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Peter Jones a326513605 MokManager: handle mok parameter allocations better.
Covscan daftly claims:

288. var_compare_op: Comparing MokSB to null implies that MokSB might be null.
2330                if (MokSB) {
2331                        menu_strings[i] = L"Change Secure Boot state";
2332                        menu_item[i] = MOK_CHANGE_SB;
2333                        i++;
2334                }
2335
...
2358                choice = console_select(perform_mok_mgmt, menu_strings, 0);
2359                if (choice < 0)
2360                        goto out;
...
2362                switch (menu_item[choice]) {
...
2395                case MOK_CHANGE_SB:
    CID 182841 (#1 of 1): Dereference after null check
    (FORWARD_NULL)293. var_deref_model: Passing null pointer MokSB to
    mok_sb_prompt, which dereferences it. [show details]
2396                        efi_status = mok_sb_prompt(MokSB, MokSBSize);

Which is, of course, entirely false, beause for menu_item[choice] to be
MOK_CHANGE_SB, MokSB must be !NULL.  And then:

    252. Condition efi_status == 0, taking true branch.
2397                        if (efi_status == EFI_SUCCESS)
2398                                MokSB = NULL;

This guarantees it won't be in the list the next time through the loop.

This adds tests for NULLness before mok_sb_prompt(), just to make it
more clear to covscan what's going on.

Also do the same thing for all of:
	MOK_CHANGE_SB
	MOK_SET_PW
	MOK_CHANGE_DB
	MOK_ENROLL_MOKX
	MOK_DELETE_MOKX

I also Lindent-ed everything I had to touch.

Three other minor errors are also fixed:
1) the loop in enter_mok_menu() leaked the menu allocations each time
   through the loop
2) mok_sb_prompt(), mok_pw_prompt(), and mok_db_prompt() all call
   FreePool() on their respective variables (MokSB, etc), and
   check_mok_request() also calls FreePool() on these.  This sounds
   horrible, but it turns out it's not an issue, because they only free
   them in their EFI_SUCCESS paths, and enter_mok_menu() resets the
   system if any of the mok_XX_prompt() calls actually returned
   EFI_SUCCESS, so we never get back to check_mok_request() for it to do
   its FreePool() calls.
3) the loop in enter_mok_menu() winds up introducing a double free in
   the call to free_menu(), but we also can't hit this bug, because all
   the exit paths from the loop are "goto out" (or return error) rather
   than actually exiting on the loop conditional.

Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
2018-03-12 16:21:43 -04:00
Cryptlib CryptLib: Add the AsciiStrCpy() decl. 2018-03-12 16:21:43 -04:00
include Use gcc's offsetof() instead of hacking out our own. 2018-03-12 16:21:43 -04:00
lib lib/shell.c: minor cleanup 2018-03-12 16:21:43 -04:00
.gitignore Add "make scan-build" target. 2018-03-12 16:21:43 -04:00
.syntastic_c_config Move includes around to clean the source tree up a bit. 2018-03-12 16:21:43 -04:00
buildid.c buildid: Check the return values of write() calls 2017-09-29 11:10:32 -04:00
BUILDING Document REQUIRE_TPM 2018-03-12 16:21:43 -04:00
cert.S Add support for 32-bit ARM 2014-08-12 10:54:05 -04:00
COPYRIGHT Add copyright file 2012-07-09 11:03:12 -04:00
crypt_blowfish.c Move includes around to clean the source tree up a bit. 2018-03-12 16:21:43 -04:00
elf_aarch64_efi.lds Don't allow anything with a small alignment in our PE files. 2017-04-26 21:52:23 -04:00
elf_arm_efi.lds Don't allow anything with a small alignment in our PE files. 2017-04-26 21:52:23 -04:00
elf_ia32_efi.lds Don't allow anything with a small alignment in our PE files. 2017-04-26 21:52:23 -04:00
elf_ia64_efi.lds Make shim_version live in a special aligned section. 2017-02-23 16:08:42 -05:00
elf_x86_64_efi.lds Don't allow anything with a small alignment in our PE files. 2017-04-26 21:52:23 -04:00
errlog.c try to show errors more usefully. 2017-09-13 15:18:28 -04:00
fallback.c Don't have tons of local guid definitions for no reason at all. 2018-03-12 16:21:43 -04:00
httpboot.c Don't have tons of local guid definitions for no reason at all. 2018-03-12 16:21:43 -04:00
make-certs Sign MokManager with a locally-generated key 2012-11-26 13:43:50 -05:00
Make.coverity Add 'make coverity' target. 2018-03-12 16:21:43 -04:00
Make.defaults Add 'make coverity' target. 2018-03-12 16:21:43 -04:00
Make.rules Add 'make coverity' target. 2018-03-12 16:21:43 -04:00
Make.scan-build Add "make scan-build" target. 2018-03-12 16:21:43 -04:00
Makefile Move includes around to clean the source tree up a bit. 2018-03-12 16:21:43 -04:00
model.c Add a model file for coverity. 2018-03-12 16:21:43 -04:00
MokManager.c MokManager: handle mok parameter allocations better. 2018-03-12 16:21:43 -04:00
MokVars.txt Add MokListX to MokVars.txt 2017-08-03 11:00:58 -04:00
netboot.c Move includes around to clean the source tree up a bit. 2018-03-12 16:21:43 -04:00
PasswordCrypt.c Move includes around to clean the source tree up a bit. 2018-03-12 16:21:43 -04:00
README Add install targets. 2017-08-11 15:18:39 -04:00
README.fallback README.fallback: correct the path of BOOT.CSV in layout example 2017-07-24 14:12:31 -04:00
README.tpm Log measurements in PCR4 for applications being verified through shim_lock 2018-03-06 14:37:07 -05:00
replacements.c Move includes around to clean the source tree up a bit. 2018-03-12 16:21:43 -04:00
shim.c Don't have tons of local guid definitions for no reason at all. 2018-03-12 16:21:43 -04:00
shim.h Use gcc's offsetof() instead of hacking out our own. 2018-03-12 16:21:43 -04:00
testplan.txt Another testplan error. 2014-10-02 01:01:46 -04:00
TODO Update TODO with some stuff 2017-08-11 15:18:39 -04:00
tpm.c Don't have tons of local guid definitions for no reason at all. 2018-03-12 16:21:43 -04:00
version.c.in Make shim_version live in a special aligned section. 2017-02-23 16:08:42 -05:00
version.h Add ident-like blobs to shim.efi for version checking. 2013-10-03 11:11:09 -04:00

shim is a trivial EFI application that, when run, attempts to open and
execute another application. It will initially attempt to do this via the
standard EFI LoadImage() and StartImage() calls. If these fail (because secure
boot is enabled and the binary is not signed with an appropriate key, for
instance) it will then validate the binary against a built-in certificate. If
this succeeds and if the binary or signing key are not blacklisted then shim
will relocate and execute the binary.

shim will also install a protocol which permits the second-stage bootloader
to perform similar binary validation. This protocol has a GUID as described
in the shim.h header file and provides a single entry point. On 64-bit systems
this entry point expects to be called with SysV ABI rather than MSABI, and
so calls to it should not be wrapped.

On systems with a TPM chip enabled and supported by the system firmware,
shim will extend various PCRs with the digests of the targets it is
loading.  A full list is in the file README.tpm .

To use shim, simply place a DER-encoded public certificate in a file such as
pub.cer and build with "make VENDOR_CERT_FILE=pub.cer".

There are a couple of build options, and a couple of ways to customize the
build, described in BUILDING.