PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/41507
Reviewed-By: Tobias Nießen <tniessen@tnie.de>
Reviewed-By: Colin Ihrig <cjihrig@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: James M Snell <jasnell@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Filip Skokan <panva.ip@gmail.com>
Add the toArray method from the TC39 iterator helper proposal to
Readable streams. This also enables a common-use case of converting a
stream to an array.
Co-Authored-By: Robert Nagy <ronagy@icloud.com>
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/41553
Reviewed-By: Robert Nagy <ronagy@icloud.com>
Reviewed-By: Matteo Collina <matteo.collina@gmail.com>
This simplifies the example and makes it runnable. (The current example
has a magic function.) (This also removes an assignment in a condition
which will be flagged if we enable ESLint's no-cond-assign rule.)
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/41574
Reviewed-By: Mestery <mestery@protonmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Benjamin Gruenbaum <benjamingr@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Tobias Nießen <tniessen@tnie.de>
Reviewed-By: Luigi Pinca <luigipinca@gmail.com>
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/41593
Reviewed-By: Mestery <mestery@protonmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Colin Ihrig <cjihrig@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Qingyu Deng <i@ayase-lab.com>
Reviewed-By: Mohammed Keyvanzadeh <mohammadkeyvanzade94@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Richard Lau <rlau@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Tobias Nießen <tniessen@tnie.de>
The 'subject' option should not only accept the values 'always' and
'never' because neither is compatible with RFC 2818, i.e., HTTPS. This
change adds a third value 'default', which implies the behavior that
HTTPS mandates.
The new 'default' case matches the default behavior of OpenSSL for both
DNS names and email addresses.
Future Node.js versions should change the default option value from
'always' to 'default'.
Refs: https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/36804
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/41569
Reviewed-By: James M Snell <jasnell@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Colin Ihrig <cjihrig@gmail.com>
Make the text more concise and clear.
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/41550
Reviewed-By: James M Snell <jasnell@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Benjamin Gruenbaum <benjamingr@gmail.com>
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/41560
Reviewed-By: Colin Ihrig <cjihrig@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Luigi Pinca <luigipinca@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Mohammed Keyvanzadeh <mohammadkeyvanzade94@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: James M Snell <jasnell@gmail.com>
subtle.sign is not supposed to support strings, and in most Web Crypto
implementations, it does not. Passing a string as the 'data' argument
only works in Node.js, and users should not rely on that oddity. The
Web Crypto spec requires the data argument to be a BufferSource, i.e.,
an ArrayBuffer or an ArrayBufferView.
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/41556
Reviewed-By: James M Snell <jasnell@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Antoine du Hamel <duhamelantoine1995@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Luigi Pinca <luigipinca@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Benjamin Gruenbaum <benjamingr@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Filip Skokan <panva.ip@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Colin Ihrig <cjihrig@gmail.com>
This is part of an effort to get our code to comply with ESLint
no-cond-assign so that we don't have to disable that rule in our config.
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/41510
Reviewed-By: Tobias Nießen <tniessen@tnie.de>
Reviewed-By: Antoine du Hamel <duhamelantoine1995@gmail.com>
Add a `forEach` method to readable streams to enable concurrent
iteration and align with the iterator-helpers proposal.
Co-Authored-By: Robert Nagy <ronagy@icloud.com>
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/41445
Reviewed-By: Matteo Collina <matteo.collina@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Robert Nagy <ronagy@icloud.com>
This statement is misleading in that it says "key generation is
expensive". ECDHE key generation (over the elliptic curves that are
commonly used for TLS) is insanely fast compared to most other types
of key generation.
This statement is irrelevant for TLS 1.3, which requires (EC)DHE.
Even if this statement is somewhat true for TLS 1.2, it does not
justify discouraging the use of (EC)DHE.
