mirror of
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/chenhuacai/linux-loongson
synced 2025-08-30 21:52:21 +00:00
loongarch-next
124 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Ondrej Mosnacek
|
b36995b860 |
lsm: fix default return value for inode_getsecctx
-EOPNOTSUPP is the return value that implements a "no-op" hook, not 0.
Without this fix having only the BPF LSM enabled (with no programs
attached) can cause uninitialized variable reads in
nfsd4_encode_fattr(), because the BPF hook returns 0 without touching
the 'ctxlen' variable and the corresponding 'contextlen' variable in
nfsd4_encode_fattr() remains uninitialized, yet being treated as valid
based on the 0 return value.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes:
|
||
|
Ondrej Mosnacek
|
866d648059 |
lsm: fix default return value for vm_enough_memory
1 is the return value that implements a "no-op" hook, not 0.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes:
|
||
|
Khadija Kamran
|
20a2aa4709 |
lsm: constify 'sb' parameter in security_sb_kern_mount()
The "sb_kern_mount" hook has implementation registered in SELinux. Looking at the function implementation we observe that the "sb" parameter is not changing. Mark the "sb" parameter of LSM hook security_sb_kern_mount() as "const" since it will not be changing in the LSM hook. Signed-off-by: Khadija Kamran <kamrankhadijadj@gmail.com> [PM: minor merge fuzzing due to other constification patches] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> |
||
|
Khadija Kamran
|
a721f7b8c3 |
lsm: constify 'bprm' parameter in security_bprm_committed_creds()
Three LSMs register the implementations for the 'bprm_committed_creds()' hook: AppArmor, SELinux and tomoyo. Looking at the function implementations we may observe that the 'bprm' parameter is not changing. Mark the 'bprm' parameter of LSM hook security_bprm_committed_creds() as 'const' since it will not be changing in the LSM hook. Signed-off-by: Khadija Kamran <kamrankhadijadj@gmail.com> [PM: minor merge fuzzing due to other constification patches] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> |
||
|
Khadija Kamran
|
64fc952614 |
lsm: constify 'bprm' parameter in security_bprm_committing_creds()
The 'bprm_committing_creds' hook has implementations registered in SELinux and Apparmor. Looking at the function implementations we observe that the 'bprm' parameter is not changing. Mark the 'bprm' parameter of LSM hook security_bprm_committing_creds() as 'const' since it will not be changing in the LSM hook. Signed-off-by: Khadija Kamran <kamrankhadijadj@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> |
||
|
Khadija Kamran
|
4a00c67306 |
lsm: constify 'file' parameter in security_bprm_creds_from_file()
The 'bprm_creds_from_file' hook has implementation registered in commoncap. Looking at the function implementation we observe that the 'file' parameter is not changing. Mark the 'file' parameter of LSM hook security_bprm_creds_from_file() as 'const' since it will not be changing in the LSM hook. Signed-off-by: Khadija Kamran <kamrankhadijadj@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> |
||
|
Khadija Kamran
|
25cc71d152 |
lsm: constify 'sb' parameter in security_quotactl()
SELinux registers the implementation for the "quotactl" hook. Looking at the function implementation we observe that the parameter "sb" is not changing. Mark the "sb" parameter of LSM hook security_quotactl() as "const" since it will not be changing in the LSM hook. Signed-off-by: Khadija Kamran <kamrankhadijadj@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> |
||
|
Linus Torvalds
|
1086eeac9c |
lsm/stable-6.6 PR 20230829
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQJIBAABCAAyFiEES0KozwfymdVUl37v6iDy2pc3iXMFAmTuKLcUHHBhdWxAcGF1 bC1tb29yZS5jb20ACgkQ6iDy2pc3iXM/Eg//cwaOu/ASS08Cz/tfXeKpzg9UpzbW uHqGtgdE9ZEvS71z+3dorOJVPEwPr+/yviq3FXYjYHFqvVhLZCvYM9rw+eNo/k4T I95UTchGUsMWwkw61YBDLythfXm2UL5nabjckO81i9UPtxUYOwF6xQMQXYyMcLL8 6fm1vnCvK5FBEXi2HSUWy3Eb3wdviGdHrL6h19Aeew+q8u33asWSxn9vmBSSFEzZ 492//Pgy0t3FA6paWXQRvoR+GvLgBXNOvHB68cAx9vS8Lq6mAwJJSCRrQtKGh2Gd YInr49f+TXOosD5Tm6ueWO4sr8RzQZ7nPyM+BLue4Yn2ZzdYgjwfHdkHWS1KeH5X qVqa9s6/QONvkSCzqHs/ne2qio1Q0/0uGgwOkx6N7oVWQWjE7iTYlADwM0CDJnd2 UD7AHTOgpc88x1T1eW599MZttSCznBTSFXv4waaS5/5NT9n8Db1TpTtCTedOc1x2 n+c+F5BHLy69vhSGCanvum/8i2gNoKVyYaHyaMsQxr5LRcLnvN6oOjWIv7jMKxe7 GavUAxU7M5rxPUH44vrrrI+XztKJOdpCz4S0xp+7pSSSGAK5KkmVVLXjzrlGO1WS 55ixxQWYTGK0KlWHp4Ofi6brE9a4ATKcd1XscPN+AtBYX2ufNHLskCZulu/lyrMx lAy9RRDe1hHWTvg= =dnm4 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20230829' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm Pull LSM updates from Paul Moore: - Add proper multi-LSM support for xattrs in the security_inode_init_security() hook Historically the LSM layer has only allowed a single LSM to add an xattr to an inode, with IMA/EVM measuring that and adding its own as well. As we work towards promoting IMA/EVM to a "proper LSM" instead of the special case that it is now, we need to better support the case of multiple LSMs each adding xattrs to an inode and after several attempts we now appear to have something that is working well. It is worth noting that in the process of making this change we uncovered a problem with Smack's SMACK64TRANSMUTE xattr which is also fixed in this pull request. - Additional LSM hook constification Two patches to constify parameters to security_capget() and security_binder_transfer_file(). While I generally don't make a special note of who submitted these patches, these were the work of an Outreachy intern, Khadija Kamran, and that makes me happy; hopefully it does the same for all of you reading this. - LSM hook comment header fixes One patch to add a missing hook comment header, one to fix a minor typo. - Remove an old, unused credential function declaration It wasn't clear to me who should pick this up, but it was trivial, obviously correct, and arguably the LSM layer has a vested interest in credentials so I merged it. Sadly I'm now noticing that despite my subject line cleanup I didn't cleanup the "unsued" misspelling, sigh * tag 'lsm-pr-20230829' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm: lsm: constify the 'file' parameter in security_binder_transfer_file() lsm: constify the 'target' parameter in security_capget() lsm: add comment block for security_sk_classify_flow LSM hook security: Fix ret values doc for security_inode_init_security() cred: remove unsued extern declaration change_create_files_as() evm: Support multiple LSMs providing an xattr evm: Align evm_inode_init_security() definition with LSM infrastructure smack: Set the SMACK64TRANSMUTE xattr in smack_inode_init_security() security: Allow all LSMs to provide xattrs for inode_init_security hook lsm: fix typo in security_file_lock() comment header |
||
|
Linus Torvalds
|
bd6c11bc43 |
Networking changes for 6.6.
Core
----
- Increase size limits for to-be-sent skb frag allocations. This
allows tun, tap devices and packet sockets to better cope with large
writes operations.
- Store netdevs in an xarray, to simplify iterating over netdevs.
- Refactor nexthop selection for multipath routes.
- Improve sched class lifetime handling.
- Add backup nexthop ID support for bridge.
- Implement drop reasons support in openvswitch.
- Several data races annotations and fixes.
- Constify the sk parameter of routing functions.
- Prepend kernel version to netconsole message.
Protocols
---------
- Implement support for TCP probing the peer being under memory
pressure.
- Remove hard coded limitation on IPv6 specific info placement
inside the socket struct.
- Get rid of sysctl_tcp_adv_win_scale and use an auto-estimated
per socket scaling factor.
- Scaling-up the IPv6 expired route GC via a separated list of
expiring routes.
- In-kernel support for the TLS alert protocol.
- Better support for UDP reuseport with connected sockets.
- Add NEXT-C-SID support for SRv6 End.X behavior, reducing the SR
header size.
- Get rid of additional ancillary per MPTCP connection struct socket.
- Implement support for BPF-based MPTCP packet schedulers.
- Format MPTCP subtests selftests results in TAP.
- Several new SMC 2.1 features including unique experimental options,
max connections per lgr negotiation, max links per lgr negotiation.
BPF
---
- Multi-buffer support in AF_XDP.
- Add multi uprobe BPF links for attaching multiple uprobes
and usdt probes, which is significantly faster and saves extra fds.
- Implement an fd-based tc BPF attach API (TCX) and BPF link support on
top of it.
- Add SO_REUSEPORT support for TC bpf_sk_assign.
- Support new instructions from cpu v4 to simplify the generated code and
feature completeness, for x86, arm64, riscv64.
- Support defragmenting IPv(4|6) packets in BPF.
- Teach verifier actual bounds of bpf_get_smp_processor_id()
and fix perf+libbpf issue related to custom section handling.
- Introduce bpf map element count and enable it for all program types.
- Add a BPF hook in sys_socket() to change the protocol ID
from IPPROTO_TCP to IPPROTO_MPTCP to cover migration for legacy.
- Introduce bpf_me_mcache_free_rcu() and fix OOM under stress.
- Add uprobe support for the bpf_get_func_ip helper.
- Check skb ownership against full socket.
- Support for up to 12 arguments in BPF trampoline.
- Extend link_info for kprobe_multi and perf_event links.
Netfilter
---------
- Speed-up process exit by aborting ruleset validation if a
fatal signal is pending.
- Allow NLA_POLICY_MASK to be used with BE16/BE32 types.
Driver API
----------
- Page pool optimizations, to improve data locality and cache usage.
- Introduce ndo_hwtstamp_get() and ndo_hwtstamp_set() to avoid the need
for raw ioctl() handling in drivers.
- Simplify genetlink dump operations (doit/dumpit) providing them
the common information already populated in struct genl_info.
- Extend and use the yaml devlink specs to [re]generate the split ops.
- Introduce devlink selective dumps, to allow SF filtering SF based on
handle and other attributes.
- Add yaml netlink spec for netlink-raw families, allow route, link and
address related queries via the ynl tool.
- Remove phylink legacy mode support.
- Support offload LED blinking to phy.
- Add devlink port function attributes for IPsec.
