mirror of
https://git.proxmox.com/git/efi-boot-shim
synced 2025-07-27 05:02:29 +00:00
Merge branch 'mok' into netboot
Conflicts: shim.c
This commit is contained in:
Matthew Garrett
commit
4ad234f175
158
shim.c
158
shim.c
@ -276,6 +276,9 @@ static CHECK_STATUS check_db_cert(CHAR16 *dbname, EFI_GUID guid,
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return rc;
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}
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/*
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* Check a hash against an EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST in a buffer
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*/
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static CHECK_STATUS check_db_hash_in_ram(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList,
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UINTN dbsize, UINT8 *data,
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int SignatureSize, EFI_GUID CertType)
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@ -314,6 +317,9 @@ static CHECK_STATUS check_db_hash_in_ram(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList,
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return DATA_NOT_FOUND;
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}
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/*
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* Check a hash against an EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST in a UEFI variable
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*/
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static CHECK_STATUS check_db_hash(CHAR16 *dbname, EFI_GUID guid, UINT8 *data,
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int SignatureSize, EFI_GUID CertType)
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{
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@ -338,6 +344,10 @@ static CHECK_STATUS check_db_hash(CHAR16 *dbname, EFI_GUID guid, UINT8 *data,
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}
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/*
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* Check whether the binary signature or hash are present in dbx or the
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* built-in blacklist
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*/
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static EFI_STATUS check_blacklist (WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *cert,
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UINT8 *sha256hash, UINT8 *sha1hash)
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{
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@ -367,6 +377,9 @@ static EFI_STATUS check_blacklist (WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *cert,
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return EFI_SUCCESS;
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}
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/*
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* Check whether the binary signature or hash are present in db or MokList
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*/
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static EFI_STATUS check_whitelist (WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *cert,
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UINT8 *sha256hash, UINT8 *sha1hash)
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{
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@ -596,6 +609,9 @@ done:
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return status;
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}
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/*
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* Ensure that the MOK database hasn't been set or modified from an OS
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*/
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static EFI_STATUS verify_mok (void) {
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EFI_GUID shim_lock_guid = SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
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EFI_STATUS status = EFI_SUCCESS;
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@ -653,8 +669,14 @@ static EFI_STATUS verify_buffer (char *data, int datasize,
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if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
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return status;
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/*
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* Check that the MOK database hasn't been modified
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*/
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verify_mok();
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/*
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* Ensure that the binary isn't blacklisted
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*/
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status = check_blacklist(cert, sha256hash, sha1hash);
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if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
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@ -662,6 +684,10 @@ static EFI_STATUS verify_buffer (char *data, int datasize,
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return status;
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}
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/*
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* Check whether the binary is whitelisted in any of the firmware
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* databases
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*/
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status = check_whitelist(cert, sha256hash, sha1hash);
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if (status == EFI_SUCCESS) {
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@ -669,6 +695,9 @@ static EFI_STATUS verify_buffer (char *data, int datasize,
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return status;
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}
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/*
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* And finally, check against shim's built-in key
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*/
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if (AuthenticodeVerify(cert->CertData,
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context->SecDir->Size - sizeof(cert->Hdr),
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vendor_cert, vendor_cert_size, sha256hash,
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@ -762,12 +791,18 @@ static EFI_STATUS handle_image (void *data, unsigned int datasize,
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char *base, *end;
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PE_COFF_LOADER_IMAGE_CONTEXT context;
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/*
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* The binary header contains relevant context and section pointers
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*/
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efi_status = read_header(data, datasize, &context);
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if (efi_status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
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Print(L"Failed to read header\n");
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return efi_status;
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}
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/*
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* We only need to verify the binary if we're in secure mode
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*/
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if (secure_mode ()) {
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efi_status = verify_buffer(data, datasize, &context);
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@ -786,6 +821,9 @@ static EFI_STATUS handle_image (void *data, unsigned int datasize,
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CopyMem(buffer, data, context.SizeOfHeaders);
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/*
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* Copy the executable's sections to their desired offsets
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*/
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Section = context.FirstSection;
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for (i = 0; i < context.NumberOfSections; i++) {
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size = Section->Misc.VirtualSize;
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@ -810,6 +848,9 @@ static EFI_STATUS handle_image (void *data, unsigned int datasize,
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Section += 1;
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}
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/*
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* Run the relocation fixups
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*/
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efi_status = relocate_coff(&context, buffer);
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if (efi_status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
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@ -819,6 +860,10 @@ static EFI_STATUS handle_image (void *data, unsigned int datasize,
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}
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entry_point = ImageAddress(buffer, context.ImageSize, context.EntryPoint);
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/*
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* grub needs to know its location and size in memory, so fix up
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* the loaded image protocol values
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*/
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li->ImageBase = buffer;
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li->ImageSize = context.ImageSize;
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@ -831,6 +876,10 @@ static EFI_STATUS handle_image (void *data, unsigned int datasize,
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return EFI_SUCCESS;
