ospf6_prefix_apply_mask would write one byte beyond the 4/8/12
bytes allocated for prefixes of length 32/64/96.
based on report and patch by Jon Andersson <jon.andersson@thales.no>
Reported-by: Jon Andersson <jon.andersson@thales.no>
Signed-off-by: David Lamparter <equinox@diac24.net>
The previous commits modified both zebra and bgpd for additional
SAFI field, but not any other routing daemon, which led to zebra
daemon crashing with failed assertion.
* fix disagreement with C99 in zlog_debug calls
Format specifier in some zlog_debug calls for size_t values
was changed in order to C99 ('%u' -> '%zu').
* fix -Wsign-compare warnings
Type of return value of ospf6_packet_max() was changed.
This is needed to avoid stale routes in some cases; the regression was
introduced by commit 1d19234e79.
* ospf6_spf.c: (ospf6_spf_calculation) Call ospf6_spf_table_finish()
before possibly returning if no router-LSA is found for the root of
the SPF tree.
* ospf6_message.h
* OSPF6_MESSAGE_TYPE_CANONICAL(): dismiss
* OSPF6_MESSAGE_TYPE_NAME(): dismiss
* ospf6_message.c
* ospf6_message_type_str: rewrite as a message list, add max value
* ospf6_packet_examin(): update to use LOOKUP()
* ospf6_receive(): idem
* ospf6_send(): idem
As long as ospf6_packet_examin() is now the single checkpoint for
received packets, most of the old checks performed elsewhere can
be converted into assert() constructs. Malformed input data at
respective points can be attributed solely to a programming error,
not a malformed packet.
* ospf6_message.c
* ospf6_hello_print()
* ospf6_dbdesc_print()
* ospf6_lsreq_print()
* ospf6_lsupdate_print()
* ospf6_lsack_print()
* ospf6_hello_recv()
* ospf6_dbdesc_recv_master()
* ospf6_dbdesc_recv_slave()
* ospf6_lsreq_recv()
* ospf6_lsupdate_recv()
* ospf6_lsupdate_recv()
* ospf6_lsack_recv()
* ospf6_receive()
this replaces most occurences of routing protocol lists by preprocessor
defines from route_types.h. the latter is autogenerated from
route_types.txt by a perl script (previously awk). adding a routing
protocol now is mostly a matter of changing route_types.txt and log.c.
Conflicts:
lib/route_types.awk
All daemons modified to support custom path to zserv
socket.
lib: generalize a zclient connection
zclient_socket_connect added. zclient_socket and
zclient_socket_un were hidden under static expression.
"zclient_serv_path_set" modified.
ospf6_routemap_rule_match_interface* was imported from ospfd
daemon with minor changes. new CLI options defined.
`ospf6_routemap_rule_match_interface' was changed to support
IPv6 (ospfv3) route's external information.
* ospf6_message.c: (ospf6_packet_max): new function, return maximum IPv6
payload on an interface; (ospf6_hello_send, ospf6_dbdesc_send,
ospf6_dbdesc_send_newone, ospf6_lsreq_send, ospf6_lsupdate_send_neighbor,
ospf6_lsupdate_send_interface, ospf6_lsack_send_neighbor,
ospf6_lsack_send_interface): compare message size with the maximum
payload instead of the MTU.
IPv6 supports the same concept of differentiated service for routing
protocols as IPv4, but like too many things, the standards committee
decided that having two names for the same thing wasn't good enough and
introduced a third more generic term transport class.
The socket option to set transport class works the same as IPv4, but the
arguments are different.
* lib/sockopt.[ch]
* setsockopt_ipv6_tclass(): new function
* bgpd/bgp_network.c
* bgp_connect(): set socket option
* bgp_listener(): set socket option
* ospf6d/ospf6_network.c
* ospf6_set_transport_class(): new function
* ospf6_serv_sock(): set socket option
* ripngd/ripngd.c
* ripng_make_socket(): set socket option
This essentially merges the fix available from Debian build of Quagga.
* ospf6_area.c
* area_filter_list(): use correct argv indices
* no_area_filter_list(): idem
This vulnerability (CERT-FI #514840) was reported by CROSS project.
ospf6d processes IPv6 prefix structures in incoming packets without
verifying that the declared prefix length is valid. This leads to a
crash
caused by out of bounds memory access.
* ospf6_abr.h: new macros for size/alignment validation
* ospf6_asbr.h: idem
* ospf6_intra.h: idem
* ospf6_lsa.h: idem
* ospf6_message.h: idem
* ospf6_proto.h: idem
* ospf6_message.c
* ospf6_packet_minlen: helper array for ospf6_packet_examin()
* ospf6_lsa_minlen: helper array for ospf6_lsa_examin()
* ospf6_hello_recv(): do not call ospf6_header_examin(), let upper
layer verify the input data
* ospf6_dbdesc_recv(): idem
* ospf6_lsreq_recv(): idem
* ospf6_lsupdate_recv(): idem
* ospf6_lsack_recv(): idem
* ospf6_prefixes_examin(): new function, implements A.4.1
* ospf6_lsa_examin(): new function, implements A.4
* ospf6_lsaseq_examin(): new function, an interface to above
* ospf6_packet_examin(): new function, implements A.3
* ospf6_rxpacket_examin(): new function, replaces
ospf6_header_examin()
* ospf6_header_examin(): sayonara
* ospf6_receive(): perform passive interface check earliest possible,
employ ospf6_rxpacket_examin()
This vulnerability (CERT-FI #514839) was reported by CROSS project.
When Database Description LSA header list contains trailing zero octets,
ospf6d tries to process this data as an LSA header. This triggers an
assertion in the code and ospf6d shuts down.