New hardware / drivers
----------------------
- Ethernet:
- Broadcom ASP 2.0 (72165) ethernet controller
- MediaTek MT7988 SoC
- Texas Instruments AM654 SoC
- Texas Instruments IEP driver
- Atheros qca8081 phy
- Marvell 88Q2110 phy
- NXP TJA1120 phy
- WiFi:
- MediaTek mt7981 support
- Can:
- Kvaser SmartFusion2 PCI Express devices
- Allwinner T113 controllers
- Texas Instruments tcan4552/4553 chips
- Bluetooth:
- Intel Gale Peak
- Qualcomm WCN3988 and WCN7850
- NXP AW693 and IW624
- Mediatek MT2925
Drivers
-------
- Ethernet NICs:
- nVidia/Mellanox:
- mlx5:
- support UDP encapsulation in packet offload mode
- IPsec packet offload support in eswitch mode
- improve aRFS observability by adding new set of counters
- extends MACsec offload support to cover RoCE traffic
- dynamic completion EQs
- mlx4:
- convert to use auxiliary bus instead of custom interface logic
- Intel
- ice:
- implement switchdev bridge offload, even for LAG interfaces
- implement SRIOV support for LAG interfaces
- igc:
- add support for multiple in-flight TX timestamps
- Broadcom:
- bnxt:
- use the unified RX page pool buffers for XDP and non-XDP
- use the NAPI skb allocation cache
- OcteonTX2:
- support Round Robin scheduling HTB offload
- TC flower offload support for SPI field
- Freescale:
- add XDP_TX feature support
- AMD:
- ionic: add support for PCI FLR event
- sfc:
- basic conntrack offload
- introduce eth, ipv4 and ipv6 pedit offloads
- ST Microelectronics:
- stmmac: maximze PTP timestamping resolution
- Virtual NICs:
- Microsoft vNIC:
- batch ringing RX queue doorbell on receiving packets
- add page pool for RX buffers
- Virtio vNIC:
- add per queue interrupt coalescing support
- Google vNIC:
- add queue-page-list mode support
- Ethernet high-speed switches:
- nVidia/Mellanox (mlxsw):
- add port range matching tc-flower offload
- permit enslavement to netdevices with uppers
- Ethernet embedded switches:
- Marvell (mv88e6xxx):
- convert to phylink_pcs
- Renesas:
- r8A779fx: add speed change support
- rzn1: enables vlan support
- Ethernet PHYs:
- convert mv88e6xxx to phylink_pcs
- WiFi:
- Qualcomm Wi-Fi 7 (ath12k):
- extremely High Throughput (EHT) PHY support
- RealTek (rtl8xxxu):
- enable AP mode for: RTL8192FU, RTL8710BU (RTL8188GU),
RTL8192EU and RTL8723BU
- RealTek (rtw89):
- Introduce Time Averaged SAR (TAS) support
- Connector:
- support for event filtering
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=9CsR
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'net-next-6.6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next
Pull networking updates from Paolo Abeni:
"Core:
- Increase size limits for to-be-sent skb frag allocations. This
allows tun, tap devices and packet sockets to better cope with
large writes operations
- Store netdevs in an xarray, to simplify iterating over netdevs
- Refactor nexthop selection for multipath routes
- Improve sched class lifetime handling
- Add backup nexthop ID support for bridge
- Implement drop reasons support in openvswitch
- Several data races annotations and fixes
- Constify the sk parameter of routing functions
- Prepend kernel version to netconsole message
Protocols:
- Implement support for TCP probing the peer being under memory
pressure
- Remove hard coded limitation on IPv6 specific info placement inside
the socket struct
- Get rid of sysctl_tcp_adv_win_scale and use an auto-estimated per
socket scaling factor
- Scaling-up the IPv6 expired route GC via a separated list of
expiring routes
- In-kernel support for the TLS alert protocol
- Better support for UDP reuseport with connected sockets
- Add NEXT-C-SID support for SRv6 End.X behavior, reducing the SR
header size
- Get rid of additional ancillary per MPTCP connection struct socket
- Implement support for BPF-based MPTCP packet schedulers
- Format MPTCP subtests selftests results in TAP
- Several new SMC 2.1 features including unique experimental options,
max connections per lgr negotiation, max links per lgr negotiation
BPF:
- Multi-buffer support in AF_XDP
- Add multi uprobe BPF links for attaching multiple uprobes and usdt
probes, which is significantly faster and saves extra fds
- Implement an fd-based tc BPF attach API (TCX) and BPF link support
on top of it
- Add SO_REUSEPORT support for TC bpf_sk_assign
- Support new instructions from cpu v4 to simplify the generated code
and feature completeness, for x86, arm64, riscv64
- Support defragmenting IPv(4|6) packets in BPF
- Teach verifier actual bounds of bpf_get_smp_processor_id() and fix
perf+libbpf issue related to custom section handling
- Introduce bpf map element count and enable it for all program types
- Add a BPF hook in sys_socket() to change the protocol ID from
IPPROTO_TCP to IPPROTO_MPTCP to cover migration for legacy
- Introduce bpf_me_mcache_free_rcu() and fix OOM under stress
- Add uprobe support for the bpf_get_func_ip helper
- Check skb ownership against full socket
- Support for up to 12 arguments in BPF trampoline
- Extend link_info for kprobe_multi and perf_event links
Netfilter:
- Speed-up process exit by aborting ruleset validation if a fatal
signal is pending
- Allow NLA_POLICY_MASK to be used with BE16/BE32 types
Driver API:
- Page pool optimizations, to improve data locality and cache usage
- Introduce ndo_hwtstamp_get() and ndo_hwtstamp_set() to avoid the
need for raw ioctl() handling in drivers
- Simplify genetlink dump operations (doit/dumpit) providing them the
common information already populated in struct genl_info
- Extend and use the yaml devlink specs to [re]generate the split ops
- Introduce devlink selective dumps, to allow SF filtering SF based
on handle and other attributes
- Add yaml netlink spec for netlink-raw families, allow route, link
and address related queries via the ynl tool
- Remove phylink legacy mode support
- Support offload LED blinking to phy
- Add devlink port function attributes for IPsec
New hardware / drivers:
- Ethernet:
- Broadcom ASP 2.0 (72165) ethernet controller
- MediaTek MT7988 SoC
- Texas Instruments AM654 SoC
- Texas Instruments IEP driver
- Atheros qca8081 phy
- Marvell 88Q2110 phy
- NXP TJA1120 phy
- WiFi:
- MediaTek mt7981 support
- Can:
- Kvaser SmartFusion2 PCI Express devices
- Allwinner T113 controllers
- Texas Instruments tcan4552/4553 chips
- Bluetooth:
- Intel Gale Peak
- Qualcomm WCN3988 and WCN7850
- NXP AW693 and IW624
- Mediatek MT2925
Drivers:
- Ethernet NICs:
- nVidia/Mellanox:
- mlx5:
- support UDP encapsulation in packet offload mode
- IPsec packet offload support in eswitch mode
- improve aRFS observability by adding new set of counters
- extends MACsec offload support to cover RoCE traffic
- dynamic completion EQs
- mlx4:
- convert to use auxiliary bus instead of custom interface
logic
- Intel
- ice:
- implement switchdev bridge offload, even for LAG
interfaces
- implement SRIOV support for LAG interfaces
- igc:
- add support for multiple in-flight TX timestamps
- Broadcom:
- bnxt:
- use the unified RX page pool buffers for XDP and non-XDP
- use the NAPI skb allocation cache
- OcteonTX2:
- support Round Robin scheduling HTB offload
- TC flower offload support for SPI field
- Freescale:
- add XDP_TX feature support
- AMD:
- ionic: add support for PCI FLR event
- sfc:
- basic conntrack offload
- introduce eth, ipv4 and ipv6 pedit offloads
- ST Microelectronics:
- stmmac: maximze PTP timestamping resolution
- Virtual NICs:
- Microsoft vNIC:
- batch ringing RX queue doorbell on receiving packets
- add page pool for RX buffers
- Virtio vNIC:
- add per queue interrupt coalescing support
- Google vNIC:
- add queue-page-list mode support
- Ethernet high-speed switches:
- nVidia/Mellanox (mlxsw):
- add port range matching tc-flower offload
- permit enslavement to netdevices with uppers
- Ethernet embedded switches:
- Marvell (mv88e6xxx):
- convert to phylink_pcs
- Renesas:
- r8A779fx: add speed change support
- rzn1: enables vlan support
- Ethernet PHYs:
- convert mv88e6xxx to phylink_pcs
- WiFi:
- Qualcomm Wi-Fi 7 (ath12k):
- extremely High Throughput (EHT) PHY support
- RealTek (rtl8xxxu):
- enable AP mode for: RTL8192FU, RTL8710BU (RTL8188GU),
RTL8192EU and RTL8723BU
- RealTek (rtw89):
- Introduce Time Averaged SAR (TAS) support
- Connector:
- support for event filtering"
* tag 'net-next-6.6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next: (1806 commits)
net: ethernet: mtk_wed: minor change in wed_{tx,rx}info_show
net: ethernet: mtk_wed: add some more info in wed_txinfo_show handler
net: stmmac: clarify difference between "interface" and "phy_interface"
r8152: add vendor/device ID pair for D-Link DUB-E250
devlink: move devlink_notify_register/unregister() to dev.c
devlink: move small_ops definition into netlink.c
devlink: move tracepoint definitions into core.c
devlink: push linecard related code into separate file
devlink: push rate related code into separate file
devlink: push trap related code into separate file
devlink: use tracepoint_enabled() helper
devlink: push region related code into separate file
devlink: push param related code into separate file
devlink: push resource related code into separate file
devlink: push dpipe related code into separate file
devlink: move and rename devlink_dpipe_send_and_alloc_skb() helper
devlink: push shared buffer related code into separate file
devlink: push port related code into separate file
devlink: push object register/unregister notifications into separate helpers
inet: fix IP_TRANSPARENT error handling
...
|
||
|
Khadija Kamran
|
8e4672d6f9 |
lsm: constify the 'file' parameter in security_binder_transfer_file()
SELinux registers the implementation for the "binder_transfer_file" hook. Looking at the function implementation we observe that the parameter "file" is not changing. Mark the "file" parameter of LSM hook security_binder_transfer_file() as "const" since it will not be changing in the LSM hook. Signed-off-by: Khadija Kamran <kamrankhadijadj@gmail.com> [PM: subject line whitespace fix] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> |
||
|
David Howells
|
d80a8f1b58 |
vfs, security: Fix automount superblock LSM init problem, preventing NFS sb sharing
When NFS superblocks are created by automounting, their LSM parameters
aren't set in the fs_context struct prior to sget_fc() being called,
leading to failure to match existing superblocks.
This bug leads to messages like the following appearing in dmesg when
fscache is enabled:
NFS: Cache volume key already in use (nfs,4.2,2,108,106a8c0,1,,,,100000,100000,2ee,3a98,1d4c,3a98,1)
Fix this by adding a new LSM hook to load fc->security for submount
creation.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/165962680944.3334508.6610023900349142034.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v1
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/165962729225.3357250.14350728846471527137.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v2
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/165970659095.2812394.6868894171102318796.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v3
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/166133579016.3678898.6283195019480567275.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v4
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/217595.1662033775@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v5
Fixes:
|
||
|
Khadija Kamran
|
6672efbb68 |
lsm: constify the 'target' parameter in security_capget()
Three LSMs register the implementations for the "capget" hook: AppArmor, SELinux, and the normal capability code. Looking at the function implementations we may observe that the first parameter "target" is not changing. Mark the first argument "target" of LSM hook security_capget() as "const" since it will not be changing in the LSM hook. cap_capget() LSM hook declaration exceeds the 80 characters per line limit. Split the function declaration to multiple lines to decrease the line length. Signed-off-by: Khadija Kamran <kamrankhadijadj@gmail.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> [PM: align the cap_capget() declaration, spelling fixes] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> |
||
|
Guillaume Nault
|
5b52ad34f9 |
security: Constify sk in the sk_getsecid hook.
The sk_getsecid hook shouldn't need to modify its socket argument. Make it const so that callers of security_sk_classify_flow() can use a const struct sock *. Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> |
||
|
Roberto Sassu
|
6bcdfd2cac |
security: Allow all LSMs to provide xattrs for inode_init_security hook
Currently, the LSM infrastructure supports only one LSM providing an xattr and EVM calculating the HMAC on that xattr, plus other inode metadata. Allow all LSMs to provide one or multiple xattrs, by extending the security blob reservation mechanism. Introduce the new lbs_xattr_count field of the lsm_blob_sizes structure, so that each LSM can specify how many xattrs it needs, and the LSM infrastructure knows how many xattr slots it should allocate. Modify the inode_init_security hook definition, by passing the full xattr array allocated in security_inode_init_security(), and the current number of xattr slots in that array filled by LSMs. The first parameter would allow EVM to access and calculate the HMAC on xattrs supplied by other LSMs, the second to not leave gaps in the xattr array, when an LSM requested but did not provide xattrs (e.g. if it is not initialized). Introduce lsm_get_xattr_slot(), which LSMs can call as many times as the number specified in the lbs_xattr_count field of the lsm_blob_sizes structure. During each call, lsm_get_xattr_slot() increments the number of filled xattrs, so that at the next invocation it returns the next xattr slot to fill. Cleanup security_inode_init_security(). Unify the !initxattrs and initxattrs case by simply not allocating the new_xattrs array in the former. Update the documentation to reflect the changes, and fix the description of the xattr name, as it is not allocated anymore. Adapt both SELinux and Smack to use the new definition of the inode_init_security hook, and to call lsm_get_xattr_slot() to obtain and fill the reserved slots in the xattr array. Move the xattr->name assignment after the xattr->value one, so that it is done only in case of successful memory allocation. Finally, change the default return value of the inode_init_security hook from zero to -EOPNOTSUPP, so that BPF LSM correctly follows the hook conventions. Reported-by: Nicolas Bouchinet <nicolas.bouchinet@clip-os.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/Y1FTSIo+1x+4X0LS@archlinux/ Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: minor comment and variable tweaks, approved by RS] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> |
||
|
Paolo Abeni
|
e3d9387f00 |
security, lsm: Introduce security_mptcp_add_subflow()
MPTCP can create subflows in kernel context, and later indirectly expose them to user-space, via the owning MPTCP socket. As discussed in the reported link, the above causes unexpected failures for server, MPTCP-enabled applications. Let's introduce a new LSM hook to allow the security module to relabel the subflow according to the owning user-space process, via the MPTCP socket owning the subflow. Note that the new hook requires both the MPTCP socket and the new subflow. This could allow future extensions, e.g. explicitly validating the MPTCP <-> subflow linkage. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/mptcp/CAHC9VhTNh-YwiyTds=P1e3rixEDqbRTFj22bpya=+qJqfcaMfg@mail.gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Acked-by: Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@tessares.net> Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@tessares.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> |
||
|
Paul Moore
|
b3816cf813 |
lsm: fix a badly named parameter in security_get_getsecurity()
There is no good reason for why the "_buffer" parameter needs an underscore, get rid of it. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> |
||
|
Christian Brauner
|
700b794052
|
fs: port acl to mnt_idmap
Convert to struct mnt_idmap.
