when a vCPU synchronizes to the
     current TSC generation, as updating the masterclock can cause
     kvmclock's time to "jump" unexpectedly, e.g. when userspace
     hotplugs a pre-created vCPU.

   - Use RIP-relative address to read kvm_rebooting in the VM-Enter
     fault paths, partly as a super minor optimization, but mostly to
     make KVM play nice with position independent executable builds.

   - Guard KVM-on-HyperV's range-based TLB flush hooks with an #ifdef on
     CONFIG_HYPERV as a minor optimization, and to self-document the
     code.

   - Add CONFIG_KVM_HYPERV to allow disabling KVM support for HyperV
     "emulation" at build time.

  ARM64:

   - LPA2 support, adding 52bit IPA/PA capability for 4kB and 16kB base
     granule sizes. Branch shared with the arm64 tree.

   - Large Fine-Grained Trap rework, bringing some sanity to the
     feature, although there is more to come. This comes with a prefix
     branch shared with the arm64 tree.

   - Some additional Nested Virtualization groundwork, mostly
     introducing the NV2 VNCR support and retargetting the NV support to
     that version of the architecture.

   - A small set of vgic fixes and associated cleanups.

  Loongarch:

   - Optimization for memslot hugepage checking

   - Cleanup and fix some HW/SW timer issues

   - Add LSX/LASX (128bit/256bit SIMD) support

  RISC-V:

   - KVM_GET_REG_LIST improvement for vector registers

   - Generate ISA extension reg_list using macros in get-reg-list
     selftest

   - Support for reporting steal time along with selftest

  s390:

   - Bugfixes

  Selftests:

   - Fix an annoying goof where the NX hugepage test prints out garbage
     instead of the magic token needed to run the test.

   - Fix build errors when a header is delete/moved due to a missing
     flag in the Makefile.

   - Detect if KVM bugged/killed a selftest's VM and print out a helpful
     message instead of complaining that a random ioctl() failed.

   - Annotate the guest printf/assert helpers with __printf(), and fix
     the various bugs that were lurking due to lack of said annotation"

* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (185 commits)
  x86/kvm: Do not try to disable kvmclock if it was not enabled
  KVM: x86: add missing "depends on KVM"
  KVM: fix direction of dependency on MMU notifiers
  KVM: introduce CONFIG_KVM_COMMON
  KVM: arm64: Add missing memory barriers when switching to pKVM's hyp pgd
  KVM: arm64: vgic-its: Avoid potential UAF in LPI translation cache
  RISC-V: KVM: selftests: Add get-reg-list test for STA registers
  RISC-V: KVM: selftests: Add steal_time test support
  RISC-V: KVM: selftests: Add guest_sbi_probe_extension
  RISC-V: KVM: selftests: Move sbi_ecall to processor.c
  RISC-V: KVM: Implement SBI STA extension
  RISC-V: KVM: Add support for SBI STA registers
  RISC-V: KVM: Add support for SBI extension registers
  RISC-V: KVM: Add SBI STA info to vcpu_arch
  RISC-V: KVM: Add steal-update vcpu request
  RISC-V: KVM: Add SBI STA extension skeleton
  RISC-V: paravirt: Implement steal-time support
  RISC-V: Add SBI STA extension definitions
  RISC-V: paravirt: Add skeleton for pv-time support
  RISC-V: KVM: Fix indentation in kvm_riscv_vcpu_set_reg_csr()
  ...
2024-01-17 13:03:37 -08:00
Paolo Bonzini
8ecb10bcbf KVM x86 support for virtualizing Linear Address Masking (LAM)
Add KVM support for Linear Address Masking (LAM).  LAM tweaks the canonicality
 checks for most virtual address usage in 64-bit mode, such that only the most
 significant bit of the untranslated address bits must match the polarity of the
 last translated address bit.  This allows software to use ignored, untranslated
 address bits for metadata, e.g. to efficiently tag pointers for address
 sanitization.
 
 LAM can be enabled separately for user pointers and supervisor pointers, and
 for userspace LAM can be select between 48-bit and 57-bit masking
 
  - 48-bit LAM: metadata bits 62:48, i.e. LAM width of 15.
  - 57-bit LAM: metadata bits 62:57, i.e. LAM width of 6.
 
