For confidential guests a policy can be provided that defines the
security level, debug status, expected launch measurement and other
parameters that define the configuration of the confidential platform.
This commit adds a new function named set_guest_policy() that can be
implemented by each confidential platform, such as AMD SEV to set the
policy. This will allow configuration of the policy from a
multi-platform resource such as an IGVM file without the IGVM processor
requiring specific implementation details for each platform.
Signed-off-by: Roy Hopkins <roy.hopkins@randomman.co.uk>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ani Sinha <anisinha@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffman <kraxel@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/d3888a2eb170c8d8c85a1c4b7e99accf3a15589c.1751554099.git.roy.hopkins@randomman.co.uk
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
In preparation for supporting the processing of IGVM files to configure
guests, this adds a set of functions to ConfidentialGuestSupport
allowing configuration of secure virtual machines that can be
implemented for each supported isolation platform type such as Intel TDX
or AMD SEV-SNP. These functions will be called by IGVM processing code
in subsequent patches.
This commit provides a default implementation of the functions that
either perform no action or generate an error when they are called.
Targets that support ConfidentalGuestSupport should override these
implementations.
Signed-off-by: Roy Hopkins <roy.hopkins@randomman.co.uk>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffman <kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ani Sinha <anisinha@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/23e34a106da87427899f93178102e4a6ef50c966.1751554099.git.roy.hopkins@randomman.co.uk
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Mechanical change using gsed, then style manually adapted
to pass checkpatch.pl script.
Suggested-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20250424194905.82506-4-philmd@linaro.org>
"exec/confidential-guest-support.h" is specific to system
emulation, so move it under the system/ namespace.
Mechanical change doing:
$ sed -i \
-e 's,exec/confidential-guest-support.h,sysemu/confidential-guest-support.h,' \
$(git grep -l exec/confidential-guest-support.h)
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Zhao Liu <zhao1.liu@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20241218155913.72288-2-philmd@linaro.org>
Several architectures have mechanisms which are designed to protect
guest memory from interference or eavesdropping by a compromised
hypervisor. AMD SEV does this with in-chip memory encryption and
Intel's TDX can do similar things. POWER's Protected Execution
Framework (PEF) accomplishes a similar goal using an ultravisor and
new memory protection features, instead of encryption.
To (partially) unify handling for these, this introduces a new
ConfidentialGuestSupport QOM base class. "Confidential" is kind of vague,
but "confidential computing" seems to be the buzzword about these schemes,
and "secure" or "protected" are often used in connection to unrelated
things (such as hypervisor-from-guest or guest-from-guest security).
The "support" in the name is significant because in at least some of the
cases it requires the guest to take specific actions in order to protect
itself from hypervisor eavesdropping.
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
