This is a first in a series of commits, whose goal is to rename
the thread system in FRR to an event system. There is a continual
problem where people are confusing `struct thread` with a true
pthread. In reality, our entire thread.c is an event system.
In this commit rename the thread.[ch] files to event.[ch].
Signed-off-by: Donald Sharp <sharpd@nvidia.com>
Reachable router information is used by OSPF opaque clients in order
to determine if the router advertising the opaque LSA data is
reachable (i.e., 2-way conectivity check).
Signed-off-by: Christian Hopps <chopps@labn.net>
When browsing or parsing OSPF LSA TLVs, we need to use the LSA length which is
part of the LSA header. This length, encoded in 16 bits, must be first
converted to host byte order with ntohs() function. However, Coverity Scan
considers that ntohs() function return TAINTED data. Thus, when the length is
used to control for() loop, Coverity Scan marks this part of the code as defect
with "Untrusted Loop Bound" due to the usage of Tainted variable. Similar
problems occur when browsing sub-TLV where length is extracted with ntohs().
To overcome this limitation, a size attribute has been added to the ospf_lsa
structure. The size is set when lsa->data buffer is allocated. In addition,
when an OSPF packet is received, the size of the payload is controlled before
contains is processed. For OSPF LSA, this allow a secure buffer allocation.
Thus, new size attribute contains the exact buffer allocation allowing a
strict control during TLV browsing.
This patch adds extra control to bound for() loop during TLV browsing to
avoid potential problem as suggested by Coverity Scan. Controls are based
on new size attribute of the ospf_lsa structure to avoid any ambiguity.
Signed-off-by: Olivier Dugeon <olivier.dugeon@orange.com>
It's possible(but unlikely) that a read of data from the
network will give us bogus data. Don't automatically
just trust the data size from the network and limit
the read to the size of the buffer we have in play.
Signed-off-by: Donald Sharp <sharpd@cumulusnetworks.com>
We have a bunch of places that look for ORIGINAL_CODING. There is
nothing in our configure system to define this value and a quick
git blame shows this code as being original to the import a very
very long time ago. This is dead code, removing.
Signed-off-by: Donald Sharp <sharpd@cumulusnetworks.com>
The following types are nonstandard:
- u_char
- u_short
- u_int
- u_long
- u_int8_t
- u_int16_t
- u_int32_t
Replace them with the C99 standard types:
- uint8_t
- unsigned short
- unsigned int
- unsigned long
- uint8_t
- uint16_t
- uint32_t
Signed-off-by: Quentin Young <qlyoung@cumulusnetworks.com>
This reverts commit c14777c6bf.
clang 5 is not widely available enough for people to indent with. This
is particularly problematic when rebasing/adjusting branches.
Signed-off-by: David Lamparter <equinox@opensourcerouting.org>
The FSF's address changed, and we had a mixture of comment styles for
the GPL file header. (The style with * at the beginning won out with
580 to 141 in existing files.)
Note: I've intentionally left intact other "variations" of the copyright
header, e.g. whether it says "Zebra", "Quagga", "FRR", or nothing.
Signed-off-by: David Lamparter <equinox@opensourcerouting.org>
HAVE_OPAQUE_LSA is used by default and you have to actively turn it off
except that OPAQUE_LSA is an industry standard and used pretty much
everywhere. There is no need to have special #defines for this anymore.
Signed-off-by: Donald Sharp <sharpd@cumulusnetworks.com>
(cherry picked from commit 36fef5708d074a3ef41f34d324c309c45bae119b)
the OSPF API-server (exporting the LSDB and allowing announcement of
Opaque-LSAs) writes past the end of fixed on-stack buffers. This leads
to an exploitable stack overflow.
For this condition to occur, the following two conditions must be true:
- Quagga is configured with --enable-opaque-lsa
- ospfd is started with the "-a" command line option
If either of these does not hold, the relevant code is not executed and
the issue does not get triggered.
Since the issue occurs on receiving large LSAs (larger than 1488 bytes),
it is possible for this to happen during normal operation of a network.
In particular, if there is an OSPF router with a large number of
interfaces, the Router-LSA of that router may exceed 1488 bytes and
trigger this, leading to an ospfd crash.
For an attacker to exploit this, s/he must be able to inject valid LSAs
into the OSPF domain. Any best-practice protection measure (using
crypto authentication, restricting OSPF to internal interfaces, packet
filtering protocol 89, etc.) will prevent exploitation. On top of that,
remote (not on an OSPF-speaking network segment) attackers will have
difficulties bringing up the adjacency needed to inject a LSA.
This patch only performs minimal changes to remove the possibility of a
stack overrun. The OSPF API in general is quite ugly and needs a
rewrite.
Reported-by: Ricky Charlet <ricky.charlet@hp.com>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Lamparter <equinox@opensourcerouting.org>
Use the array_size() helper macro. Replaces several instances of local
macros with the same definition.
Reviewed-by: Scott Feldman <sfeldma@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David Lamparter <equinox@opensourcerouting.org>
* ospf_api.c: sign warnings.
* ospf_apiserver.c: sign warning and convert all the struct
in_addr initialisations so as not to make assumptions about
how this struct is organised, initialise the s_addr member
explicitely.
* ospf_packet.c: Add const qualifier to auth_key.
