/* * QEMU Confidential Guest support * This interface describes the common pieces between various * schemes for protecting guest memory or other state against a * compromised hypervisor. This includes memory encryption (AMD's * SEV and Intel's MKTME) or special protection modes (PEF on POWER, * or PV on s390x). * * Copyright Red Hat. * * Authors: * David Gibson * * This work is licensed under the terms of the GNU GPL, version 2 or * later. See the COPYING file in the top-level directory. * */ #ifndef QEMU_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT_H #define QEMU_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT_H #include "qom/object.h" #include "exec/hwaddr.h" #define TYPE_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT "confidential-guest-support" OBJECT_DECLARE_TYPE(ConfidentialGuestSupport, ConfidentialGuestSupportClass, CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT) typedef enum ConfidentialGuestPlatformType { CGS_PLATFORM_SEV, CGS_PLATFORM_SEV_ES, CGS_PLATFORM_SEV_SNP, } ConfidentialGuestPlatformType; typedef enum ConfidentialGuestMemoryType { CGS_MEM_RAM, CGS_MEM_RESERVED, CGS_MEM_ACPI, CGS_MEM_NVS, CGS_MEM_UNUSABLE, } ConfidentialGuestMemoryType; typedef struct ConfidentialGuestMemoryMapEntry { uint64_t gpa; uint64_t size; ConfidentialGuestMemoryType type; } ConfidentialGuestMemoryMapEntry; typedef enum ConfidentialGuestPageType { CGS_PAGE_TYPE_NORMAL, CGS_PAGE_TYPE_VMSA, CGS_PAGE_TYPE_ZERO, CGS_PAGE_TYPE_UNMEASURED, CGS_PAGE_TYPE_SECRETS, CGS_PAGE_TYPE_CPUID, CGS_PAGE_TYPE_REQUIRED_MEMORY, } ConfidentialGuestPageType; typedef enum ConfidentialGuestPolicyType { GUEST_POLICY_SEV, } ConfidentialGuestPolicyType; struct ConfidentialGuestSupport { Object parent; /* * True if the machine should use guest_memfd for RAM. */ bool require_guest_memfd; /* * ready: flag set by CGS initialization code once it's ready to * start executing instructions in a potentially-secure * guest * * The definition here is a bit fuzzy, because this is essentially * part of a self-sanity-check, rather than a strict mechanism. * * It's not feasible to have a single point in the common machine * init path to configure confidential guest support, because * different mechanisms have different interdependencies requiring * initialization in different places, often in arch or machine * type specific code. It's also usually not possible to check * for invalid configurations until that initialization code. * That means it would be very easy to have a bug allowing CGS * init to be bypassed entirely in certain configurations. * * Silently ignoring a requested security feature would be bad, so * to avoid that we check late in init that this 'ready' flag is * set if CGS was requested. If the CGS init hasn't happened, and * so 'ready' is not set, we'll abort. */ bool ready; }; typedef struct ConfidentialGuestSupportClass { ObjectClass parent; int (*kvm_init)(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp); int (*kvm_reset)(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp); /* * Check to see if this confidential guest supports a particular * platform or configuration. * * Return true if supported or false if not supported. */ bool (*check_support)(ConfidentialGuestPlatformType platform, uint16_t platform_version, uint8_t highest_vtl, uint64_t shared_gpa_boundary); /* * Configure part of the state of a guest for a particular set of data, page * type and gpa. This can be used for example to pre-populate and measure * guest memory contents, define private ranges or set the initial CPU state * for one or more CPUs. * * If memory_type is CGS_PAGE_TYPE_VMSA then ptr points to the initial CPU * context for a virtual CPU. The format of the data depends on the type of * confidential virtual machine. For example, for SEV-ES ptr will point to a * vmcb_save_area structure that should be copied into guest memory at the * address specified in gpa. The cpu_index parameter contains the index of * the CPU the VMSA applies to. */ int (*set_guest_state)(hwaddr gpa, uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len, ConfidentialGuestPageType memory_type, uint16_t cpu_index, Error **errp); /* * Set the guest policy. The policy can be used to configure the * confidential platform, such as if debug is enabled or not and can contain * information about expected launch measurements, signed verification of * guest configuration and other platform data. * * The format of the policy data is specific to each platform. For example, * SEV-SNP uses a policy bitfield in the 'policy' argument and provides an * ID block and ID authentication in the 'policy_data' parameters. The type * of policy data is identified by the 'policy_type' argument. */ int (*set_guest_policy)(ConfidentialGuestPolicyType policy_type, uint64_t policy, void *policy_data1, uint32_t policy_data1_size, void *policy_data2, uint32_t policy_data2_size, Error **errp); /* * Iterate the system memory map, getting the entry with the given index * that can be populated into guest memory. * * Returns 0 for ok, 1 if the index is out of range and -1 on error. */ int (*get_mem_map_entry)(int index, ConfidentialGuestMemoryMapEntry *entry, Error **errp); } ConfidentialGuestSupportClass; static inline int confidential_guest_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp) { ConfidentialGuestSupportClass *klass; klass = CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT_GET_CLASS(cgs); if (klass->kvm_init) { return klass->kvm_init(cgs, errp); } return 0; } static inline int confidential_guest_kvm_reset(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp) { ConfidentialGuestSupportClass *klass; klass = CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT_GET_CLASS(cgs); if (klass->kvm_reset) { return klass->kvm_reset(cgs, errp); } return 0; } #endif /* QEMU_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT_H */