mirror of
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/chenhuacai/linux-loongson
synced 2025-08-31 22:23:05 +00:00
loongarch-next
436 Commits
Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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2504ba8b01 |
Power management updates for 6.3-rc1
- Add EPP support to the AMD P-state cpufreq driver (Perry Yuan, Wyes Karny, Arnd Bergmann, Bagas Sanjaya). - Drop the custom cpufreq driver for loongson1 that is not necessary any more and the corresponding cpufreq platform device (Keguang Zhang). - Remove "select SRCU" from system sleep, cpufreq and OPP Kconfig entries (Paul E. McKenney). - Enable thermal cooling for Tegra194 (Yi-Wei Wang). - Register module device table and add missing compatibles for cpufreq-qcom-hw (Nícolas F. R. A. Prado, Abel Vesa and Luca Weiss). - Various dt binding updates for qcom-cpufreq-nvmem and opp-v2-kryo-cpu (Christian Marangi). - Make kobj_type structure in the cpufreq core constant (Thomas Weißschuh). - Make cpufreq_unregister_driver() return void (Uwe Kleine-König). - Make the TEO cpuidle governor check CPU utilization in order to refine idle state selection (Kajetan Puchalski). - Make Kconfig select the haltpoll cpuidle governor when the haltpoll cpuidle driver is selected and replace a default_idle() call in that driver with arch_cpu_idle() to allow MWAIT to be used (Li RongQing). - Add Emerald Rapids Xeon support to the intel_idle driver (Artem Bityutskiy). - Add ARCH_SUSPEND_POSSIBLE dependencies for ARMv4 cpuidle drivers to avoid randconfig build failures (Arnd Bergmann). - Make kobj_type structures used in the cpuidle sysfs interface constant (Thomas Weißschuh). - Make the cpuidle driver registration code update microsecond values of idle state parameters in accordance with their nanosecond values if they are provided (Rafael Wysocki). - Make the PSCI cpuidle driver prevent topology CPUs from being suspended on PREEMPT_RT (Krzysztof Kozlowski). - Document that pm_runtime_force_suspend() cannot be used with DPM_FLAG_SMART_SUSPEND (Richard Fitzgerald). - Add EXPORT macros for exporting PM functions from drivers (Richard Fitzgerald). - Remove /** from non-kernel-doc comments in hibernation code (Randy Dunlap). - Fix possible name leak in powercap_register_zone() (Yang Yingliang). - Add Meteor Lake and Emerald Rapids support to the intel_rapl power capping driver (Zhang Rui). - Modify the idle_inject power capping facility to support 100% idle injection (Srinivas Pandruvada). - Fix large time windows handling in the intel_rapl power capping driver (Zhang Rui). - Fix memory leaks with using debugfs_lookup() in the generic PM domains and Energy Model code (Greg Kroah-Hartman). - Add missing 'cache-unified' property in the example for kryo OPP bindings (Rob Herring). - Fix error checking in opp_migrate_dentry() (Qi Zheng). - Let qcom,opp-fuse-level be a 2-long array for qcom SoCs (Konrad Dybcio). - Modify some power management utilities to use the canonical ftrace path (Ross Zwisler). - Correct spelling problems for Documentation/power/ as reported by codespell (Randy Dunlap). -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQJGBAABCAAwFiEE4fcc61cGeeHD/fCwgsRv/nhiVHEFAmPuJfMSHHJqd0Byand5 c29ja2kubmV0AAoJEILEb/54YlRx/5kQAJNOVImLEPLerLP8xufw30//LuDU5Gi0 STsyDOMql/I2MpkeqeCcgrSbpy6NlEglOvg16gfpQ3qqTCLF9ypENxs9E5BGGvW0 aEdCzvaoqmvi9PCr/jmj0EPP70/U+rIX5m/k0QdjLh9x0aLoAEe3uRJTfR9QVqXf I7JX0N9kjKi7YxpA5DlkHrS7J7GPPiWlesJ3p4wXuHMo3jf+6fgkoPFt8yRrGWeh AHzGT2BLrsy7aAUjGZB65Qx9q3fnSXMmXOjmn0Xh2njQah+zRZDwrNzwoY2HTLL/ KQ6/Ww16USYRZtCS1fmGwAj9I+ddq6AOvhPCMn0vLXXmKVAMUrVVWnQS/0+vpm9y suUMK9Tndkgxd1vjby2246ThJn27uDd/ERFan4ouQo2j22uICY+SDo3osj2hMXka wq4zthXkY8KgjZ+MuXnZxPhcOvo8KRvfxAU0fy5efQnSkbtwY9UlMvjPBMBHm/RA 21/6kjQNtq5vMmI37oC8DH+oPrRQ7sUKuY7HNqwO9P3QNKWVmNe7cF5UtXXxME7Q ULvP1d+u+TNNdHFLryPwCSzBO34wQEccdRZBjalZ8tBe6JiDWUFHC3giSURZSuzZ GDvzVaNX6PkgToyv4inBTB8lTp6pAuUjaWNvNJzVvUXiEKHB0ihzg5vpJW5NdwlH 15Tn8cjH7pp0 =lZLx -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'pm-6.3-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rafael/linux-pm Pull power management updates from Rafael Wysocki: "These add EPP support to the AMD P-state cpufreq driver, add support for new platforms to the Intel RAPL power capping driver, intel_idle and the Qualcomm cpufreq driver, enable thermal cooling for Tegra194, drop the custom cpufreq driver for loongson1 that is not necessary any more (and the corresponding cpufreq platform device), fix assorted issues and clean up code. Specifics: - Add EPP support to the AMD P-state cpufreq driver (Perry Yuan, Wyes Karny, Arnd Bergmann, Bagas Sanjaya) - Drop the custom cpufreq driver for loongson1 that is not necessary any more and the corresponding cpufreq platform device (Keguang Zhang) - Remove "select SRCU" from system sleep, cpufreq and OPP Kconfig entries (Paul E. McKenney) - Enable thermal cooling for Tegra194 (Yi-Wei Wang) - Register module device table and add missing compatibles for cpufreq-qcom-hw (Nícolas F. R. A. Prado, Abel Vesa and Luca Weiss) - Various dt binding updates for qcom-cpufreq-nvmem and opp-v2-kryo-cpu (Christian Marangi) - Make kobj_type structure in the cpufreq core constant (Thomas Weißschuh) - Make cpufreq_unregister_driver() return void (Uwe Kleine-König) - Make the TEO cpuidle governor check CPU utilization in order to refine idle state selection (Kajetan Puchalski) - Make Kconfig select the haltpoll cpuidle governor when the haltpoll cpuidle driver is selected and replace a default_idle() call in that driver with arch_cpu_idle() to allow MWAIT to be used (Li RongQing) - Add Emerald Rapids Xeon support to the intel_idle driver (Artem Bityutskiy) - Add ARCH_SUSPEND_POSSIBLE dependencies for ARMv4 cpuidle drivers to avoid randconfig build failures (Arnd Bergmann) - Make kobj_type structures used in the cpuidle sysfs interface constant (Thomas Weißschuh) - Make the cpuidle driver registration code update microsecond values of idle state parameters in accordance with their nanosecond values if they are provided (Rafael Wysocki) - Make the PSCI cpuidle driver prevent topology CPUs from being suspended on PREEMPT_RT (Krzysztof Kozlowski) - Document that pm_runtime_force_suspend() cannot be used with DPM_FLAG_SMART_SUSPEND (Richard Fitzgerald) - Add EXPORT macros for exporting PM functions from drivers (Richard Fitzgerald) - Remove /** from non-kernel-doc comments in hibernation code (Randy Dunlap) - Fix possible name leak in powercap_register_zone() (Yang Yingliang) - Add Meteor Lake and Emerald Rapids support to the intel_rapl power capping driver (Zhang Rui) - Modify the idle_inject power capping facility to support 100% idle injection (Srinivas Pandruvada) - Fix large time windows handling in the intel_rapl power capping driver (Zhang Rui) - Fix memory leaks with using debugfs_lookup() in the generic PM domains and Energy Model code (Greg Kroah-Hartman) - Add missing 'cache-unified' property in the example for kryo OPP bindings (Rob Herring) - Fix error checking in opp_migrate_dentry() (Qi Zheng) - Let qcom,opp-fuse-level be a 2-long array for qcom SoCs (Konrad Dybcio) - Modify some power management utilities to use the canonical ftrace path (Ross Zwisler) - Correct spelling problems for Documentation/power/ as reported by codespell (Randy Dunlap)" * tag 'pm-6.3-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rafael/linux-pm: (53 commits) Documentation: amd-pstate: disambiguate user space sections cpufreq: amd-pstate: Fix invalid write to MSR_AMD_CPPC_REQ dt-bindings: opp: opp-v2-kryo-cpu: enlarge opp-supported-hw maximum dt-bindings: cpufreq: qcom-cpufreq-nvmem: make cpr bindings optional dt-bindings: cpufreq: qcom-cpufreq-nvmem: specify supported opp tables PM: Add EXPORT macros for exporting PM functions cpuidle: psci: Do not suspend topology CPUs on PREEMPT_RT MIPS: loongson32: Drop obsolete cpufreq platform device powercap: intel_rapl: Fix handling for large time window cpuidle: driver: Update microsecond values of state parameters as needed cpuidle: sysfs: make kobj_type structures constant cpuidle: add ARCH_SUSPEND_POSSIBLE dependencies PM: EM: fix memory leak with using debugfs_lookup() PM: domains: fix memory leak with using debugfs_lookup() cpufreq: Make kobj_type structure constant cpufreq: davinci: Fix clk use after free cpufreq: amd-pstate: avoid uninitialized variable use cpufreq: Make cpufreq_unregister_driver() return void OPP: fix error checking in opp_migrate_dentry() dt-bindings: cpufreq: cpufreq-qcom-hw: Add SM8550 compatible ... |
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716ff71ae2 |
cpuidle-haltpoll: Replace default_idle() with arch_cpu_idle()
When a KVM guest has MWAIT, mwait_idle() is used as the default idle
function.
However, the cpuidle-haltpoll driver calls default_idle() from
default_enter_idle() directly and that one uses HLT instead of MWAIT,
which may affect performance adversely, because MWAIT is preferred to
HLT as explained by the changelog of commit
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89b3098703 |
arch/idle: Change arch_cpu_idle() behavior: always exit with IRQs disabled
Current arch_cpu_idle() is called with IRQs disabled, but will return with IRQs enabled. However, the very first thing the generic code does after calling arch_cpu_idle() is raw_local_irq_disable(). This means that architectures that can idle with IRQs disabled end up doing a pointless 'enable-disable' dance. Therefore, push this IRQ disabling into the idle function, meaning that those architectures can avoid the pointless IRQ state flipping. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Tested-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com> Tested-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Gautham R. Shenoy <gautham.shenoy@amd.com> Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> [arm64] Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Acked-by: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org> Acked-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230112195540.618076436@infradead.org |
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aaa3896b96 |
x86/idle: Replace 'x86_idle' function pointer with a static_call
Typical boot time setup; no need to suffer an indirect call for that. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Tested-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com> Tested-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230112195539.453613251@infradead.org |
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268325bda5 |
Random number generator updates for Linux 6.2-rc1.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAABCAAdFiEEq5lC5tSkz8NBJiCnSfxwEqXeA64FAmOU+U8ACgkQSfxwEqXe A67NnQ//Y5DltmvibyPd7r1TFT2gUYv+Rx3sUV9ZE1NYptd/SWhhcL8c5FZ70Fuw bSKCa1uiWjOxosjXT1kGrWq3de7q7oUpAPSOGxgxzoaNURIt58N/ajItCX/4Au8I RlGAScHy5e5t41/26a498kB6qJ441fBEqCYKQpPLINMBAhe8TQ+NVp0rlpUwNHFX WrUGg4oKWxdBIW3HkDirQjJWDkkAiklRTifQh/Al4b6QDbOnRUGGCeckNOhixsvS waHWTld+Td8jRrA4b82tUb2uVZ2/b8dEvj/A8CuTv4yC0lywoyMgBWmJAGOC+UmT ZVNdGW02Jc2T+Iap8ZdsEmeLHNqbli4+IcbY5xNlov+tHJ2oz41H9TZoYKbudlr6 /ReAUPSn7i50PhbQlEruj3eg+M2gjOeh8OF8UKwwRK8PghvyWQ1ScW0l3kUhPIhI PdIG6j4+D2mJc1FIj2rTVB+Bg933x6S+qx4zDxGlNp62AARUFYf6EgyD6aXFQVuX RxcKb6cjRuFkzFiKc8zkqg5edZH+IJcPNuIBmABqTGBOxbZWURXzIQvK/iULqZa4 CdGAFIs6FuOh8pFHLI3R4YoHBopbHup/xKDEeAO9KZGyeVIuOSERDxxo5f/ITzcq APvT77DFOEuyvanr8RMqqh0yUjzcddXqw9+ieufsAyDwjD9DTuE= =QRhK -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'random-6.2-rc1-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random Pull random number generator updates from Jason Donenfeld: - Replace prandom_u32_max() and various open-coded variants of it, there is now a new family of functions that uses fast rejection sampling to choose properly uniformly random numbers within an interval: get_random_u32_below(ceil) - [0, ceil) get_random_u32_above(floor) - (floor, U32_MAX] get_random_u32_inclusive(floor, ceil) - [floor, ceil] Coccinelle was used to convert all current users of prandom_u32_max(), as well as many open-coded patterns, resulting in improvements throughout the tree. I'll have a "late" 6.1-rc1 pull for you that removes the now unused prandom_u32_max() function, just in case any other trees add a new use case of it that needs to converted. According to linux-next, there may be two trivial cases of prandom_u32_max() reintroductions that are fixable with a 's/.../.../'. So I'll have for you a final conversion patch doing that alongside the removal patch during the second week. This is a treewide change that touches many files throughout. - More consistent use of get_random_canary(). - Updates to comments, documentation, tests, headers, and simplification in configuration. - The arch_get_random*_early() abstraction was only used by arm64 and wasn't entirely useful, so this has been replaced by code that works in all relevant contexts. - The kernel will use and manage random seeds in non-volatile EFI variables, refreshing a variable with a fresh seed when the RNG is initialized. The RNG GUID namespace is then hidden from efivarfs to prevent accidental leakage. These changes are split into random.c infrastructure code used in the EFI subsystem, in this pull request, and related support inside of EFISTUB, in Ard's EFI tree. These are co-dependent for full functionality, but the order of merging doesn't matter. - Part of the infrastructure added for the EFI support is also used for an improvement to the way vsprintf initializes its siphash key, replacing an sleep loop wart. - The hardware RNG framework now always calls its correct random.c input function, add_hwgenerator_randomness(), rather than sometimes going through helpers better suited for other cases. - The add_latent_entropy() function has long been called from the fork handler, but is a no-op when the latent entropy gcc plugin isn't used, which is fine for the purposes of latent entropy. But it was missing out on the cycle counter that was also being mixed in beside the latent entropy variable. So now, if the latent entropy gcc plugin isn't enabled, add_latent_entropy() will expand to a call to add_device_randomness(NULL, 0), which adds a cycle counter, without the absent latent entropy variable. - The RNG is now reseeded from a delayed worker, rather than on demand when used. Always running from a worker allows it to make use of the CPU RNG on platforms like S390x, whose instructions are too slow to do so from interrupts. It also has the effect of adding in new inputs more frequently with more regularity, amounting to a long term transcript of random values. Plus, it helps a bit with the upcoming vDSO implementation (which isn't yet ready for 6.2). - The jitter entropy algorithm now tries to execute on many different CPUs, round-robining, in hopes of hitting even more memory latencies and other unpredictable effects. It also will mix in a cycle counter when the entropy timer fires, in addition to being mixed in from the main loop, to account more explicitly for fluctuations in that timer firing. And the state it touches is now kept within the same cache line, so that it's assured that the different execution contexts will cause latencies. * tag 'random-6.2-rc1-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random: (23 commits) random: include <linux/once.h> in the right header random: align entropy_timer_state to cache line random: mix in cycle counter when jitter timer fires random: spread out jitter callback to different CPUs random: remove extraneous period and add a missing one in comments efi: random: refresh non-volatile random seed when RNG is initialized vsprintf: initialize siphash key using notifier random: add back async readiness notifier random: reseed in delayed work rather than on-demand random: always mix cycle counter in add_latent_entropy() hw_random: use add_hwgenerator_randomness() for early entropy random: modernize documentation comment on get_random_bytes() random: adjust comment to account for removed function random: remove early archrandom abstraction random: use random.trust_{bootloader,cpu} command line option only stackprotector: actually use get_random_canary() stackprotector: move get_random_canary() into stackprotector.h treewide: use get_random_u32_inclusive() when possible treewide: use get_random_u32_{above,below}() instead of manual loop treewide: use get_random_u32_below() instead of deprecated function ... |
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6606515742 |
x86/bugs: Make sure MSR_SPEC_CTRL is updated properly upon resume from S3
The "force" argument to write_spec_ctrl_current() is currently ambiguous
as it does not guarantee the MSR write. This is due to the optimization
that writes to the MSR happen only when the new value differs from the
cached value.