 For user pointers, LAM enabling utilizes two previously-reserved high bits from
 CR3 (similar to how PCID_NOFLUSH uses bit 63): LAM_U48 and LAM_U57, bits 62 and
 61 respectively.  Note, if LAM_57 is set, LAM_U48 is ignored, i.e.:
 
  - CR3.LAM_U48=0 && CR3.LAM_U57=0 == LAM disabled for user pointers
  - CR3.LAM_U48=1 && CR3.LAM_U57=0 == LAM-48 enabled for user pointers
  - CR3.LAM_U48=x && CR3.LAM_U57=1 == LAM-57 enabled for user pointers
 
 For supervisor pointers, LAM is controlled by a single bit, CR4.LAM_SUP, with
 the 48-bit versus 57-bit LAM behavior following the current paging mode, i.e.:
 
  - CR4.LAM_SUP=0 && CR4.LA57=x == LAM disabled for supervisor pointers
  - CR4.LAM_SUP=1 && CR4.LA57=0 == LAM-48 enabled for supervisor pointers
  - CR4.LAM_SUP=1 && CR4.LA57=1 == LAM-57 enabled for supervisor pointers
 
 The modified LAM canonicality checks:
  - LAM_S48                : [ 1 ][ metadata ][ 1 ]
                               63               47
  - LAM_U48                : [ 0 ][ metadata ][ 0 ]
                               63               47
  - LAM_S57                : [ 1 ][ metadata ][ 1 ]
                               63               56
  - LAM_U57 + 5-lvl paging : [ 0 ][ metadata ][ 0 ]
                               63               56
  - LAM_U57 + 4-lvl paging : [ 0 ][ metadata ][ 0...0 ]
                               63               56..47
 
 The bulk of KVM support for LAM is to emulate LAM's modified canonicality
 checks.  The approach taken by KVM is to "fill" the metadata bits using the
 highest bit of the translated address, e.g. for LAM-48, bit 47 is sign-extended
 to bits 62:48.  The most significant bit, 63, is *not* modified, i.e. its value
 from the raw, untagged virtual address is kept for the canonicality check. This
 untagging allows
 
 Aside from emulating LAM's canonical checks behavior, LAM has the usual KVM
 touchpoints for selectable features: enumeration (CPUID.7.1:EAX.LAM[bit 26],
 enabling via CR3 and CR4 bits, etc.
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Merge tag 'kvm-x86-lam-6.8' of https://github.com/kvm-x86/linux into HEAD

KVM x86 support for virtualizing Linear Address Masking (LAM)

Add KVM support for Linear Address Masking (LAM).  LAM tweaks the canonicality
checks for most virtual address usage in 64-bit mode, such that only the most
significant bit of the untranslated address bits must match the polarity of the
last translated address bit.  This allows software to use ignored, untranslated
address bits for metadata, e.g. to efficiently tag pointers for address
sanitization.

LAM can be enabled separately for user pointers and supervisor pointers, and
for userspace LAM can be select between 48-bit and 57-bit masking

 - 48-bit LAM: metadata bits 62:48, i.e. LAM width of 15.
 - 57-bit LAM: metadata bits 62:57, i.e. LAM width of 6.

For user pointers, LAM enabling utilizes two previously-reserved high bits from
CR3 (similar to how PCID_NOFLUSH uses bit 63): LAM_U48 and LAM_U57, bits 62 and
61 respectively.  Note, if LAM_57 is set, LAM_U48 is ignored, i.e.:

 - CR3.LAM_U48=0 && CR3.LAM_U57=0 == LAM disabled for user pointers
 - CR3.LAM_U48=1 && CR3.LAM_U57=0 == LAM-48 enabled for user pointers
 - CR3.LAM_U48=x && CR3.LAM_U57=1 == LAM-57 enabled for user pointers

For supervisor pointers, LAM is controlled by a single bit, CR4.LAM_SUP, with
the 48-bit versus 57-bit LAM behavior following the current paging mode, i.e.:

 - CR4.LAM_SUP=0 && CR4.LA57=x == LAM disabled for supervisor pointers
 - CR4.LAM_SUP=1 && CR4.LA57=0 == LAM-48 enabled for supervisor pointers
 - CR4.LAM_SUP=1 && CR4.LA57=1 == LAM-57 enabled for supervisor pointers

The modified LAM canonicality checks:
 - LAM_S48                : [ 1 ][ metadata ][ 1 ]
                              63               47
 - LAM_U48                : [ 0 ][ metadata ][ 0 ]
                              63               47
 - LAM_S57                : [ 1 ][ metadata ][ 1 ]
                              63               56
 - LAM_U57 + 5-lvl paging : [ 0 ][ metadata ][ 0 ]
                              63               56
 - LAM_U57 + 4-lvl paging : [ 0 ][ metadata ][ 0...0 ]
                              63               56..47

The bulk of KVM support for LAM is to emulate LAM's modified canonicality
checks.  The approach taken by KVM is to "fill" the metadata bits using the
highest bit of the translated address, e.g. for LAM-48, bit 47 is sign-extended
to bits 62:48.  The most significant bit, 63, is *not* modified, i.e. its value
from the raw, untagged virtual address is kept for the canonicality check. This
untagging allows

Aside from emulating LAM's canonical checks behavior, LAM has the usual KVM
touchpoints for selectable features: enumeration (CPUID.7.1:EAX.LAM[bit 26],
enabling via CR3 and CR4 bits, etc.
2024-01-08 08:10:12 -05:00
Paolo Bonzini
33d0403fda KVM x86 misc changes for 6.8:
- Turn off KVM_WERROR by default for all configs so that it's not
    inadvertantly enabled by non-KVM developers, which can be problematic for
    subsystems that require no regressions for W=1 builds.
 
