Pass all commands executed by GRUB to the verifiers layer. Most verifiers will
ignore this, but some (such as the TPM verifier) want to be able to measure and
log each command executed in order to ensure that the boot state is as expected.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
verify.h was added without include guards. This means compiling anything
including both include/grub/verify.h and include/grub/lib/cmdline.h fails
(at least grub-core/loader/arm64/linux.c.
Add the necessary include guard.
Signed-off-by: Leif Lindholm <leif.lindholm@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
This way if a verifier requires verification of a given file it can defer task
to another verifier (another authority) if it is not able to do it itself. E.g.
shim_lock verifier, posted as a subsequent patch, is able to verify only PE
files. This means that it is not able to verify any of GRUB2 modules which have
to be trusted on UEFI systems with secure boot enabled. So, it can defer
verification to other verifier, e.g. PGP one.
I silently assume that other verifiers are trusted and will do good job for us.
Or at least they will not do any harm.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Serbinenko <phcoder@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
Verifiers framework provides core file verification functionality which
can be used by various security mechanisms, e.g., UEFI secure boot, TPM,
PGP signature verification, etc.
The patch contains PGP code changes and probably they should be extracted
to separate patch for the sake of clarity.
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Serbinenko <phcoder@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
