efi-boot-shim/replacements.c
Matthew Garrett e60f118155 Clarify meaning of insecure_mode
insecure_mode was intended to indicate that the user had explicity disabled
checks with mokutil, which means it wasn't the opposite of secure_mode().
Change the names to clarify this and don't show the insecure mode message
unless the user has explicitly enabled that mode.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
2013-11-19 10:20:34 -05:00

142 lines
4.9 KiB
C

/*
* shim - trivial UEFI first-stage bootloader
*
* Copyright 2012 Red Hat, Inc <mjg@redhat.com>
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
* "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
* LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS
* FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
* COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT,
* INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
* (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
* SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* Significant portions of this code are derived from Tianocore
* (http://tianocore.sf.net) and are Copyright 2009-2012 Intel
* Corporation.
*/
/* Chemical agents lend themselves to covert use in sabotage against
* which it is exceedingly difficult to visualize any really effective
* defense... I will not dwell upon this use of CBW because, as one
* pursues the possibilities of such covert uses, one discovers that the
* scenarios resemble that in which the components of a nuclear weapon
* are smuggled into New York City and assembled in the basement of the
* Empire State Building.
* In other words, once the possibility is recognized to exist, about
* all that one can do is worry about it.
* -- Dr. Ivan L Bennett, Jr., testifying before the Subcommittee on
* National Security Policy and Scientific Developments, November 20,
* 1969.
*/
#include <efi.h>
#include <efiapi.h>
#include <efilib.h>
#include "shim.h"
#include "replacements.h"
/* oh for fuck's sakes.*/
#ifndef EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
#define EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION 26
#endif
static EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE *systab;
static typeof(systab->BootServices->StartImage) system_start_image;
static typeof(systab->BootServices->Exit) system_exit;
static typeof(systab->BootServices->ExitBootServices) system_exit_boot_services;
void
unhook_system_services(void)
{
systab->BootServices->Exit = system_exit;
systab->BootServices->StartImage = system_start_image;
systab->BootServices->ExitBootServices = system_exit_boot_services;
}
static EFI_STATUS EFIAPI
start_image(EFI_HANDLE image_handle, UINTN *exit_data_size, CHAR16 **exit_data)
{
EFI_STATUS status;
unhook_system_services();
status = systab->BootServices->StartImage(image_handle, exit_data_size, exit_data);
if (EFI_ERROR(status))
hook_system_services(systab);
return status;
}
static EFI_STATUS EFIAPI
exit_boot_services(EFI_HANDLE image_key, UINTN map_key)
{
if (loader_is_participating || verification_method == VERIFIED_BY_HASH) {
unhook_system_services();
EFI_STATUS status;
status = systab->BootServices->ExitBootServices(image_key, map_key);
if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
hook_system_services(systab);
return status;
}
Print(L"Bootloader has not verified loaded image.\n");
Print(L"System is compromised. halting.\n");
systab->BootServices->Stall(5000000);
systab->RuntimeServices->ResetSystem(EfiResetShutdown, EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION, 0, NULL);
return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
}
static EFI_STATUS EFIAPI
exit(EFI_HANDLE ImageHandle, EFI_STATUS ExitStatus,
UINTN ExitDataSize, CHAR16 *ExitData)
{
EFI_STATUS status;
unhook_system_services();
status = systab->BootServices->Exit(ImageHandle, ExitStatus, ExitDataSize, ExitData);
if (EFI_ERROR(status))
hook_system_services(systab);
return status;
}
void
hook_system_services(EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE *local_systab)
{
systab = local_systab;
/* We need to hook various calls to make this work... */
/* we need StartImage() so that we can allow chain booting to an
* image trusted by the firmware */
system_start_image = systab->BootServices->StartImage;
systab->BootServices->StartImage = start_image;
/* we need to hook ExitBootServices() so a) we can enforce the policy
* and b) we can unwrap when we're done. */
system_exit_boot_services = systab->BootServices->ExitBootServices;
systab->BootServices->ExitBootServices = exit_boot_services;
/* we need to hook Exit() so that we can allow users to quit the
* bootloader and still e.g. start a new one or run an internal
* shell. */
system_exit = systab->BootServices->Exit;
systab->BootServices->Exit = exit;
}