  - Advertise all of the host-supported CPUID bits that enumerate IA32_SPEC_CTRL
    "features".
 
  - Don't force a masterclock update when a vCPU synchronizes to the current TSC
    generation, as updating the masterclock can cause kvmclock's time to "jump"
    unexpectedly, e.g. when userspace hotplugs a pre-created vCPU.
 
  - Use RIP-relative address to read kvm_rebooting in the VM-Enter fault paths,
    partly as a super minor optimization, but mostly to make KVM play nice with
    position independent executable builds.
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Merge tag 'kvm-x86-misc-6.8' of https://github.com/kvm-x86/linux into HEAD

KVM x86 misc changes for 6.8:

 - Turn off KVM_WERROR by default for all configs so that it's not
   inadvertantly enabled by non-KVM developers, which can be problematic for
   subsystems that require no regressions for W=1 builds.

 - Advertise all of the host-supported CPUID bits that enumerate IA32_SPEC_CTRL
   "features".

 - Don't force a masterclock update when a vCPU synchronizes to the current TSC
   generation, as updating the masterclock can cause kvmclock's time to "jump"
   unexpectedly, e.g. when userspace hotplugs a pre-created vCPU.

 - Use RIP-relative address to read kvm_rebooting in the VM-Enter fault paths,
   partly as a super minor optimization, but mostly to make KVM play nice with
   position independent executable builds.
2024-01-08 08:10:04 -05:00
Paolo Bonzini
0afdfd85e3 KVM x86 Hyper-V changes for 6.8:
- Guard KVM-on-HyperV's range-based TLB flush hooks with an #ifdef on
    CONFIG_HYPERV as a minor optimization, and to self-document the code.
 
  - Add CONFIG_KVM_HYPERV to allow disabling KVM support for HyperV "emulation"
    at build time.
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Merge tag 'kvm-x86-hyperv-6.8' of https://github.com/kvm-x86/linux into HEAD

KVM x86 Hyper-V changes for 6.8:

 - Guard KVM-on-HyperV's range-based TLB flush hooks with an #ifdef on
   CONFIG_HYPERV as a minor optimization, and to self-document the code.

 - Add CONFIG_KVM_HYPERV to allow disabling KVM support for HyperV "emulation"
   at build time.
2024-01-08 08:10:01 -05:00
Bjorn Helgaas
54aa699e80 arch/x86: Fix typos
Fix typos, most reported by "codespell arch/x86".  Only touches comments,
no code changes.

Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240103004011.1758650-1-helgaas@kernel.org
2024-01-03 11:46:22 +01:00
Vitaly Kuznetsov
b4f69df0f6 KVM: x86: Make Hyper-V emulation optional
Hyper-V emulation in KVM is a fairly big chunk and in some cases it may be
desirable to not compile it in to reduce module sizes as well as the attack
surface. Introduce CONFIG_KVM_HYPERV option to make it possible.

Note, there's room for further nVMX/nSVM code optimizations when
!CONFIG_KVM_HYPERV, this will be done in follow-up patches.

Reorganize Makefile a bit so all CONFIG_HYPERV and CONFIG_KVM_HYPERV files
are grouped together.

Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jeremi Piotrowski <jpiotrowski@linux.microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231205103630.1391318-13-vkuznets@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-12-07 09:34:57 -08:00
Philipp Stanner
573cc0e5cf KVM: x86: Harden copying of userspace-array against overflow
cpuid.c utilizes vmemdup_user() and array_size() to copy two userspace
arrays. This, currently, does not check for an overflow.

Use the new wrapper vmemdup_array_user() to copy the arrays more safely,
as vmemdup_user() doesn't check for overflow.

Note, KVM explicitly checks the number of entries before duplicating the
array, i.e. adding the overflow check should be a glorified nop.

Suggested-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Philipp Stanner <pstanner@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231102181526.43279-2-pstanner@redhat.com
[sean: call out that KVM pre-checks the number of entries]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-11-30 13:16:21 -08:00
Jim Mattson
eefe5e6682 KVM: x86: Advertise CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=2):EDX[5:0] to userspace
The low five bits {INTEL_PSFD, IPRED_CTRL, RRSBA_CTRL, DDPD_U, BHI_CTRL}
advertise the availability of specific bits in IA32_SPEC_CTRL. Since KVM
dynamically determines the legal IA32_SPEC_CTRL bits for the underlying
hardware, the hard work has already been done. Just let userspace know
that a guest can use these IA32_SPEC_CTRL bits.

The sixth bit (MCDT_NO) states that the processor does not exhibit MXCSR
Configuration Dependent Timing (MCDT) behavior. This is an inherent
property of the physical processor that is inherited by the virtual
CPU. Pass that information on to userspace.

Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231024001636.890236-1-jmattson@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-11-30 11:50:16 -08:00
Robert Hoo
703d794cb8 KVM: x86: Advertise and enable LAM (user and supervisor)
LAM is enumerated by CPUID.7.1:EAX.LAM[bit 26]. Advertise the feature to
userspace and enable it as the final step after the LAM virtualization
support for supervisor and user pointers.

SGX LAM support is not advertised yet. SGX LAM support is enumerated in
SGX's own CPUID and there's no hard requirement that it must be supported
when LAM is reported in CPUID leaf 0x7.

Signed-off-by: Robert Hoo <robert.hu@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jingqi Liu <jingqi.liu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Tested-by: Xuelian Guo <xuelian.guo@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230913124227.12574-13-binbin.wu@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-11-28 17:54:09 -08:00
Paolo Bonzini
e122d7a100 KVM x86 Xen changes for 6.7:
- Omit "struct kvm_vcpu_xen" entirely when CONFIG_KVM_XEN=n.
 
  - Use the fast path directly from the timer callback when delivering Xen timer
    events.  Avoid the problematic races with using the fast path by ensuring
    the hrtimer isn't running when (re)starting the timer or saving the timer
    information (for userspace).
 
  - Follow the lead of upstream Xen and ignore the VCPU_SSHOTTMR_future flag.
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Merge tag 'kvm-x86-xen-6.7' of https://github.com/kvm-x86/linux into HEAD

KVM x86 Xen changes for 6.7:

 - Omit "struct kvm_vcpu_xen" entirely when CONFIG_KVM_XEN=n.

 - Use the fast path directly from the timer callback when delivering Xen timer
   events.  Avoid the problematic races with using the fast path by ensuring
   the hrtimer isn't running when (re)starting the timer or saving the timer
   information (for userspace).

 - Follow the lead of upstream Xen and ignore the VCPU_SSHOTTMR_future flag.
2023-10-31 10:21:42 -04:00
Paolo Bonzini
f292dc8aad KVM x86 misc changes for 6.7:
- Add CONFIG_KVM_MAX_NR_VCPUS to allow supporting up to 4096 vCPUs without
    forcing more common use cases to eat the extra memory overhead.
 
  - Add IBPB and SBPB virtualization support.
 
  - Fix a bug where restoring a vCPU snapshot that was taken within 1 second of
    creating the original vCPU would cause KVM to try to synchronize the vCPU's
    TSC and thus clobber the correct TSC being set by userspace.
 
  - Compute guest wall clock using a single TSC read to avoid generating an
    inaccurate time, e.g. if the vCPU is preempted between multiple TSC reads.
 
  - "Virtualize" HWCR.TscFreqSel to make Linux guests happy, which complain
     about a "Firmware Bug" if the bit isn't set for select F/M/S combos.
 
  - Don't apply side effects to Hyper-V's synthetic timer on writes from
    userspace to fix an issue where the auto-enable behavior can trigger
    spurious interrupts, i.e. do auto-enabling only for guest writes.
 
  - Remove an unnecessary kick of all vCPUs when synchronizing the dirty log
    without PML enabled.
 
  - Advertise "support" for non-serializing FS/GS base MSR writes as appropriate.
 
  - Use octal notation for file permissions through KVM x86.
 
  - Fix a handful of typo fixes and warts.
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Merge tag 'kvm-x86-misc-6.7' of https://github.com/kvm-x86/linux into HEAD

KVM x86 misc changes for 6.7:

 - Add CONFIG_KVM_MAX_NR_VCPUS to allow supporting up to 4096 vCPUs without
   forcing more common use cases to eat the extra memory overhead.

 - Add IBPB and SBPB virtualization support.

 - Fix a bug where restoring a vCPU snapshot that was taken within 1 second of
   creating the original vCPU would cause KVM to try to synchronize the vCPU's
   TSC and thus clobber the correct TSC being set by userspace.

 - Compute guest wall clock using a single TSC read to avoid generating an
   inaccurate time, e.g. if the vCPU is preempted between multiple TSC reads.

 - "Virtualize" HWCR.TscFreqSel to make Linux guests happy, which complain
    about a "Firmware Bug" if the bit isn't set for select F/M/S combos.

 - Don't apply side effects to Hyper-V's synthetic timer on writes from
   userspace to fix an issue where the auto-enable behavior can trigger
   spurious interrupts, i.e. do auto-enabling only for guest writes.

 - Remove an unnecessary kick of all vCPUs when synchronizing the dirty log
   without PML enabled.

 - Advertise "support" for non-serializing FS/GS base MSR writes as appropriate.

 - Use octal notation for file permissions through KVM x86.

 - Fix a handful of typo fixes and warts.
2023-10-31 10:15:15 -04:00
Jim Mattson
329369caec x86: KVM: Add feature flag for CPUID.80000021H:EAX[bit 1]
Define an X86_FEATURE_* flag for CPUID.80000021H:EAX.[bit 1], and
advertise the feature to userspace via KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID.

