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			Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
		
			
				
	
	
		
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			163 lines
		
	
	
		
			6.0 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			ReStructuredText
		
	
	
	
	
	
| .. _secret data:
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| 
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| Providing secret data to QEMU
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| -----------------------------
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| 
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| There are a variety of objects in QEMU which require secret data to be provided
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| by the administrator or management application. For example, network block
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| devices often require a password, LUKS block devices require a passphrase to
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| unlock key material, remote desktop services require an access password.
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| QEMU has a general purpose mechanism for providing secret data to QEMU in a
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| secure manner, using the ``secret`` object type.
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| 
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| At startup this can be done using the ``-object secret,...`` command line
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| argument. At runtime this can be done using the ``object_add`` QMP / HMP
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| monitor commands. The examples that follow will illustrate use of ``-object``
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| command lines, but they all apply equivalentely in QMP / HMP. When creating
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| a ``secret`` object it must be given a unique ID string. This ID is then
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| used to identify the object when configuring the thing which need the data.
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| 
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| 
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| INSECURE: Passing secrets as clear text inline
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| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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| 
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| **The following should never be done in a production environment or on a
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| multi-user host. Command line arguments are usually visible in the process
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| listings and are often collected in log files by system monitoring agents
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| or bug reporting tools. QMP/HMP commands and their arguments are also often
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| logged and attached to bug reports. This all risks compromising secrets that
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| are passed inline.**
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| 
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| For the convenience of people debugging / developing with QEMU, it is possible
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| to pass secret data inline on the command line.
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| 
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| ::
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| 
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|    -object secret,id=secvnc0,data=87539319
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| 
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| 
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| Again it is possible to provide the data in base64 encoded format, which is
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| particularly useful if the data contains binary characters that would clash
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| with argument parsing.
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| 
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| ::
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| 
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|    -object secret,id=secvnc0,data=ODc1MzkzMTk=,format=base64
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| 
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| 
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| **Note: base64 encoding does not provide any security benefit.**
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| 
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| Passing secrets as clear text via a file
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| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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| 
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| The simplest approach to providing data securely is to use a file to store
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| the secret:
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| 
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| ::
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| 
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|    -object secret,id=secvnc0,file=vnc-password.txt
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| 
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| 
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| In this example the file ``vnc-password.txt`` contains the plain text secret
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| data. It is important to note that the contents of the file are treated as an
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| opaque blob. The entire raw file contents is used as the value, thus it is
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| important not to mistakenly add any trailing newline character in the file if
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| this newline is not intended to be part of the secret data.
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| 
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| In some cases it might be more convenient to pass the secret data in base64
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| format and have QEMU decode to get the raw bytes before use:
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| 
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| ::
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| 
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|    -object secret,id=sec0,file=vnc-password.txt,format=base64
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| 
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| 
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| The file should generally be given mode ``0600`` or ``0400`` permissions, and
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| have its user/group ownership set to the same account that the QEMU process
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| will be launched under. If using mandatory access control such as SELinux, then
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| the file should be labelled to only grant access to the specific QEMU process
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| that needs access. This will prevent other processes/users from compromising the
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| secret data.
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| 
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| 
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| Passing secrets as cipher text inline
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| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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| 
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| To address the insecurity of passing secrets inline as clear text, it is
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| possible to configure a second secret as an AES key to use for decrypting
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| the data.
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| 
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| The secret used as the AES key must always be configured using the file based
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| storage mechanism:
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| 
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| ::
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| 
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|    -object secret,id=secmaster,file=masterkey.data,format=base64
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| 
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| 
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| In this case the ``masterkey.data`` file would be initialized with 32
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| cryptographically secure random bytes, which are then base64 encoded.
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| The contents of this file will by used as an AES-256 key to encrypt the
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| real secret that can now be safely passed to QEMU inline as cipher text
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| 
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| ::
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| 
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|    -object secret,id=secvnc0,keyid=secmaster,data=BASE64-CIPHERTEXT,iv=BASE64-IV,format=base64
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| 
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| 
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| In this example ``BASE64-CIPHERTEXT`` is the result of AES-256-CBC encrypting
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| the secret with ``masterkey.data`` and then base64 encoding the ciphertext.
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| The ``BASE64-IV`` data is 16 random bytes which have been base64 encrypted.
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| These bytes are used as the initialization vector for the AES-256-CBC value.
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| 
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| A single master key can be used to encrypt all subsequent secrets, **but it is
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| critical that a different initialization vector is used for every secret**.
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| 
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| Passing secrets via the Linux keyring
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| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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| 
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| The earlier mechanisms described are platform agnostic. If using QEMU on a Linux
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| host, it is further possible to pass secrets to QEMU using the Linux keyring:
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| 
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| ::
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| 
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|    -object secret_keyring,id=secvnc0,serial=1729
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| 
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| 
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| This instructs QEMU to load data from the Linux keyring secret identified by
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| the serial number ``1729``. It is possible to combine use of the keyring with
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| other features mentioned earlier such as base64 encoding:
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| 
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| ::
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| 
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|    -object secret_keyring,id=secvnc0,serial=1729,format=base64
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| 
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| 
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| and also encryption with a master key:
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| 
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| ::
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| 
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|    -object secret_keyring,id=secvnc0,keyid=secmaster,serial=1729,iv=BASE64-IV
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| 
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| 
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| Best practice
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| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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| 
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| It is recommended for production deployments to use a master key secret, and
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| then pass all subsequent inline secrets encrypted with the master key.
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| 
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| Each QEMU instance must have a distinct master key, and that must be generated
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| from a cryptographically secure random data source. The master key should be
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| deleted immediately upon QEMU shutdown. If passing the master key as a file,
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| the key file must have access control rules applied that restrict access to
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| just the one QEMU process that is intended to use it. Alternatively the Linux
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| keyring can be used to pass the master key to QEMU.
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| 
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| The secrets for individual QEMU device backends must all then be encrypted
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| with this master key.
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| 
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| This procedure helps ensure that the individual secrets for QEMU backends will
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| not be compromised, even if ``-object`` CLI args or ``object_add`` monitor
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| commands are collected in log files and attached to public bug support tickets.
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| The only item that needs strongly protecting is the master key file.
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