mirror of
https://git.proxmox.com/git/efi-boot-shim
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48 lines
2.3 KiB
Plaintext
48 lines
2.3 KiB
Plaintext
- Versioned protocol:
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- Make shim and the bootloaders using it express how enlightened they
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are to one another, so we can stop earlier without tricks
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- Make EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_2 protocol and a LOAD_IMAGE protocol with
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LoadImage/CheckImage/StartImage.
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- Implement EFI_CERT_X509_SHA{256,384,512} revocation checks
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- It doesn't necessarily have to include timestamp checking support
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- Make the openssl code supply the Pkcs7Verify() API, and use the system
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one (instead) if it is available.
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- And make building it optional
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- Get meb30's multiple-certs patch merged
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- Hashing of option roms:
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- hash option roms and add them to MokListRT
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- probably belongs in MokManager
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- And some PCR?
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- Ability to specify second stage as a device path
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- including vendor path that means "parent of this image's path"
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- including vendor path that means "this image"
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- including path that's like Fv() to embed images.
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- Make all build options be able to be set in 'git config --local shim.OPTION'
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- Make the build dump those to stdout as well
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- make debuginfo paths configurable
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- make arch dependent names configurable
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- Make it easier to avoid CryptPem
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- Post process full path names out of __FILE__ / __BASE_FILE__ entries in
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the string table :/
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- Reproducible builds:
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- Make build.log an artifact of building.
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- KEK for Mok. (koike expressed an interest in working on this.)
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- Reorder builds to take hashes of mm, fb and insert those in shim
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instead of ephemeral certs
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- Make an easy strip+implant tool for our embedded cert lists
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- Detection of fallback.efi boot loops
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- Some tablet devices seem to always boot the fallback path, ignoring
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boot variables, so we need to detect that.
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- fallback creates 2 variables, one volatile, one nonvolatile
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- if shim sees the nonvolatile variable but not the volatile one, it has
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been booted correctly after fallback has run, so it should remove the
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nonvolatile variable.
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- if fallback sees the nonvolatile variable, it is in a fallback boot
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loop, and should launch the next stage instead of rebooting.
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- This means the TPM extend chain on machines with broken BDS always
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looks like: shim -> fallback -> shim -> grub2 -> kernel, *except* on
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boots from removable media (i.e. install media without fallback),
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where it looks like shim -> grub2 -> kernel /once/.
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# vim:filetype=mail:tw=74
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