This is fine in most cases, but breaks for S3 resume when the cached MSR
value gets out of sync with the hardware MSR value due to S3 resetting
it.
When x86_spec_ctrl_current is same as x86_spec_ctrl_base, the MSR write
is skipped. Which results in SPEC_CTRL mitigations not getting restored.
Move the MSR write from write_spec_ctrl_current() to a new function that
unconditionally writes to the MSR. Update the callers accordingly and
rename functions.
[ bp: Rework a bit. ]
Fixes:
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8032bf1233 |
treewide: use get_random_u32_below() instead of deprecated function
This is a simple mechanical transformation done by: @@ expression E; @@ - prandom_u32_max + get_random_u32_below (E) Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Acked-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> # for xfs Reviewed-by: SeongJae Park <sj@kernel.org> # for damon Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> # for infiniband Reviewed-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk> # for arm Acked-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org> # for mmc Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> |
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81895a65ec |
treewide: use prandom_u32_max() when possible, part 1
Rather than incurring a division or requesting too many random bytes for the given range, use the prandom_u32_max() function, which only takes the minimum required bytes from the RNG and avoids divisions. This was done mechanically with this coccinelle script: @basic@ expression E; type T; identifier get_random_u32 =~ "get_random_int|prandom_u32|get_random_u32"; typedef u64; @@ ( - ((T)get_random_u32() % (E)) + prandom_u32_max(E) | - ((T)get_random_u32() & ((E) - 1)) + prandom_u32_max(E * XXX_MAKE_SURE_E_IS_POW2) | - ((u64)(E) * get_random_u32() >> 32) + prandom_u32_max(E) | - ((T)get_random_u32() & ~PAGE_MASK) + prandom_u32_max(PAGE_SIZE) ) @multi_line@ identifier get_random_u32 =~ "get_random_int|prandom_u32|get_random_u32"; identifier RAND; expression E; @@ - RAND = get_random_u32(); ... when != RAND - RAND %= (E); + RAND = prandom_u32_max(E); // Find a potential literal @literal_mask@ expression LITERAL; type T; identifier get_random_u32 =~ "get_random_int|prandom_u32|get_random_u32"; position p; @@ ((T)get_random_u32()@p & (LITERAL)) // Add one to the literal. @script:python add_one@ literal << literal_mask.LITERAL; RESULT; @@ value = None if literal.startswith('0x'): value = int(literal, 16) elif literal[0] in '123456789': value = int(literal, 10) if value is None: print("I don't know how to handle %s" % (literal)) cocci.include_match(False) elif value == 2**32 - 1 or value == 2**31 - 1 or value == 2**24 - 1 or value == 2**16 - 1 or value == 2**8 - 1: print("Skipping 0x%x for cleanup elsewhere" % (value)) cocci.include_match(False) elif value & (value + 1) != 0: print("Skipping 0x%x because it's not a power of two minus one" % (value)) cocci.include_match(False) elif literal.startswith('0x'): coccinelle.RESULT = cocci.make_expr("0x%x" % (value + 1)) else: coccinelle.RESULT = cocci.make_expr("%d" % (value + 1)) // Replace the literal mask with the calculated result. @plus_one@ expression literal_mask.LITERAL; position literal_mask.p; expression add_one.RESULT; identifier FUNC; @@ - (FUNC()@p & (LITERAL)) + prandom_u32_max(RESULT) @collapse_ret@ type T; identifier VAR; expression E; @@ { - T VAR; - VAR = (E); - return VAR; + return E; } @drop_var@ type T; identifier VAR; @@ { - T VAR; ... when != VAR } Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Yury Norov <yury.norov@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> # for ext4 and sbitmap Reviewed-by: Christoph Böhmwalder <christoph.boehmwalder@linbit.com> # for drbd Acked-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> # for s390 Acked-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org> # for mmc Acked-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> # for xfs Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> |
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42efa5e3a8 |
- Remove the vendor check when selecting MWAIT as the default idle state
- Respect idle=nomwait when supplied on the kernel cmdline - Two small cleanups -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAABCgAdFiEEzv7L6UO9uDPlPSfHEsHwGGHeVUoFAmLntx0ACgkQEsHwGGHe VUqlRxAAkULobsk6Dx3wrQcYlpA8Mt/ctttTQXWiIQwhK1j7uP0zlGWBqImr5Wsk T04g1s29azulnPs3PydCF2QlLqSyF4v2PyyUwnpKfTP6CPM+MLtz98Gm6Xcbkt+s f28ISYgNP+15tskWdNqB5XIVGkuyBdNne9TiFwtnVrJYF47FSwqEWRyqMH+bIOGT wSZUCfjcw7PtKwfIAmYq4beS2+wbY9bsfVyIz+H0ks2EVFQdjYWb/kH9PgUYEQFe VEOBsPvTHDOJt0QXEXSJjmoSRUS77Wduw56Y3L2T4jWdXXQFWJ79rqNYDBvXGAdh Y8BKM5IYFZpzrmfw2RB6jbDY/JWO5PPFvHTXogQf9+wttSerZEffVQdOeTwjT8VD wc9/ZnNkT7915033VI90V+hdFkwarq8FXuFH8TkzcxP9DQNYG8CRTZBceq0UWBl0 5RpIDwNX9JxGrR+frJi0D24qxz//wLe56UqW9hLp73NP8QtEYEW1nb1q30Q2eM3N iQblgmh63qQ/dy6JV1GFb3aePiWMUNQwcTrj1pd8YDfNlp4IsFsSswnsdAZWtr1A l9qewHkBZbbzyTQkBjExUsaIdiaMywFwnUmcQNL+fHqznZIvMhJC/oCJeS0Pe/RH alTUrYsk6Y87HFpxoXpd85a9+20m8yrA64uY8cSQguGZ9i5Lm8g= =jkpj -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'x86_cpu_for_v6.0_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 cpu updates from Borislav Petkov: - Remove the vendor check when selecting MWAIT as the default idle state - Respect idle=nomwait when supplied on the kernel cmdline - Two small cleanups * tag 'x86_cpu_for_v6.0_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/cpu: Use MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE constants x86: Fix comment for X86_FEATURE_ZEN x86: Remove vendor checks from prefer_mwait_c1_over_halt x86: Handle idle=nomwait cmdline properly for x86_idle |
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c779bc1a90 |
x86/bugs: Optimize SPEC_CTRL MSR writes
When changing SPEC_CTRL for user control, the WRMSR can be delayed until return-to-user when KERNEL_IBRS has been enabled. This avoids an MSR write during context switch. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> |
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caa0ff24d5 |
x86/bugs: Keep a per-CPU IA32_SPEC_CTRL value
Due to TIF_SSBD and TIF_SPEC_IB the actual IA32_SPEC_CTRL value can differ from x86_spec_ctrl_base. As such, keep a per-CPU value reflecting the current task's MSR content. [jpoimboe: rename] Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> |
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aebef63cf7 |
x86: Remove vendor checks from prefer_mwait_c1_over_halt
Remove vendor checks from prefer_mwait_c1_over_halt function. Restore the decision tree to support MWAIT C1 as the default idle state based on CPUID checks as done by Thomas Gleixner in commit |
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8bcedb4ce0 |
x86: Handle idle=nomwait cmdline properly for x86_idle
When kernel is booted with idle=nomwait do not use MWAIT as the default idle state. If the user boots the kernel with idle=nomwait, it is a clear direction to not use mwait as the default idle state. However, the current code does not take this into consideration while selecting the default idle state on x86. Fix it by checking for the idle=nomwait boot option in prefer_mwait_c1_over_halt(). Also update the documentation around idle=nomwait appropriately. [ dhansen: tweak commit message ] Signed-off-by: Wyes Karny <wyes.karny@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Tested-by: Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/fdc2dc2d0a1bc21c2f53d989ea2d2ee3ccbc0dbe.1654538381.git-series.wyes.karny@amd.com |
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1ec6574a3c |
This set of changes updates init and user mode helper tasks to be
ordinary user mode tasks. In commit |
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3e2cbc016b |
- Add Raptor Lake to the set of CPU models which support splitlock
- Make life miserable for apps using split locks by slowing them down considerably while the rest of the system remains responsive. The hope is it will hurt more and people will really fix their misaligned locks apps. As a result, free a TIF bit. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAABCgAdFiEEzv7L6UO9uDPlPSfHEsHwGGHeVUoFAmKL5PQACgkQEsHwGGHe VUrz1Q//QjAKyKsAwCzGSPergtnZp9drimSuNsZAz6/xL8wFnn2nfWJTxugNF5jg n0Hal2oUGC8lg13mliB7NuDNu4RUWpkFzTzcIbPT8K9h7CUBdQPzqS7E3/p4s/eG ZCHp8psBGNp8+/+/LFfu9yhzYsAH9ji5KWmOzTVx9UdP3ovgR8BuCI7FCVJSfRz7 cY690XgvcuKoXKckVNaCcoQXPJxykfk4Y1yt1TpITqivFbs2I0vLgzEhoRcTAhPA nX3pR3uy6oaA6rZAapRt8lbLWOwIEWoI0Tt1v+r5p28+nFiCRfm1XdPYK6CDBlox UuMBK4WyvSKjKHLu3wEdLCvYbs1kw2l9pXvS3hrqsKhbdeXKrxrNZ3zshwFMAYap MY/nSTsKSWUUgMgUbWI084csapGFB+hxwY8OVr6JXbxE8YYD/yCbPGOe1cLI7MMt /H3F6vNqSzdp1N3mAaaKVxiiT21lHIn6oJuSZcDE5sOvBwvpXsOp/w3FxhJCOX49 PXrZLZmSHkDQSbh1XnvT/a+rq3XX1TFXFz71HYZf1yDk+xTijECglNtGnGSdj2Za iOw6M8VduV5Wy3ED9ubonruuHEJn6njpx/MH1B9+mAZsuLBpmuYFBxOn6AHOkXSb MVJD4flHXj0ugYm4Q5Y3yi24iWLsRI9utTOU079VL6i6DmFXeZc= =svvI -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'x86_splitlock_for_v5.19_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 splitlock updates from Borislav Petkov: - Add Raptor Lake to the set of CPU models which support splitlock - Make life miserable for apps using split locks by slowing them down considerably while the rest of the system remains responsive. The hope is it will hurt more and people will really fix their misaligned locks apps. As a result, free a TIF bit. * tag 'x86_splitlock_for_v5.19_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/split_lock: Enable the split lock feature on Raptor Lake x86/split-lock: Remove unused TIF_SLD bit x86/split_lock: Make life miserable for split lockers |
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de8ac81747 |
- Remove all the code around GS switching on 32-bit now that it is not
needed anymore - Other misc improvements -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAABCgAdFiEEzv7L6UO9uDPlPSfHEsHwGGHeVUoFAmKLp74ACgkQEsHwGGHe VUpqrhAAgNdNw/vNTTzeOH5ZSNxyIoTQapmrSNev0cXRW4tV2hxuYSa2wPZPJZXx aYhnFxwL7rVy0er7jG/5KaOyzHmrh6PcmqgFdPVo8+yVrfcsPIUqg/4L5peFZh7T ETV2pvFIiB4njkL/pR3mU5uAtTjyO89tD/LclKmc4ndv19vI8maj+k/dCDOnNnEz m4wJMXYWh4bG47/izU5TcTYU7ttTLEiVQ/mC5kEuj7PQeUR0kXKvvLo4rX+lOI2v dQRHgHg/qoNM7uVLd7vV/YdMWwcHchmKG5Y7+a/ogdlwR7a/X9e+lklFSeuxNvyH 8dOHIyzcb6lKTijpqhisZ3o9150ax3Q5FlSWuE3F/9Rcuc1T5eY82kTW2RTOTdV9 xsjob4y+hlpsUfuImupxJLHn685xsYAdqyiG/SPkcnJL++tNBlWiGHX9NqXF5cgw bq4/94Aouxevl0OBxnFBeoQOJvOnf60OY3LHcYR78yEEJyi4iWsC0/TEmD+9IE+r EpC1wz9bHCYbSwZ+yv8u2tNPd/rKxdspPL/6SxT9a+WAVrOZbQAN3VmlOIon6W9O bW5ye6suqBbl/Q1FACVU1xxSNjLTJUTFsB1X3QKGm8E+Kr7/zD1ZtT0WQNvyLMfT p/I4VRcdIxV3eDiYqeTfJ3sTS7IjKHSaZVBnpkZvRh869mMdqCg= =CfX1 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'x86_core_for_v5.19_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull core x86 updates from Borislav Petkov: - Remove all the code around GS switching on 32-bit now that it is not needed anymore - Other misc improvements * tag 'x86_core_for_v5.19_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: bug: Use normal relative pointers in 'struct bug_entry' x86/nmi: Make register_nmi_handler() more robust x86/asm: Merge load_gs_index() x86/32: Remove lazy GS macros ELF: Remove elf_core_copy_kernel_regs() x86/32: Simplify ELF_CORE_COPY_REGS |
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a13dc4d409 |
- Serious sanitization and cleanup of the whole APERF/MPERF and
frequency invariance code along with removing the need for unnecessary IPIs - Finally remove a.out support - The usual trivial cleanups and fixes all over x86 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAABCgAdFiEEzv7L6UO9uDPlPSfHEsHwGGHeVUoFAmKLn48ACgkQEsHwGGHe VUpbkg/+PELrc0y/qxLM/+dyftKYY16Rhk6ZVAXfwqlh5ldyVQcLMUgKwDqYyTn2 XmgdI3cTcFlH2K7j6ANWLu0I9NPaviimUcEdMVcXt7aY5mGWk/q4hIyCYM8d41sV qKx4OjNSdyoofG6MtwFLJDuoeVg99Bqgvm4nP9BuxL0dZJ2hfcUZ7MTxYCx9ZYjK /3trx0NV287Yg/wm91EU0nLQzy9xbGS7WCmMnse6uxiUdm2vXbBt8oNFF4f747Dj 0cArfNrMgYq4Cv5bgt/Ki0NU/n4EOGDpJUSyQwlnjDKeN81ESPy7IWtTQ6cE/rJK BZeUIPiGiYHwtqXv0UTAPGLG8cAqKeab8u0xAOyrFVDkTc0+WlPJRsUAOmRRGIGE M8ZjoxrLeuFgxw6vKpVjaA+mDRj3qEpSH+IrTcekS98PN7gmVzvq03GobgGbT7YB xmtbThJa+514FfUVckkyC0+A56BknUIgVxwFPqrthE2atzYTbH67hW4U0yVWXXr7 2VI7ttozBrYVgHCWhD9eoT0uhyD74Vl6pqHnqzY9ShIfKVUGvMgKHHg04nLLtF7W hm87xV3Q5UEmXhTmDzT1rUZ99mBUxGbWxk227I9raMugIh7pp9wIr57+7O0LRYfX TdnE2+tL8RMi7+XzRH5iLhnwkrvahBESeHSQ7GVI1Y2zMmmFN+0= =Dks/ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'x86_cleanups_for_v5.19_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 cleanups from Borislav Petkov: - Serious sanitization and cleanup of the whole APERF/MPERF and frequency invariance code along with removing the need for unnecessary IPIs - Finally remove a.out support - The usual trivial cleanups and fixes all over x86 * tag 'x86_cleanups_for_v5.19_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (21 commits) x86: Remove empty files x86/speculation: Add missing srbds=off to the mitigations= help text x86/prctl: Remove pointless task argument x86/aperfperf: Make it correct on 32bit and UP kernels x86/aperfmperf: Integrate the fallback code from show_cpuinfo() x86/aperfmperf: Replace arch_freq_get_on_cpu() x86/aperfmperf: Replace aperfmperf_get_khz() x86/aperfmperf: Store aperf/mperf data for cpu frequency reads x86/aperfmperf: Make parts of the frequency invariance code unconditional x86/aperfmperf: Restructure arch_scale_freq_tick() x86/aperfmperf: Put frequency invariance aperf/mperf data into a struct x86/aperfmperf: Untangle Intel and AMD frequency invariance init x86/aperfmperf: Separate AP/BP frequency invariance init x86/smp: Move APERF/MPERF code where it belongs x86/aperfmperf: Dont wake idle CPUs in arch_freq_get_on_cpu() x86/process: Fix kernel-doc warning due to a changed function name x86: Remove a.out support x86/mm: Replace nodes_weight() with nodes_empty() where appropriate x86: Replace cpumask_weight() with cpumask_empty() where appropriate x86/pkeys: Remove __arch_set_user_pkey_access() declaration ... |