Last cycle we merged the necessary infrastructure in
|
||
|
Christian Brauner
|
39f60c1cce
|
fs: port xattr to mnt_idmap
Convert to struct mnt_idmap.
Last cycle we merged the necessary infrastructure in
|
||
|
Christian Brauner
|
4609e1f18e
|
fs: port ->permission() to pass mnt_idmap
Convert to struct mnt_idmap.
Last cycle we merged the necessary infrastructure in
|
||
|
Linus Torvalds
|
c76ff350bd |
lsm/stable-6.2 PR 20221212
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQJIBAABCAAyFiEES0KozwfymdVUl37v6iDy2pc3iXMFAmOXmxkUHHBhdWxAcGF1 bC1tb29yZS5jb20ACgkQ6iDy2pc3iXMPXg//cxfYC8lRtVpuGNCZWDietSiHzpzu +qFntaTplvybJMQX0HfgNee5cTBZM+W5mp1BHRcZInvV5LRhyrVtgsxDBifutE4x LyUJAw5SkiPdRC+XLDIRLKiZCobFBLVs2zO+qibIqsyR60pFjU6WXBLbJfidXBFR yWudDbLU0YhQJCHdNHNqnHCgqrEculxn6q3QPvm/DX0xzBwkFHSSYBkGNvHW2ZTA lKNreEOwEk5DTLIKjP4bJ72ixp0xbshw5CXuxtwB/12/4h8QbWbJVQLlIeZrTLmp zQXQLJ3pCqKJ2OUCgMDK+wmkvLezd80BV3Due7KX0pT0YRDygoh5QEpZ5/8k8eG7 prxToh2gJWk2htfJF6kgMpAh9Jqewcke4BysbYVM/427OPZYwQqLDZDGOzbtT6pl FYF+adN9wwkAErnHnPlzYipUEpBWurbjtsV8KFWNERoZ4YmzfSPEisRqGIHDGRws bTyq/7qs5FXkb1zULELj8V+S2ULsmxPqsxJ63p9di54Uo9lHK0I+0IUtajGDdfze psAasa9DD/oH2PAbSmpQ5Xo9XyfHRXsVuz1twEmEA14ML0m4wHbNWVHaK0aaXVdG kJKSDSjMsiV+GiwNo7ISJ4pVdUpnMI/iZSghFfV28cJslNhJDeaREHaE/Wtn1/xF /bCVmEfS16UoJsQ= =klFk -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20221212' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm Pull lsm updates from Paul Moore: - Improve the error handling in the device cgroup such that memory allocation failures when updating the access policy do not potentially alter the policy. - Some minor fixes to reiserfs to ensure that it properly releases LSM-related xattr values. - Update the security_socket_getpeersec_stream() LSM hook to take sockptr_t values. Previously the net/BPF folks updated the getsockopt code in the network stack to leverage the sockptr_t type to make it easier to pass both kernel and __user pointers, but unfortunately when they did so they didn't convert the LSM hook. While there was/is no immediate risk by not converting the LSM hook, it seems like this is a mistake waiting to happen so this patch proactively does the LSM hook conversion. - Convert vfs_getxattr_alloc() to return an int instead of a ssize_t and cleanup the callers. Internally the function was never going to return anything larger than an int and the callers were doing some very odd things casting the return value; this patch fixes all that and helps bring a bit of sanity to vfs_getxattr_alloc() and its callers. - More verbose, and helpful, LSM debug output when the system is booted with "lsm.debug" on the command line. There are examples in the commit description, but the quick summary is that this patch provides better information about which LSMs are enabled and the ordering in which they are processed. - General comment and kernel-doc fixes and cleanups. * tag 'lsm-pr-20221212' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm: lsm: Fix description of fs_context_parse_param lsm: Add/fix return values in lsm_hooks.h and fix formatting lsm: Clarify documentation of vm_enough_memory hook reiserfs: Add missing calls to reiserfs_security_free() lsm,fs: fix vfs_getxattr_alloc() return type and caller error paths device_cgroup: Roll back to original exceptions after copy failure LSM: Better reporting of actual LSMs at boot lsm: make security_socket_getpeersec_stream() sockptr_t safe audit: Fix some kernel-doc warnings lsm: remove obsoleted comments for security hooks fs: edit a comment made in bad taste |
||
|
Linus Torvalds
|
299e2b1967 |
Landlock updates for v6.2-rc1
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iIYEABYIAC4WIQSVyBthFV4iTW/VU1/l49DojIL20gUCY5b27RAcbWljQGRpZ2lr b2QubmV0AAoJEOXj0OiMgvbSg9YA/0K10H+VsGt1+qqR4+w9SM7SFzbgszrV3Yw9 rwiPgaPVAP9rxXPr2bD2hAk7/Lv9LeJ2kfM9RzMErP1A6UsC5YVbDA== =mAG7 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'landlock-6.2-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux Pull landlock updates from Mickaël Salaün: "This adds file truncation support to Landlock, contributed by Günther Noack. As described by Günther [1], the goal of these patches is to work towards a more complete coverage of file system operations that are restrictable with Landlock. The known set of currently unsupported file system operations in Landlock is described at [2]. Out of the operations listed there, truncate is the only one that modifies file contents, so these patches should make it possible to prevent the direct modification of file contents with Landlock. The new LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE access right covers both the truncate(2) and ftruncate(2) families of syscalls, as well as open(2) with the O_TRUNC flag. This includes usages of creat() in the case where existing regular files are overwritten. Additionally, this introduces a new Landlock security blob associated with opened files, to track the available Landlock access rights at the time of opening the file. This is in line with Unix's general approach of checking the read and write permissions during open(), and associating this previously checked authorization with the opened file. An ongoing patch documents this use case [3]. In order to treat truncate(2) and ftruncate(2) calls differently in an LSM hook, we split apart the existing security_path_truncate hook into security_path_truncate (for truncation by path) and security_file_truncate (for truncation of previously opened files)" Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221018182216.301684-1-gnoack3000@gmail.com [1] Link: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v6.1/userspace-api/landlock.html#filesystem-flags [2] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221209193813.972012-1-mic@digikod.net [3] * tag 'landlock-6.2-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux: samples/landlock: Document best-effort approach for LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER landlock: Document Landlock's file truncation support samples/landlock: Extend sample tool to support LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE selftests/landlock: Test ftruncate on FDs created by memfd_create(2) selftests/landlock: Test FD passing from restricted to unrestricted processes selftests/landlock: Locally define __maybe_unused selftests/landlock: Test open() and ftruncate() in multiple scenarios selftests/landlock: Test file truncation support landlock: Support file truncation landlock: Document init_layer_masks() helper landlock: Refactor check_access_path_dual() into is_access_to_paths_allowed() security: Create file_truncate hook from path_truncate hook |
||
|
Paul Moore
|
b10b9c342f |
lsm: make security_socket_getpeersec_stream() sockptr_t safe
Commit
|
||
|
Christian Brauner
|
72b3897e78
|
security: add get, remove and set acl hook
The current way of setting and getting posix acls through the generic xattr interface is error prone and type unsafe. The vfs needs to interpret and fixup posix acls before storing or reporting it to userspace. Various hacks exist to make this work. The code is hard to understand and difficult to maintain in it's current form. Instead of making this work by hacking posix acls through xattr handlers we are building a dedicated posix acl api around the get and set inode operations. This removes a lot of hackiness and makes the codepaths easier to maintain. A lot of background can be found in [1]. So far posix acls were passed as a void blob to the security and integrity modules. Some of them like evm then proceed to interpret the void pointer and convert it into the kernel internal struct posix acl representation to perform their integrity checking magic. This is obviously pretty problematic as that requires knowledge that only the vfs is guaranteed to have and has lead to various bugs. Add a proper security hook for setting posix acls and pass down the posix acls in their appropriate vfs format instead of hacking it through a void pointer stored in the uapi format. In the next patches we implement the hooks for the few security modules that do actually have restrictions on posix acls. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220801145520.1532837-1-brauner@kernel.org [1] Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org> |
||
|
Günther Noack
|
3350607dc5
|
security: Create file_truncate hook from path_truncate hook
Like path_truncate, the file_truncate hook also restricts file truncation, but is called in the cases where truncation is attempted on an already-opened file. This is required in a subsequent commit to handle ftruncate() operations differently to truncate() operations. Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221018182216.301684-2-gnoack3000@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> |
||
|
Linus Torvalds
|
4c0ed7d8d6 |
whack-a-mole: constifying struct path *
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iHUEABYIAB0WIQQqUNBr3gm4hGXdBJlZ7Krx/gZQ6wUCYzxmRQAKCRBZ7Krx/gZQ 6+/kAQD2xyf+i4zOYVBr1NB3qBbhVS1zrni1NbC/kT3dJPgTvwEA7z7eqwnrN4zg scKFP8a3yPoaQBfs4do5PolhuSr2ngA= =NBI+ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'pull-path' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull vfs constification updates from Al Viro: "whack-a-mole: constifying struct path *" * tag 'pull-path' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: ecryptfs: constify path spufs: constify path nd_jump_link(): constify path audit_init_parent(): constify path __io_setxattr(): constify path do_proc_readlink(): constify path overlayfs: constify path fs/notify: constify path may_linkat(): constify path do_sys_name_to_handle(): constify path ->getprocattr(): attribute name is const char *, TYVM... |
||
|
Linus Torvalds
|
26b84401da |
lsm/stable-6.1 PR 20221003
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=VZl5
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20221003' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm
Pull LSM updates from Paul Moore:
"Seven patches for the LSM layer and we've got a mix of trivial and
significant patches. Highlights below, starting with the smaller bits
first so they don't get lost in the discussion of the larger items:
- Remove some redundant NULL pointer checks in the common LSM audit
code.
- Ratelimit the lockdown LSM's access denial messages.
With this change there is a chance that the last visible lockdown
message on the console is outdated/old, but it does help preserve
the initial series of lockdown denials that started the denial
message flood and my gut feeling is that these might be the more
valuable messages.
- Open userfaultfds as readonly instead of read/write.
While this code obviously lives outside the LSM, it does have a
noticeable impact on the LSMs with Ondrej explaining the situation
in the commit description. It is worth noting that this patch
languished on the VFS list for over a year without any comments
(objections or otherwise) so I took the liberty of pulling it into
the LSM tree after giving fair notice. It has been in linux-next
since the end of August without any noticeable problems.
- Add a LSM hook for user namespace creation, with implementations
for both the BPF LSM and SELinux.
Even though the changes are fairly small, this is the bulk of the
diffstat as we are also including BPF LSM selftests for the new
hook.
It's also the most contentious of the changes in this pull request
with Eric Biederman NACK'ing the LSM hook multiple times during its
development and discussion upstream. While I've never taken NACK's
lightly, I'm sending these patches to you because it is my belief
that they are of good quality, satisfy a long-standing need of
users and distros, and are in keeping with the existing nature of
the LSM layer and the Linux Kernel as a whole.
The patches in implement a LSM hook for user namespace creation
that allows for a granular approach, configurable at runtime, which
enables both monitoring and control of user namespaces. The general
consensus has been that this is far preferable to the other
solutions that have been adopted downstream including outright
removal from the kernel, disabling via system wide sysctls, or
various other out-of-tree mechanisms that users have been forced to
adopt since we haven't been able to provide them an upstream
solution for their requests. Eric has been steadfast in his
objections to this LSM hook, explaining that any restrictions on
the user namespace could have significant impact on userspace.