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/41528
Reviewed-By: Rich Trott <rtrott@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Anna Henningsen <anna@addaleax.net>
Reviewed-By: Benjamin Gruenbaum <benjamingr@gmail.com>
This statement was objectively false. Clients usually only need to
generate and/or own a private key if the server sends a
CertificateRequest during the TLS handshake, which is not a common case.
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/41505
Reviewed-By: Filip Skokan <panva.ip@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Benjamin Gruenbaum <benjamingr@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Colin Ihrig <cjihrig@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Michael Dawson <midawson@redhat.com>
The internal use of tls.parseCertString was removed in
a336444c7f. The function does not handle
multi-value RDNs correctly, leading to incorrect representations and
security concerns.
This change is breaking in two ways: tls.parseCertString is removed
(but has been runtime-deprecated since Node.js 9) and
_tls_common.translatePeerCertificate does not translate the `subject`
and `issuer` properties anymore.
This change also removes the recommendation to use querystring.parse
instead, which is similarly dangerous.
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/41479
Reviewed-By: James M Snell <jasnell@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Benjamin Gruenbaum <benjamingr@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Matteo Collina <matteo.collina@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Richard Lau <rlau@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Colin Ihrig <cjihrig@gmail.com>
This adds a missing _is_ in the readable.read() text and makes
small style adjustments.
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/41524
Reviewed-By: Richard Lau <rlau@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Tobias Nießen <tniessen@tnie.de>
Reviewed-By: Antoine du Hamel <duhamelantoine1995@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Darshan Sen <raisinten@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Benjamin Gruenbaum <benjamingr@gmail.com>
The current documentation is inaccurate in that checkHost does not
necessarily return the given host name, but instead returns the subject
name that matched the given host name.
Refs: https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/36804
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/41468
Reviewed-By: Luigi Pinca <luigipinca@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Filip Skokan <panva.ip@gmail.com>
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/41477
Refs: https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/24358
Reviewed-By: Colin Ihrig <cjihrig@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Richard Lau <rlau@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Tierney Cyren <hello@bnb.im>
Reviewed-By: Benjamin Gruenbaum <benjamingr@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Luigi Pinca <luigipinca@gmail.com>
Referring to `Object.is()` will be more clear and direct. The
`Object.is()` reference in turn refers to `SameValue` so people can dig
deeper there if they want or need to.
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/41460
Reviewed-By: Luigi Pinca <luigipinca@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Tobias Nießen <tniessen@tnie.de>
Reviewed-By: Anna Henningsen <anna@addaleax.net>
Reviewed-By: Harshitha K P <harshitha014@gmail.com>
If the file fails to be written (e.g. missing permissions, no space left
on device, etc), `writeHeapSnapshot` will now throw an exception.
This commit also adds error handling for the `fclose` call, returning
false if a non-zero value was returned.
Fixes: https://github.com/nodejs/node/issues/41346
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/41373
Reviewed-By: Anna Henningsen <anna@addaleax.net>
Reviewed-By: Darshan Sen <raisinten@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Mohammed Keyvanzadeh <mohammadkeyvanzade94@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Colin Ihrig <cjihrig@gmail.com>
This is a security release.
Notable changes:
Improper handling of URI Subject Alternative Names (Medium)(CVE-2021-44531)
- Accepting arbitrary Subject Alternative Name (SAN) types, unless a PKI
is specifically defined to use a particular SAN type, can result in
bypassing name-constrained intermediates. Node.js was accepting URI SAN
types, which PKIs are often not defined to use. Additionally, when a
protocol allows URI SANs, Node.js did not match the URI correctly.
- Versions of Node.js with the fix for this disable the URI SAN type when
checking a certificate against a hostname. This behavior can be
reverted through the `--security-revert` command-line option.
- More details will be available at
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-44531
Certificate Verification Bypass via String Injection (Medium)(CVE-2021-44532)
- Node.js converts SANs (Subject Alternative Names) to a string format.