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}
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/*
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* Generate the path of an executable given shim's path and the name
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* of the executable
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*/
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static EFI_STATUS generate_path(EFI_LOADED_IMAGE *li, CHAR16 *ImagePath,
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EFI_DEVICE_PATH **grubpath, CHAR16 **PathName)
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{
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@ -877,7 +926,7 @@ error:
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}
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/*
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* Locate the second stage bootloader and read it into a buffer
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* Open the second stage bootloader and read it into a buffer
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*/
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static EFI_STATUS load_image (EFI_LOADED_IMAGE *li, void **data,
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int *datasize, CHAR16 *PathName)
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@ -893,6 +942,9 @@ static EFI_STATUS load_image (EFI_LOADED_IMAGE *li, void **data,
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device = li->DeviceHandle;
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/*
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* Open the device
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*/
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efi_status = uefi_call_wrapper(BS->HandleProtocol, 3, device,
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&simple_file_system_protocol,
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(void **)&drive);
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@ -909,6 +961,9 @@ static EFI_STATUS load_image (EFI_LOADED_IMAGE *li, void **data,
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goto error;
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}
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/*
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* And then open the file
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*/
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efi_status = uefi_call_wrapper(root->Open, 5, root, &grub, PathName,
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EFI_FILE_MODE_READ, 0);
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@ -925,6 +980,10 @@ static EFI_STATUS load_image (EFI_LOADED_IMAGE *li, void **data,
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goto error;
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}
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/*
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* Find out how big the file is in order to allocate the storage
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* buffer
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*/
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efi_status = uefi_call_wrapper(grub->GetInfo, 4, grub, &file_info_id,
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&buffersize, fileinfo);
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@ -955,6 +1014,10 @@ static EFI_STATUS load_image (EFI_LOADED_IMAGE *li, void **data,
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efi_status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
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goto error;
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}
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/*
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* Perform the actual read
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*/
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efi_status = uefi_call_wrapper(grub->Read, 3, grub, &buffersize,
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*data);
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@ -986,6 +1049,10 @@ error:
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return efi_status;
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}
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/*
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* Protocol entry point. If secure boot is enabled, verify that the provided
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* buffer is signed with a trusted key.
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*/
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EFI_STATUS shim_verify (void *buffer, UINT32 size)
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{
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EFI_STATUS status;
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@ -1004,6 +1071,9 @@ EFI_STATUS shim_verify (void *buffer, UINT32 size)
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return status;
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}
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/*
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* Load and run an EFI executable
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*/
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EFI_STATUS start_image(EFI_HANDLE image_handle, CHAR16 *ImagePath)
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{
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EFI_GUID loaded_image_protocol = LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL;
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@ -1016,6 +1086,10 @@ EFI_STATUS start_image(EFI_HANDLE image_handle, CHAR16 *ImagePath)
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void *data = NULL;
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int datasize;
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/*
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* We need to refer to the loaded image protocol on the running
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* binary in order to find our path
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*/
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efi_status = uefi_call_wrapper(BS->HandleProtocol, 3, image_handle,
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&loaded_image_protocol, (void **)&li);
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@ -1024,6 +1098,9 @@ EFI_STATUS start_image(EFI_HANDLE image_handle, CHAR16 *ImagePath)
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return efi_status;
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}
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/*
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* Build a new path from the existing one plus the executable name
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*/
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efi_status = generate_path(li, ImagePath, &path, &PathName);
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if (efi_status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
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@ -1046,6 +1123,9 @@ EFI_STATUS start_image(EFI_HANDLE image_handle, CHAR16 *ImagePath)
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data = sourcebuffer;
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datasize = sourcesize;
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} else {
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/*
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* Read the new executable off disk
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*/
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efi_status = load_image(li, &data, &datasize, PathName);
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if (efi_status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
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@ -1054,8 +1134,15 @@ EFI_STATUS start_image(EFI_HANDLE image_handle, CHAR16 *ImagePath)
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}
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}
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/*
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* We need to modify the loaded image protocol entry before running
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* the new binary, so back it up
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*/
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CopyMem(&li_bak, li, sizeof(li_bak));
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/*
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* Verify and, if appropriate, relocate and execute the executable
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*/
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efi_status = handle_image(data, datasize, li);
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if (efi_status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
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@ -1064,8 +1151,14 @@ EFI_STATUS start_image(EFI_HANDLE image_handle, CHAR16 *ImagePath)
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goto done;
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}
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/*
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* The binary is trusted and relocated. Run it
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*/
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efi_status = uefi_call_wrapper(entry_point, 2, image_handle, systab);
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/*
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* Restore our original loaded image values
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*/
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CopyMem(li, &li_bak, sizeof(li_bak));
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done:
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if (PathName)
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@ -1077,6 +1170,10 @@ done:
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return efi_status;
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}
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/*
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* Load and run grub. If that fails because grub isn't trusted, load and
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* run MokManager.