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f5c0b4f304 |
x86/prctl: Remove pointless task argument
The functions invoked via do_arch_prctl_common() can only operate on the current task and none of these function uses the task argument. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87lev7vtxj.ffs@tglx |
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5bd2e97c86 |
fork: Generalize PF_IO_WORKER handling
Add fn and fn_arg members into struct kernel_clone_args and test for them in copy_thread (instead of testing for PF_KTHREAD | PF_IO_WORKER). This allows any task that wants to be a user space task that only runs in kernel mode to use this functionality. The code on x86 is an exception and still retains a PF_KTHREAD test because x86 unlikely everything else handles kthreads slightly differently than user space tasks that start with a function. The functions that created tasks that start with a function have been updated to set ".fn" and ".fn_arg" instead of ".stack" and ".stack_size". These functions are fork_idle(), create_io_thread(), kernel_thread(), and user_mode_thread(). Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220506141512.516114-4-ebiederm@xmission.com Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> |
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c5febea095 |
fork: Pass struct kernel_clone_args into copy_thread
With io_uring we have started supporting tasks that are for most purposes user space tasks that exclusively run code in kernel mode. The kernel task that exec's init and tasks that exec user mode helpers are also user mode tasks that just run kernel code until they call kernel execve. Pass kernel_clone_args into copy_thread so these oddball tasks can be supported more cleanly and easily. v2: Fix spelling of kenrel_clone_args on h8300 Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220506141512.516114-2-ebiederm@xmission.com Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> |
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ef79970d7c |
x86/split-lock: Remove unused TIF_SLD bit
Changes to the "warn" mode of split lock handling mean that TIF_SLD is never set. Remove the bit, and the functions that use it. Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220310204854.31752-3-tony.luck@intel.com |
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3a24a60854 |
x86/32: Remove lazy GS macros
GS is always a user segment now. Signed-off-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220325153953.162643-4-brgerst@gmail.com |
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dbb5ab6d2c |
x86/process: Fix kernel-doc warning due to a changed function name
Fix the following scripts/kernel-doc warning: arch/x86/kernel/process.c:412: warning: expecting prototype for tss_update_io_bitmap(). Prototype was for native_tss_update_io_bitmap() instead. [ bp: Massage. ] Reported-by: Abaci Robot <abaci@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Jiapeng Chong <jiapeng.chong@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220414062110.60343-1-jiapeng.chong@linux.alibaba.com |
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bfe6ed0c67 |
x86/tdx: Add HLT support for TDX guests
The HLT instruction is a privileged instruction, executing it stops instruction execution and places the processor in a HALT state. It is used in kernel for cases like reboot, idle loop and exception fixup handlers. For the idle case, interrupts will be enabled (using STI) before the HLT instruction (this is also called safe_halt()). To support the HLT instruction in TDX guests, it needs to be emulated using TDVMCALL (hypercall to VMM). More details about it can be found in Intel Trust Domain Extensions (Intel TDX) Guest-Host-Communication Interface (GHCI) specification, section TDVMCALL[Instruction.HLT]. In TDX guests, executing HLT instruction will generate a #VE, which is used to emulate the HLT instruction. But #VE based emulation will not work for the safe_halt() flavor, because it requires STI instruction to be executed just before the TDCALL. Since idle loop is the only user of safe_halt() variant, handle it as a special case. To avoid *safe_halt() call in the idle function, define the tdx_guest_idle() and use it to override the "x86_idle" function pointer for a valid TDX guest. Alternative choices like PV ops have been considered for adding safe_halt() support. But it was rejected because HLT paravirt calls only exist under PARAVIRT_XXL, and enabling it in TDX guest just for safe_halt() use case is not worth the cost. Co-developed-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220405232939.73860-9-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com |
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9cea0d46f5 |
Merge branch 'x86/cpu' into x86/core, to resolve conflicts
Conflicts: arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> |
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f9cdf7ca57 |
x86: Mark stop_this_cpu() __noreturn
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: smp_stop_nmi_callback()+0x2b: unreachable instruction 0000 0000000000047cf0 <smp_stop_nmi_callback>: ... 0026 47d16: e8 00 00 00 00 call 47d1b <smp_stop_nmi_callback+0x2b> 47d17: R_X86_64_PLT32 stop_this_cpu-0x4 002b 47d1b: b8 01 00 00 00 mov $0x1,%eax Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220308154319.290905453@infradead.org |
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08f253ec37 |
x86/cpu: Clear SME feature flag when not in use
Currently, the SME CPU feature flag is reflective of whether the CPU supports the feature but not whether it has been activated by the kernel. Change this around to clear the SME feature flag if the kernel is not using it so userspace can determine if it is available and in use from /proc/cpuinfo. As the feature flag is cleared on systems where SME isn't active, use CPUID 0x8000001f to confirm SME availability before calling native_wbinvd(). Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220216034446.2430634-1-mario.limonciello@amd.com |
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79e06c4c49 |
RISCV:
- Use common KVM implementation of MMU memory caches - SBI v0.2 support for Guest - Initial KVM selftests support - Fix to avoid spurious virtual interrupts after clearing hideleg CSR - Update email address for Anup and Atish ARM: - Simplification of the 'vcpu first run' by integrating it into KVM's 'pid change' flow - Refactoring of the FP and SVE state tracking, also leading to a simpler state and less shared data between EL1 and EL2 in the nVHE case - Tidy up the header file usage for the nvhe hyp object - New HYP unsharing mechanism, finally allowing pages to be unmapped from the Stage-1 EL2 page-tables - Various pKVM cleanups around refcounting and sharing - A couple of vgic fixes for bugs that would trigger once the vcpu xarray rework is merged, but not sooner - Add minimal support for ARMv8.7's PMU extension - Rework kvm_pgtable initialisation ahead of the NV work - New selftest for IRQ injection - Teach selftests about the lack of default IPA space and page sizes - Expand sysreg selftest to deal with Pointer Authentication - The usual bunch of cleanups and doc update s390: - fix sigp sense/start/stop/inconsistency - cleanups x86: - Clean up some function prototypes more - improved gfn_to_pfn_cache with proper invalidation, used by Xen emulation - add KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_XEN_EVTCHN and event channel delivery - completely remove potential TOC/TOU races in nested SVM consistency checks - update some PMCs on emulated instructions - Intel AMX support (joint work between Thomas and Intel) - large MMU cleanups - module parameter to disable PMU virtualization - cleanup register cache - first part of halt handling cleanups - Hyper-V enlightened MSR bitmap support for nested hypervisors Generic: - clean up Makefiles - introduce CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_DIRTY_RING - optimize memslot lookup using a tree - optimize vCPU array usage by converting to xarray -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQFIBAABCAAyFiEE8TM4V0tmI4mGbHaCv/vSX3jHroMFAmHhxvsUHHBib256aW5p QHJlZGhhdC5jb20ACgkQv/vSX3jHroPZkAf+Nz92UL/5nNGcdHtE4m7AToMmitE9 bYkesf9BMQvAe5wjkABLuoHGi6ay4jabo4fiGzbdkiK7lO5YgfsWiMB3/MT5fl4E jRPzaVQabp3YZLM8UYCBmfUVuRj524S967SfSRe0AvYjDEH8y7klPf4+7sCsFT0/ Px9Vf2KGuOlf0eM78yKg4rGaF0jS22eLgXm6FfNMY8/e29ZAo/jyUmqBY+Z2xxZG aWhceDtSheW1jwLHLj3nOlQJvHTn8LVGXBE/R8Gda3ZjrBV2rKaDi4Fh+HD+dz86 2zVXwzQ7uck2CMW73GMoXMTWoKSHMyvlBOs1BdvBm4UsnGcXR+q8IFCeuQ== =s73m -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm Pull kvm updates from Paolo Bonzini: "RISCV: - Use common KVM implementation of MMU memory caches - SBI v0.2 support for Guest - Initial KVM selftests support - Fix to avoid spurious virtual interrupts after clearing hideleg CSR - Update email address for Anup and Atish ARM: - Simplification of the 'vcpu first run' by integrating it into KVM's 'pid change' flow - Refactoring of the FP and SVE state tracking, also leading to a simpler state and less shared data between EL1 and EL2 in the nVHE case - Tidy up the header file usage for the nvhe hyp object - New HYP unsharing mechanism, finally allowing pages to be unmapped from the Stage-1 EL2 page-tables - Various pKVM cleanups around refcounting and sharing - A couple of vgic fixes for bugs that would trigger once the vcpu xarray rework is merged, but not sooner - Add minimal support for ARMv8.7's PMU extension - Rework kvm_pgtable initialisation ahead of the NV work - New selftest for IRQ injection - Teach selftests about the lack of default IPA space and page sizes - Expand sysreg selftest to deal with Pointer Authentication - The usual bunch of cleanups and doc update s390: - fix sigp sense/start/stop/inconsistency - cleanups x86: - Clean up some function prototypes more - improved gfn_to_pfn_cache with proper invalidation, used by Xen emulation - add KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_XEN_EVTCHN and event channel delivery - completely remove potential TOC/TOU races in nested SVM consistency checks - update some PMCs on emulated instructions - Intel AMX support (joint work between Thomas and Intel) - large MMU cleanups - module parameter to disable PMU virtualization - cleanup register cache - first part of halt handling cleanups - Hyper-V enlightened MSR bitmap support for nested hypervisors Generic: - clean up Makefiles - introduce CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_DIRTY_RING - optimize memslot lookup using a tree - optimize vCPU array usage by converting to xarray" * tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (268 commits) x86/fpu: Fix inline prefix warnings selftest: kvm: Add amx selftest selftest: kvm: Move struct kvm_x86_state to header selftest: kvm: Reorder vcpu_load_state steps for AMX kvm: x86: Disable interception for IA32_XFD on demand x86/fpu: Provide fpu_sync_guest_vmexit_xfd_state() kvm: selftests: Add support for KVM_CAP_XSAVE2 kvm: x86: Add support for getting/setting expanded xstate buffer x86/fpu: Add uabi_size to guest_fpu kvm: x86: Add CPUID support for Intel AMX kvm: x86: Add XCR0 support for Intel AMX kvm: x86: Disable RDMSR interception of IA32_XFD_ERR kvm: x86: Emulate IA32_XFD_ERR for guest kvm: x86: Intercept #NM for saving IA32_XFD_ERR x86/fpu: Prepare xfd_err in struct fpu_guest kvm: x86: Add emulation for IA32_XFD x86/fpu: Provide fpu_update_guest_xfd() for IA32_XFD emulation kvm: x86: Enable dynamic xfeatures at KVM_SET_CPUID2 x86/fpu: Provide fpu_enable_guest_xfd_features() for KVM x86/fpu: Add guest support to xfd_enable_feature() ... |
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980fe2fddc |
x86/fpu: Extend fpu_xstate_prctl() with guest permissions
