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OpenSSL changes quite a bit of the key validation, and most of the keys I can find in the wild aren't marked as trusted by the new checker. Intel noticed this too: https://github.com/vathpela/edk2/commit/f536d7c3ed but instead of fixing the compatibility error, they switched their test data to match the bug. So that's pretty broken. For now, I'm reverting OpenSSL 1.1.0e, because we need those certs in the wild to work. This reverts commit513cbe2aea
. This reverts commite9cc33d6f2
. This reverts commit80d49f758e
. This reverts commit9bc647e2b2
. This reverts commitae75df6232
. This reverts commite883479f35
. This reverts commit97469449fd
. This reverts commite39692647f
. This reverts commit0f3dfc01e2
. This reverts commit4da6ac8195
. This reverts commitd064bd7eef
. This reverts commit9bc86cfd6f
. This reverts commitab9a05a10f
. Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
277 lines
8.4 KiB
C
277 lines
8.4 KiB
C
/* p5_pbev2.c */
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/*
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* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
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* 1999-2004.
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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*
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
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* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
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* distribution.
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*
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
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* software must display the following acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
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*
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* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
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* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
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* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
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* licensing@OpenSSL.org.
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*
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
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* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
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* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
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*
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* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
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* acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
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* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
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* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
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* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
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* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
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* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
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* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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* ====================================================================
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*
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* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
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* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
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* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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*/
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include "cryptlib.h"
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#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
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#include <openssl/x509.h>
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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/* PKCS#5 v2.0 password based encryption structures */
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ASN1_SEQUENCE(PBE2PARAM) = {
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ASN1_SIMPLE(PBE2PARAM, keyfunc, X509_ALGOR),
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ASN1_SIMPLE(PBE2PARAM, encryption, X509_ALGOR)
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} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(PBE2PARAM)
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IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PBE2PARAM)
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ASN1_SEQUENCE(PBKDF2PARAM) = {
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ASN1_SIMPLE(PBKDF2PARAM, salt, ASN1_ANY),
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ASN1_SIMPLE(PBKDF2PARAM, iter, ASN1_INTEGER),
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ASN1_OPT(PBKDF2PARAM, keylength, ASN1_INTEGER),
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ASN1_OPT(PBKDF2PARAM, prf, X509_ALGOR)
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} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(PBKDF2PARAM)
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IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PBKDF2PARAM)
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/*
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* Return an algorithm identifier for a PKCS#5 v2.0 PBE algorithm: yes I know
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* this is horrible! Extended version to allow application supplied PRF NID
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* and IV.
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*/
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X509_ALGOR *PKCS5_pbe2_set_iv(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, int iter,
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unsigned char *salt, int saltlen,
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unsigned char *aiv, int prf_nid)
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{
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X509_ALGOR *scheme = NULL, *ret = NULL;
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int alg_nid, keylen;
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
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unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
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PBE2PARAM *pbe2 = NULL;
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alg_nid = EVP_CIPHER_type(cipher);
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if (alg_nid == NID_undef) {
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ASN1err(ASN1_F_PKCS5_PBE2_SET_IV,
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ASN1_R_CIPHER_HAS_NO_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER);
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goto err;
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}
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if (!(pbe2 = PBE2PARAM_new()))
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goto merr;
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/* Setup the AlgorithmIdentifier for the encryption scheme */
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scheme = pbe2->encryption;
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scheme->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(alg_nid);
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if (!(scheme->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new()))
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goto merr;
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/* Create random IV */
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if (EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher)) {
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if (aiv)
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memcpy(iv, aiv, EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher));
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else if (RAND_bytes(iv, EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher)) <= 0)
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goto err;
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}
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
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/* Dummy cipherinit to just setup the IV, and PRF */
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if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(&ctx, cipher, NULL, NULL, iv, 0))
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goto err;
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if (EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1(&ctx, scheme->parameter) < 0) {
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ASN1err(ASN1_F_PKCS5_PBE2_SET_IV, ASN1_R_ERROR_SETTING_CIPHER_PARAMS);
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
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goto err;
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}
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/*
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* If prf NID unspecified see if cipher has a preference. An error is OK
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* here: just means use default PRF.
