grub2/grub-core/kern/efi/sb.c
Javier Martinez Canillas 8f73052885 efi: Use grub_is_lockdown() instead of hardcoding a disabled modules list
Now the GRUB can check if it has been locked down and this can be used to
prevent executing commands that can be utilized to circumvent the UEFI
Secure Boot mechanisms. So, instead of hardcoding a list of modules that
have to be disabled, prevent the usage of commands that can be dangerous.

This not only allows the commands to be disabled on other platforms, but
also properly separate the concerns. Since the shim_lock verifier logic
should be only about preventing to run untrusted binaries and not about
defining these kind of policies.

Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
2021-03-02 15:54:15 +01:00

174 lines
4.7 KiB
C

/*
* GRUB -- GRand Unified Bootloader
* Copyright (C) 2020 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
*
* GRUB is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* GRUB is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with GRUB. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*
* UEFI Secure Boot related checkings.
*/
#include <grub/efi/efi.h>
#include <grub/efi/pe32.h>
#include <grub/efi/sb.h>
#include <grub/err.h>
#include <grub/file.h>
#include <grub/i386/linux.h>
#include <grub/mm.h>
#include <grub/types.h>
#include <grub/verify.h>
static grub_efi_guid_t shim_lock_guid = GRUB_EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
/*
* Determine whether we're in secure boot mode.
*
* Please keep the logic in sync with the Linux kernel,
* drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c:efi_get_secureboot().
*/
grub_uint8_t
grub_efi_get_secureboot (void)
{
static grub_efi_guid_t efi_variable_guid = GRUB_EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
static grub_efi_guid_t efi_shim_lock_guid = GRUB_EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
grub_efi_status_t status;
grub_efi_uint32_t attr = 0;
grub_size_t size = 0;
grub_uint8_t *secboot = NULL;
grub_uint8_t *setupmode = NULL;
grub_uint8_t *moksbstate = NULL;
grub_uint8_t secureboot = GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_UNKNOWN;
const char *secureboot_str = "UNKNOWN";
status = grub_efi_get_variable ("SecureBoot", &efi_variable_guid,
&size, (void **) &secboot);
if (status == GRUB_EFI_NOT_FOUND)
{
secureboot = GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_DISABLED;
goto out;
}
if (status != GRUB_EFI_SUCCESS)
goto out;
status = grub_efi_get_variable ("SetupMode", &efi_variable_guid,
&size, (void **) &setupmode);
if (status != GRUB_EFI_SUCCESS)
goto out;
if ((*secboot == 0) || (*setupmode == 1))
{
secureboot = GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_DISABLED;
goto out;
}
/*
* See if a user has put the shim into insecure mode. If so, and if the
* variable doesn't have the runtime attribute set, we might as well
* honor that.
*/
status = grub_efi_get_variable_with_attributes ("MokSBState", &efi_shim_lock_guid,
&size, (void **) &moksbstate, &attr);
/* If it fails, we don't care why. Default to secure. */
if (status != GRUB_EFI_SUCCESS)
{
secureboot = GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_ENABLED;
goto out;
}
if (!(attr & GRUB_EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS) && *moksbstate == 1)
{
secureboot = GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_DISABLED;
goto out;
}
secureboot = GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_ENABLED;
out:
grub_free (moksbstate);
grub_free (setupmode);
grub_free (secboot);
if (secureboot == GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_DISABLED)
secureboot_str = "Disabled";
else if (secureboot == GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_ENABLED)
secureboot_str = "Enabled";
grub_dprintf ("efi", "UEFI Secure Boot state: %s\n", secureboot_str);
return secureboot;
}
static grub_err_t
shim_lock_verifier_init (grub_file_t io __attribute__ ((unused)),
enum grub_file_type type,
void **context __attribute__ ((unused)),
enum grub_verify_flags *flags)
{
*flags = GRUB_VERIFY_FLAGS_SKIP_VERIFICATION;
switch (type & GRUB_FILE_TYPE_MASK)
{
case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_LINUX_KERNEL:
case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_MULTIBOOT_KERNEL:
case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_BSD_KERNEL:
case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_XNU_KERNEL:
case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_PLAN9_KERNEL:
*flags = GRUB_VERIFY_FLAGS_SINGLE_CHUNK;
/* Fall through. */
default:
return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
}
}
static grub_err_t
shim_lock_verifier_write (void *context __attribute__ ((unused)), void *buf, grub_size_t size)
{
grub_efi_shim_lock_protocol_t *sl = grub_efi_locate_protocol (&shim_lock_guid, 0);
if (!sl)
return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_ACCESS_DENIED, N_("shim_lock protocol not found"));
if (sl->verify (buf, size) != GRUB_EFI_SUCCESS)
return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE, N_("bad shim signature"));
return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
}
struct grub_file_verifier shim_lock_verifier =
{
.name = "shim_lock_verifier",
.init = shim_lock_verifier_init,
.write = shim_lock_verifier_write
};
void
grub_shim_lock_verifier_setup (void)
{
grub_efi_shim_lock_protocol_t *sl =
grub_efi_locate_protocol (&shim_lock_guid, 0);
if (!sl)
return;
if (grub_efi_get_secureboot () != GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_ENABLED)
return;
grub_verifier_register (&shim_lock_verifier);
}