Per AMD's "Processor Programming Reference (PPR) for AMD Family 19h
Model 61h, Revision B1 Processors (56713-B1-PUB)," this CPUID bit
indicates that a WRMSR to MSR_FS_BASE, MSR_GS_BASE, or
MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE is non-serializing. This is a change in previously
architected behavior.

Effectively, this CPUID bit is a "defeature" bit, or a reverse
polarity feature bit. When this CPUID bit is clear, the feature
(serialization on WRMSR to any of these three MSRs) is available. When
this CPUID bit is set, the feature is not available.

KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID must pass this bit through from the underlying
hardware, if it is set. Leaving the bit clear claims that WRMSR to
these three MSRs will be serializing in a guest running under
KVM. That isn't true. Though KVM could emulate the feature by
intercepting writes to the specified MSRs, it does not do so
today. The guest is allowed direct read/write access to these MSRs
without interception, so the innate hardware behavior is preserved
under KVM.

Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231005031237.1652871-1-jmattson@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-10-18 13:50:28 -07:00
Sean Christopherson
8647c52e95 KVM: x86: Constrain guest-supported xfeatures only at KVM_GET_XSAVE{2}
Mask off xfeatures that aren't exposed to the guest only when saving guest
state via KVM_GET_XSAVE{2} instead of modifying user_xfeatures directly.
Preserving the maximal set of xfeatures in user_xfeatures restores KVM's
ABI for KVM_SET_XSAVE, which prior to commit ad856280dd ("x86/kvm/fpu:
Limit guest user_xfeatures to supported bits of XCR0") allowed userspace
to load xfeatures that are supported by the host, irrespective of what
xfeatures are exposed to the guest.

There is no known use case where userspace *intentionally* loads xfeatures
that aren't exposed to the guest, but the bug fixed by commit ad856280dd
was specifically that KVM_GET_SAVE{2} would save xfeatures that weren't
exposed to the guest, e.g. would lead to userspace unintentionally loading
guest-unsupported xfeatures when live migrating a VM.

Restricting KVM_SET_XSAVE to guest-supported xfeatures is especially
problematic for QEMU-based setups, as QEMU has a bug where instead of
terminating the VM if KVM_SET_XSAVE fails, QEMU instead simply stops
loading guest state, i.e. resumes the guest after live migration with
incomplete guest state, and ultimately results in guest data corruption.

Note, letting userspace restore all host-supported xfeatures does not fix
setups where a VM is migrated from a host *without* commit ad856280dd,
to a target with a subset of host-supported xfeatures.  However there is
no way to safely address that scenario, e.g. KVM could silently drop the
unsupported features, but that would be a clear violation of KVM's ABI and
so would require userspace to opt-in, at which point userspace could
simply be updated to sanitize the to-be-loaded XSAVE state.

Reported-by: Tyler Stachecki <stachecki.tyler@gmail.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230914010003.358162-1-tstachecki@bloomberg.net
Fixes: ad856280dd ("x86/kvm/fpu: Limit guest user_xfeatures to supported bits of XCR0")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Leonardo Bras <leobras@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Message-Id: <20230928001956.924301-3-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2023-10-12 11:08:58 -04:00
Josh Poimboeuf
e47d86083c KVM: x86: Add SBPB support
Add support for the AMD Selective Branch Predictor Barrier (SBPB) by
advertising the CPUID bit and handling PRED_CMD writes accordingly.

Note, like SRSO_NO and IBPB_BRTYPE before it, advertise support for SBPB
even if it's not enumerated by in the raw CPUID.  Some CPUs that gained
support via a uCode patch don't report SBPB via CPUID (the kernel forces
the flag).

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/a4ab1e7fe50096d50fde33e739ed2da40b41ea6a.1692919072.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-10-04 15:19:32 -07:00
Josh Poimboeuf
6f0f23ef76 KVM: x86: Add IBPB_BRTYPE support
Add support for the IBPB_BRTYPE CPUID flag, which indicates that IBPB
includes branch type prediction flushing.

Note, like SRSO_NO, advertise support for IBPB_BRTYPE even if it's not
enumerated by in the raw CPUID, i.e. bypass the cpuid_count() in
__kvm_cpu_cap_mask().  Some CPUs that gained support via a uCode patch
don't report IBPB_BRTYPE via CPUID (the kernel forces the flag).

Opportunistically use kvm_cpu_cap_check_and_set() for SRSO_NO instead
of manually querying host support (cpu_feature_enabled() and
boot_cpu_has() yield the same end result in this case).

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/79d5f5914fb42c2c62418ffbcd78f138645ded21.1692919072.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-10-04 15:15:52 -07:00
Peng Hao
ee11ab6bb0 KVM: X86: Reduce size of kvm_vcpu_arch structure when CONFIG_KVM_XEN=n
When CONFIG_KVM_XEN=n, the size of kvm_vcpu_arch can be reduced
from 5100+ to 4400+ by adding macro control.