While there is the possibility of impacting userspace, it is
important to note that this solution only impacts userspace when it
is requested based on the runtime configuration supplied by the
distro/admin/user. Frederick (the pathset author), the LSM/security
community, and myself have tried to work with Eric during
development of this patchset to find a mutually acceptable
solution, but Eric's approach and unwillingness to engage in a
meaningful way have made this impossible. I have CC'd Eric directly
on this pull request so he has a chance to provide his side of the
story; there have been no objections outside of Eric's"
* tag 'lsm-pr-20221003' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm:
lockdown: ratelimit denial messages
userfaultfd: open userfaultfds with O_RDONLY
selinux: Implement userns_create hook
selftests/bpf: Add tests verifying bpf lsm userns_create hook
bpf-lsm: Make bpf_lsm_userns_create() sleepable
security, lsm: Introduce security_create_user_ns()
lsm: clean up redundant NULL pointer check
|
||
|
Al Viro
|
c8e477c649 |
->getprocattr(): attribute name is const char *, TYVM...
cast of ->d_name.name to char * is completely wrong - nothing is allowed to modify its contents. Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> |
||
|
Luis Chamberlain
|
2a58401240 |
lsm,io_uring: add LSM hooks for the new uring_cmd file op
io-uring cmd support was added through |
||
|
Frederick Lawler
|
7cd4c5c210 |
security, lsm: Introduce security_create_user_ns()
User namespaces are an effective tool to allow programs to run with
permission without requiring the need for a program to run as root. User
namespaces may also be used as a sandboxing technique. However, attackers
sometimes leverage user namespaces as an initial attack vector to perform
some exploit. [1,2,3]
While it is not the unprivileged user namespace functionality, which
causes the kernel to be exploitable, users/administrators might want to
more granularly limit or at least monitor how various processes use this
functionality, while vulnerable kernel subsystems are being patched.
Preventing user namespace already creation comes in a few of forms in
order of granularity:
1. /proc/sys/user/max_user_namespaces sysctl
2. Distro specific patch(es)
3. CONFIG_USER_NS
To block a task based on its attributes, the LSM hook cred_prepare is a
decent candidate for use because it provides more granular control, and
it is called before create_user_ns():
cred = prepare_creds()
security_prepare_creds()
call_int_hook(cred_prepare, ...
if (cred)
create_user_ns(cred)
Since security_prepare_creds() is meant for LSMs to copy and prepare
credentials, access control is an unintended use of the hook. [4]
Further, security_prepare_creds() will always return a ENOMEM if the
hook returns any non-zero error code.
This hook also does not handle the clone3 case which requires us to
access a user space pointer to know if we're in the CLONE_NEW_USER
call path which may be subject to a TOCTTOU attack.
Lastly, cred_prepare is called in many call paths, and a targeted hook
further limits the frequency of calls which is a beneficial outcome.
Therefore introduce a new function security_create_user_ns() with an
accompanying userns_create LSM hook.
With the new userns_create hook, users will have more control over the
observability and access control over user namespace creation. Users
should expect that normal operation of user namespaces will behave as
usual, and only be impacted when controls are implemented by users or
administrators.
This hook takes the prepared creds for LSM authors to write policy
against. On success, the new namespace is applied to credentials,
otherwise an error is returned.
Links:
1. https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-0492
2. https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-25636
3. https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-34918
4. https://lore.kernel.org/all/1c4b1c0d-12f6-6e9e-a6a3-cdce7418110c@schaufler-ca.com/
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Frederick Lawler <fred@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
||
|
Micah Morton
|
fcfe0ac2fc |
security: Add LSM hook to setgroups() syscall
Give the LSM framework the ability to filter setgroups() syscalls. There are already analagous hooks for the set*uid() and set*gid() syscalls. The SafeSetID LSM will use this new hook to ensure setgroups() calls are allowed by the installed security policy. Tested by putting print statement in security_task_fix_setgroups() hook and confirming that it gets hit when userspace does a setgroups() syscall. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org> |
||
|
Mickaël Salaün
|
100f59d964
|
LSM: Remove double path_rename hook calls for RENAME_EXCHANGE
In order to be able to identify a file exchange with renameat2(2) and RENAME_EXCHANGE, which will be useful for Landlock [1], propagate the rename flags to LSMs. This may also improve performance because of the switch from two set of LSM hook calls to only one, and because LSMs using this hook may optimize the double check (e.g. only one lock, reduce the number of path walks). AppArmor, Landlock and Tomoyo are updated to leverage this change. This should not change the current behavior (same check order), except (different level of) speed boosts. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220221212522.320243-1-mic@digikod.net Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506161102.525323-7-mic@digikod.net |
||
|
Linus Torvalds
|
c269497d24 |
selinux/stable-5.18 PR 20220321
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=5E1v
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20220321' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
"We've got a number of SELinux patches queued up, the highlights are:
- Fixup the security_fs_context_parse_param() LSM hook so it executes
all of the LSM hook implementations unless a serious error occurs.
We also correct the SELinux hook implementation so that it returns
zero on success.
- In addition to a few SELinux mount option parsing fixes, we
simplified the parsing by moving it earlier in the process.
The logic was that it was unlikely an admin/user would use the new
mount API and not have the policy loaded before passing the SELinux
options.
- Properly fixed the LSM/SELinux/SCTP hooks with the addition of the
security_sctp_assoc_established() hook.
This work was done in conjunction with the netdev folks and should
complete the move of the SCTP labeling from the endpoints to the
associations.
- Fixed a variety of sparse warnings caused by changes in the "__rcu"
markings of some core kernel structures.
- Ensure we access the superblock's LSM security blob using the
stacking-safe accessors.
- Added the ability for the kernel to always allow FIOCLEX and
FIONCLEX if the "ioctl_skip_cloexec" policy capability is
specified.
- Various constifications improvements, type casting improvements,
additional return value checks, and dead code/parameter removal.
- Documentation fixes"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20220321' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: (23 commits)
selinux: shorten the policy capability enum names
docs: fix 'make htmldocs' warning in SCTP.rst
selinux: allow FIOCLEX and FIONCLEX with policy capability
selinux: use correct type for context length
selinux: drop return statement at end of void functions
security: implement sctp_assoc_established hook in selinux
security: add sctp_assoc_established hook
selinux: parse contexts for mount options early
selinux: various sparse fixes
selinux: try to use preparsed sid before calling parse_sid()
selinux: Fix selinux_sb_mnt_opts_compat()
LSM: general protection fault in legacy_parse_param
selinux: fix a type cast problem in cred_init_security()
selinux: drop unused macro
selinux: simplify cred_init_security
selinux: do not discard const qualifier in cast
selinux: drop unused parameter of avtab_insert_node
selinux: drop cast to same type
selinux: enclose macro arguments in parenthesis
selinux: declare name parameter of hash_eval const
...
|
||
|
Ondrej Mosnacek
|
5e50f5d4ff |
security: add sctp_assoc_established hook
security_sctp_assoc_established() is added to replace
security_inet_conn_established() called in
sctp_sf_do_5_1E_ca(), so that asoc can be accessed in security
subsystem and save the peer secid to asoc->peer_secid.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Linus Torvalds
|
d1e7f0919e |
Fix NULL pointer crash in LSM via Ceph, from Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAABCAAdFiEEgycj0O+d1G2aycA8rZhLv9lQBTwFAmH0PXMACgkQrZhLv9lQ BTxbug/+KqeRDohriURz9Gj1nfUlPSNDEJaYQPMiaU4x73S75vawOVR2uOhk4sdJ hedTdM4fUhws0u36neMOmk1RApEe9njZrzeEg4tbFUMnc+sf63x2Nrk90QsgAW+Q nv8x4/wzdA5IjwtK8xU32AhP51SLgRMTHvDpj+ovlzLksjDZrORuSfZ0GGlqECfe I/s2QvX6yKrjV9RcouI+axDh1G/QQq2uPKiGD2uewUogWfEwkMg0TANcKwdAy0+f suBSgkcDPQRII8TuWH3ryJHBaQ9N6nwGxubfQjxyns/D6/peqFf6a2xQnkm6nDVI MYsdvOMR8sTr6F1H44oLtIocCDfhSfWvF173sffm/wsGuRbq9IiaOUxCiVjOHvo9 ArciFUXUE4gTg0R4SELlixHUbBeXuDeUh11t3PdAD8NJfy7AyjK1GeU6DcCMoTDr x4zAtUhPnBRlXPKAYP14YWTqtsQI3le/w4pjWtKkDiYLj/mtAxNWxrQWiGzkGPhm +kAK1evLUZaHskBx1URF7whcdUxbqMUaQRx0ZzVgx4//N2hRka3kQlNeqZztvoBG jlHWAsY3Vl8wKcr0xJvhN8HjkFFZJVO9OgFIOmuivgvW2V3Pm5gT9RPpZKQHmiZY IpDnLTH3hJxR96zW16UrLpFqoCJ2iR5lJShLO4BMBnby5c3pivQ= =dJXk -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'fixes-v5.17-lsm-ceph-null' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security sybsystem fix from James Morris: "Fix NULL pointer crash in LSM via Ceph, from Vivek Goyal" * tag 'fixes-v5.17-lsm-ceph-null' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: security, lsm: dentry_init_security() Handle multi LSM registration |
||
|
Vivek Goyal
|
7f5056b9e7 |
security, lsm: dentry_init_security() Handle multi LSM registration
A ceph user has reported that ceph is crashing with kernel NULL pointer dereference. Following is the backtrace. /proc/version: Linux version 5.16.2-arch1-1 (linux@archlinux) (gcc (GCC) 11.1.0, GNU ld (GNU Binutils) 2.36.1) #1 SMP PREEMPT Thu, 20 Jan 2022 16:18:29 +0000 distro / arch: Arch Linux / x86_64 SELinux is not enabled ceph cluster version: 16.2.7 (dd0603118f56ab514f133c8d2e3adfc983942503) relevant dmesg output: [ 30.947129] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 [ 30.947206] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 30.947258] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 30.947310] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 30.947342] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI [ 30.947388] CPU: 5 PID: 778 Comm: touch Not tainted 5.16.2-arch1-1 #1 86fbf2c313cc37a553d65deb81d98e9dcc2a3659 [ 30.947486] Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. B365M DS3H/B365M DS3H, BIOS F5 08/13/2019 [ 30.947569] RIP: 0010:strlen+0x0/0x20 [ 30.947616] Code: b6 07 38 d0 74 16 48 83 c7 01 84 c0 74 05 48 39 f7 75 ec 31 c0 31 d2 89 d6 89 d7 c3 48 89 f8 31 d2 89 d6 89 d7 c3 0 f 1f 40 00 <80> 3f 00 74 12 48 89 f8 48 83 c0 01 80 38 00 75 f7 48 29 f8 31 ff [ 30.947782] RSP: 0018:ffffa4ed80ffbbb8 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 30.947836] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffa4ed80ffbc60 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 30.947904] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 30.947971] RBP: ffff94b0d15c0ae0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 30.948040] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 30.948106] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffffa4ed80ffbc60 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 30.948174] FS: 00007fc7520f0740(0000) GS:ffff94b7ced40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 30.948252] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 30.948308] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000104a40001 CR4: 00000000003706e0 [ 30.948376] Call Trace: [ 30.948404] <TASK> [ 30.948431] ceph_security_init_secctx+0x7b/0x240 [ceph 49f9c4b9bf5be8760f19f1747e26da33920bce4b] [ 30.948582] ceph_atomic_open+0x51e/0x8a0 [ceph 49f9c4b9bf5be8760f19f1747e26da33920bce4b] [ 30.948708] ? get_cached_acl+0x4d/0xa0 [ 30.948759] path_openat+0x60d/0x1030 [ 30.948809] do_filp_open+0xa5/0x150 [ 30.948859] do_sys_openat2+0xc4/0x190 [ 30.948904] __x64_sys_openat+0x53/0xa0 [ 30.948948] do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x90 [ 30.948989] ? exc_page_fault+0x72/0x180 [ 30.949034] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 30.949091] RIP: 0033:0x7fc7521e25bb [ 30.950849] Code: 25 00 00 41 00 3d 00 00 41 00 74 4b 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 67 44 89 e2 48 89 ee bf 9c ff ff ff b8 01 01 0 0 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 0f 87 91 00 00 00 48 8b 54 24 28 64 48 2b 14 25 Core of the problem is that ceph checks for return code from security_dentry_init_security() and if return code is 0, it assumes everything is fine and continues to call strlen(name), which crashes. Typically SELinux LSM returns 0 and sets name to "security.selinux" and it is not a problem. Or if selinux is not compiled in or disabled, it returns -EOPNOTSUP and ceph deals with it. But somehow in this configuration, 0 is being returned and "name" is not being initialized and that's creating the problem. Our suspicion is that BPF LSM is registering a hook for dentry_init_security() and returns hook default of 0. LSM_HOOK(int, 0, dentry_init_security, struct dentry *dentry,...) I have not been able to reproduce it just by doing CONFIG_BPF_LSM=y. Stephen has tested the patch though and confirms it solves the problem for him. dentry_init_security() is written in such a way that it expects only one LSM to register the hook. Atleast that's the expectation with current code. If another LSM returns a hook and returns default, it will simply return 0 as of now and that will break ceph. Hence, suggestion is that change semantics of this hook a bit. If there are no LSMs or no LSM is taking ownership and initializing security context, then return -EOPNOTSUP. Also allow at max one LSM to initialize security context. This hook can't deal with multiple LSMs trying to init security context. This patch implements this new behavior. Reported-by: Stephen Muth <smuth4@gmail.com> Tested-by: Stephen Muth <smuth4@gmail.com> Suggested-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.16.0 Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> |
||
|
Ondrej Mosnacek
|
52f982f00b |
security,selinux: remove security_add_mnt_opt()
Its last user has been removed in commit
|
||
|
Paul Moore
|
6326948f94 |
lsm: security_task_getsecid_subj() -> security_current_getsecid_subj()
The security_task_getsecid_subj() LSM hook invites misuse by allowing callers to specify a task even though the hook is only safe when the current task is referenced. Fix this by removing the task_struct argument to the hook, requiring LSM implementations to use the current task. While we are changing the hook declaration we also rename the function to security_current_getsecid_subj() in an effort to reinforce that the hook captures the subjective credentials of the current task and not an arbitrary task on the system. Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> |
||
|
Paul Moore
|
32a370abf1 |
net,lsm,selinux: revert the security_sctp_assoc_established() hook
This patch reverts two prior patches, |
||
|
Xin Long
|
7c2ef0240e |
security: add sctp_assoc_established hook
security_sctp_assoc_established() is added to replace
security_inet_conn_established() called in
sctp_sf_do_5_1E_ca(), so that asoc can be accessed in security
subsystem and save the peer secid to asoc->peer_secid.