It uses this string to check peer certificates against hostnames when
validating connections. The string format was subject to an injection
vulnerability when name constraints were used within a certificate
chain, allowing the bypass of these name constraints.
- Versions of Node.js with the fix for this escape SANs containing the
problematic characters in order to prevent the injection. This
behavior can be reverted through the `--security-revert` command-line
option.
- More details will be available at
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-44532
Incorrect handling of certificate subject and issuer fields (Medium)(CVE-2021-44533)
- Node.js did not handle multi-value Relative Distinguished Names
correctly. Attackers could craft certificate subjects containing a
single-value Relative Distinguished Name that would be interpreted as a
multi-value Relative Distinguished Name, for example, in order to inject
a Common Name that would allow bypassing the certificate subject
verification.
- Affected versions of Node.js do not accept multi-value Relative
Distinguished Names and are thus not vulnerable to such attacks
themselves. However, third-party code that uses node's ambiguous
presentation of certificate subjects may be vulnerable.
- More details will be available at
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-44533
Prototype pollution via `console.table` properties (Low)(CVE-2022-21824)
- Due to the formatting logic of the `console.table()` function it was
not safe to allow user controlled input to be passed to the `properties`
parameter while simultaneously passing a plain object with at least one
property as the first parameter, which could be `__proto__`. The
prototype pollution has very limited control, in that it only allows an
empty string to be assigned numerical keys of the object prototype.
- Versions of Node.js with the fix for this use a null protoype for the
object these properties are being assigned to.
- More details will be available at
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2022-21824
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs-private/node-private/pull/311
This is a security release.
Notable changes:
Improper handling of URI Subject Alternative Names (Medium)(CVE-2021-44531)
- Accepting arbitrary Subject Alternative Name (SAN) types, unless a PKI
is specifically defined to use a particular SAN type, can result in
bypassing name-constrained intermediates. Node.js was accepting URI SAN
types, which PKIs are often not defined to use. Additionally, when a
protocol allows URI SANs, Node.js did not match the URI correctly.
- Versions of Node.js with the fix for this disable the URI SAN type when
checking a certificate against a hostname. This behavior can be
reverted through the `--security-revert` command-line option.
- More details will be available at
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-44531
Certificate Verification Bypass via String Injection (Medium)(CVE-2021-44532)
- Node.js converts SANs (Subject Alternative Names) to a string format.
It uses this string to check peer certificates against hostnames when
validating connections. The string format was subject to an injection
vulnerability when name constraints were used within a certificate
chain, allowing the bypass of these name constraints.
- Versions of Node.js with the fix for this escape SANs containing the
problematic characters in order to prevent the injection. This
behavior can be reverted through the `--security-revert` command-line
option.
- More details will be available at
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-44532
Incorrect handling of certificate subject and issuer fields (Medium)(CVE-2021-44533)
- Node.js did not handle multi-value Relative Distinguished Names
correctly. Attackers could craft certificate subjects containing a
single-value Relative Distinguished Name that would be interpreted as a
multi-value Relative Distinguished Name, for example, in order to inject
a Common Name that would allow bypassing the certificate subject
verification.
- Affected versions of Node.js do not accept multi-value Relative
Distinguished Names and are thus not vulnerable to such attacks
themselves. However, third-party code that uses node's ambiguous
presentation of certificate subjects may be vulnerable.
- More details will be available at
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-44533
Prototype pollution via `console.table` properties (Low)(CVE-2022-21824)
- Due to the formatting logic of the `console.table()` function it was
not safe to allow user controlled input to be passed to the `properties`
parameter while simultaneously passing a plain object with at least one
property as the first parameter, which could be `__proto__`. The
prototype pollution has very limited control, in that it only allows an
empty string to be assigned numerical keys of the object prototype.
- Versions of Node.js with the fix for this use a null protoype for the
object these properties are being assigned to.
- More details will be available at
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2022-21824
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs-private/node-private/pull/312
This is a security release.