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*/
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if ((prf_nid == -1) &&
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&ctx, EVP_CTRL_PBE_PRF_NID, 0, &prf_nid) <= 0) {
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ERR_clear_error();
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prf_nid = NID_hmacWithSHA1;
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}
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
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/* If its RC2 then we'd better setup the key length */
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if (alg_nid == NID_rc2_cbc)
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keylen = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher);
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else
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keylen = -1;
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/* Setup keyfunc */
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X509_ALGOR_free(pbe2->keyfunc);
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pbe2->keyfunc = PKCS5_pbkdf2_set(iter, salt, saltlen, prf_nid, keylen);
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if (!pbe2->keyfunc)
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goto merr;
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/* Now set up top level AlgorithmIdentifier */
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if (!(ret = X509_ALGOR_new()))
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goto merr;
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if (!(ret->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new()))
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goto merr;
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ret->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pbes2);
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/* Encode PBE2PARAM into parameter */
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if (!ASN1_item_pack(pbe2, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PBE2PARAM),
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&ret->parameter->value.sequence))
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goto merr;
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ret->parameter->type = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE;
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PBE2PARAM_free(pbe2);
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pbe2 = NULL;
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return ret;
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merr:
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ASN1err(ASN1_F_PKCS5_PBE2_SET_IV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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err:
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PBE2PARAM_free(pbe2);
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/* Note 'scheme' is freed as part of pbe2 */
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X509_ALGOR_free(ret);
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return NULL;
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}
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X509_ALGOR *PKCS5_pbe2_set(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, int iter,
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unsigned char *salt, int saltlen)
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{
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return PKCS5_pbe2_set_iv(cipher, iter, salt, saltlen, NULL, -1);
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}
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X509_ALGOR *PKCS5_pbkdf2_set(int iter, unsigned char *salt, int saltlen,
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int prf_nid, int keylen)
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{
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X509_ALGOR *keyfunc = NULL;
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PBKDF2PARAM *kdf = NULL;
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ASN1_OCTET_STRING *osalt = NULL;
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if (!(kdf = PBKDF2PARAM_new()))
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goto merr;
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if (!(osalt = M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new()))
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goto merr;
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kdf->salt->value.octet_string = osalt;
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kdf->salt->type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
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if (!saltlen)
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saltlen = PKCS5_SALT_LEN;
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if (!(osalt->data = OPENSSL_malloc(saltlen)))
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goto merr;
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osalt->length = saltlen;
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if (salt)
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memcpy(osalt->data, salt, saltlen);
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else if (RAND_bytes(osalt->data, saltlen) <= 0)
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goto merr;
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if (iter <= 0)
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iter = PKCS5_DEFAULT_ITER;
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if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(kdf->iter, iter))
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goto merr;
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/* If have a key len set it up */
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if (keylen > 0) {
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if (!(kdf->keylength = M_ASN1_INTEGER_new()))
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goto merr;
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if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(kdf->keylength, keylen))
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goto merr;
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}
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/* prf can stay NULL if we are using hmacWithSHA1 */
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if (prf_nid > 0 && prf_nid != NID_hmacWithSHA1) {
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kdf->prf = X509_ALGOR_new();
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if (!kdf->prf)
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goto merr;
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X509_ALGOR_set0(kdf->prf, OBJ_nid2obj(prf_nid), V_ASN1_NULL, NULL);
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}
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/* Finally setup the keyfunc structure */
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keyfunc = X509_ALGOR_new();
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if (!keyfunc)
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goto merr;
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keyfunc->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_pbkdf2);
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/* Encode PBKDF2PARAM into parameter of pbe2 */
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if (!(keyfunc->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new()))
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goto merr;
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if (!ASN1_item_pack(kdf, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PBKDF2PARAM),
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&keyfunc->parameter->value.sequence))
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goto merr;
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keyfunc->parameter->type = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE;
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PBKDF2PARAM_free(kdf);
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return keyfunc;
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merr:
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ASN1err(ASN1_F_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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PBKDF2PARAM_free(kdf);
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X509_ALGOR_free(keyfunc);
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return NULL;
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}
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