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![]() This does not affect UEFI capsule updates as the signing is checked by the machine itself. We don't know anything about the trust level at all because NIST SP800-147 pretty much says we're not allowed to. For BIOS or ColorHug updates however we really do need to request authentication before downgrading or installing non-signed code. At the moment only the Hughski Limited key is trusted for firmware, although I hope in the future we can also include Red Hat, Microsoft, Intel, AMD and other hardware vendors in that list too. Fixes: https://github.com/hughsie/fwupd/issues/5 |
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Makefile.am | ||
org.freedesktop.fwupd.policy.in | ||
org.freedesktop.fwupd.rules |