Signed-off-by: Peng Hao <flyingpeng@tencent.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAPm50aKwbZGeXPK5uig18Br8CF1hOS71CE2j_dLX+ub7oJdpGg@mail.gmail.com
[sean: fix whitespace damage]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-10-04 12:26:02 -07:00
Paolo Bonzini
6d5e3c318a KVM x86 changes for 6.6:
- Misc cleanups
 
  - Retry APIC optimized recalculation if a vCPU is added/enabled
 
  - Overhaul emergency reboot code to bring SVM up to par with VMX, tie the
    "emergency disabling" behavior to KVM actually being loaded, and move all of
    the logic within KVM
 
  - Fix user triggerable WARNs in SVM where KVM incorrectly assumes the TSC
    ratio MSR can diverge from the default iff TSC scaling is enabled, and clean
    up related code
 
  - Add a framework to allow "caching" feature flags so that KVM can check if
    the guest can use a feature without needing to search guest CPUID
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Merge tag 'kvm-x86-misc-6.6' of https://github.com/kvm-x86/linux into HEAD

KVM x86 changes for 6.6:

 - Misc cleanups

 - Retry APIC optimized recalculation if a vCPU is added/enabled

 - Overhaul emergency reboot code to bring SVM up to par with VMX, tie the
   "emergency disabling" behavior to KVM actually being loaded, and move all of
   the logic within KVM

 - Fix user triggerable WARNs in SVM where KVM incorrectly assumes the TSC
   ratio MSR can diverge from the default iff TSC scaling is enabled, and clean
   up related code

 - Add a framework to allow "caching" feature flags so that KVM can check if
   the guest can use a feature without needing to search guest CPUID
2023-08-31 13:36:33 -04:00
Sean Christopherson
9717efbe5b KVM: x86: Disallow guest CPUID lookups when IRQs are disabled
Now that KVM has a framework for caching guest CPUID feature flags, add
a "rule" that IRQs must be enabled when doing guest CPUID lookups, and
enforce the rule via a lockdep assertion.  CPUID lookups are slow, and
within KVM, IRQs are only ever disabled in hot paths, e.g. the core run
loop, fast page fault handling, etc.  I.e. querying guest CPUID with IRQs
disabled, especially in the run loop, should be avoided.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230815203653.519297-16-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-08-17 11:43:32 -07:00
Sean Christopherson
ccf31d6e6c KVM: x86/mmu: Use KVM-governed feature framework to track "GBPAGES enabled"
Use the governed feature framework to track whether or not the guest can
use 1GiB pages, and drop the one-off helper that wraps the surprisingly
non-trivial logic surrounding 1GiB page usage in the guest.

No functional change intended.

Reviewed-by: Yuan Yao <yuan.yao@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230815203653.519297-3-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-08-17 11:38:27 -07:00
Sean Christopherson
42764413d1 KVM: x86: Add a framework for enabling KVM-governed x86 features
Introduce yet another X86_FEATURE flag framework to manage and cache KVM
governed features (for lack of a better name).  "Governed" in this case
means that KVM has some level of involvement and/or vested interest in
whether or not an X86_FEATURE can be used by the guest.  The intent of the
framework is twofold: to simplify caching of guest CPUID flags that KVM
needs to frequently query, and to add clarity to such caching, e.g. it
isn't immediately obvious that SVM's bundle of flags for "optional nested
SVM features" track whether or not a flag is exposed to L1.

Begrudgingly define KVM_MAX_NR_GOVERNED_FEATURES for the size of the
bitmap to avoid exposing governed_features.h in arch/x86/include/asm/, but
add a FIXME to call out that it can and should be cleaned up once
"struct kvm_vcpu_arch" is no longer expose to the kernel at large.

Cc: Zeng Guang <guang.zeng@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Yuan Yao <yuan.yao@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230815203653.519297-2-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-08-17 11:38:27 -07:00
Tao Su
99b6685453 KVM: x86: Advertise AMX-COMPLEX CPUID to userspace
Latest Intel platform GraniteRapids-D introduces AMX-COMPLEX, which adds
two instructions to perform matrix multiplication of two tiles containing
complex elements and accumulate the results into a packed single precision
tile.

AMX-COMPLEX is enumerated via CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=1):EDX[bit 8]

Advertise AMX_COMPLEX if it's supported in hardware.  There are no VMX
controls for the feature, i.e. the instructions can't be interecepted, and
KVM advertises base AMX in CPUID if AMX is supported in hardware, even if
KVM doesn't advertise AMX as being supported in XCR0, e.g. because the
process didn't opt-in to allocating tile data.

Signed-off-by: Tao Su <tao1.su@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230802022954.193843-1-tao1.su@linux.intel.com
[sean: tweak last paragraph of changelog]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-08-03 15:40:17 -07:00
Takahiro Itazuri
af8e2ccfa6 KVM: x86: Advertise host CPUID 0x80000005 in KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID
Advertise CPUID 0x80000005 (L1 cache and TLB info) to userspace so that
VMMs that reflect KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID into KVM_SET_CPUID2 will
enumerate sane cache/TLB information to the guest.