KVM requires a clear separation of host user space and guest permissions for dynamic XSTATE components. Add a guest permissions member to struct fpu and a separate set of prctl() arguments: ARCH_GET_XCOMP_GUEST_PERM and ARCH_REQ_XCOMP_GUEST_PERM. The semantics are equivalent to the host user space permission control except for the following constraints: 1) Permissions have to be requested before the first vCPU is created 2) Permissions are frozen when the first vCPU is created to ensure consistency. Any attempt to expand permissions via the prctl() after that point is rejected. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Jing Liu <jing2.liu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com> Message-Id: <20220105123532.12586-2-yang.zhong@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> |
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dca99fb643 |
x86: Snapshot thread flags
Some thread flags can be set remotely, and so even when IRQs are disabled, the flags can change under our feet. Generally this is unlikely to cause a problem in practice, but it is somewhat unsound, and KCSAN will legitimately warn that there is a data race. To avoid such issues, a snapshot of the flags has to be taken prior to using them. Some places already use READ_ONCE() for that, others do not. Convert them all to the new flag accessor helpers. Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211129130653.2037928-12-mark.rutland@arm.com |
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0dc636b3b7 |
x86: Pin task-stack in __get_wchan()
When commit |
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cc0356d6a0 |
- Do not #GP on userspace use of CLI/STI but pretend it was a NOP to
keep old userspace from breaking. Adjust the corresponding iopl selftest to that. - Improve stack overflow warnings to say which stack got overflowed and raise the exception stack sizes to 2 pages since overflowing the single page of exception stack is very easy to do nowadays with all the tracing machinery enabled. With that, rip out the custom mapping of AMD SEV's too. - A bunch of changes in preparation for FGKASLR like supporting more than 64K section headers in the relocs tool, correct ORC lookup table size to cover the whole kernel .text and other adjustments. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAABCgAdFiEEzv7L6UO9uDPlPSfHEsHwGGHeVUoFAmF/uugACgkQEsHwGGHe VUroKw//e8BJ3Aun8bg00FHxfiMGbPYcozjLGDkaoMtMDZ8WlfCUrvtqYICEr8eB UU0eRyygAPI167dre1O9JvAcbilkNTKntaU6qbu/ZVyUwS3+Jkjwsotbqn3xKtkd QDDTDNiCU+beCJ2ZbspbrPgEh13+H0MwMHUfRxZB9Scpmo6aGSEaU3g295f6GX57 VFGJ/LNov5MV1dTD7Pp/h6/Nb+R6WmflKcBzJmQxYuKyKX+g1xsSv0VSga+t+uf3 M9pUkizqTiUxzC2eLgtcEZTqqBHu810E8M76FmhKBUMilsFJT5YAJTiqyahwHXds HYarOFRgcnFuJPd29vn8UHjqeeoi6ru8GtcZYzccEc7U3ku/gXPaDJ9ffmvhs7vU pJX5Um3GiiFm0w/ZZOKDqh78wRAsCKLN+jIoyszuhkkNchZSj/jKfOgdd3EmcZst 6L6rxBA4oRHwNOgM7uVMp+jFeRe1/prR280OWWH0D4QmmuqybThOdO23Iuh/Deth W3qPUH3UQtfSWxGy2yODzJ1ciuGAr/AzJZ9zjg04e3Vl0DkEpyWtLKJiG3ClXZag Nj+3xc4xYH2Aw+M0HRaONk5XVKLpqVjuAfgU5iLQa0YSUbtrR+wCWvY8KgQNbAqK xZmzYzQ89stwVCuGKx10gPsL3jSJ3VCylMfqdHD2Ajmld1yApr0= =DOZU -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'x86_core_for_v5.16_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 core updates from Borislav Petkov: - Do not #GP on userspace use of CLI/STI but pretend it was a NOP to keep old userspace from breaking. Adjust the corresponding iopl selftest to that. - Improve stack overflow warnings to say which stack got overflowed and raise the exception stack sizes to 2 pages since overflowing the single page of exception stack is very easy to do nowadays with all the tracing machinery enabled. With that, rip out the custom mapping of AMD SEV's too. - A bunch of changes in preparation for FGKASLR like supporting more than 64K section headers in the relocs tool, correct ORC lookup table size to cover the whole kernel .text and other adjustments. * tag 'x86_core_for_v5.16_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: selftests/x86/iopl: Adjust to the faked iopl CLI/STI usage vmlinux.lds.h: Have ORC lookup cover entire _etext - _stext x86/boot/compressed: Avoid duplicate malloc() implementations x86/boot: Allow a "silent" kaslr random byte fetch x86/tools/relocs: Support >64K section headers x86/sev: Make the #VC exception stacks part of the default stacks storage x86: Increase exception stack sizes x86/mm/64: Improve stack overflow warnings x86/iopl: Fake iopl(3) CLI/STI usage |
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8cb1ae19bf |
x86/fpu updates:
- Cleanup of extable fixup handling to be more robust, which in turn allows to make the FPU exception fixups more robust as well. - Change the return code for signal frame related failures from explicit error codes to a boolean fail/success as that's all what the calling code evaluates. - A large refactoring of the FPU code to prepare for adding AMX support: - Distangle the public header maze and remove especially the misnomed kitchen sink internal.h which is despite it's name included all over the place. - Add a proper abstraction for the register buffer storage (struct fpstate) which allows to dynamically size the buffer at runtime by flipping the pointer to the buffer container from the default container which is embedded in task_struct::tread::fpu to a dynamically allocated container with a larger register buffer. - Convert the code over to the new fpstate mechanism. - Consolidate the KVM FPU handling by moving the FPU related code into the FPU core which removes the number of exports and avoids adding even more export when AMX has to be supported in KVM. This also removes duplicated code which was of course unnecessary different and incomplete in the KVM copy. - Simplify the KVM FPU buffer handling by utilizing the new fpstate container and just switching the buffer pointer from the user space buffer to the KVM guest buffer when entering vcpu_run() and flipping it back when leaving the function. This cuts the memory requirements of a vCPU for FPU buffers in half and avoids pointless memory copy operations. This also solves the so far unresolved problem of adding AMX support because the current FPU buffer handling of KVM inflicted a circular dependency between adding AMX support to the core and to KVM. With the new scheme of switching fpstate AMX support can be added to the core code without affecting KVM. - Replace various variables with proper data structures so the extra information required for adding dynamically enabled FPU features (AMX) can be added in one place - Add AMX (Advanved Matrix eXtensions) support (finally): AMX is a large XSTATE component which is going to be available with Saphire Rapids XEON CPUs. The feature comes with an extra MSR (MSR_XFD) which allows to trap the (first) use of an AMX related instruction, which has two benefits: 1) It allows the kernel to control access to the feature 2) It allows the kernel to dynamically allocate the large register state buffer instead of burdening every task with the the extra 8K or larger state storage. It would have been great to gain this kind of control already with AVX512. The support comes with the following infrastructure components: 1) arch_prctl() to - read the supported features (equivalent to XGETBV(0)) - read the permitted features for a task - request permission for a dynamically enabled feature Permission is granted per process, inherited on fork() and cleared on exec(). The permission policy of the kernel is restricted to sigaltstack size validation, but the syscall obviously allows further restrictions via seccomp etc. 2) A stronger sigaltstack size validation for sys_sigaltstack(2) which takes granted permissions and the potentially resulting larger signal frame into account. This mechanism can also be used to enforce factual sigaltstack validation independent of dynamic features to help with finding potential victims of the 2K sigaltstack size constant which is broken since AVX512 support was added. 3) Exception handling for #NM traps to catch first use of a extended feature via a new cause MSR. If the exception was caused by the use of such a feature, the handler checks permission for that feature. If permission has not been granted, the handler sends a SIGILL like the #UD handler would do if the feature would have been disabled in XCR0. If permission has been granted, then a new fpstate which fits the larger buffer requirement is allocated. In the unlikely case that this allocation fails, the handler sends SIGSEGV to the task. That's not elegant, but unavoidable as the other discussed options of preallocation or full per task permissions come with their own set of horrors for kernel and/or userspace. So this is the lesser of the evils and SIGSEGV caused by unexpected memory allocation failures is not a fundamentally new concept either. When allocation succeeds, the fpstate properties are filled in to reflect the extended feature set and the resulting sizes, the fpu::fpstate pointer is updated accordingly and the trap is disarmed for this task permanently. 4) Enumeration and size calculations 5) Trap switching via MSR_XFD The XFD (eXtended Feature Disable) MSR is context switched with the same life time rules as the FPU register state itself. The mechanism is keyed off with a static key which is default disabled so !AMX equipped CPUs have zero overhead. On AMX enabled CPUs the overhead is limited by comparing the tasks XFD value with a per CPU shadow variable to avoid redundant MSR writes. In case of switching from a AMX using task to a non AMX using task or vice versa, the extra MSR write is obviously inevitable. All other places which need to be aware of the variable feature sets and resulting variable sizes are not affected at all because they retrieve the information (feature set, sizes) unconditonally from the fpstate properties. 6) Enable the new AMX states Note, this is relatively new code despite the fact that AMX support is in the works for more than a year now. The big refactoring of the FPU code, which allowed to do a proper integration has been started exactly 3 weeks ago. Refactoring of the existing FPU code and of the original AMX patches took a week and has been subject to extensive review and testing. The only fallout which has not been caught in review and testing right away was restricted to AMX enabled systems, which is completely irrelevant for anyone outside Intel and their early access program. There might be dragons lurking as usual, but so far the fine grained refactoring has held up and eventual yet undetected fallout is bisectable and should be easily addressable before the 5.16 release. Famous last words... Many thanks to Chang Bae and Dave Hansen for working hard on this and also to the various test teams at Intel who reserved extra capacity to follow the rapid development of this closely which provides the confidence level required to offer this rather large update for inclusion into 5.16-rc1. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQJHBAABCgAxFiEEQp8+kY+LLUocC4bMphj1TA10mKEFAmF/NkITHHRnbHhAbGlu dXRyb25peC5kZQAKCRCmGPVMDXSYodDkEADH4+/nN/QoSUHIuuha5Zptj3g2b16a /3TxT9fhwPen/kzMGsUk70s3iWJMA+I5dCfkSZexJ2hfhcRe9cBzZIa1HCawKwf3 YCISTsO/M+LpeORuZ+TpfFLJKnxNr1SEOl+EYffGhq0AkCjifb9Cnr0JZuoMUzGU jpfJZ2bj28ri5lG812DtzSMBM9E3SAwgJv+GNjmZbxZKb9mAfhbAMdBUXHirX7Ej jmx6koQjYOKwYIW8w1BrdC270lUKQUyJTbQgdRkN9Mh/HnKyFixQ18JqGlgaV2cT EtYePUfTEdaHdAhUINLIlEug1MfOslHU+HyGsdywnoChNB4GHPQuePC5Tz60VeFN RbQ9aKcBUu8r95rjlnKtAtBijNMA4bjGwllVxNwJ/ZoA9RPv1SbDZ07RX3qTaLVY YhVQl8+shD33/W24jUTJv1kMMexpHXIlv0gyfMryzpwI7uzzmGHRPAokJdbYKctC dyMPfdE90rxTiMUdL/1IQGhnh3awjbyfArzUhHyQ++HyUyzCFh0slsO0CD18vUy8 FofhCugGBhjuKw3XwLNQ+KsWURz5qHctSzBc3qMOSyqFHbAJCVRANkhsFvWJo2qL 75+Z7OTRebtsyOUZIdq26r4roSxHrps3dupWTtN70HWx2NhQG1nLEw986QYiQu1T hcKvDmehQLrUvg== =x3WL -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'x86-fpu-2021-11-01' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 fpu updates from Thomas Gleixner: - Cleanup of extable fixup handling to be more robust, which in turn allows to make the FPU exception fixups more robust as well. - Change the return code for signal frame related failures from explicit error codes to a boolean fail/success as that's all what the calling code evaluates. - A large refactoring of the FPU code to prepare for adding AMX support: - Distangle the public header maze and remove especially the misnomed kitchen sink internal.h which is despite it's name included all over the place. - Add a proper abstraction for the register buffer storage (struct fpstate) which allows to dynamically size the buffer at runtime by flipping the pointer to the buffer container from the default container which is embedded in task_struct::tread::fpu to a dynamically allocated container with a larger register buffer. - Convert the code over to the new fpstate mechanism. - Consolidate the KVM FPU handling by moving the FPU related code into the FPU core which removes the number of exports and avoids adding even more export when AMX has to be supported in KVM. This also removes duplicated code which was of course unnecessary different and incomplete in the KVM copy. - Simplify the KVM FPU buffer handling by utilizing the new fpstate container and just switching the buffer pointer from the user space buffer to the KVM guest buffer when entering vcpu_run() and flipping it back when leaving the function. This cuts the memory