v1->v2:
- fix the return value of security_sctp_assoc_established() in
security.h, found by kernel test robot and Ondrej.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Xin Long
|
c081d53f97 |
security: pass asoc to sctp_assoc_request and sctp_sk_clone
This patch is to move secid and peer_secid from endpoint to association,
and pass asoc to sctp_assoc_request and sctp_sk_clone instead of ep. As
ep is the local endpoint and asoc represents a connection, and in SCTP
one sk/ep could have multiple asoc/connection, saving secid/peer_secid
for new asoc will overwrite the old asoc's.
Note that since asoc can be passed as NULL, security_sctp_assoc_request()
is moved to the place right after the new_asoc is created in
sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init() and sctp_sf_do_unexpected_init().
v1->v2:
- fix the description of selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(), as Jakub noticed.
- fix the annotation in selinux_sctp_assoc_request(), as Richard Noticed.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Vivek Goyal
|
15bf32398a |
security: Return xattr name from security_dentry_init_security()
Right now security_dentry_init_security() only supports single security label and is used by SELinux only. There are two users of this hook, namely ceph and nfs. NFS does not care about xattr name. Ceph hardcodes the xattr name to security.selinux (XATTR_NAME_SELINUX). I am making changes to fuse/virtiofs to send security label to virtiofsd and I need to send xattr name as well. I also hardcoded the name of xattr to security.selinux. Stephen Smalley suggested that it probably is a good idea to modify security_dentry_init_security() to also return name of xattr so that we can avoid this hardcoding in the callers. This patch adds a new parameter "const char **xattr_name" to security_dentry_init_security() and LSM puts the name of xattr too if caller asked for it (xattr_name != NULL). Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> [PM: fixed typos in the commit description] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> |
||
|
Todd Kjos
|
52f8869337 |
binder: use cred instead of task for selinux checks
Since binder was integrated with selinux, it has passed
'struct task_struct' associated with the binder_proc
to represent the source and target of transactions.
The conversion of task to SID was then done in the hook
implementations. It turns out that there are race conditions
which can result in an incorrect security context being used.
Fix by using the 'struct cred' saved during binder_open and pass
it to the selinux subsystem.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.14 (need backport for earlier stables)
Fixes:
|
||
|
Paul Moore
|
cdc1404a40 |
lsm,io_uring: add LSM hooks to io_uring
A full expalantion of io_uring is beyond the scope of this commit description, but in summary it is an asynchronous I/O mechanism which allows for I/O requests and the resulting data to be queued in memory mapped "rings" which are shared between the kernel and userspace. Optionally, io_uring offers the ability for applications to spawn kernel threads to dequeue I/O requests from the ring and submit the requests in the kernel, helping to minimize the syscall overhead. Rings are accessed in userspace by memory mapping a file descriptor provided by the io_uring_setup(2), and can be shared between applications as one might do with any open file descriptor. Finally, process credentials can be registered with a given ring and any process with access to that ring can submit I/O requests using any of the registered credentials. While the io_uring functionality is widely recognized as offering a vastly improved, and high performing asynchronous I/O mechanism, its ability to allow processes to submit I/O requests with credentials other than its own presents a challenge to LSMs. When a process creates a new io_uring ring the ring's credentials are inhertied from the calling process; if this ring is shared with another process operating with different credentials there is the potential to bypass the LSMs security policy. Similarly, registering credentials with a given ring allows any process with access to that ring to submit I/O requests with those credentials. In an effort to allow LSMs to apply security policy to io_uring I/O operations, this patch adds two new LSM hooks. These hooks, in conjunction with the LSM anonymous inode support previously submitted, allow an LSM to apply access control policy to the sharing of io_uring rings as well as any io_uring credential changes requested by a process. The new LSM hooks are described below: * int security_uring_override_creds(cred) Controls if the current task, executing an io_uring operation, is allowed to override it's credentials with @cred. In cases where the current task is a user application, the current credentials will be those of the user application. In cases where the current task is a kernel thread servicing io_uring requests the current credentials will be those of the io_uring ring (inherited from the process that created the ring). * int security_uring_sqpoll(void) Controls if the current task is allowed to create an io_uring polling thread (IORING_SETUP_SQPOLL). Without a SQPOLL thread in the kernel processes must submit I/O requests via io_uring_enter(2) which allows us to compare any requested credential changes against the application making the request. With a SQPOLL thread, we can no longer compare requested credential changes against the application making the request, the comparison is made against the ring's credentials. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> |
||
|
Zhongjun Tan
|
8a922805fb |
selinux: delete selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup() useless argument
seliunx_xfrm_policy_lookup() is hooks of security_xfrm_policy_lookup(). The dir argument is uselss in security_xfrm_policy_lookup(). So remove the dir argument from selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup() and security_xfrm_policy_lookup(). Signed-off-by: Zhongjun Tan <tanzhongjun@yulong.com> [PM: reformat the subject line] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> |
||
|
Linus Torvalds
|
17ae69aba8 |
Add Landlock, a new LSM from Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=uCN4
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'landlock_v34' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull Landlock LSM from James Morris:
"Add Landlock, a new LSM from Mickaël Salaün.
Briefly, Landlock provides for unprivileged application sandboxing.
From Mickaël's cover letter:
"The goal of Landlock is to enable to restrict ambient rights (e.g.
global filesystem access) for a set of processes. Because Landlock
is a stackable LSM [1], it makes possible to create safe security
sandboxes as new security layers in addition to the existing
system-wide access-controls. This kind of sandbox is expected to
help mitigate the security impact of bugs or unexpected/malicious
behaviors in user-space applications. Landlock empowers any
process, including unprivileged ones, to securely restrict
themselves.
Landlock is inspired by seccomp-bpf but instead of filtering
syscalls and their raw arguments, a Landlock rule can restrict the
use of kernel objects like file hierarchies, according to the
kernel semantic. Landlock also takes inspiration from other OS
sandbox mechanisms: XNU Sandbox, FreeBSD Capsicum or OpenBSD
Pledge/Unveil.
In this current form, Landlock misses some access-control features.
This enables to minimize this patch series and ease review. This
series still addresses multiple use cases, especially with the
combined use of seccomp-bpf: applications with built-in sandboxing,
init systems, security sandbox tools and security-oriented APIs [2]"
The cover letter and v34 posting is here:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20210422154123.13086-1-mic@digikod.net/
See also:
https://landlock.io/
This code has had extensive design discussion and review over several
years"
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/50db058a-7dde-441b-a7f9-f6837fe8b69f@schaufler-ca.com/ [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/f646e1c7-33cf-333f-070c-0a40ad0468cd@digikod.net/ [2]
* tag 'landlock_v34' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
landlock: Enable user space to infer supported features
landlock: Add user and kernel documentation
samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example
selftests/landlock: Add user space tests
landlock: Add syscall implementations
arch: Wire up Landlock syscalls
fs,security: Add sb_delete hook
landlock: Support filesystem access-control
LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock
landlock: Add ptrace restrictions
landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials
landlock: Add ruleset and domain management
landlock: Add object management
|
||
|
Mickaël Salaün
|
83e804f0bf |
fs,security: Add sb_delete hook
The sb_delete security hook is called when shutting down a superblock, which may be useful to release kernel objects tied to the superblock's lifetime (e.g. inodes). This new hook is needed by Landlock to release (ephemerally) tagged struct inodes. This comes from the unprivileged nature of Landlock described in the next commit. Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-7-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> |
||
|
Paul Moore
|
4ebd7651bf |
lsm: separate security_task_getsecid() into subjective and objective variants
Of the three LSMs that implement the security_task_getsecid() LSM hook, all three LSMs provide the task's objective security credentials. This turns out to be unfortunate as most of the hook's callers seem to expect the task's subjective credentials, although a small handful of callers do correctly expect the objective credentials. This patch is the first step towards fixing the problem: it splits the existing security_task_getsecid() hook into two variants, one for the subjective creds, one for the objective creds. void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid); void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid); While this patch does fix all of the callers to use the correct variant, in order to keep this patch focused on the callers and to ease review, the LSMs continue to use the same implementation for both hooks. The net effect is that this patch should not change the behavior of the kernel in any way, it will be up to the latter LSM specific patches in this series to change the hook implementations and return the correct credentials. Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> (IMA) Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> |
||
|
Olga Kornievskaia
|
69c4a42d72 |
lsm,selinux: add new hook to compare new mount to an existing mount
Add a new hook that takes an existing super block and a new mount with new options and determines if new options confict with an existing mount or not. A filesystem can use this new hook to determine if it can share the an existing superblock with a new superblock for the new mount. Signed-off-by: Olga Kornievskaia <kolga@netapp.com> Acked-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com> [PM: tweak the subject line, fix tab/space problems] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> |
||
|
Linus Torvalds
|
7d6beb71da |
idmapped-mounts-v5.12
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
iHUEABYKAB0WIQRAhzRXHqcMeLMyaSiRxhvAZXjcogUCYCegywAKCRCRxhvAZXjc
ouJ6AQDlf+7jCQlQdeKKoN9QDFfMzG1ooemat36EpRRTONaGuAD8D9A4sUsG4+5f
4IU5Lj9oY4DEmF8HenbWK2ZHsesL2Qg=
=yPaw
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'idmapped-mounts-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux
Pull idmapped mounts from Christian Brauner:
"This introduces idmapped mounts which has been in the making for some
time. Simply put, different mounts can expose the same file or
directory with different ownership. This initial implementation comes
with ports for fat, ext4 and with Christoph's port for xfs with more
filesystems being actively worked on by independent people and
maintainers.
Idmapping mounts handle a wide range of long standing use-cases. Here
are just a few:
- Idmapped mounts make it possible to easily share files between
multiple users or multiple machines especially in complex
scenarios. For example, idmapped mounts will be used in the
implementation of portable home directories in
systemd-homed.service(8) where they allow users to move their home
directory to an external storage device and use it on multiple
computers where they are assigned different uids and gids. This
effectively makes it possible to assign random uids and gids at
login time.
- It is possible to share files from the host with unprivileged
containers without having to change ownership permanently through
chown(2).
- It is possible to idmap a container's rootfs and without having to
mangle every file. For example, Chromebooks use it to share the
user's Download folder with their unprivileged containers in their
Linux subsystem.
- It is possible to share files between containers with
non-overlapping idmappings.
- Filesystem that lack a proper concept of ownership such as fat can
use idmapped mounts to implement discretionary access (DAC)
permission checking.
- They allow users to efficiently changing ownership on a per-mount
basis without having to (recursively) chown(2) all files. In
contrast to chown (2) changing ownership of large sets of files is
instantenous with idmapped mounts. This is especially useful when
ownership of a whole root filesystem of a virtual machine or
container is changed. With idmapped mounts a single syscall
mount_setattr syscall will be sufficient to change the ownership of
all files.
- Idmapped mounts always take the current ownership into account as
idmappings specify what a given uid or gid is supposed to be mapped
to. This contrasts with the chown(2) syscall which cannot by itself
take the current ownership of the files it changes into account. It
simply changes the ownership to the specified uid and gid. This is
especially problematic when recursively chown(2)ing a large set of
files which is commong with the aforementioned portable home
directory and container and vm scenario.
- Idmapped mounts allow to change ownership locally, restricting it
to specific mounts, and temporarily as the ownership changes only
apply as long as the mount exists.
