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8b89d4d421
SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN means not just close_notify or fatal alert. From what I can tell, this was just a mistake? OnStreamRead's comment suggests eof_ was intended to be for close_notify. This fixes a bug in TLSSocket error reporting that seems to have made it into existing tests. If we receive a fatal alert, EmitRead(UV_EOF) would, via onConnectEnd in _tls_wrap.js, synthesize an ECONNRESET before the alert itself is surfaced. As a result, TLS alerts received during the handshake are misreported by Node. See the tests that had to be updated as part of this. PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/44563 Reviewed-By: Luigi Pinca <luigipinca@gmail.com>
71 lines
2.1 KiB
JavaScript
71 lines
2.1 KiB
JavaScript
'use strict';
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const common = require('../common');
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if (!common.hasCrypto)
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common.skip('missing crypto');
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const assert = require('assert');
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const tls = require('tls');
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const CIPHERS = 'PSK+HIGH:TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256';
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const USERS = {
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UserA: Buffer.allocUnsafe(128),
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UserB: Buffer.from('82072606b502b0f4025e90eb75fe137d', 'hex'),
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};
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const TEST_DATA = 'x';
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const serverOptions = {
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ciphers: CIPHERS,
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pskCallback(socket, id) {
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assert.ok(socket instanceof tls.TLSSocket);
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assert.ok(typeof id === 'string');
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return USERS[id];
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},
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};
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function test(secret, opts, error) {
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const cb = !error ?
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common.mustCall((c) => { c.pipe(c); }) :
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common.mustNotCall();
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const server = tls.createServer(serverOptions, cb);
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server.listen(0, common.mustCall(() => {
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const options = {
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port: server.address().port,
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ciphers: CIPHERS,
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checkServerIdentity: () => {},
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pskCallback: common.mustCall(() => secret),
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...opts,
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};
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if (!error) {
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const client = tls.connect(options, common.mustCall(() => {
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client.end(TEST_DATA);
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client.on('data', common.mustCall((data) => {
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assert.strictEqual(data.toString(), TEST_DATA);
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}));
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client.on('close', common.mustCall(() => server.close()));
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}));
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} else {
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const client = tls.connect(options, common.mustNotCall());
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client.on('error', common.mustCall((err) => {
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assert.strictEqual(err.code, error);
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server.close();
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}));
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}
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}));
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}
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test({ psk: USERS.UserA, identity: 'UserA' });
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test({ psk: USERS.UserA, identity: 'UserA' }, { maxVersion: 'TLSv1.2' });
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test({ psk: USERS.UserA, identity: 'UserA' }, { minVersion: 'TLSv1.3' });
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test({ psk: USERS.UserB, identity: 'UserB' });
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test({ psk: USERS.UserB, identity: 'UserB' }, { minVersion: 'TLSv1.3' });
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// Unrecognized user should fail handshake
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test({ psk: USERS.UserB, identity: 'UserC' }, {},
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'ERR_SSL_SSLV3_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE');
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// Recognized user but incorrect secret should fail handshake
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test({ psk: USERS.UserA, identity: 'UserB' }, {},
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'ERR_SSL_SSLV3_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER');
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test({ psk: USERS.UserB, identity: 'UserB' });
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