Because you know you wanted a test plan. You feel it deeply inside.
Note that none of the /negative/ cases are tested yet.
Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
Because you know you wanted a test plan. You feel it deeply inside.
Note that none of the /negative/ cases are tested yet.
Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
Some firmwares seem to ignore our boot entries and put their fallback
entries back on top. Right now that results in a lot of boot entries
for our stuff, a la https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=995834 .
Instead of that happening, if we simply find existing entries that match
the entry we would create and move them to the top of the boot order,
the machine will continue to operate in failure mode (which we can't
avoid), but at least we won't create thousands of extra entries.
Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
Some firmwares seem to ignore our boot entries and put their fallback
entries back on top. Right now that results in a lot of boot entries
for our stuff, a la https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=995834 .
Instead of that happening, if we simply find existing entries that match
the entry we would create and move them to the top of the boot order,
the machine will continue to operate in failure mode (which we can't
avoid), but at least we won't create thousands of extra entries.
Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
UEFI 2.x section 3.1.2 provides for "short-form device path", where the
first element specified is a "hard drive media device path", so that you
can move a disk around on different buses without invalidating your
device path. Fallback has not been using this option, though in most
cases efibootmgr has.
Note that we still keep the full device path, because LoadImage()
isn't necessarily the layer where HD() works - one some systems BDS is
responsible for resolving the full path and passes that to LoadImage()
instead. So we have to do LoadImage() with the full path.
UEFI 2.x section 3.1.2 provides for "short-form device path", where the
first element specified is a "hard drive media device path", so that you
can move a disk around on different buses without invalidating your
device path. Fallback has not been using this option, though in most
cases efibootmgr has.
Note that we still keep the full device path, because LoadImage()
isn't necessarily the layer where HD() works - one some systems BDS is
responsible for resolving the full path and passes that to LoadImage()
instead. So we have to do LoadImage() with the full path.
The things we do for our tools. In this case, make the AllocatePool()
happen outside of a conditional, even though that conditional will
always bee satisfied. This way coverity won't think we're setting fi
to NULL and passing it to StrCaseCmp.
Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
The things we do for our tools. In this case, make the AllocatePool()
happen outside of a conditional, even though that conditional will
always bee satisfied. This way coverity won't think we're setting fi
to NULL and passing it to StrCaseCmp.
Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
Right now we always look for e.g. "\grubx64.efi", which is completely
wrong. This makes it look for the path shim was loaded from and modify
that to end in a sanitized version of our default loader name.
Resolves: rhbz#1032583
Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
Right now we always look for e.g. "\grubx64.efi", which is completely
wrong. This makes it look for the path shim was loaded from and modify
that to end in a sanitized version of our default loader name.
Resolves: rhbz#1032583
Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
Shim should only need to enforce its security policy when its launching
binaries signed with its built-in key. Binaries signed by keys in db or
Mokdb should be able to rely on their own security policy.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
Shim should only need to enforce its security policy when its launching
binaries signed with its built-in key. Binaries signed by keys in db or
Mokdb should be able to rely on their own security policy.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
insecure_mode was intended to indicate that the user had explicity disabled
checks with mokutil, which means it wasn't the opposite of secure_mode().
Change the names to clarify this and don't show the insecure mode message
unless the user has explicitly enabled that mode.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
insecure_mode was intended to indicate that the user had explicity disabled
checks with mokutil, which means it wasn't the opposite of secure_mode().
Change the names to clarify this and don't show the insecure mode message
unless the user has explicitly enabled that mode.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
%r when used in Print() will show a string representation of
an EFI_STATUS code.
Change-Id: I6db47f5213454603bd66177aca378ad01e9f0bd4
Signed-off-by: Andrew Boie <andrew.p.boie@intel.com>
%r when used in Print() will show a string representation of
an EFI_STATUS code.
Change-Id: I6db47f5213454603bd66177aca378ad01e9f0bd4
Signed-off-by: Andrew Boie <andrew.p.boie@intel.com>
Also removed unused LIB_PATH from some Makefiles.
Change-Id: I7d28d18f7531b51b6121a2ffb88bcaedec57c467
Signed-off-by: Andrew Boie <andrew.p.boie@intel.com>
Also removed unused LIB_PATH from some Makefiles.
Change-Id: I7d28d18f7531b51b6121a2ffb88bcaedec57c467
Signed-off-by: Andrew Boie <andrew.p.boie@intel.com>
If these are overridden on the command line, pass them along to
the sub-makes.
Change-Id: I531ccb5d2f5e4be8e99d4892cdcfffffc1ad9877
Signed-off-by: Andrew Boie <andrew.p.boie@intel.com>
If these are overridden on the command line, pass them along to
the sub-makes.
Change-Id: I531ccb5d2f5e4be8e99d4892cdcfffffc1ad9877
Signed-off-by: Andrew Boie <andrew.p.boie@intel.com>
fh->Read expects pointer to 32-bit int, use UINTN
Change-Id: If1a728efd51a9a24dfcd8123e84bf4c0713491fe
Signed-off-by: Andrew Boie <andrew.p.boie@intel.com>
fh->Read expects pointer to 32-bit int, use UINTN
Change-Id: If1a728efd51a9a24dfcd8123e84bf4c0713491fe
Signed-off-by: Andrew Boie <andrew.p.boie@intel.com>
() Fix the return value semantics. If the MokList doesn't
exist, we are OK. If the MokList was compromised but we
were able to erase it, that is OK too. Only if the list
can't be nuked do we return an error.
() Fix use of potentially uninitialized attribute variable
() Actually use the return value when called from verify_buffer.
Change-Id: If16df21d79c52a1726928df96d133390cde4cb7e
Signed-off-by: Andrew Boie <andrew.p.boie@intel.com>
() Fix the return value semantics. If the MokList doesn't
exist, we are OK. If the MokList was compromised but we
were able to erase it, that is OK too. Only if the list
can't be nuked do we return an error.
() Fix use of potentially uninitialized attribute variable
() Actually use the return value when called from verify_buffer.
Change-Id: If16df21d79c52a1726928df96d133390cde4cb7e
Signed-off-by: Andrew Boie <andrew.p.boie@intel.com>
After going back and inspecting this further, the logic for "SetupMode"
being present at all was incorrect. Also initialize our state earlier
so it's sure to always be set.
Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
After going back and inspecting this further, the logic for "SetupMode"
being present at all was incorrect. Also initialize our state earlier
so it's sure to always be set.
Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