Several userspace projects have either already put up patches and
pull-requests for this feature or will do so should you decide to pull
this:
- systemd: In a wide variety of scenarios but especially right away
in their implementation of portable home directories.
https://systemd.io/HOME_DIRECTORY/
- container runtimes: containerd, runC, LXD:To share data between
host and unprivileged containers, unprivileged and privileged
containers, etc. The pull request for idmapped mounts support in
containerd, the default Kubernetes runtime is already up for quite
a while now: https://github.com/containerd/containerd/pull/4734
- The virtio-fs developers and several users have expressed interest
in using this feature with virtual machines once virtio-fs is
ported.
- ChromeOS: Sharing host-directories with unprivileged containers.
I've tightly synced with all those projects and all of those listed
here have also expressed their need/desire for this feature on the
mailing list. For more info on how people use this there's a bunch of
talks about this too. Here's just two recent ones:
https://www.cncf.io/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Rootless-Containers-in-Gitpod.pdf
https://fosdem.org/2021/schedule/event/containers_idmap/
This comes with an extensive xfstests suite covering both ext4 and
xfs:
https://git.kernel.org/brauner/xfstests-dev/h/idmapped_mounts
It covers truncation, creation, opening, xattrs, vfscaps, setid
execution, setgid inheritance and more both with idmapped and
non-idmapped mounts. It already helped to discover an unrelated xfs
setgid inheritance bug which has since been fixed in mainline. It will
be sent for inclusion with the xfstests project should you decide to
merge this.
In order to support per-mount idmappings vfsmounts are marked with
user namespaces. The idmapping of the user namespace will be used to
map the ids of vfs objects when they are accessed through that mount.
By default all vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace.
The initial user namespace is used to indicate that a mount is not
idmapped. All operations behave as before and this is verified in the
testsuite.
Based on prior discussions we want to attach the whole user namespace
and not just a dedicated idmapping struct. This allows us to reuse all
the helpers that already exist for dealing with idmappings instead of
introducing a whole new range of helpers. In addition, if we decide in
the future that we are confident enough to enable unprivileged users
to setup idmapped mounts the permission checking can take into account
whether the caller is privileged in the user namespace the mount is
currently marked with.
The user namespace the mount will be marked with can be specified by
passing a file descriptor refering to the user namespace as an
argument to the new mount_setattr() syscall together with the new
MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP flag. The system call follows the openat2() pattern
of extensibility.
The following conditions must be met in order to create an idmapped
mount:
- The caller must currently have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in the
user namespace the underlying filesystem has been mounted in.
- The underlying filesystem must support idmapped mounts.
- The mount must not already be idmapped. This also implies that the
idmapping of a mount cannot be altered once it has been idmapped.
- The mount must be a detached/anonymous mount, i.e. it must have
been created by calling open_tree() with the OPEN_TREE_CLONE flag
and it must not already have been visible in the filesystem.
The last two points guarantee easier semantics for userspace and the
kernel and make the implementation significantly simpler.
By default vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace and no
behavioral or performance changes are observed.
The manpage with a detailed description can be found here:
|
||
|
Christian Brauner
|
71bc356f93
|
commoncap: handle idmapped mounts
When interacting with user namespace and non-user namespace aware filesystem capabilities the vfs will perform various security checks to determine whether or not the filesystem capabilities can be used by the caller, whether they need to be removed and so on. The main infrastructure for this resides in the capability codepaths but they are called through the LSM security infrastructure even though they are not technically an LSM or optional. This extends the existing security hooks security_inode_removexattr(), security_inode_killpriv(), security_inode_getsecurity() to pass down the mount's user namespace and makes them aware of idmapped mounts. In order to actually get filesystem capabilities from disk the capability infrastructure exposes the get_vfs_caps_from_disk() helper. For user namespace aware filesystem capabilities a root uid is stored alongside the capabilities. In order to determine whether the caller can make use of the filesystem capability or whether it needs to be ignored it is translated according to the superblock's user namespace. If it can be translated to uid 0 according to that id mapping the caller can use the filesystem capabilities stored on disk. If we are accessing the inode that holds the filesystem capabilities through an idmapped mount we map the root uid according to the mount's user namespace. Afterwards the checks are identical to non-idmapped mounts: reading filesystem caps from disk enforces that the root uid associated with the filesystem capability must have a mapping in the superblock's user namespace and that the caller is either in the same user namespace or is a descendant of the superblock's user namespace. For filesystems that are mountable inside user namespace the caller can just mount the filesystem and won't usually need to idmap it. If they do want to idmap it they can create an idmapped mount and mark it with a user namespace they created and which is thus a descendant of s_user_ns. For filesystems that are not mountable inside user namespaces the descendant rule is trivially true because the s_user_ns will be the initial user namespace. If the initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical behavior as before. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-11-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> |
||
|
Lokesh Gidra
|
215b674b84 |
security: add inode_init_security_anon() LSM hook
This change adds a new LSM hook, inode_init_security_anon(), that will be used while creating secure anonymous inodes. The hook allows/denies its creation and assigns a security context to the inode. The new hook accepts an optional context_inode parameter that callers can use to provide additional contextual information to security modules for granting/denying permission to create an anon-inode of the same type. This context_inode's security_context can also be used to initialize the newly created anon-inode's security_context. Signed-off-by: Lokesh Gidra <lokeshgidra@google.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> |
||
|
Linus Torvalds
|
ca5b877b6c |
selinux/stable-5.11 PR 20201214
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
iQJIBAABCAAyFiEES0KozwfymdVUl37v6iDy2pc3iXMFAl/YBtEUHHBhdWxAcGF1
bC1tb29yZS5jb20ACgkQ6iDy2pc3iXNnwA/9Ek8DG/1t8CEoJxpoRvwovQxNo+bi
0rCT9vqvx9PeCwoZi/0Vp6oKmpE1HADvbeB/+e00VrbLYnzE3oRY6VkpjoZRofKS
vc0/MzHSFxFUR1OTHwCefcXlPLK+bfitQbX5jEMeVyQCXNXXIrN7CnJf1LmCeLTR
kQBPlEN9lt7HyNVAi34FhOD/TQbWnFHgl2z5puffgri6cWnc+TALKMYytUZ+rYex
NYndDJW5b3g5kTat2eErn0FruxfzloGs0xMIiWb+z2i9kl41D+dkKPdAN7idqCSC
Jv0nJP/bDftzA0wOe9szmGaLQzu7YnCN5kiWcSspatZVnon42Cy/tp9tiuPGLRFU
XtelDfpyX6o3CLN0tX7LQEO+GYxPzvM6iaR2OrsChWPozUIIR3TLQg7jJN4bvNKl
TR6gCGZCoAeS5JLNGjzVKxT/oKQY+tCLLlYXQdQY6swNFi3EKmPr+K1D9lgm98fO
f3d1QmWiZZNmtxxoVogT0qoQYjkfgpnm3dVx813Vt+lwHlVpHGMEPpO27iD3/RYb
w2yWOJaGKwMD8iL0l+Cm6CPW0/nE5FFISQjWgC8b4Vgxlyan6+L9eViqGICkrUQ2
Edo0i1YFFZ4utHYkDf1VYBbJ+36KyCtdktgLAcbgnePiPB3E1XBsXTIIStSUIbVQ
iEbTkBlsCG4GIeU=
=6Cqb
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20201214' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
"While we have a small number of SELinux patches for v5.11, there are a
few changes worth highlighting:
- Change the LSM network hooks to pass flowi_common structs instead
of the parent flowi struct as the LSMs do not currently need the
full flowi struct and they do not have enough information to use it
safely (missing information on the address family).
This patch was discussed both with Herbert Xu (representing team
netdev) and James Morris (representing team
LSMs-other-than-SELinux).
- Fix how we handle errors in inode_doinit_with_dentry() so that we
attempt to properly label the inode on following lookups instead of
continuing to treat it as unlabeled.
- Tweak the kernel logic around allowx, auditallowx, and dontauditx
SELinux policy statements such that the auditx/dontauditx are
effective even without the allowx statement.
Everything passes our test suite"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20201214' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
lsm,selinux: pass flowi_common instead of flowi to the LSM hooks
selinux: Fix fall-through warnings for Clang
selinux: drop super_block backpointer from superblock_security_struct
selinux: fix inode_doinit_with_dentry() LABEL_INVALID error handling
selinux: allow dontauditx and auditallowx rules to take effect without allowx
selinux: fix error initialization in inode_doinit_with_dentry()
|
||
|
Florian Westphal
|
41dd9596d6 |
security: add const qualifier to struct sock in various places
A followup change to tcp_request_sock_op would have to drop the 'const' qualifier from the 'route_req' function as the 'security_inet_conn_request' call is moved there - and that function expects a 'struct sock *'. However, it turns out its also possible to add a const qualifier to security_inet_conn_request instead. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> |
||
|
Paul Moore
|
3df98d7921 |
lsm,selinux: pass flowi_common instead of flowi to the LSM hooks
As pointed out by Herbert in a recent related patch, the LSM hooks do not have the necessary address family information to use the flowi struct safely. As none of the LSMs currently use any of the protocol specific flowi information, replace the flowi pointers with pointers to the address family independent flowi_common struct. Reported-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> |
||
|
Nathan Chancellor
|
200da27ab3 |
LSM: Fix type of id parameter in kernel_post_load_data prototype
Clang warns:
security/security.c:1716:59: warning: implicit conversion from
enumeration type 'enum kernel_load_data_id' to different enumeration
type 'enum kernel_read_file_id' [-Wenum-conversion]
ret = call_int_hook(kernel_post_load_data, 0, buf, size, id,
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~
security/security.c:715:22: note: expanded from macro 'call_int_hook'
RC = P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__); \
~ ^~~~~~~~~~~
1 warning generated.
There is a mismatch between the id parameter type in
security_kernel_post_load_data and the function pointer prototype that
is created by the LSM_HOOK macro in the security_list_options union. Fix
the type in the LSM_HOOK macro as 'enum kernel_load_data_id' is what is
expected.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Kees Cook
|
2039bda1fa |
LSM: Add "contents" flag to kernel_read_file hook
As with the kernel_load_data LSM hook, add a "contents" flag to the kernel_read_file LSM hook that indicates whether the LSM can expect a matching call to the kernel_post_read_file LSM hook with the full contents of the file. With the coming addition of partial file read support for kernel_read_file*() API, the LSM will no longer be able to always see the entire contents of a file during the read calls. For cases where the LSM must read examine the complete file contents, it will need to do so on its own every time the kernel_read_file hook is called with contents=false (or reject such cases). Adjust all existing LSMs to retain existing behavior. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-12-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
||
|
Kees Cook
|
b64fcae74b |
LSM: Introduce kernel_post_load_data() hook
There are a few places in the kernel where LSMs would like to have visibility into the contents of a kernel buffer that has been loaded or read. While security_kernel_post_read_file() (which includes the buffer) exists as a pairing for security_kernel_read_file(), no such hook exists to pair with security_kernel_load_data(). Earlier proposals for just using security_kernel_post_read_file() with a NULL file argument were rejected (i.e. "file" should always be valid for the security_..._file hooks, but it appears at least one case was left in the kernel during earlier refactoring. (This will be fixed in a subsequent patch.) Since not all cases of security_kernel_load_data() can have a single contiguous buffer made available to the LSM hook (e.g. kexec image segments are separately loaded), there needs to be a way for the LSM to reason about its expectations of the hook coverage. In order to handle this, add a "contents" argument to the "kernel_load_data" hook that indicates if the newly added "kernel_post_load_data" hook will be called with the full contents once loaded. That way, LSMs requiring full contents can choose to unilaterally reject "kernel_load_data" with contents=false (which is effectively the existing hook coverage), but when contents=true they can allow it and later evaluate the "kernel_post_load_data" hook once the buffer is loaded. With this change, LSMs can gain coverage over non-file-backed data loads (e.g. init_module(2) and firmware userspace helper), which will happen in subsequent patches. Additionally prepare IMA to start processing these cases. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-9-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
||
|
Linus Torvalds
|
ce13266d97 |
Minor fixes for v5.9.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAABCAAdFiEEgycj0O+d1G2aycA8rZhLv9lQBTwFAl8xl0QACgkQrZhLv9lQ BTzEUA/+Muf7gha2mtxGJ49ZX/AsUOi/feHFDjt+NEA6lQTIaaqU5LxXNdtARu/5 j+RlJkrw8+3QGJ4h544HIJodbLZHghWpp15AxBAy+1BaeAoswEnrW2/6mD1iUBEH pFI0P2OjnVYxEPJGubLhp4qQ0lnqVKwzciNbBDLMydr6SerwoPDz9h0h5SMDoOxF m4f1/dsoXrpyp86GSvHDVa9NRs/GMKz/qIeC6DXuMRoqGX15EZVV1iABC7vPd2we 84IacCRIE/DO1M1rmbNBSpeErmvkxRo00Qjupl0XGf7D4aazxnQl+RpaLdHAtBI1 ubzU/76DCkaCO1x+3KPHyQUHZvXa3dt0/n4yEkOv01RIzivKZZz6jahsCrbX6lzX Dq4n0zg8sA7vh/T7aNX77z0FU1TuFBpiJ8dn/0vUgJPxDwt2V9F2k9jyV1pUeK1V yvSkIleIQmwmuT0p2nB/1g7yE5xkvWTM5WOy8/zIQj2aCvuo3ToY06Qc0rNOKTa8 6Qi/Byi/5S1bBwYQqrAyrd5GhPVdZ8oNZyaUu8Mpm+4P0+2CquvDfN3ZHUxwILNX /TMVTVMu1PQQIltWANA0L0BjGIjSGxutisEUQL7o24566GXA3wTQd8HoKRBc6h+p DGeVMehPG7GIwoCIvuzdahSRdzzI/iBG3P10TZ5u+3BwTL0OUNY= =s2Jw -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'for-v5.9' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: "A couple of minor documentation updates only for this release" * tag 'for-v5.9' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: LSM: drop duplicated words in header file comments Replace HTTP links with HTTPS ones: security |
||
|
Randy Dunlap
|
bb22d80b47 |
LSM: drop duplicated words in header file comments
Drop the doubled words "the" and "and" in comments. Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> |
||
|
KP Singh
|
23e390cdbe |
security: Fix hook iteration and default value for inode_copy_up_xattr
inode_copy_up_xattr returns 0 to indicate the acceptance of the xattr
and 1 to reject it. If the LSM does not know about the xattr, it's
expected to return -EOPNOTSUPP, which is the correct default value for
this hook. BPF LSM, currently, uses 0 as the default value and thereby
falsely allows all overlay fs xattributes to be copied up.