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*/
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EFI_STATUS init_grub(EFI_HANDLE image_handle)
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{
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EFI_STATUS efi_status;
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@ -1094,6 +1191,10 @@ done:
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return efi_status;
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}
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/*
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* Copy the boot-services only MokList variable to the runtime-accessible
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* MokListRT variable. It's not marked NV, so the OS can't modify it.
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*/
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EFI_STATUS mirror_mok_list()
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{
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EFI_GUID shim_lock_guid = SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
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@ -1122,6 +1223,9 @@ done:
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return efi_status;
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}
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/*
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* Check if a variable exists
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*/
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static BOOLEAN check_var(CHAR16 *varname)
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{
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EFI_STATUS efi_status;
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@ -1140,6 +1244,10 @@ static BOOLEAN check_var(CHAR16 *varname)
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return FALSE;
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}
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/*
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* If the OS has set any of these variables we need to drop into MOK and
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* handle them appropriately
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*/
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EFI_STATUS check_mok_request(EFI_HANDLE image_handle)
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{
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EFI_STATUS efi_status;
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@ -1157,6 +1265,10 @@ EFI_STATUS check_mok_request(EFI_HANDLE image_handle)
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return EFI_SUCCESS;
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}
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/*
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* Verify that MokSBState is valid, and if appropriate set insecure mode
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*/
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static EFI_STATUS check_mok_sb (void)
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{
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EFI_GUID shim_lock_guid = SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
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@ -1171,6 +1283,10 @@ static EFI_STATUS check_mok_sb (void)
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if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
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return EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
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/*
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* Delete and ignore the variable if it's been set from or could be
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* modified by the OS
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*/
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if (attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS) {
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Print(L"MokSBState is compromised! Clearing it\n");
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if (LibDeleteVariable(L"MokSBState", &shim_lock_guid) != EFI_SUCCESS) {
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@ -1186,7 +1302,6 @@ static EFI_STATUS check_mok_sb (void)
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return status;
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}
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EFI_STATUS efi_main (EFI_HANDLE image_handle, EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE *passed_systab)
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{
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EFI_GUID shim_lock_guid = SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
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@ -1194,31 +1309,62 @@ EFI_STATUS efi_main (EFI_HANDLE image_handle, EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE *passed_systab)
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EFI_HANDLE handle = NULL;
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EFI_STATUS efi_status;
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/*
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* Set up the shim lock protocol so that grub and MokManager can
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* call back in and use shim functions
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*/
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shim_lock_interface.Verify = shim_verify;
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shim_lock_interface.Hash = generate_hash;
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shim_lock_interface.Context = read_header;
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systab = passed_systab;
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/*
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* Ensure that gnu-efi functions are available
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*/
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InitializeLib(image_handle, systab);
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/*
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* Check whether the user has configured the system to run in
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* insecure mode
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*/
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check_mok_sb();
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/*
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* Tell the user that we're in insecure mode if necessary
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*/
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if (insecure_mode) {
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Print(L"Booting in insecure mode\n");
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uefi_call_wrapper(BS->Stall, 1, 2000000);
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}
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efi_status = check_mok_request(image_handle);
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efi_status = mirror_mok_list();
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/*
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* Install the protocol
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*/
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uefi_call_wrapper(BS->InstallProtocolInterface, 4, &handle,
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&shim_lock_guid, EFI_NATIVE_INTERFACE,
|
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&shim_lock_interface);
|
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/*
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* Enter MokManager if necessary
|
||||
*/
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efi_status = check_mok_request(image_handle);
|
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/*
|
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* Copy the MOK list to a runtime variable so the kernel can make
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* use of it
|
||||
*/
|
||||
efi_status = mirror_mok_list();
|
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/*
|
||||
* Hand over control to the second stage bootloader
|
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*/
|
||||
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||||
efi_status = init_grub(image_handle);
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* If we're back here then clean everything up before exiting
|
||||
*/
|
||||
uefi_call_wrapper(BS->UninstallProtocolInterface, 3, handle,
|
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&shim_lock_guid, &shim_lock_interface);
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
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Block a user