CPUID 0x80000006 (L2 cache and TLB and L3 cache info) has been returned
since commit 43d05de2be ("KVM: pass through CPUID(0x80000006)").
Enumerating both 0x80000005 and 0x80000006 with KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID
is better than reporting one or the other, and 0x80000005 could be helpful
for VMM to pass it to KVM_SET_CPUID{,2} for the same reason with
0x80000006.

Signed-off-by: Takahiro Itazuri <itazur@amazon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZK7NmfKI9xur%2FMop@google.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230712183136.85561-1-itazur@amazon.com
[sean: add link, massage changelog]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-08-02 15:49:23 -07:00
Borislav Petkov (AMD)
1b5277c0ea x86/srso: Add SRSO_NO support
Add support for the CPUID flag which denotes that the CPU is not
affected by SRSO.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
2023-07-27 11:07:19 +02:00
Paolo Bonzini
751d77fefa KVM x86/pmu changes for 6.5:
- Add support for AMD PerfMonV2, with a variety of cleanups and minor fixes
    included along the way
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Merge tag 'kvm-x86-pmu-6.5' of https://github.com/kvm-x86/linux into HEAD

KVM x86/pmu changes for 6.5:

 - Add support for AMD PerfMonV2, with a variety of cleanups and minor fixes
   included along the way
2023-07-01 07:18:51 -04:00
Like Xu
94cdeebd82 KVM: x86/cpuid: Add AMD CPUID ExtPerfMonAndDbg leaf 0x80000022
CPUID leaf 0x80000022 i.e. ExtPerfMonAndDbg advertises some new
performance monitoring features for AMD processors.

Bit 0 of EAX indicates support for Performance Monitoring Version 2
(PerfMonV2) features. If found to be set during PMU initialization,
the EBX bits of the same CPUID function can be used to determine
the number of available PMCs for different PMU types.

Expose the relevant bits via KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID so that
guests can make use of the PerfMonV2 features.

Co-developed-by: Sandipan Das <sandipan.das@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Sandipan Das <sandipan.das@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Like Xu <likexu@tencent.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230603011058.1038821-13-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-06-06 17:31:44 -07:00
Like Xu
6593039d33 KVM: x86: Explicitly zero cpuid "0xa" leaf when PMU is disabled
Add an explicit !enable_pmu check as relying on kvm_pmu_cap to be
zeroed isn't obvious. Although when !enable_pmu, KVM will have
zero-padded kvm_pmu_cap to do subsequent CPUID leaf assignments.

Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Like Xu <likexu@tencent.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230603011058.1038821-7-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-06-06 17:31:44 -07:00
Sean Christopherson
ab322c43cc KVM: x86: Update number of entries for KVM_GET_CPUID2 on success, not failure
Update cpuid->nent if and only if kvm_vcpu_ioctl_get_cpuid2() succeeds.
The sole caller copies @cpuid to userspace only on success, i.e. the
existing code effectively does nothing.

Arguably, KVM should report the number of entries when returning -E2BIG so
that userspace doesn't have to guess the size, but all other similar KVM
ioctls() don't report the size either, i.e. userspace is conditioned to
guess.

Suggested-by: Takahiro Itazuri <itazur@amazon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230410141820.57328-1-itazur@amazon.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230526210340.2799158-2-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-06-01 14:07:14 -07:00
Sean Christopherson
275a87244e KVM: x86: Don't adjust guest's CPUID.0x12.1 (allowed SGX enclave XFRM)
Drop KVM's manipulation of guest's CPUID.0x12.1 ECX and EDX, i.e. the
allowed XFRM of SGX enclaves, now that KVM explicitly checks the guest's
allowed XCR0 when emulating ECREATE.

Note, this could theoretically break a setup where userspace advertises
a "bad" XFRM and relies on KVM to provide a sane CPUID model, but QEMU
is the only known user of KVM SGX, and QEMU explicitly sets the SGX CPUID
XFRM subleaf based on the guest's XCR0.

Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Tested-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20230503160838.3412617-3-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2023-05-21 04:05:51 -04:00
Paolo Bonzini
c21775ae02 KVM selftests, and an AMX/XCR0 bugfix, for 6.4:
- Don't advertisze XTILE_CFG in KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID if XTILE_DATA is
    not being reported due to userspace not opting in via prctl()
 
  - Overhaul the AMX selftests to improve coverage and cleanup the test
 
  - Misc cleanups
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Merge tag 'kvm-x86-selftests-6.4' of https://github.com/kvm-x86/linux into HEAD

KVM selftests, and an AMX/XCR0 bugfix, for 6.4:

 - Don't advertise XTILE_CFG in KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID if XTILE_DATA is
   not being reported due to userspace not opting in via prctl()