requirements of a vCPU for FPU buffers in half and avoids pointless memory copy operations. This also solves the so far unresolved problem of adding AMX support because the current FPU buffer handling of KVM inflicted a circular dependency between adding AMX support to the core and to KVM. With the new scheme of switching fpstate AMX support can be added to the core code without affecting KVM. - Replace various variables with proper data structures so the extra information required for adding dynamically enabled FPU features (AMX) can be added in one place - Add AMX (Advanced Matrix eXtensions) support (finally): AMX is a large XSTATE component which is going to be available with Saphire Rapids XEON CPUs. The feature comes with an extra MSR (MSR_XFD) which allows to trap the (first) use of an AMX related instruction, which has two benefits: 1) It allows the kernel to control access to the feature 2) It allows the kernel to dynamically allocate the large register state buffer instead of burdening every task with the the extra 8K or larger state storage. It would have been great to gain this kind of control already with AVX512. The support comes with the following infrastructure components: 1) arch_prctl() to - read the supported features (equivalent to XGETBV(0)) - read the permitted features for a task - request permission for a dynamically enabled feature Permission is granted per process, inherited on fork() and cleared on exec(). The permission policy of the kernel is restricted to sigaltstack size validation, but the syscall obviously allows further restrictions via seccomp etc. 2) A stronger sigaltstack size validation for sys_sigaltstack(2) which takes granted permissions and the potentially resulting larger signal frame into account. This mechanism can also be used to enforce factual sigaltstack validation independent of dynamic features to help with finding potential victims of the 2K sigaltstack size constant which is broken since AVX512 support was added. 3) Exception handling for #NM traps to catch first use of a extended feature via a new cause MSR. If the exception was caused by the use of such a feature, the handler checks permission for that feature. If permission has not been granted, the handler sends a SIGILL like the #UD handler would do if the feature would have been disabled in XCR0. If permission has been granted, then a new fpstate which fits the larger buffer requirement is allocated. In the unlikely case that this allocation fails, the handler sends SIGSEGV to the task. That's not elegant, but unavoidable as the other discussed options of preallocation or full per task permissions come with their own set of horrors for kernel and/or userspace. So this is the lesser of the evils and SIGSEGV caused by unexpected memory allocation failures is not a fundamentally new concept either. When allocation succeeds, the fpstate properties are filled in to reflect the extended feature set and the resulting sizes, the fpu::fpstate pointer is updated accordingly and the trap is disarmed for this task permanently. 4) Enumeration and size calculations 5) Trap switching via MSR_XFD The XFD (eXtended Feature Disable) MSR is context switched with the same life time rules as the FPU register state itself. The mechanism is keyed off with a static key which is default disabled so !AMX equipped CPUs have zero overhead. On AMX enabled CPUs the overhead is limited by comparing the tasks XFD value with a per CPU shadow variable to avoid redundant MSR writes. In case of switching from a AMX using task to a non AMX using task or vice versa, the extra MSR write is obviously inevitable. All other places which need to be aware of the variable feature sets and resulting variable sizes are not affected at all because they retrieve the information (feature set, sizes) unconditonally from the fpstate properties. 6) Enable the new AMX states Note, this is relatively new code despite the fact that AMX support is in the works for more than a year now. The big refactoring of the FPU code, which allowed to do a proper integration has been started exactly 3 weeks ago. Refactoring of the existing FPU code and of the original AMX patches took a week and has been subject to extensive review and testing. The only fallout which has not been caught in review and testing right away was restricted to AMX enabled systems, which is completely irrelevant for anyone outside Intel and their early access program. There might be dragons lurking as usual, but so far the fine grained refactoring has held up and eventual yet undetected fallout is bisectable and should be easily addressable before the 5.16 release. Famous last words... Many thanks to Chang Bae and Dave Hansen for working hard on this and also to the various test teams at Intel who reserved extra capacity to follow the rapid development of this closely which provides the confidence level required to offer this rather large update for inclusion into 5.16-rc1 * tag 'x86-fpu-2021-11-01' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (110 commits) Documentation/x86: Add documentation for using dynamic XSTATE features x86/fpu: Include vmalloc.h for vzalloc() selftests/x86/amx: Add context switch test selftests/x86/amx: Add test cases for AMX state management x86/fpu/amx: Enable the AMX feature in 64-bit mode x86/fpu: Add XFD handling for dynamic states x86/fpu: Calculate the default sizes independently x86/fpu/amx: Define AMX state components and have it used for boot-time checks x86/fpu/xstate: Prepare XSAVE feature table for gaps in state component numbers x86/fpu/xstate: Add fpstate_realloc()/free() x86/fpu/xstate: Add XFD #NM handler x86/fpu: Update XFD state where required x86/fpu: Add sanity checks for XFD x86/fpu: Add XFD state to fpstate x86/msr-index: Add MSRs for XFD x86/cpufeatures: Add eXtended Feature Disabling (XFD) feature bit x86/fpu: Reset permission and fpstate on exec() x86/fpu: Prepare fpu_clone() for dynamically enabled features x86/fpu/signal: Prepare for variable sigframe length x86/signal: Use fpu::__state_user_size for sigalt stack validation ... |
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5d1ceb3969 |
x86: Fix __get_wchan() for !STACKTRACE
Use asm/unwind.h to implement wchan, since we cannot always rely on
STACKTRACE=y.
Fixes:
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500afbf645 |
x86/fpu/xstate: Add fpstate_realloc()/free()
The fpstate embedded in struct fpu is the default state for storing the FPU registers. It's sized so that the default supported features can be stored. For dynamically enabled features the register buffer is too small. The #NM handler detects first use of a feature which is disabled in the XFD MSR. After handling permission checks it recalculates the size for kernel space and user space state and invokes fpstate_realloc() which tries to reallocate fpstate and install it. Provide the allocator function which checks whether the current buffer size is sufficient and if not allocates one. If allocation is successful the new fpstate is initialized with the new features and sizes and the now enabled features is removed from the task's XFD mask. realloc_fpstate() uses vzalloc(). If use of this mechanism grows to re-allocate buffers larger than 64KB, a more sophisticated allocation scheme that includes purpose-built reclaim capability might be justified. Signed-off-by: Chang S. Bae <chang.seok.bae@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211021225527.10184-19-chang.seok.bae@intel.com |
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9e798e9aa1 |
x86/fpu: Prepare fpu_clone() for dynamically enabled features
The default portion of the parent's FPU state is saved in a child task. With dynamic features enabled, the non-default portion is not saved in a child's fpstate because these register states are defined to be caller-saved. The new task's fpstate is therefore the default buffer. Fork inherits the permission of the parent. Also, do not use memcpy() when TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD is set because it is invalid when the parent has dynamic features. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Chang S. Bae <chang.seok.bae@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211021225527.10184-11-chang.seok.bae@intel.com |
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db8268df09 |
x86/arch_prctl: Add controls for dynamic XSTATE components
Dynamically enabled XSTATE features are by default disabled for all processes. A process has to request permission to use such a feature. To support this implement a architecture specific prctl() with the options: - ARCH_GET_XCOMP_SUPP Copies the supported feature bitmap into the user space provided u64 storage. The pointer is handed in via arg2 - ARCH_GET_XCOMP_PERM Copies the process wide permitted feature bitmap into the user space provided u64 storage. The pointer is handed in via arg2 - ARCH_REQ_XCOMP_PERM Request permission for a feature set. A feature set can be mapped to a facility, e.g. AMX, and can require one or more XSTATE components to be enabled. The feature argument is the number of the highest XSTATE component which is required for a facility to work. The request argument is not a user supplied bitmap because that makes filtering harder (think seccomp) and even impossible because to support 32bit tasks the argument would have to be a pointer. The permission mechanism works this way: Task asks for permission for a facility and kernel checks whether that's supported. If supported it does: 1) Check whether permission has already been granted 2) Compute the size of the required kernel and user space buffer (sigframe) size. 3) Validate that no task has a sigaltstack installed which is smaller than the resulting sigframe size 4) Add the requested feature bit(s) to the permission bitmap of current->group_leader->fpu and store the sizes in the group leaders fpu struct as well. If that is successful then the feature is still not enabled for any of the tasks. The first usage of a related instruction will result in a #NM trap. The trap handler validates the permission bit of the tasks group leader and if permitted it installs a larger kernel buffer and transfers the permission and size info to the new fpstate container which makes all the FPU functions which require per task information aware of the extended feature set. [ tglx: Adopted to new base code, added missing serialization, massaged namings, comments and changelog ] Signed-off-by: Chang S. Bae <chang.seok.bae@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Chang S. Bae <chang.seok.bae@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211021225527.10184-7-chang.seok.bae@intel.com |
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f0cbc8b3cd |
x86/fpu: Do not leak fpstate pointer on fork
If fork fails early then the copied task struct would carry the fpstate pointer of the parent task. Not a problem right now, but later when dynamically allocated buffers are available, keeping the pointer might result in freeing the parent's buffer. Set it to NULL which prevents that. If fork reaches clone_thread(), the pointer will be correctly set to the new task context. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211013145322.817101108@linutronix.de |
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63e81807c1 |
x86/fpu: Move context switch and exit to user inlines into sched.h
internal.h is a kitchen sink which needs to get out of the way to prepare for the upcoming changes. Move the context switch and exit to user inlines into a separate header, which is all that code needs. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211015011539.349132461@linutronix.de |
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2d16a1876f |
x86/process: Clone FPU in copy_thread()
There is no reason to clone FPU in arch_dup_task_struct(). Quite the contrary - it prevents optimizations. Move it to copy_thread(). Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211015011538.780714235@linutronix.de |
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42a20f86dc |
sched: Add wrapper for get_wchan() to keep task blocked
Having a stable wchan means the process must be blocked and for it to stay that way while performing stack unwinding. Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Acked-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk> [arm] Tested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> [arm64] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211008111626.332092234@infradead.org |
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bc9bbb8173 |
x86: Fix get_wchan() to support the ORC unwinder
Currently, the kernel CONFIG_UNWINDER_ORC option is enabled by default
on x86, but the implementation of get_wchan() is still based on the frame
pointer unwinder, so the /proc/<pid>/wchan usually returned 0 regardless
of whether the task <pid> is running.
Reimplement get_wchan() by calling stack_trace_save_tsk(), which is
adapted to the ORC and frame pointer unwinders.
