mirror_corosync/SECURITY

----------------------------
 Security Design of openais
----------------------------

The openais project uses code from the libtomcrypt package (www.libtomcrypt.org)
for most of the algorithms described in this document.  The libtomcrypt code has
a public domain license.

The openais project intends to mitigate the following threats:

1. forged group messaging messages which are intended to fault the openais
   executive
2. forged group messaging messages which are intended to fault applications
   using openais apis
3. monitoring of network data to capture sensitive information

The openais project does not intend to mitigate the following threats:

1. physical access to the hardware which could expose the private key
2. privledged access to the operating system which could expose the private key
   or be used to inject errors into the ais executive.
3. library user creates requests which are intended to fault the openais
   executive

The openais project mitigates the threats using two mechanisms:

1. Authentication
2. Secrecy

Library Interface
-----------------
The openais executive authenticates every library user.  The library is only
allowed to access services if it's GID is ais or 0.  Unauthorized library
users are rejected.

The ais group is a trusted group.  If the administrator doesn't trust the
application, it should not be added to the group!  Any member of the ais group
could potentially send a malformed request to the executive and cause it to
fault.

Group Messaging Interface
-------------------------
Group messaging uses UDP/IP to communicate with other openais executives using
messages.  It is possible without authentication of every packet that an
attacker could forge messages.  These forged messages could fault the openais
executive distributed state machines.  It would also be possible to corrupt 
end applications by forging updates 

Since messages are sent using UDP/IP it would be possible to snoop those
messages and rebuild sensitive data.

To solve these problems, the group messaging interface uses two new interfaces
interal to it's implementation:
1. ctr_encrypt_and_sign - encrypts and signs a message securely
2. ctr_authenticate_and_decrypt - authenticates and decrypts a message securely

When the executive wants to send a message over the network, it uses
ctr_encrypt_and_sign to prepare the message to be sent.  When the executive
wants to receive a message from the network, it uses
ctr_authenticate_and_decrypt to verify the message is valid and decrypt it.

These two functions utilize the following algorithms:
yarrow - secure pseudo random number generator
pkcs #5 alg #2 - Converts a random and secret key into a larger key
md4 - hash algorithm secure for using with yarrow and pkcs
sha1 - hash algorithm secure for using with hmac 
hmac - produces a 20 byte sha1 digest from any length input and a 16 byte key
blowfish - cipher algorithm - encrypts one block of data
ctr - Counter mode of ciphering - encrypts variable length data blocks

The hmac algorithm requires a 16 byte key.
The blowfish algorithm requires a 16 byte key.
The ctr algorithm requires a 16 byte nonce.

The private key is read from disk and stored in memory for use with the
pkcs #5 alg #2 operation.

Every message starts with a
struct digest {
	unsigned char digest[20]; A one way hash digest
};

struct salt {
	unsigned char salt[16]; A securely generated random number 
};

struct sec_hdr {
	struct digest;
	struct salt;
}

The sec_hdr.digest is never hashed or encrypted by the algorithms described.
The sec_hdr.salt is never encrypted, but is hashed by the algoriths described.

When a message is sent (ctr_encrypt_and_sign):
----------------------------------------------
1. yarrow is used to create a 16 byte random number (salt) using the md4
   algorithm
2. pkcs #5 alg #2 is used with the salt and private key to create a 48 byte
   key.  This 48 byte key is split into 3 16 byte keys.  The keys are the
   hmac key, the blowfish key, and the ctr nonce key.  pkcs uses the md4
   algorithm.
3. The ctr nonce and blowfish key from step #2 are used to setup the ctr cipher
   for use with blowfish.
4. The data of the packet, except for the sec_hdr, is encrypted using
   the ctr cipher that was initialized in step #3.
5. The salt is stored in the sec_hdr header of the outgoing message.
6. The hmac is initialized with the hmac key generated in step #2.
7. The message, except for the sec_hdr.digest, is hmaced to produce a digest
   using the sha1 algorithm.
8. The digest is stored in the outgoing message.
9. The message is transmitted. 


When a message is received (ctr_decrypt_and_authenticate):
---------------------------------------------------------
1. yarrow is used to create a 16 byte random number (salt) using the md4
   algorithm
2. pkcs #5 alg #2 is used with the salt and private key to create a 48 byte
   key.  This 48 byte key is split into 3 16 byte keys.  The keys are the
   hmac key, the blowfish key, and the ctr nonce key.  pkcs uses the md4
   algorithm.
3. The ctr nonce and blowfish key from step #2 are used to setup the ctr cipher
   for use with blowfish.
4. The hmac is setup using the hmac key generated in step #2 using sha1.
5. The message is authenticated, except for the sec_hdr.digest.
6. If the message was not authenticated, the caller is told of the result.
   The caller ignores the message.
7. The message is decrypted, except for the sec_hdr, using the ctr
   initialized in step #3.
8. The message is processed.

This does consume some resources.  It ensures the private key is never shared
openly.  All messages are authenticated and encrypted.   An exposure of 
one of the nonce key, blowfish key, or hmac key can only be used to
attack the key relating to the algorithm.  Finally every key used is
randomly unique (within the 2^128 search space of the input to pkcs) to ensure
that keys are never reused, nonce's are never reused, and hmac's are never
reused in combination with each other.

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