The iteration logic is also updated from the "bail-on-fail"
call_int_hook to continue on the non-decisive -EOPNOTSUPP and bail out
on other values.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Sami Tolvanen
|
4bc799dcb6 |
security: fix the key_permission LSM hook function type
Commit |
||
|
Linus Torvalds
|
4a87b197c1 |
Add additional LSM hooks for SafeSetID
SafeSetID is capable of making allow/deny decisions for set*uid calls on a system, and we want to add similar functionality for set*gid calls. The work to do that is not yet complete, so probably won't make it in for v5.8, but we are looking to get this simple patch in for v5.8 since we have it ready. We are planning on the rest of the work for extending the SafeSetID LSM being merged during the v5.9 merge window. This patch was sent to the security mailing list and there were no objections. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAABCgAdFiEEgvWslnM+qUy+sgVg5n2WYw6TPBAFAl7mZCoACgkQ5n2WYw6T PBAk1RAAl8t3/m3lELf8qIir4OAd4nK0kc4e+7W8WkznX2ljUl2IetlNxDCBmEXr T5qoW6uPsr6kl5AKnbl9Ii7WpW/halsslpKSUNQCs6zbecoVdxekJ8ISW7xHuboZ SvS1bqm+t++PM0c0nWSFEr7eXYmPH8OGbCqu6/+nnbxPZf2rJX03e5LnHkEFDFnZ 0D/rsKgzMt01pdBJQXeoKk79etHO5MjuAkkYVEKJKCR1fM16lk7ECaCp0KJv1Mmx I88VncbLvI+um4t82d1Z8qDr2iLgogjJrMZC4WKfxDTmlmxox2Fz9ZJo+8sIWk6k T3a95x0s/mYCO4gWtpCVICt9+71Z3ie9T2iaI+CIe/kJvI/ysb+7LSkF+PD33bdz 0yv6Y9+VMRdzb3pW69R28IoP4wdYQOJRomsY49z6ypH0RgBWcBvyE6e4v+WJGRNK E164Imevf6rrZeqJ0kGSBS1nL9WmQHMaXabAwxg1jK1KRZD+YZj3EKC9S/+PAkaT 1qXUgvGuXHGjQrwU0hclQjgc6BAudWfAGdfrVr7IWwNKJmjgBf6C35my/azrkOg9 wHCEpUWVmZZLIZLM69/6QXdmMA+iR+rPz5qlVnWhWTfjRYJUXM455Zk+aNo+Qnwi +saCcdU+9xqreLeDIoYoebcV/ctHeW0XCQi/+ebjexXVlyeSfYs= =I+0L -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'LSM-add-setgid-hook-5.8-author-fix' of git://github.com/micah-morton/linux Pull SafeSetID update from Micah Morton: "Add additional LSM hooks for SafeSetID SafeSetID is capable of making allow/deny decisions for set*uid calls on a system, and we want to add similar functionality for set*gid calls. The work to do that is not yet complete, so probably won't make it in for v5.8, but we are looking to get this simple patch in for v5.8 since we have it ready. We are planning on the rest of the work for extending the SafeSetID LSM being merged during the v5.9 merge window" * tag 'LSM-add-setgid-hook-5.8-author-fix' of git://github.com/micah-morton/linux: security: Add LSM hooks to set*gid syscalls |
||
|
Thomas Cedeno
|
39030e1351 |
security: Add LSM hooks to set*gid syscalls
The SafeSetID LSM uses the security_task_fix_setuid hook to filter set*uid() syscalls according to its configured security policy. In preparation for adding analagous support in the LSM for set*gid() syscalls, we add the requisite hook here. Tested by putting print statements in the security_task_fix_setgid hook and seeing them get hit during kernel boot. Signed-off-by: Thomas Cedeno <thomascedeno@google.com> Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org> |
||
|
Linus Torvalds
|
6c32978414 |
Notifications over pipes + Keyring notifications
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=YTGf
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'notifications-20200601' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs
Pull notification queue from David Howells:
"This adds a general notification queue concept and adds an event
source for keys/keyrings, such as linking and unlinking keys and
changing their attributes.
Thanks to Debarshi Ray, we do have a pull request to use this to fix a
problem with gnome-online-accounts - as mentioned last time:
https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gnome-online-accounts/merge_requests/47
Without this, g-o-a has to constantly poll a keyring-based kerberos
cache to find out if kinit has changed anything.
[ There are other notification pending: mount/sb fsinfo notifications
for libmount that Karel Zak and Ian Kent have been working on, and
Christian Brauner would like to use them in lxc, but let's see how
this one works first ]
LSM hooks are included:
- A set of hooks are provided that allow an LSM to rule on whether or
not a watch may be set. Each of these hooks takes a different
"watched object" parameter, so they're not really shareable. The
LSM should use current's credentials. [Wanted by SELinux & Smack]
- A hook is provided to allow an LSM to rule on whether or not a
particular message may be posted to a particular queue. This is
given the credentials from the event generator (which may be the
system) and the watch setter. [Wanted by Smack]
I've provided SELinux and Smack with implementations of some of these
hooks.
WHY
===
Key/keyring notifications are desirable because if you have your
kerberos tickets in a file/directory, your Gnome desktop will monitor
that using something like fanotify and tell you if your credentials
cache changes.
However, we also have the ability to cache your kerberos tickets in
the session, user or persistent keyring so that it isn't left around
on disk across a reboot or logout. Keyrings, however, cannot currently
be monitored asynchronously, so the desktop has to poll for it - not
so good on a laptop. This facility will allow the desktop to avoid the
need to poll.
DESIGN DECISIONS
================
- The notification queue is built on top of a standard pipe. Messages
are effectively spliced in. The pipe is opened with a special flag:
pipe2(fds, O_NOTIFICATION_PIPE);
The special flag has the same value as O_EXCL (which doesn't seem
like it will ever be applicable in this context)[?]. It is given up
front to make it a lot easier to prohibit splice&co from accessing
the pipe.
[?] Should this be done some other way? I'd rather not use up a new
O_* flag if I can avoid it - should I add a pipe3() system call
instead?
The pipe is then configured::
ioctl(fds[1], IOC_WATCH_QUEUE_SET_SIZE, queue_depth);
ioctl(fds[1], IOC_WATCH_QUEUE_SET_FILTER, &filter);
Messages are then read out of the pipe using read().
- It should be possible to allow write() to insert data into the
notification pipes too, but this is currently disabled as the
kernel has to be able to insert messages into the pipe *without*
holding pipe->mutex and the code to make this work needs careful
auditing.
- sendfile(), splice() and vmsplice() are disabled on notification
pipes because of the pipe->mutex issue and also because they
sometimes want to revert what they just did - but one or more
notification messages might've been interleaved in the ring.
- The kernel inserts messages with the wait queue spinlock held. This
means that pipe_read() and pipe_write() have to take the spinlock
to update the queue pointers.
- Records in the buffer are binary, typed and have a length so that
they can be of varying size.
This allows multiple heterogeneous sources to share a common
buffer; there are 16 million types available, of which I've used
just a few, so there is scope for others to be used. Tags may be
specified when a watchpoint is created to help distinguish the
sources.
- Records are filterable as types have up to 256 subtypes that can be
individually filtered. Other filtration is also available.
- Notification pipes don't interfere with each other; each may be
bound to a different set of watches. Any particular notification
will be copied to all the queues that are currently watching for it
- and only those that are watching for it.
- When recording a notification, the kernel will not sleep, but will
rather mark a queue as having lost a message if there's
insufficient space. read() will fabricate a loss notification
message at an appropriate point later.
- The notification pipe is created and then watchpoints are attached
to it, using one of:
keyctl_watch_key(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, fds[1], 0x01);
watch_mount(AT_FDCWD, "/", 0, fd, 0x02);
watch_sb(AT_FDCWD, "/mnt", 0, fd, 0x03);
where in both cases, fd indicates the queue and the number after is
a tag between 0 and 255.
- Watches are removed if either the notification pipe is destroyed or
the watched object is destroyed. In the latter case, a message will
be generated indicating the enforced watch removal.
Things I want to avoid:
- Introducing features that make the core VFS dependent on the
network stack or networking namespaces (ie. usage of netlink).
- Dumping all this stuff into dmesg and having a daemon that sits
there parsing the output and distributing it as this then puts the
responsibility for security into userspace and makes handling
namespaces tricky. Further, dmesg might not exist or might be
inaccessible inside a container.
- Letting users see events they shouldn't be able to see.
TESTING AND MANPAGES
====================
- The keyutils tree has a pipe-watch branch that has keyctl commands
for making use of notifications. Proposed manual pages can also be
found on this branch, though a couple of them really need to go to
the main manpages repository instead.
If the kernel supports the watching of keys, then running "make
test" on that branch will cause the testing infrastructure to spawn
a monitoring process on the side that monitors a notifications pipe
for all the key/keyring changes induced by the tests and they'll
all be checked off to make sure they happened.
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/keyutils.git/log/?h=pipe-watch
- A test program is provided (samples/watch_queue/watch_test) that
can be used to monitor for keyrings, mount and superblock events.