Fixes:
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b968e84b50 |
x86/iopl: Fake iopl(3) CLI/STI usage
Since commit |
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1423e2660c |
Fixes and improvements for FPU handling on x86:
- Prevent sigaltstack out of bounds writes. The kernel unconditionally writes the FPU state to the alternate stack without checking whether the stack is large enough to accomodate it. Check the alternate stack size before doing so and in case it's too small force a SIGSEGV instead of silently corrupting user space data. - MINSIGSTKZ and SIGSTKSZ are constants in signal.h and have never been updated despite the fact that the FPU state which is stored on the signal stack has grown over time which causes trouble in the field when AVX512 is available on a CPU. The kernel does not expose the minimum requirements for the alternate stack size depending on the available and enabled CPU features. ARM already added an aux vector AT_MINSIGSTKSZ for the same reason. Add it to x86 as well - A major cleanup of the x86 FPU code. The recent discoveries of XSTATE related issues unearthed quite some inconsistencies, duplicated code and other issues. The fine granular overhaul addresses this, makes the code more robust and maintainable, which allows to integrate upcoming XSTATE related features in sane ways. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQJHBAABCgAxFiEEQp8+kY+LLUocC4bMphj1TA10mKEFAmDlcpETHHRnbHhAbGlu dXRyb25peC5kZQAKCRCmGPVMDXSYoeP5D/4i+AgYYeiMLgGb+NS7iaKPfoWo6LIz y3qdTSA0DQaIYbYivWwRO/g0GYdDMXDWeZalFi7eGnVI8O3eOog+22Zrf/y0UINB KJHdYd4ApWHhs401022y5hexrWQvnV8w1yQCuj/zLm6eC+AVhdwt2AY+IBoRrdUj wqY97B/4rJNsBvvqTDn9EeDrJA2y0y0Suc7AhIp2BGMI+dpIdxys8RJDamXNWyDL gJf0YRgUoiIn3AHKb+fgv60AoxfC175NSg/5/y/scFNXqVlW0Up4YCb7pqG9o2Ga f3XvtWfbw1N5PmUYjFkALwEkzGUbM3v0RA3xLY2j2WlWm9fBPPy59dt+i/h/VKyA GrA7i7lcIqX8dfVH6XkrReZBkRDSB6t9SZTvV54jAz5fcIZO2Rg++UFUvI/R6GKK XCcxukYaArwo+IG62iqDszS3gfLGhcor/cviOeULRC5zMUIO4Jah+IhDnifmShtC M5s9QzrwIRD/XMewGRQmvkiN4kBfE7jFoBQr1J9leCXJKrM+2JQmMzVInuubTQIq SdlKOaAIn7xtekz+6XdFG9Gmhck0PCLMJMOLNvQkKWI3KqGLRZ+dAWKK0vsCizAx 0BA7ZeB9w9lFT+D8mQCX77JvW9+VNwyfwIOLIrJRHk3VqVpS5qvoiFTLGJJBdZx4 /TbbRZu7nXDN2w== =Mq1m -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'x86-fpu-2021-07-07' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 fpu updates from Thomas Gleixner: "Fixes and improvements for FPU handling on x86: - Prevent sigaltstack out of bounds writes. The kernel unconditionally writes the FPU state to the alternate stack without checking whether the stack is large enough to accomodate it. Check the alternate stack size before doing so and in case it's too small force a SIGSEGV instead of silently corrupting user space data. - MINSIGSTKZ and SIGSTKSZ are constants in signal.h and have never been updated despite the fact that the FPU state which is stored on the signal stack has grown over time which causes trouble in the field when AVX512 is available on a CPU. The kernel does not expose the minimum requirements for the alternate stack size depending on the available and enabled CPU features. ARM already added an aux vector AT_MINSIGSTKSZ for the same reason. Add it to x86 as well. - A major cleanup of the x86 FPU code. The recent discoveries of XSTATE related issues unearthed quite some inconsistencies, duplicated code and other issues. The fine granular overhaul addresses this, makes the code more robust and maintainable, which allows to integrate upcoming XSTATE related features in sane ways" * tag 'x86-fpu-2021-07-07' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (74 commits) x86/fpu/xstate: Clear xstate header in copy_xstate_to_uabi_buf() again x86/fpu/signal: Let xrstor handle the features to init x86/fpu/signal: Handle #PF in the direct restore path x86/fpu: Return proper error codes from user access functions x86/fpu/signal: Split out the direct restore code x86/fpu/signal: Sanitize copy_user_to_fpregs_zeroing() x86/fpu/signal: Sanitize the xstate check on sigframe x86/fpu/signal: Remove the legacy alignment check x86/fpu/signal: Move initial checks into fpu__restore_sig() x86/fpu: Mark init_fpstate __ro_after_init x86/pkru: Remove xstate fiddling from write_pkru() x86/fpu: Don't store PKRU in xstate in fpu_reset_fpstate() x86/fpu: Remove PKRU handling from switch_fpu_finish() x86/fpu: Mask PKRU from kernel XRSTOR[S] operations x86/fpu: Hook up PKRU into ptrace() x86/fpu: Add PKRU storage outside of task XSAVE buffer x86/fpu: Dont restore PKRU in fpregs_restore_userspace() x86/fpu: Rename xfeatures_mask_user() to xfeatures_mask_uabi() x86/fpu: Move FXSAVE_LEAK quirk info __copy_kernel_to_fpregs() x86/fpu: Rename __fpregs_load_activate() to fpregs_restore_userregs() ... |
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9782a712eb |
x86/fpu: Add PKRU storage outside of task XSAVE buffer
PKRU is currently partly XSAVE-managed and partly not. It has space in the task XSAVE buffer and is context-switched by XSAVE/XRSTOR. However, it is switched more eagerly than FPU because there may be a need for PKRU to be up-to-date for things like copy_to/from_user() since PKRU affects user-permission memory accesses, not just accesses from userspace itself. This leaves PKRU in a very odd position. XSAVE brings very little value to the table for how Linux uses PKRU except for signal related XSTATE handling. Prepare to move PKRU away from being XSAVE-managed. Allocate space in the thread_struct for it and save/restore it in the context-switch path separately from the XSAVE-managed features. task->thread_struct.pkru is only valid when the task is scheduled out. For the current task the authoritative source is the hardware, i.e. it has to be retrieved via rdpkru(). Leave the XSAVE code in place for now to ensure bisectability. Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210623121456.399107624@linutronix.de |
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33344368cb |
x86/fpu: Clean up the fpu__clear() variants
fpu__clear() currently resets both register state and kernel XSAVE buffer state. It has two modes: one for all state (supervisor and user) and another for user state only. fpu__clear_all() uses the "all state" (user_only=0) mode, while a number of signal paths use the user_only=1 mode. Make fpu__clear() work only for user state (user_only=1) and remove the "all state" (user_only=0) code. Rename it to match so it can be used by the signal paths. Replace the "all state" (user_only=0) fpu__clear() functionality. Use the TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD functionality instead of making any actual hardware registers changes in this path. Instead of invoking fpu__initialize() just memcpy() init_fpstate into the task's FPU state because that has already the correct format and in case of PKRU also contains the default PKRU value. Move the actual PKRU write out into flush_thread() where it belongs and where it will end up anyway when PKRU and XSTATE have been untangled. For bisectability a workaround is required which stores the PKRU value in the xstate memory until PKRU is untangled from XSTATE for context switching and return to user. [ Dave Hansen: Polished changelog ] [ tglx: Fixed the PKRU fallout ] Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210623121455.922729522@linutronix.de |
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e7ecad17c8 |
x86/fpu: Rename fpu__clear_all() to fpu_flush_thread()
Make it clear what the function is about. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210623121455.827979263@linutronix.de |
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b2681e791d |
x86/fpu: Rename and sanitize fpu__save/copy()
Both function names are a misnomer. fpu__save() is actually about synchronizing the hardware register state into the task's memory state so that either coredump or a math exception handler can inspect the state at the time where the problem happens. The function guarantees to preserve the register state, while "save" is a common terminology for saving the current state so it can be modified and restored later. This is clearly not the case here. Rename it to fpu_sync_fpstate(). fpu__copy() is used to clone the current task's FPU state when duplicating task_struct. While the register state is a copy the rest of the FPU state is not. Name it accordingly and remove the really pointless @src argument along with the warning which comes along with it. Nothing can ever copy the FPU state of a non-current task. It's clearly just a consequence of arch_dup_task_struct(), but it makes no sense to proliferate that further. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210623121455.196727450@linutronix.de |
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b03fbd4ff2 |
sched: Introduce task_is_running()
Replace a bunch of 'p->state == TASK_RUNNING' with a new helper: task_is_running(p). Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net> Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210611082838.222401495@infradead.org |
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50b7b6f29d |
x86/process: setup io_threads more like normal user space threads
As io_threads are fully set up USER threads it's clearer to separate the
code path from the KTHREAD logic.
The only remaining difference to user space threads is that io_threads
never return to user space again. Instead they loop within the given
worker function.
The fact that they never return to user space means they don't have an
user space thread stack. In order to indicate that to tools like gdb we
reset the stack and instruction pointers to 0.
This allows gdb attach to user space processes using io-uring, which like
means that they have io_threads, without printing worrying message like
this:
warning: Selected architecture i386:x86-64 is not compatible with reported target architecture i386
warning: Architecture rejected target-supplied description
The output will be something like this:
(gdb) info threads
Id Target Id Frame
* 1 LWP 4863 "io_uring-cp-for" syscall () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/syscall.S:38
2 LWP 4864 "iou-mgr-4863" 0x0000000000000000 in ?? ()
3 LWP 4865 "iou-wrk-4863" 0x0000000000000000 in ?? ()
(gdb) thread 3
[Switching to thread 3 (LWP 4865)]
#0 0x0000000000000000 in ?? ()
(gdb) bt
#0 0x0000000000000000 in ?? ()
Backtrace stopped: Cannot access memory at address 0x0
Fixes:
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1591584e2e |
x86/process/64: Move cpu_current_top_of_stack out of TSS
cpu_current_top_of_stack is currently stored in TSS.sp1. TSS is exposed through the cpu_entry_area which is visible with user CR3 when PTI is enabled and active. This makes it a coveted fruit for attackers. An attacker can fetch the kernel stack top from it and continue next steps of actions based on the kernel stack. But it is actualy not necessary to be stored in the TSS. It is only accessed after the entry code switched to kernel CR3 and kernel GS_BASE which means it can be in any regular percpu variable. The reason why it is in TSS is historical (pre PTI) because TSS is also used as scratch space in SYSCALL_64 and therefore cache hot. A syscall also needs the per CPU variable current_task and eventually __preempt_count, so placing cpu_current_top_of_stack next to them makes it likely that they end up in the same cache line which should avoid performance regressions. This is not enforced as the compiler is free to place these variables, so these entry relevant variables should move into a data structure to make this enforceable. The seccomp_benchmark doesn't show any performance loss in the "getpid native" test result. Actually, the result changes from 93ns before to 92ns with this change when KPTI is disabled. The test is very stable and although the test doesn't show a higher degree of precision it gives enough confidence that moving cpu_current_top_of_stack does not cause a regression. [ tglx: Removed unneeded export. Massaged changelog ] Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210125173444.22696-2-jiangshanlai@gmail.com |
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d9f6e12fb0 |
x86: Fix various typos in comments
Fix ~144 single-word typos in arch/x86/ code comments. Doing this in a single commit should reduce the churn. Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org |
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4727dc20e0 |
arch: setup PF_IO_WORKER threads like PF_KTHREAD
PF_IO_WORKER are kernel threads too, but they aren't PF_KTHREAD in the sense that we don't assign ->set_child_tid with our own structure. Just ensure that every arch sets up the PF_IO_WORKER threads like kthreads in the arch implementation of copy_thread(). Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> |
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58c644ba51 |
sched/idle: Fix arch_cpu_idle() vs tracing
We call arch_cpu_idle() with RCU disabled, but then use local_irq_{en,dis}able(), which invokes tracing, which relies on RCU. Switch all arch_cpu_idle() implementations to use raw_local_irq_{en,dis}able() and carefully manage the lockdep,rcu,tracing state like we do in entry. (XXX: we really should change arch_cpu_idle() to not return with interrupts enabled) Reported-by: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Tested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201120114925.594122626@infradead.org |
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6f9885a36c |
x86/unwind/fp: Fix FP unwinding in ret_from_fork
There have been some reports of "bad bp value" warnings printed by the
frame pointer unwinder:
WARNING: kernel stack regs at 000000005bac7112 in sh:1014 has bad 'bp' value 0000000000000000
This warning happens when unwinding from an interrupt in
ret_from_fork(). If entry code gets interrupted, the state of the
frame pointer (rbp) may be undefined, which can confuse the unwinder,
resulting in warnings like the above.
There's an in_entry_code() check which normally silences such
warnings for entry code. But in this case, ret_from_fork() is getting
interrupted. It recently got moved out of .entry.text, so the
in_entry_code() check no longer works.
It could be moved back into .entry.text, but that would break the
noinstr validation because of the call to schedule_tail().
Instead, initialize each new task's RBP to point to the task's entry
regs via an encoded frame pointer. That will allow the unwinder to
reach the end of the stack gracefully.
Fixes:
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9864f5b594 |
cpuidle: Move trace_cpu_idle() into generic code
Remove trace_cpu_idle() from the arch_cpu_idle() implementations and put it in the generic code, right before disabling RCU. Gets rid of more trace_*_rcuidle() users. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Tested-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200821085348.428433395@infradead.org |
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4da9f33026 |
Support for FSGSBASE. Almost 5 years after the first RFC to support it,
