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		1ea0d14e48
		
	
	
	
	
		
			
			The Intel Optimization Reference Guide says: In Intel Atom microarchitecture, the address generation unit assumes that the segment base will be 0 by default. Non-zero segment base will cause load and store operations to experience a delay. - If the segment base isn't aligned to a cache line boundary, the max throughput of memory operations is reduced to one [e]very 9 cycles. [...] Assembly/Compiler Coding Rule 15. (H impact, ML generality) For Intel Atom processors, use segments with base set to 0 whenever possible; avoid non-zero segment base address that is not aligned to cache line boundary at all cost. We can't avoid having a non-zero base for the stack-protector segment, but we can make it cache-aligned. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> LKML-Reference: <4AA01893.6000507@goop.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
		
			
				
	
	
		
			123 lines
		
	
	
		
			3.8 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			C
		
	
	
	
	
	
			
		
		
	
	
			123 lines
		
	
	
		
			3.8 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			C
		
	
	
	
	
	
| /*
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|  * GCC stack protector support.
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|  *
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|  * Stack protector works by putting predefined pattern at the start of
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|  * the stack frame and verifying that it hasn't been overwritten when
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|  * returning from the function.  The pattern is called stack canary
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|  * and unfortunately gcc requires it to be at a fixed offset from %gs.
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|  * On x86_64, the offset is 40 bytes and on x86_32 20 bytes.  x86_64
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|  * and x86_32 use segment registers differently and thus handles this
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|  * requirement differently.
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|  *
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|  * On x86_64, %gs is shared by percpu area and stack canary.  All
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|  * percpu symbols are zero based and %gs points to the base of percpu
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|  * area.  The first occupant of the percpu area is always
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|  * irq_stack_union which contains stack_canary at offset 40.  Userland
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|  * %gs is always saved and restored on kernel entry and exit using
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|  * swapgs, so stack protector doesn't add any complexity there.
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|  *
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|  * On x86_32, it's slightly more complicated.  As in x86_64, %gs is
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|  * used for userland TLS.  Unfortunately, some processors are much
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|  * slower at loading segment registers with different value when
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|  * entering and leaving the kernel, so the kernel uses %fs for percpu
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|  * area and manages %gs lazily so that %gs is switched only when
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|  * necessary, usually during task switch.
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|  *
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|  * As gcc requires the stack canary at %gs:20, %gs can't be managed
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|  * lazily if stack protector is enabled, so the kernel saves and
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|  * restores userland %gs on kernel entry and exit.  This behavior is
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|  * controlled by CONFIG_X86_32_LAZY_GS and accessors are defined in
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|  * system.h to hide the details.
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|  */
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| 
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| #ifndef _ASM_STACKPROTECTOR_H
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| #define _ASM_STACKPROTECTOR_H 1
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| 
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| #ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
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| 
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| #include <asm/tsc.h>
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| #include <asm/processor.h>
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| #include <asm/percpu.h>
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| #include <asm/system.h>
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| #include <asm/desc.h>
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| #include <linux/random.h>
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| 
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| /*
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|  * 24 byte read-only segment initializer for stack canary.  Linker
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|  * can't handle the address bit shifting.  Address will be set in
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|  * head_32 for boot CPU and setup_per_cpu_areas() for others.
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|  */
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| #define GDT_STACK_CANARY_INIT						\
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| 	[GDT_ENTRY_STACK_CANARY] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0x4090, 0, 0x18),
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| 
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| /*
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|  * Initialize the stackprotector canary value.
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|  *
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|  * NOTE: this must only be called from functions that never return,
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|  * and it must always be inlined.
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|  */
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| static __always_inline void boot_init_stack_canary(void)
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| {
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| 	u64 canary;
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| 	u64 tsc;
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| 
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| #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
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| 	BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(union irq_stack_union, stack_canary) != 40);
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| #endif
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| 	/*
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| 	 * We both use the random pool and the current TSC as a source
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| 	 * of randomness. The TSC only matters for very early init,
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| 	 * there it already has some randomness on most systems. Later
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| 	 * on during the bootup the random pool has true entropy too.
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| 	 */
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| 	get_random_bytes(&canary, sizeof(canary));
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| 	tsc = __native_read_tsc();
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| 	canary += tsc + (tsc << 32UL);
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| 
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| 	current->stack_canary = canary;
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| #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
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| 	percpu_write(irq_stack_union.stack_canary, canary);
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| #else
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| 	percpu_write(stack_canary.canary, canary);
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| #endif
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| }
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| 
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| static inline void setup_stack_canary_segment(int cpu)
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| {
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| #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
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| 	unsigned long canary = (unsigned long)&per_cpu(stack_canary, cpu);
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| 	struct desc_struct *gdt_table = get_cpu_gdt_table(cpu);
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| 	struct desc_struct desc;
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| 
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| 	desc = gdt_table[GDT_ENTRY_STACK_CANARY];
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| 	set_desc_base(&desc, canary);
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| 	write_gdt_entry(gdt_table, GDT_ENTRY_STACK_CANARY, &desc, DESCTYPE_S);
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| #endif
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| }
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| 
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| static inline void load_stack_canary_segment(void)
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| {
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| #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
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| 	asm("mov %0, %%gs" : : "r" (__KERNEL_STACK_CANARY) : "memory");
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| #endif
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| }
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| 
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| #else	/* CC_STACKPROTECTOR */
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| 
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| #define GDT_STACK_CANARY_INIT
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| 
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| /* dummy boot_init_stack_canary() is defined in linux/stackprotector.h */
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| 
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| static inline void setup_stack_canary_segment(int cpu)
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| { }
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| 
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| static inline void load_stack_canary_segment(void)
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| {
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| #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
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| 	asm volatile ("mov %0, %%gs" : : "r" (0));
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| #endif
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| }
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| 
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| #endif	/* CC_STACKPROTECTOR */
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| #endif	/* _ASM_STACKPROTECTOR_H */
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