Information on the notifications is simply logged to stdout"
* tag 'notifications-20200601' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
smack: Implement the watch_key and post_notification hooks
selinux: Implement the watch_key security hook
keys: Make the KEY_NEED_* perms an enum rather than a mask
pipe: Add notification lossage handling
pipe: Allow buffers to be marked read-whole-or-error for notifications
Add sample notification program
watch_queue: Add a key/keyring notification facility
security: Add hooks to rule on setting a watch
pipe: Add general notification queue support
pipe: Add O_NOTIFICATION_PIPE
security: Add a hook for the point of notification insertion
uapi: General notification queue definitions
|
||
|
Linus Torvalds
|
15a2bc4dbb |
Merge branch 'exec-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull execve updates from Eric Biederman: "Last cycle for the Nth time I ran into bugs and quality of implementation issues related to exec that could not be easily be fixed because of the way exec is implemented. So I have been digging into exec and cleanup up what I can. I don't think I have exec sorted out enough to fix the issues I started with but I have made some headway this cycle with 4 sets of changes. - promised cleanups after introducing exec_update_mutex - trivial cleanups for exec - control flow simplifications - remove the recomputation of bprm->cred The net result is code that is a bit easier to understand and work with and a decrease in the number of lines of code (if you don't count the added tests)" * 'exec-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (24 commits) exec: Compute file based creds only once exec: Add a per bprm->file version of per_clear binfmt_elf_fdpic: fix execfd build regression selftests/exec: Add binfmt_script regression test exec: Remove recursion from search_binary_handler exec: Generic execfd support exec/binfmt_script: Don't modify bprm->buf and then return -ENOEXEC exec: Move the call of prepare_binprm into search_binary_handler exec: Allow load_misc_binary to call prepare_binprm unconditionally exec: Convert security_bprm_set_creds into security_bprm_repopulate_creds exec: Factor security_bprm_creds_for_exec out of security_bprm_set_creds exec: Teach prepare_exec_creds how exec treats uids & gids exec: Set the point of no return sooner exec: Move handling of the point of no return to the top level exec: Run sync_mm_rss before taking exec_update_mutex exec: Fix spelling of search_binary_handler in a comment exec: Move the comment from above de_thread to above unshare_sighand exec: Rename flush_old_exec begin_new_exec exec: Move most of setup_new_exec into flush_old_exec exec: In setup_new_exec cache current in the local variable me ... |
||
|
Eric W. Biederman
|
56305aa9b6 |
exec: Compute file based creds only once
Move the computation of creds from prepare_binfmt into begin_new_exec so that the creds need only be computed once. This is just code reorganization no semantic changes of any kind are made. Moving the computation is safe. I have looked through the kernel and verified none of the binfmts look at bprm->cred directly, and that there are no helpers that look at bprm->cred indirectly. Which means that it is not a problem to compute the bprm->cred later in the execution flow as it is not used until it becomes current->cred. A new function bprm_creds_from_file is added to contain the work that needs to be done. bprm_creds_from_file first computes which file bprm->executable or most likely bprm->file that the bprm->creds will be computed from. The funciton bprm_fill_uid is updated to receive the file instead of accessing bprm->file. The now unnecessary work needed to reset the bprm->cred->euid, and bprm->cred->egid is removed from brpm_fill_uid. A small comment to document that bprm_fill_uid now only deals with the work to handle suid and sgid files. The default case is already heandled by prepare_exec_creds. The function security_bprm_repopulate_creds is renamed security_bprm_creds_from_file and now is explicitly passed the file from which to compute the creds. The documentation of the bprm_creds_from_file security hook is updated to explain when the hook is called and what it needs to do. The file is passed from cap_bprm_creds_from_file into get_file_caps so that the caps are computed for the appropriate file. The now unnecessary work in cap_bprm_creds_from_file to reset the ambient capabilites has been removed. A small comment to document that the work of cap_bprm_creds_from_file is to read capabilities from the files secureity attribute and derive capabilities from the fact the user had uid 0 has been added. Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> |
||
|
Eric W. Biederman
|
112b714759 |
exec: Convert security_bprm_set_creds into security_bprm_repopulate_creds
Rename bprm->cap_elevated to bprm->active_secureexec and initialize it in prepare_binprm instead of in cap_bprm_set_creds. Initializing bprm->active_secureexec in prepare_binprm allows multiple implementations of security_bprm_repopulate_creds to play nicely with each other. Rename security_bprm_set_creds to security_bprm_reopulate_creds to emphasize that this path recomputes part of bprm->cred. This recomputation avoids the time of check vs time of use problems that are inherent in unix #! interpreters. In short two renames and a move in the location of initializing bprm->active_secureexec. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87o8qkzrxp.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> |
||
|
Eric W. Biederman
|
b8bff59926 |
exec: Factor security_bprm_creds_for_exec out of security_bprm_set_creds
Today security_bprm_set_creds has several implementations: apparmor_bprm_set_creds, cap_bprm_set_creds, selinux_bprm_set_creds, smack_bprm_set_creds, and tomoyo_bprm_set_creds. Except for cap_bprm_set_creds they all test bprm->called_set_creds and return immediately if it is true. The function cap_bprm_set_creds ignores bprm->calld_sed_creds entirely. Create a new LSM hook security_bprm_creds_for_exec that is called just before prepare_binprm in __do_execve_file, resulting in a LSM hook that is called exactly once for the entire of exec. Modify the bits of security_bprm_set_creds that only want to be called once per exec into security_bprm_creds_for_exec, leaving only cap_bprm_set_creds behind. Remove bprm->called_set_creds all of it's former users have been moved to security_bprm_creds_for_exec. Add or upate comments a appropriate to bring them up to date and to reflect this change. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87v9kszrzh.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> # For the LSM and Smack bits Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> |
||
|
David Howells
|
998f50407f |
security: Add hooks to rule on setting a watch
Add security hooks that will allow an LSM to rule on whether or not a watch may be set. More than one hook is required as the watches watch different types of object. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org |
||
|
David Howells
|
344fa64ef8 |
security: Add a hook for the point of notification insertion
Add a security hook that allows an LSM to rule on whether a notification
message is allowed to be inserted into a particular watch queue.
The hook is given the following information:
(1) The credentials of the triggerer (which may be init_cred for a system
notification, eg. a hardware error).
(2) The credentials of the whoever set the watch.
(3) The notification message.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
|
||
|
Linus Torvalds
|
f85c1598dd |
Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net
Pull networking fixes from David Miller:
1) Fix sk_psock reference count leak on receive, from Xiyu Yang.
2) CONFIG_HNS should be invisible, from Geert Uytterhoeven.
3) Don't allow locking route MTUs in ipv6, RFCs actually forbid this,
from Maciej Żenczykowski.
4) ipv4 route redirect backoff wasn't actually enforced, from Paolo
Abeni.
5) Fix netprio cgroup v2 leak, from Zefan Li.
6) Fix infinite loop on rmmod in conntrack, from Florian Westphal.
7) Fix tcp SO_RCVLOWAT hangs, from Eric Dumazet.
8) Various bpf probe handling fixes, from Daniel Borkmann.
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net: (68 commits)
selftests: mptcp: pm: rm the right tmp file
dpaa2-eth: properly handle buffer size restrictions
bpf: Restrict bpf_trace_printk()'s %s usage and add %pks, %pus specifier
bpf: Add bpf_probe_read_{user, kernel}_str() to do_refine_retval_range
bpf: Restrict bpf_probe_read{, str}() only to archs where they work
MAINTAINERS: Mark networking drivers as Maintained.
ipmr: Add lockdep expression to ipmr_for_each_table macro
ipmr: Fix RCU list debugging warning
drivers: net: hamradio: Fix suspicious RCU usage warning in bpqether.c
net: phy: broadcom: fix BCM54XX_SHD_SCR3_TRDDAPD value for BCM54810
tcp: fix error recovery in tcp_zerocopy_receive()
MAINTAINERS: Add Jakub to networking drivers.
MAINTAINERS: another add of Karsten Graul for S390 networking
drivers: ipa: fix typos for ipa_smp2p structure doc
pppoe: only process PADT targeted at local interfaces
selftests/bpf: Enforce returning 0 for fentry/fexit programs
bpf: Enforce returning 0 for fentry/fexit progs
net: stmmac: fix num_por initialization
security: Fix the default value of secid_to_secctx hook
libbpf: Fix register naming in PT_REGS s390 macros
...
|
||
|
Anders Roxell
|
625236ba38 |
security: Fix the default value of secid_to_secctx hook
security_secid_to_secctx is called by the bpf_lsm hook and a successful
return value (i.e 0) implies that the parameter will be consumed by the
LSM framework. The current behaviour return success when the pointer
isn't initialized when CONFIG_BPF_LSM is enabled, with the default
return from kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c.
This is the internal error:
[ 1229.341488][ T2659] usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from null address (offset 0, size 280)!
[ 1229.374977][ T2659] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 1229.376813][ T2659] kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:99!
[ 1229.378398][ T2659] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[ 1229.380348][ T2659] Modules linked in:
[ 1229.381654][ T2659] CPU: 0 PID: 2659 Comm: systemd-journal Tainted: G B W 5.7.0-rc5-next-20200511-00019-g864e0c6319b8-dirty #13
[ 1229.385429][ T2659] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
[ 1229.387143][ T2659] pstate: 80400005 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO BTYPE=--)
[ 1229.389165][ T2659] pc : usercopy_abort+0xc8/0xcc
[ 1229.390705][ T2659] lr : usercopy_abort+0xc8/0xcc
[ 1229.392225][ T2659] sp : ffff000064247450
[ 1229.393533][ T2659] x29: ffff000064247460 x28: 0000000000000000
[ 1229.395449][ T2659] x27: 0000000000000118 x26: 0000000000000000
[ 1229.397384][ T2659] x25: ffffa000127049e0 x24: ffffa000127049e0
[ 1229.399306][ T2659] x23: ffffa000127048e0 x22: ffffa000127048a0
[ 1229.401241][ T2659] x21: ffffa00012704b80 x20: ffffa000127049e0
[ 1229.403163][ T2659] x19: ffffa00012704820 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 1229.405094][ T2659] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 1229.407008][ T2659] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 003d090000000000
[ 1229.408942][ T2659] x13: ffff80000d5b25b2 x12: 1fffe0000d5b25b1
[ 1229.410859][ T2659] x11: 1fffe0000d5b25b1 x10: ffff80000d5b25b1
[ 1229.412791][ T2659] x9 : ffffa0001034bee0 x8 : ffff00006ad92d8f
[ 1229.414707][ T2659] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffffa00015eacb20
[ 1229.416642][ T2659] x5 : ffff0000693c8040 x4 : 0000000000000000
[ 1229.418558][ T2659] x3 : ffffa0001034befc x2 : d57a7483a01c6300
[ 1229.420610][ T2659] x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000059
[ 1229.422526][ T2659] Call trace:
[ 1229.423631][ T2659] usercopy_abort+0xc8/0xcc
[ 1229.425091][ T2659] __check_object_size+0xdc/0x7d4
[ 1229.426729][ T2659] put_cmsg+0xa30/0xa90
[ 1229.428132][ T2659] unix_dgram_recvmsg+0x80c/0x930
[ 1229.429731][ T2659] sock_recvmsg+0x9c/0xc0
[ 1229.431123][ T2659] ____sys_recvmsg+0x1cc/0x5f8
[ 1229.432663][ T2659] ___sys_recvmsg+0x100/0x160
[ 1229.434151][ T2659] __sys_recvmsg+0x110/0x1a8
[ 1229.435623][ T2659] __arm64_sys_recvmsg+0x58/0x70
[ 1229.437218][ T2659] el0_svc_common.constprop.1+0x29c/0x340
[ 1229.438994][ T2659] do_el0_svc+0xe8/0x108
[ 1229.440587][ T2659] el0_svc+0x74/0x88
[ 1229.441917][ T2659] el0_sync_handler+0xe4/0x8b4
[ 1229.443464][ T2659] el0_sync+0x17c/0x180
[ 1229.444920][ T2659] Code: aa1703e2 aa1603e1 910a8260 97ecc860 (d4210000)
[ 1229.447070][ T2659] ---[ end trace 400497d91baeaf51 ]---
[ 1229.448791][ T2659] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
[ 1229.450692][ T2659] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 1229.452061][ T2659] CPU features: 0x240002,20002004
[ 1229.453647][ T2659] Memory Limit: none
[ 1229.455015][ T2659] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception ]---
Rework the so the default return value is -EOPNOTSUPP.
There are likely other callbacks such as security_inode_getsecctx() that
may have the same problem, and that someone that understand the code
better needs to audit them.
Thank you Arnd for helping me figure out what went wrong.
Fixes:
|
||
|
KP Singh
|
54261af473 |
security: Fix the default value of fs_context_parse_param hook
security_fs_context_parse_param is called by vfs_parse_fs_param and
a succussful return value (i.e 0) implies that a parameter will be
consumed by the LSM framework. This stops all further parsing of the
parmeter by VFS. Furthermore, if an LSM hook returns a success, the
remaining LSM hooks are not invoked for the parameter.
The current default behavior of returning success means that all the
parameters are expected to be parsed by the LSM hook and none of them
end up being populated by vfs in fs_context
This was noticed when lsm=bpf is supplied on the command line before any
other LSM. As the bpf lsm uses this default value to implement a default
hook, this resulted in a failure to parse any fs_context parameters and
a failure to mount the root filesystem.
Fixes:
|
||
|
KP Singh
|
98e828a065 |
security: Refactor declaration of LSM hooks
The information about the different types of LSM hooks is scattered in two locations i.e. union security_list_options and struct security_hook_heads. Rather than duplicating this information even further for BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM, define all the hooks with the LSM_HOOK macro in lsm_hook_defs.h which is then used to generate all the data structures required by the LSM framework. The LSM hooks are defined as: LSM_HOOK(<return_type>, <default_value>, <hook_name>, args...) with <default_value> acccessible in security.c as: LSM_RET_DEFAULT(<hook_name>) Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com> Reviewed-by: Florent Revest <revest@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200329004356.27286-3-kpsingh@chromium.org |