this has been brought into a shape which is maintainable and actually works. This final version was done by Sasha Levin who took it up after Intel dropped the ball. Sasha discovered that the SGX (sic!) offerings out there ship rogue kernel modules enabling FSGSBASE behind the kernels back which opens an instantanious unpriviledged root hole. The FSGSBASE instructions provide a considerable speedup of the context switch path and enable user space to write GSBASE without kernel interaction. This enablement requires careful handling of the exception entries which go through the paranoid entry path as they cannot longer rely on the assumption that user GSBASE is positive (as enforced via prctl() on non FSGSBASE enabled systemn). All other entries (syscalls, interrupts and exceptions) can still just utilize SWAPGS unconditionally when the entry comes from user space. Converting these entries to use FSGSBASE has no benefit as SWAPGS is only marginally slower than WRGSBASE and locating and retrieving the kernel GSBASE value is not a free operation either. The real benefit of RD/WRGSBASE is the avoidance of the MSR reads and writes. The changes come with appropriate selftests and have held up in field testing against the (sanitized) Graphene-SGX driver. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQJHBAABCgAxFiEEQp8+kY+LLUocC4bMphj1TA10mKEFAl8pGnoTHHRnbHhAbGlu dXRyb25peC5kZQAKCRCmGPVMDXSYoTYJD/9873GkwvGcc/Vq/dJH1szGTgFftPyZ c/Y9gzx7EGBPLo25BS820L+ZlynzXHDxExKfCEaD10TZfe5XIc1vYNR0J74M2NmK IBgEDstJeW93ai+rHCFRXIevhpzU4GgGYJ1MeeOgbVMN3aGU1g6HfzMvtF0fPn8Y n6fsLZa43wgnoTdjwjjikpDTrzoZbaL1mbODBzBVPAaTbim7IKKTge6r/iCKrOjz Uixvm3g9lVzx52zidJ9kWa8esmbOM1j0EPe7/hy3qH9DFo87KxEzjHNH3T6gY5t6 NJhRAIfY+YyTHpPCUCshj6IkRudE6w/qjEAmKP9kWZxoJrvPCTWOhCzelwsFS9b9 gxEYfsnaKhsfNhB6fi0PtWlMzPINmEA7SuPza33u5WtQUK7s1iNlgHfvMbjstbwg MSETn4SG2/ZyzUrSC06lVwV8kh0RgM3cENc/jpFfIHD0vKGI3qfka/1RY94kcOCG AeJd0YRSU2RqL7lmxhHyG8tdb8eexns41IzbPCLXX2sF00eKNkVvMRYT2mKfKLFF q8v1x7yuwmODdXfFR6NdCkGm9IU7wtL6wuQ8Nhu9UraFmcXo6X6FLJC18FqcvSb9 jvcRP4XY/8pNjjf44JB8yWfah0xGQsaMIKQGP4yLv4j6Xk1xAQKH1MqcC7l1D2HN 5Z24GibFqSK/vA== =QaAN -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'x86-fsgsbase-2020-08-04' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 fsgsbase from Thomas Gleixner: "Support for FSGSBASE. Almost 5 years after the first RFC to support it, this has been brought into a shape which is maintainable and actually works. This final version was done by Sasha Levin who took it up after Intel dropped the ball. Sasha discovered that the SGX (sic!) offerings out there ship rogue kernel modules enabling FSGSBASE behind the kernels back which opens an instantanious unpriviledged root hole. The FSGSBASE instructions provide a considerable speedup of the context switch path and enable user space to write GSBASE without kernel interaction. This enablement requires careful handling of the exception entries which go through the paranoid entry path as they can no longer rely on the assumption that user GSBASE is positive (as enforced via prctl() on non FSGSBASE enabled systemn). All other entries (syscalls, interrupts and exceptions) can still just utilize SWAPGS unconditionally when the entry comes from user space. Converting these entries to use FSGSBASE has no benefit as SWAPGS is only marginally slower than WRGSBASE and locating and retrieving the kernel GSBASE value is not a free operation either. The real benefit of RD/WRGSBASE is the avoidance of the MSR reads and writes. The changes come with appropriate selftests and have held up in field testing against the (sanitized) Graphene-SGX driver" * tag 'x86-fsgsbase-2020-08-04' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (21 commits) x86/fsgsbase: Fix Xen PV support x86/ptrace: Fix 32-bit PTRACE_SETREGS vs fsbase and gsbase selftests/x86/fsgsbase: Add a missing memory constraint selftests/x86/fsgsbase: Fix a comment in the ptrace_write_gsbase test selftests/x86: Add a syscall_arg_fault_64 test for negative GSBASE selftests/x86/fsgsbase: Test ptracer-induced GS base write with FSGSBASE selftests/x86/fsgsbase: Test GS selector on ptracer-induced GS base write Documentation/x86/64: Add documentation for GS/FS addressing mode x86/elf: Enumerate kernel FSGSBASE capability in AT_HWCAP2 x86/cpu: Enable FSGSBASE on 64bit by default and add a chicken bit x86/entry/64: Handle FSGSBASE enabled paranoid entry/exit x86/entry/64: Introduce the FIND_PERCPU_BASE macro x86/entry/64: Switch CR3 before SWAPGS in paranoid entry x86/speculation/swapgs: Check FSGSBASE in enabling SWAPGS mitigation x86/process/64: Use FSGSBASE instructions on thread copy and ptrace x86/process/64: Use FSBSBASE in switch_to() if available x86/process/64: Make save_fsgs_for_kvm() ready for FSGSBASE x86/fsgsbase/64: Enable FSGSBASE instructions in helper functions x86/fsgsbase/64: Add intrinsics for FSGSBASE instructions x86/cpu: Add 'unsafe_fsgsbase' to enable CR4.FSGSBASE ... |
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9ba27414f2 |
fork-v5.9
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iHUEABYKAB0WIQRAhzRXHqcMeLMyaSiRxhvAZXjcogUCXyge/QAKCRCRxhvAZXjc oildAQCCWpnTeXm6hrIE3VZ36X5npFtbaEthdBVAUJM7mo0FYwEA8+Wbnubg6jCw mztkXCnTfU7tApUdhKtQzcpEws45/Qk= =REE/ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'fork-v5.9' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux Pull fork cleanups from Christian Brauner: "This is cleanup series from when we reworked a chunk of the process creation paths in the kernel and switched to struct {kernel_}clone_args. High-level this does two main things: - Remove the double export of both do_fork() and _do_fork() where do_fork() used the incosistent legacy clone calling convention. Now we only export _do_fork() which is based on struct kernel_clone_args. - Remove the copy_thread_tls()/copy_thread() split making the architecture specific HAVE_COYP_THREAD_TLS config option obsolete. This switches all remaining architectures to select HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS and thus to the copy_thread_tls() calling convention. The current split makes the process creation codepaths more convoluted than they need to be. Each architecture has their own copy_thread() function unless it selects HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS then it has a copy_thread_tls() function. The split is not needed anymore nowadays, all architectures support CLONE_SETTLS but quite a few of them never bothered to select HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS and instead simply continued to use copy_thread() and use the old calling convention. Removing this split cleans up the process creation codepaths and paves the way for implementing clone3() on such architectures since it requires the copy_thread_tls() calling convention. After having made each architectures support copy_thread_tls() this series simply renames that function back to copy_thread(). It also switches all architectures that call do_fork() directly over to _do_fork() and the struct kernel_clone_args calling convention. This is a corollary of switching the architectures that did not yet support it over to copy_thread_tls() since do_fork() is conditional on not supporting copy_thread_tls() (Mostly because it lacks a separate argument for tls which is trivial to fix but there's no need for this function to exist.). The do_fork() removal is in itself already useful as it allows to to remove the export of both do_fork() and _do_fork() we currently have in favor of only _do_fork(). This has already been discussed back when we added clone3(). The legacy clone() calling convention is - as is probably well-known - somewhat odd: # # ABI hall of shame # config CLONE_BACKWARDS config CLONE_BACKWARDS2 config CLONE_BACKWARDS3 that is aggravated by the fact that some architectures such as sparc follow the CLONE_BACKWARDSx calling convention but don't really select the corresponding config option since they call do_fork() directly. So do_fork() enforces a somewhat arbitrary calling convention in the first place that doesn't really help the individual architectures that deviate from it. They can thus simply be switched to _do_fork() enforcing a single calling convention. (I really hope that any new architectures will __not__ try to implement their own calling conventions...) Most architectures already have made a similar switch (m68k comes to mind). Overall this removes more code than it adds even with a good portion of added comments. It simplifies a chunk of arch specific assembly either by moving the code into C or by simply rewriting the assembly. Architectures that have been touched in non-trivial ways have all been actually boot and stress tested: sparc and ia64 have been tested with Debian 9 images. They are the two architectures which have been touched the most. All non-trivial changes to architectures have seen acks from the relevant maintainers. nios2 with a custom built buildroot image. h8300 I couldn't get something bootable to test on but the changes have been fairly automatic and I'm sure we'll hear people yell if I broke something there. All other architectures that have been touched in trivial ways have been compile tested for each single patch of the series via git rebase -x "make ..." v5.8-rc2. arm{64} and x86{_64} have been boot tested even though they have just been trivially touched (removal of the HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS macro from their Kconfig) because well they are basically "core architectures" and since it is trivial to get your hands on a useable image" * tag 'fork-v5.9' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux: arch: rename copy_thread_tls() back to copy_thread() arch: remove HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS unicore: switch to copy_thread_tls() sh: switch to copy_thread_tls() nds32: switch to copy_thread_tls() microblaze: switch to copy_thread_tls() hexagon: switch to copy_thread_tls() c6x: switch to copy_thread_tls() alpha: switch to copy_thread_tls() fork: remove do_fork() h8300: select HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS, switch to kernel_clone_args nios2: enable HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS, switch to kernel_clone_args ia64: enable HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS, switch to kernel_clone_args sparc: unconditionally enable HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS sparc: share process creation helpers between sparc and sparc64 sparc64: enable HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS fork: fold legacy_clone_args_valid() into _do_fork() |
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cadfad8701 |
x86/ioperm: Fix io bitmap invalidation on Xen PV
tss_invalidate_io_bitmap() wasn't wired up properly through the pvop
machinery, so the TSS and Xen's io bitmap would get out of sync
whenever disabling a valid io bitmap.
Add a new pvop for tss_invalidate_io_bitmap() to fix it.
This is XSA-329.
Fixes:
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714acdbd1c
|
arch: rename copy_thread_tls() back to copy_thread()
Now that HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS has been removed, rename copy_thread_tls() back simply copy_thread(). It's a simpler name, and doesn't imply that only tls is copied here. This finishes an outstanding chunk of internal process creation work since we've added clone3(). Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>A Acked-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> Acked-by: Greentime Hu <green.hu@gmail.com> Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>A Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> |
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005f141e5d |
x86/process/64: Use FSGSBASE instructions on thread copy and ptrace
When FSGSBASE is enabled, copying threads and reading fsbase and gsbase using ptrace must read the actual values. When copying a thread, use save_fsgs() and copy the saved values. For ptrace, the bases must be read from memory regardless of the selector if FSGSBASE is enabled. [ tglx: Invoke __rdgsbase_inactive() with interrupts disabled ] [ luto: Massage changelog ] Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Chang S. Bae <chang.seok.bae@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1557309753-24073-9-git-send-email-chang.seok.bae@intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200528201402.1708239-8-sashal@kernel.org |
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6a45a65888 |
A set of fixes and updates for x86:
- Unbreak paravirt VDSO clocks. While the VDSO code was moved into lib for sharing a subtle check for the validity of paravirt clocks got replaced. While the replacement works perfectly fine for bare metal as the update of the VDSO clock mode is synchronous, it fails for paravirt clocks because the hypervisor can invalidate them asynchronous. Bring it back as an optional function so it does not inflict this on architectures which are free of PV damage. - Fix the jiffies to jiffies64 mapping on 64bit so it does not trigger an ODR violation on newer compilers - Three fixes for the SSBD and *IB* speculation mitigation maze to ensure consistency, not disabling of some *IB* variants wrongly and to prevent a rogue cross process shutdown of SSBD. All marked for stable. - Add yet more CPU models to the splitlock detection capable list !@#%$! - Bring the pr_info() back which tells that TSC deadline timer is enabled. - Reboot quirk for MacBook6,1 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQJHBAABCgAxFiEEQp8+kY+LLUocC4bMphj1TA10mKEFAl7ie1oTHHRnbHhAbGlu dXRyb25peC5kZQAKCRCmGPVMDXSYofXrEACDD0mNBU2c4vQiR+n4d41PqW1p15DM /wG7dYqYt2RdR6qOAspmNL5ilUP+L+eoT/86U9y0g4j3FtTREqyy6mpWE4MQzqaQ eKWVoeYt7l9QbR1kP4eks1CN94OyVBUPo3P78UPruWMB11iyKjyrkEdsDmRSLOdr 6doqMFGHgowrQRwsLPFUt7b2lls6ssOSYgM/ChHi2Iga431ZuYYcRe2mNVsvqx3n 0N7QZlJ/LivXdCmdpe3viMBsDaomiXAloKUo+HqgrCLYFXefLtfOq09U7FpddYqH ztxbGW/7gFn2HEbmdeaiufux263MdHtnjvdPhQZKHuyQmZzzxDNBFgOILSrBJb5y qLYJGhMa0sEwMBM9MMItomNgZnOITQ3WGYAdSCg3mG3jK4EXzr6aQm/Qz5SI+Cte bQKB2dgR53Gw/1uc7F5qMGQ2NzeUbKycT0ZbF3vkUPVh1kdU3juIntsovv2lFeBe Rog/rZliT1xdHrGAHRbubb2/3v66CSodMoYz0eQtr241Oz0LGwnyFqLN3qcZVLDt OtxHQ3bbaxevDEetJXfSh3CfHKNYMToAcszmGDse3MJxC7DL5AA51OegMa/GYOX6 r5J99MUsEzZQoQYyXFf1MjwgxH4CQK1xBBUXYaVG65AcmhT21YbNWnCbxgf7hW+V hqaaUSig4V3NLw== =VlBk -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'x86-urgent-2020-06-11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull more x86 updates from Thomas Gleixner: "A set of fixes and updates for x86: - Unbreak paravirt VDSO clocks. While the VDSO code was moved into lib for sharing a subtle check for the validity of paravirt clocks got replaced. While the replacement works perfectly fine for bare metal as the update of the VDSO clock mode is synchronous, it fails for paravirt clocks because the hypervisor can invalidate them asynchronously. Bring it back as an optional function so it does not inflict this on architectures which are free of PV damage. - Fix the jiffies to jiffies64 mapping on 64bit so it does not trigger an ODR violation on newer compilers - Three fixes for the SSBD and *IB* speculation mitigation maze to ensure consistency, not disabling of some *IB* variants wrongly and to prevent a rogue cross process shutdown of SSBD. All marked for stable. - Add yet more CPU models to the splitlock detection capable list !@#%$! - Bring the pr_info() back which tells that TSC deadline timer is enabled. - Reboot quirk for MacBook6,1" * tag 'x86-urgent-2020-06-11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/vdso: Unbreak paravirt VDSO clocks lib/vdso: Provide sanity check for cycles (again) clocksource: Remove obsolete ifdef x86_64: Fix jiffies ODR violation x86/speculation: PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE enforcement for indirect branches. x86/speculation: Prevent rogue cross-process SSBD shutdown x86/speculation: Avoid force-disabling IBPB based on STIBP and enhanced IBRS. x86/cpu: Add Sapphire Rapids CPU model number x86/split_lock: Add Icelake microserver and Tigerlake CPU models x86/apic: Make TSC deadline timer detection message visible x86/reboot/quirks: Add MacBook6,1 reboot quirk |
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dbbe2ad02e |
x86/speculation: Prevent rogue cross-process SSBD shutdown
On context switch the change of TIF_SSBD and TIF_SPEC_IB are evaluated
to adjust the mitigations accordingly. This is optimized to avoid the
expensive MSR write if not needed.
This optimization is buggy and allows an attacker to shutdown the SSBD
protection of a victim process.
The update logic reads the cached base value for the speculation control
MSR which has neither the SSBD nor the STIBP bit set. It then OR's the
SSBD bit only when TIF_SSBD is different and requests the MSR update.
That means if TIF_SSBD of the previous and next task are the same, then
the base value is not updated, even if TIF_SSBD is set. The MSR write is
not requested.
Subsequently if the TIF_STIBP bit differs then the STIBP bit is updated
in the base value and the MSR is written with a wrong SSBD value.
This was introduced when the per task/process conditional STIPB
switching was added on top of the existing SSBD switching.
It is exploitable if the attacker creates a process which enforces SSBD
and has the contrary value of STIBP than the victim process (i.e. if the
victim process enforces STIBP, the attacker process must not enforce it;
if the victim process does not enforce STIBP, the attacker process must
enforce it) and schedule it on the same core as the victim process. If
the victim runs after the attacker the victim becomes vulnerable to
Spectre V4.
To fix this, update the MSR value independent of the TIF_SSBD difference
and dependent on the SSBD mitigation method available. This ensures that
a subsequent STIPB initiated MSR write has the correct state of SSBD.