Notable changes:
Improper handling of URI Subject Alternative Names (Medium)(CVE-2021-44531)
- Accepting arbitrary Subject Alternative Name (SAN) types, unless a PKI
is specifically defined to use a particular SAN type, can result in
bypassing name-constrained intermediates. Node.js was accepting URI SAN
types, which PKIs are often not defined to use. Additionally, when a
protocol allows URI SANs, Node.js did not match the URI correctly.
- Versions of Node.js with the fix for this disable the URI SAN type when
checking a certificate against a hostname. This behavior can be
reverted through the `--security-revert` command-line option.
- More details will be available at
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-44531
Certificate Verification Bypass via String Injection (Medium)(CVE-2021-44532)
- Node.js converts SANs (Subject Alternative Names) to a string format.
It uses this string to check peer certificates against hostnames when
validating connections. The string format was subject to an injection
vulnerability when name constraints were used within a certificate
chain, allowing the bypass of these name constraints.
- Versions of Node.js with the fix for this escape SANs containing the
problematic characters in order to prevent the injection. This
behavior can be reverted through the `--security-revert` command-line
option.
- More details will be available at
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-44532
Incorrect handling of certificate subject and issuer fields (Medium)(CVE-2021-44533)
- Node.js did not handle multi-value Relative Distinguished Names
correctly. Attackers could craft certificate subjects containing a
single-value Relative Distinguished Name that would be interpreted as a
multi-value Relative Distinguished Name, for example, in order to inject
a Common Name that would allow bypassing the certificate subject
verification.
- Affected versions of Node.js do not accept multi-value Relative
Distinguished Names and are thus not vulnerable to such attacks
themselves. However, third-party code that uses node's ambiguous
presentation of certificate subjects may be vulnerable.
- More details will be available at
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-44533
Prototype pollution via `console.table` properties (Low)(CVE-2022-21824)
- Due to the formatting logic of the `console.table()` function it was
not safe to allow user controlled input to be passed to the `properties`
parameter while simultaneously passing a plain object with at least one
property as the first parameter, which could be `__proto__`. The
prototype pollution has very limited control, in that it only allows an
empty string to be assigned numerical keys of the object prototype.
- Versions of Node.js with the fix for this use a null protoype for the
object these properties are being assigned to.
- More details will be available at
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2022-21824
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs-private/node-private/pull/310
This is a security release.
Notable changes:
Improper handling of URI Subject Alternative Names (Medium)(CVE-2021-44531)
- Accepting arbitrary Subject Alternative Name (SAN) types, unless a PKI
is specifically defined to use a particular SAN type, can result in
bypassing name-constrained intermediates. Node.js was accepting URI SAN
types, which PKIs are often not defined to use. Additionally, when a
protocol allows URI SANs, Node.js did not match the URI correctly.
- Versions of Node.js with the fix for this disable the URI SAN type when
checking a certificate against a hostname. This behavior can be
reverted through the `--security-revert` command-line option.
- More details will be available at
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-44531
Certificate Verification Bypass via String Injection (Medium)(CVE-2021-44532)
- Node.js converts SANs (Subject Alternative Names) to a string format.
It uses this string to check peer certificates against hostnames when
validating connections. The string format was subject to an injection
vulnerability when name constraints were used within a certificate
chain, allowing the bypass of these name constraints.
- Versions of Node.js with the fix for this escape SANs containing the
problematic characters in order to prevent the injection. This
behavior can be reverted through the `--security-revert` command-line
option.
- More details will be available at
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-44532
Incorrect handling of certificate subject and issuer fields (Medium)(CVE-2021-44533)
- Node.js did not handle multi-value Relative Distinguished Names
correctly. Attackers could craft certificate subjects containing a
single-value Relative Distinguished Name that would be interpreted as a
multi-value Relative Distinguished Name, for example, in order to inject
a Common Name that would allow bypassing the certificate subject
verification.