* ospf6_lsa.c
* ospf6_lsa_is_changed(): handle header-only argument(s)
appropriately, do not treat LSA length underrun as a fatal error.
Two extern declarations in ospf6_abr.h are based on struct ospf6_route,
which may not be available at the time ospf6_abr.h is included. This may
lead to warnings after including ospf6_abr.h just for the structures
defined in it.
"mtu-ignore" is an option ospfd used to mimic from the vendor's
implementation, now ospf6d will also implement it.
* ospf6_interface.h: extend ospf6_interface structure by one flag
* ospf6_interface.c: (ipv6_ospf6_mtu_ignore, no_ipv6_ospf6_mtu_ignore):
new declarations; (ospf6_interface_create): show initial value for
consistency; (ospf6_interface_show): print flag status
* ospf6_message.c: (ospf6_dbdesc_recv): consider interface-specific flag
when checking MTU
* ospf6_route.c ([no_]debug_ospf6_route) Include memory as a debug
option. This allows ospf6 route memory debugging to be enabled or
disabled interactively or from a config file.
* ospf6_route.c: (ospf6_route_best_next) Allows unlock route, even
when there's no next route. This is consistent with how
ospf6_route_next() behaves.
* ospf6_intra.c: (ospf6_intra_prefix_lsa_remove) Make sure the last
route considered is always unlocked. This is needed when the for
loop terminates because ospf6_route_is_prefix() returns zero.
A clean exit makes it easier to use memory debuggers.
* ospf6_asbr.c: (ospf6_asbr_terminate) Add a function to do route map
cleanup.
* ospf6_lsa.c: (ospf6_lsa_terminate) Add a function to cleanup the lsa
handler vector.
* ospf6_main.c: (ospf6_exit) Add an function that causes ospf6d to
gracefully exit.
* ospf6_message.c: (ospf6_message_terminate) Add a function that frees
the send and receive buffers.
* ospf6_top.c: (ospf6_delete) Enable the ospf6_delete() function.
Disable ospf6 before freeing everything.
* ospf6_area.c: Call ospf6_spf_table_finish() before deleting the spf
table. This ensures that the associated ospf6_vertex structures
are also freed.
* ospf6_spf.c: Only allocate a priority queue when a spf calculation
is actually performed. Also defer calling ospf6_spf_table_finish().
* ospf6_spf.c: Don't replace a node with another node with a lower
number of hops, instead get them from the queue in the correct
order. (Actually, the replacement crashed the ospf6d daemon
rather than worked.)
* ospf6_interface.c: When '[no] ipv6 ospf6 advertise prefix-list'
appears in the startup configuration for ospf6d, a crash occurs,
because ospf6d attempts to schedule LSAs when the 'oi->area'
structure has not yet been initialized.
Now, when the command above is issued (either in the startup
configuration or at runtime), ospf6d will only schedule LSAs if
the 'oi->area' structure has been initalized. A similar test is
already used when handling the commands 'ipv6 ospf6 priority'
and 'ipv6 ospf6 cost'.
Make one version of check prefix bit, and put it inline
with proper prototype. This gets rid of some macro's and also some
assert() that can never happen on a non-broken compiler.
* bgpd/bgp_table.c
* CHECK_BIT(): sayonara
* check_bit(): sayonara
* SET_LINK(): sayonara
* set_link(): make use of prefix_bit() instead of check_bit()
* bgp_node_match(): idem
* bgp_node_lookup(): idem
* bgp_node_get(): idem
* lib/prefix.h
* prefix_bit(): new inline version of check_bit()
* lib/table.c
* CHECK_BIT(): sayonara
* check_bit(): sayonara
* SET_LINK(): sayonara
* set_link(): make use of prefix_bit() instead of check_bit()
* route_node_match(): idem
* route_node_lookup(): idem
* route_node_get(): idem
* ospf6d/ospf6_lsdb.c
* CHECK_BIT(): sayonara
* ospf6_lsdb_lookup_next(): make use of prefix_bit() instead of
CHECK_BIT()
* ospf6_lsdb_type_router_head(): idem
* ospf6_lsdb_type_head(): idem
* ospf6d/ospf6_route.c
* CHECK_BIT(): sayonara
* ospf6_route_match_head() make use of prefix_bit() instead of
* CHECK_BIT()
It seems that there is a bug in ospf6d in ospf6_lsa_compare(): If LSA A
has sequence number smaller than 0x80000000 and LSA B has sequence
number larger than 0x80000000, ospf6_lsa_compare() returns that B is
more recent than A, although RFC says that sequence numbers should be
compared as signed numbers (0x8000001 smallest and 0x7FFFFFFF largest).
In ospfd, the function ospf_lsa_more_recent() has it right.
The problem appears when Quagga is used together with OSPFv3 in
development version of BIRD daemon ( http://bird.network.cz/ ),
which creates LSAs with maximum sequence number (0x7FFFFFFF)
as a part of flushing/premature aging LSA from OSPF area.
Because both daemons has different idea of which LSA instance
is more recent, it would lead to LSA storm.
* ospf6_lsdb.c: (ospf6_new_ls_id) Unlock the current LSA when breaking
out of the ospf6_lsdb_*_head() / ospf6_lsdb_*_next() loop early. No
explicit unlocking is needed when all LSAs are looped through
because ospf6_lsdb_*_next() manages everything in that case.
ospf6d will crash if attempting to remove interface when no areas have been
defined Check if any areas have been defined. Should prevent use of empty
pointer.
ospf6d will crash if this command is executed on a non-border-router.
Included test to verify that any routes are defined, preventing empty
pointer from being used.
Suggestion: Makes no sense to me that the statement to remove ospf6
configuration is located in OSPF6D_NODE.
Moved to CONFIG_NODE next to matching define command.