 - Overhaul the AMX selftests to improve coverage and cleanup the test

 - Misc cleanups
2023-04-26 15:56:01 -04:00
Paolo Bonzini
48b1893ae3 KVM x86 PMU changes for 6.4:
- Disallow virtualizing legacy LBRs if architectural LBRs are available,
    the two are mutually exclusive in hardware
 
  - Disallow writes to immutable feature MSRs (notably PERF_CAPABILITIES)
    after KVM_RUN, and overhaul the vmx_pmu_caps selftest to better
    validate PERF_CAPABILITIES
 
  - Apply PMU filters to emulated events and add test coverage to the
    pmu_event_filter selftest
 
  - Misc cleanups and fixes
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Merge tag 'kvm-x86-pmu-6.4' of https://github.com/kvm-x86/linux into HEAD

KVM x86 PMU changes for 6.4:

 - Disallow virtualizing legacy LBRs if architectural LBRs are available,
   the two are mutually exclusive in hardware

 - Disallow writes to immutable feature MSRs (notably PERF_CAPABILITIES)
   after KVM_RUN, and overhaul the vmx_pmu_caps selftest to better
   validate PERF_CAPABILITIES

 - Apply PMU filters to emulated events and add test coverage to the
   pmu_event_filter selftest

 - Misc cleanups and fixes
2023-04-26 15:53:36 -04:00
Aaron Lewis
6be3ae45f5 KVM: x86: Add a helper to handle filtering of unpermitted XCR0 features
Add a helper, kvm_get_filtered_xcr0(), to dedup code that needs to account
for XCR0 features that require explicit opt-in on a per-process basis.  In
addition to documenting when KVM should/shouldn't consult
xstate_get_guest_group_perm(), the helper will also allow sanitizing the
filtered XCR0 to avoid enumerating architecturally illegal XCR0 values,
e.g. XTILE_CFG without XTILE_DATA.

No functional changes intended.

Signed-off-by: Aaron Lewis <aaronlewis@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Mingwei Zhang <mizhang@google.com>
[sean: rename helper, move to x86.h, massage changelog]
Reviewed-by: Aaron Lewis <aaronlewis@google.com>
Tested-by: Aaron Lewis <aaronlewis@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230405004520.421768-2-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-04-11 10:19:03 -07:00
Sean Christopherson
fb3146b4dc KVM: x86: Add a helper to query whether or not a vCPU has ever run
Add a helper to query if a vCPU has run so that KVM doesn't have to open
code the check on last_vmentry_cpu being set to a magic value.

No functional change intended.

Suggested-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Cc: Like Xu <like.xu.linux@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230311004618.920745-3-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-04-06 14:57:22 -07:00
Sean Christopherson
3d8f61bf8b x86: KVM: Add common feature flag for AMD's PSFD
Use a common X86_FEATURE_* flag for AMD's PSFD, and suppress it from
/proc/cpuinfo via the standard method of an empty string instead of
hacking in a one-off "private" #define in KVM.  The request that led to
KVM defining its own flag was really just that the feature not show up
in /proc/cpuinfo, and additional patches+discussions in the interim have
clarified that defining flags in cpufeatures.h purely so that KVM can
advertise features to userspace is ok so long as the kernel already uses
a word to track the associated CPUID leaf.

No functional change intended.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/d1b1e0da-29f0-c443-6c86-9549bbe1c79d@redhat.como
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/YxGZH7aOXQF7Pu5q@nazgul.tnic
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/Y3O7UYWfOLfJkwM%2F@zn.tnic
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230124194519.2893234-1-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-03-23 16:07:29 -07:00
Binbin Wu
607475cfa0 KVM: x86: Add helpers to query individual CR0/CR4 bits
Add helpers to check if a specific CR0/CR4 bit is set to avoid a plethora
of implicit casts from the "unsigned long" return of kvm_read_cr*_bits(),
and to make each caller's intent more obvious.

Defer converting helpers that do truly ugly casts from "unsigned long" to
"int", e.g. is_pse(), to a future commit so that their conversion is more
isolated.

Opportunistically drop the superfluous pcid_enabled from kvm_set_cr3();
the local variable is used only once, immediately after its declaration.

Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230322045824.22970-2-binbin.wu@linux.intel.com
[sean: move "obvious" conversions to this commit, massage changelog]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
2023-03-22 10:10:53 -07:00
Emanuele Giuseppe Esposito
45cf86f261 kvm: x86: Advertise FLUSH_L1D to user space
FLUSH_L1D was already added in 11e34e64e4, but the feature is not
visible to userspace yet.

The bit definition:
CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):EDX[bit 28]

If the feature is supported by the host, kvm should support it too so
that userspace can choose whether to expose it to the guest or not.
One disadvantage of not exposing it is that the guest will report
a non existing vulnerability in
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mmio_stale_data
because the mitigation is present only if the guest supports
(FLUSH_L1D and MD_CLEAR) or FB_CLEAR.

Signed-off-by: Emanuele Giuseppe Esposito <eesposit@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20230201132905.549148-4-eesposit@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2023-03-16 10:18:05 -04:00