- Affected versions of Node.js do not accept multi-value Relative
Distinguished Names and are thus not vulnerable to such attacks
themselves. However, third-party code that uses node's ambiguous
presentation of certificate subjects may be vulnerable.
- More details will be available at
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-44533
Prototype pollution via `console.table` properties (Low)(CVE-2022-21824)
- Due to the formatting logic of the `console.table()` function it was
not safe to allow user controlled input to be passed to the `properties`
parameter while simultaneously passing a plain object with at least one
property as the first parameter, which could be `__proto__`. The
prototype pollution has very limited control, in that it only allows an
empty string to be assigned numerical keys of the object prototype.
- Versions of Node.js with the fix for this use a null protoype for the
object these properties are being assigned to.
- More details will be available at
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2022-21824
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs-private/node-private/pull/309
Previously, Node.js incorrectly accepted uniformResourceIdentifier (URI)
subject alternative names in checkServerIdentity regardless of the
application protocol. This was incorrect even in the most common cases.
For example, RFC 2818 specifies (and RFC 6125 confirms) that HTTP over
TLS only uses dNSName and iPAddress subject alternative names, but not
uniformResourceIdentifier subject alternative names.
Additionally, name constrained certificate authorities might not be
constrained to specific URIs, allowing them to issue certificates for
URIs that specify hosts that they would not be allowed to issue dNSName
certificates for.
Even for application protocols that make use of URI subject alternative
names (such as SIP, see RFC 5922), Node.js did not implement the
required checks correctly, for example, because checkServerIdentity
ignores the URI scheme.
As a side effect, this also fixes an edge case. When a hostname is not
an IP address and no dNSName subject alternative name exists, the
subject's Common Name should be considered even when an iPAddress
subject alternative name exists.
It remains possible for users to pass a custom checkServerIdentity
function to the TLS implementation in order to implement custom identity
verification logic.
This addresses CVE-2021-44531.
CVE-ID: CVE-2021-44531
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs-private/node-private/pull/300
Reviewed-By: Michael Dawson <midawson@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Rich Trott <rtrott@gmail.com>
This change introduces JSON-compatible escaping rules for strings that
include X.509 GeneralName components (see RFC 5280). This non-standard
format avoids ambiguities and prevents injection attacks that could
previously lead to X.509 certificates being accepted even though they
were not valid for the target hostname.
These changes affect the format of subject alternative names and the
format of authority information access. The checkServerIdentity function
has been modified to safely handle the new format, eliminating the
possibility of injecting subject alternative names into the verification
logic.
Because each subject alternative name is only encoded as a JSON string
literal if necessary for security purposes, this change will only be
visible in rare cases.
This addresses CVE-2021-44532.
CVE-ID: CVE-2021-44532
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs-private/node-private/pull/300
Reviewed-By: Michael Dawson <midawson@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Rich Trott <rtrott@gmail.com>
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/41434
Reviewed-By: Guy Bedford <guybedford@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Mohammed Keyvanzadeh <mohammadkeyvanzade94@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Luigi Pinca <luigipinca@gmail.com>
* Remove link to ECMAScript specification because the term Abstract
Equality Comparison is no longer used there.
* Edit surprising-results material
* Other minor edits
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/41375
Reviewed-By: Benjamin Gruenbaum <benjamingr@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Antoine du Hamel <duhamelantoine1995@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Luigi Pinca <luigipinca@gmail.com>
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/41341
Reviewed-By: Colin Ihrig <cjihrig@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Antoine du Hamel <duhamelantoine1995@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Luigi Pinca <luigipinca@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Tobias Nießen <tniessen@tnie.de>
Reviewed-By: Franziska Hinkelmann <franziska.hinkelmann@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Harshitha K P <harshitha014@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Mohammed Keyvanzadeh <mohammadkeyvanzade94@gmail.com>