[ tglx: Handle X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD & X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD correctly
and massaged changelog ]
Fixes:
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f4dd60a3d4 |
Misc changes:
- Unexport various PAT primitives - Unexport per-CPU tlbstate Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQJFBAABCgAvFiEEBpT5eoXrXCwVQwEKEnMQ0APhK1gFAl7Z+3cRHG1pbmdvQGtl cm5lbC5vcmcACgkQEnMQ0APhK1jgyxAAjPoXEzi9rqGHY6Eus37DNbzHtdQj4fqN 68h8T2tSnOMzETe3L/c4puxI50YFpMA0sFbzm8BfjCtucs0K7Tj4Sv8Aoap2b99A /bP+ySgHh2BMoI/tu9TiD8et+vttAGGwkXQhIOgeakZcYzpAY7oUNwc+CogkytbQ DaC8s9FL7RjCXCL91fvZ33C0ksg5J9ynFbRozEHOacHPrE3CbrqUwu+75PmS7nJC 13vatOxjdqNPQhVMg7waN1nHv7K06kph1wxWxYHoD0QwAPy1ecE84wLvg9gv5AqK BfUBmB34qRW21qbB5tQrMlGDS9tuV0vUB1fxUV7/iOKXQUH6viEG/7J7jm+YwXji U9S54UPj/TOp8fvYdS18sp6vI1gS3HKjd3LO3pPHWsyZVMJBoGuMConZRs3C31Cp WuwBU1gY+mFB5l4prt8WU8ocPvEnZkP00cCYNyzPk21tblfUwFbrmu3wcZxOkx3s ZhRO4KrhxtL7l/wDLuNtWShBL2c6Rz2tts58tr/fj/M+UscJK2MPKxPLCAb20QYZ qSkMa36+r8LkuMCyjpegEEmo4sw9yC6aLXFKfYu2ABki5o9AR4tavk+lwO+dad6T k0DJjGXLsG9sReR6hrfaNTk5h7ImiRFDVntnWAhgKhARRoloJJS4/RkzW+ylPbac mTuNNJDChUQ= =RXKK -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'x86-mm-2020-06-05' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 mm updates from Ingo Molnar: "Misc changes: - Unexport various PAT primitives - Unexport per-CPU tlbstate and uninline TLB helpers" * tag 'x86-mm-2020-06-05' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (23 commits) x86/tlb/uv: Add a forward declaration for struct flush_tlb_info x86/cpu: Export native_write_cr4() only when CONFIG_LKTDM=m x86/tlb: Restrict access to tlbstate xen/privcmd: Remove unneeded asm/tlb.h include x86/tlb: Move PCID helpers where they are used x86/tlb: Uninline nmi_uaccess_okay() x86/tlb: Move cr4_set_bits_and_update_boot() to the usage site x86/tlb: Move paravirt_tlb_remove_table() to the usage site x86/tlb: Move __flush_tlb_all() out of line x86/tlb: Move flush_tlb_others() out of line x86/tlb: Move __flush_tlb_one_kernel() out of line x86/tlb: Move __flush_tlb_one_user() out of line x86/tlb: Move __flush_tlb_global() out of line x86/tlb: Move __flush_tlb() out of line x86/alternatives: Move temporary_mm helpers into C x86/cr4: Sanitize CR4.PCE update x86/cpu: Uninline CR4 accessors x86/tlb: Uninline __get_current_cr3_fast() x86/mm: Use pgprotval_t in protval_4k_2_large() and protval_large_2_4k() x86/mm: Unexport __cachemode2pte_tbl ... |
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0a319ef75d |
Most of the changes here related to 'XSAVES supervisor state' support,
which is a feature that allows kernel-only data to be automatically saved/restored by the FPU context switching code. CPU features that can be supported this way are Intel PT, 'PASID' and CET features. Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQJFBAABCgAvFiEEBpT5eoXrXCwVQwEKEnMQ0APhK1gFAl7VMZgRHG1pbmdvQGtl cm5lbC5vcmcACgkQEnMQ0APhK1jmAQ/7BJpyAHUjFJdChtkvUmLcBgI2qnxP7rc8 Eh/tSo4PKh484Uqb4WY6XAHIAPBzEt3rHJG3fdaavzlUl98YJCdD9tstfwMPcCQ4 L4c2Ru+h+mPQCMOZUctOphPjDzGWPzR4IhceH6gqhoS4vg9EqgN4o158x4jW6KFN Jlocp9CMfIaGSmaMlRrIUZ4Dj3mgboqqHsuCaibtaKAMK6LqZQDViTEal4mNbESX KQPOFpKrhoq6Jtzzer7fLPY2qb6kkLrL03X5IUGFP5UxigSejnfrI9SZpAuPP9S0 kdN04Jo0T2aBIAikBTVhDWdLMJk19qeu7YXBrFEVbyhZHl1HdDqOhMdWPOp1GH9W CtGUalbIvz/5FbXuUImiiNh/bw2FxYjHsrDguW96IvMVFteucrFg9QyL+taYb1cV WqWdpIC0VoMuQxQI5FBWu4Bb/cLNV9VCxWAZjZQ806kwmyDxldsw5mucMGmH3+bO LD6bwRShSMRzI9bzcJSG+Z3y7Fe8b5IGNjCjzgPb88ezffBEFHzIEKdCL6QTNlRF 6UgSGbRs41SqXwNw5tdQQNwPpDO73p+KVRGoEzyMJvojLKRGTcOHHUDriGZ30MNX 3oHvLf5+dNrLC/frbOqUmQ7doBQOplR5VxlZVwwqkdpPw13Jf5zn4ewzriTOmKCq mEHMQmbkyi4= =M+BC -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'x86-fpu-2020-06-01' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 FPU updates from Ingo Molnar: "Most of the changes here related to 'XSAVES supervisor state' support, which is a feature that allows kernel-only data to be automatically saved/restored by the FPU context switching code. CPU features that can be supported this way are Intel PT, 'PASID' and CET features" * tag 'x86-fpu-2020-06-01' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/fpu/xstate: Restore supervisor states for signal return x86/fpu/xstate: Preserve supervisor states for the slow path in __fpu__restore_sig() x86/fpu: Introduce copy_supervisor_to_kernel() x86/fpu/xstate: Update copy_kernel_to_xregs_err() for supervisor states x86/fpu/xstate: Update sanitize_restored_xstate() for supervisor xstates x86/fpu/xstate: Define new functions for clearing fpregs and xstates x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce XSAVES supervisor states x86/fpu/xstate: Separate user and supervisor xfeatures mask x86/fpu/xstate: Define new macros for supervisor and user xstates x86/fpu/xstate: Rename validate_xstate_header() to validate_user_xstate_header() |
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4bfe6cce13 |
x86/ioperm: Prevent a memory leak when fork fails
In the copy_process() routine called by _do_fork(), failure to allocate
a PID (or further along in the function) will trigger an invocation to
exit_thread(). This is done to clean up from an earlier call to
copy_thread_tls(). Naturally, the child task is passed into exit_thread(),
however during the process, io_bitmap_exit() nullifies the parent's
io_bitmap rather than the child's.
As copy_thread_tls() has been called ahead of the failure, the reference
count on the calling thread's io_bitmap is incremented as we would expect.
However, io_bitmap_exit() doesn't accept any arguments, and thus assumes
it should trash the current thread's io_bitmap reference rather than the
child's. This is pretty sneaky in practice, because in all instances but
this one, exit_thread() is called with respect to the current task and
everything works out.
A determined attacker can issue an appropriate ioctl (i.e. KDENABIO) to
get a bitmap allocated, and force a clone3() syscall to fail by passing
in a zeroed clone_args structure. The kernel handles the erroneous struct
and the buggy code path is followed, and even though the parent's reference
to the io_bitmap is trashed, the child still holds a reference and thus
the structure will never be freed.
Fix this by tweaking io_bitmap_exit() and its subroutines to accept a
task_struct argument which to operate on.
Fixes:
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b860eb8dce |
x86/fpu/xstate: Define new functions for clearing fpregs and xstates
Currently, fpu__clear() clears all fpregs and xstates. Once XSAVES supervisor states are introduced, supervisor settings (e.g. CET xstates) must remain active for signals; It is necessary to have separate functions: - Create fpu__clear_user_states(): clear only user settings for signals; - Create fpu__clear_all(): clear both user and supervisor settings in flush_thread(). Also modify copy_init_fpstate_to_fpregs() to take a mask from above two functions. Remove obvious side-comment in fpu__clear(), while at it. [ bp: Make the second argument of fpu__clear() bool after requesting it a bunch of times during review. - Add a comment about copy_init_fpstate_to_fpregs() locking needs. ] Co-developed-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200512145444.15483-6-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com |
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d8f0b35331 |
x86/cpu: Uninline CR4 accessors
cpu_tlbstate is exported because various TLB-related functions need access to it, but cpu_tlbstate is sensitive information which should only be accessed by well-contained kernel functions and not be directly exposed to modules. The various CR4 accessors require cpu_tlbstate as the CR4 shadow cache is located there. In preparation for unexporting cpu_tlbstate, create a builtin function for manipulating CR4 and rework the various helpers to use it. No functional change. [ bp: push the export of native_write_cr4() only when CONFIG_LKTDM=m to the last patch in the series. ] Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200421092558.939985695@linutronix.de |
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2853d5fafb |
Support for "split lock" detection:
- Atomic operations (lock prefixed instructions) which span two cache lines have to acquire the global bus lock. This is at least 1k cycles slower than an atomic operation within a cache line and disrupts performance on other cores. Aside of performance disruption this is a unpriviledged form of DoS. Some newer CPUs have the capability to raise an #AC trap when such an operation is attempted. The detection is by default enabled in warning mode which will warn once when a user space application is caught. A command line option allows to disable the detection or to select fatal mode which will terminate offending applications with SIGBUS. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQJHBAABCgAxFiEEQp8+kY+LLUocC4bMphj1TA10mKEFAl6B/uMTHHRnbHhAbGlu dXRyb25peC5kZQAKCRCmGPVMDXSYocsAD/9yqpw+XlPKNPsfbm9sbirBDfTrENcL F44iwn4WnrjoW/gnnZCYmPxJFsTtGVPqxHdUf4eyGemg9r9ZEO0DQftmUHC5Z6KX aa/b5JoeM61wp9HlpVlD4D1jVt4pWyQODQeZnUXE4DEzmRc3cD/5lSU+/VeaIwwz lxwUemqmXK7ucH2KA7smOGsl2nU6ED84q3mdOB1b4Cw+gWYMUnPJnuS/ipriBRx4 BYbMItcxsFvtdO9Hx8PvGd5LUK0wW8JOWrYQICD2kLpZtHtGeaHpBzFzL0+nMU7d 1epyDqJQDmX+PAzvj+EYyn3HTfobZlckn+tbxMQkkS+oDk1ywOZd+BancClvn5/5 jMfPIQJF5bGASVnzGMWhzVdwthTZiMG4d1iKsUWOA/hN0ch0+rm1BqraToabsEFg Sv7/rvl9KtSOtMJTeAmMhlZUMBj9m8BtPFjniDwp6nw/upGgJdST5mrKFNYZvqOj JnXsEMr/nJVW6bnUvT6LF66xbHlzHdxtodkQWqF+IEsyRaOz1zAGpQamP98KxNLc dq/XYoEe1KqIFbg4BkNP+GeDL3FQDxjFNwPQnnjQEzWRbjkHlfmq1uKCsR2r8mBO fYNJ1X8lTyGV0kx/ERpWGazzabpzh+8Lr1yMhnoA3EWvlzUjmpN2PFI4oTpTrtzT c/q16SCxim3NWA== =D9x8 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'x86-splitlock-2020-03-30' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 splitlock updates from Thomas Gleixner: "Support for 'split lock' detection: Atomic operations (lock prefixed instructions) which span two cache lines have to acquire the global bus lock. This is at least 1k cycles slower than an atomic operation within a cache line and disrupts performance on other cores. Aside of performance disruption this is a unpriviledged form of DoS. Some newer CPUs have the capability to raise an #AC trap when such an operation is attempted. The detection is by default enabled in warning mode which will warn once when a user space application is caught. A command line option allows to disable the detection or to select fatal mode which will terminate offending applications with SIGBUS" * tag 'x86-splitlock-2020-03-30' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/split_lock: Avoid runtime reads of the TEST_CTRL MSR x86/split_lock: Rework the initialization flow of split lock detection x86/split_lock: Enable split lock detection by kernel |
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d5f744f9a2 |
x86 entry code updates:
- Convert the 32bit syscalls to be pt_regs based which removes the requirement to push all 6 potential arguments onto the stack and consolidates the interface with the 64bit variant - The first small portion of the exception and syscall related entry code consolidation which aims to address the recently discovered issues vs. RCU, int3, NMI and some other exceptions which can interrupt any context. The bulk of the changes is still work in progress and aimed for 5.8. - A few lockdep namespace cleanups which have been applied into this branch to keep the prerequisites for the ongoing work confined. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQJHBAABCgAxFiEEQp8+kY+LLUocC4bMphj1TA10mKEFAl6B/TMTHHRnbHhAbGlu dXRyb25peC5kZQAKCRCmGPVMDXSYoYA6EAC7r/bCMxBelljT3b7LkBbiJcocJ+zK OSzWU9miJGTAvYqn4/ciLKg4dA424b/1rBFlF1hBTCQ0HL5Cv4lajxdKEZCO5WCC WWTCz+MC60aWFaH3VNoywiLGb39H2IbqWbS9yNPd/wBkLHiMAD6NPQntOvcPaD4j 1lyrMtLzfrWlrHxvxdI3kt5ZpFLYNXr2xk61xQjTz0ROFQBhf2sDsuhHhiYVLPj7 JwYktpbBiPeaw2+I18NPymNPY+VfY8LCTgLl5M+rbKyCqebKaedZQJ7QXFhAEqKC Y2f+gJsKWtTDzGP2mk/5kF0uP7cd0vJK35ZCXtLZ9BbcNtFZU6w+ADqRo4pJBHRY QRzo/AWrdkuTJF0CrP6mcneNC7NwWLSdKrE1z77RQCHUPVvhHhRDZsgdLcZ/KKwx y1ji22trwNB+7LmI2fUOU5RRHZBIuNvQT+mPt24febJuHpZKul62dd3cqTGeSTC+ MYVknYDSg/+jk+83DhuZnTyb9lWTbq/0Q1HRDu6l2LrMIH7YMPpY5Ea64ZFYzWXy s0+iHEM4mUzltwNauHIntjbwXi3C0l2k1WQyG0gun2eS6SXfu0lb93V4msFj/N1+ oHavH2n2A4XrRr+Ob87fsl7nfXJibWP7R9xPblrWP2sNdqfjSyGd49rnsvpWqWMK Fj0d7tQ78+/SwA== =tWXS -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'x86-entry-2020-03-30' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 entry code updates from Thomas Gleixner: - Convert the 32bit syscalls to be pt_regs based which removes the requirement to push all 6 potential arguments onto the stack and consolidates the interface with the 64bit variant - The first small portion of the exception and syscall related entry code consolidation which aims to address the recently discovered issues vs. RCU, int3, NMI and some other exceptions which can interrupt any context. The bulk of the changes is still work in progress and aimed for 5.8. - A few lockdep namespace cleanups which have been applied into this branch to keep the prerequisites for the ongoing work confined. * tag 'x86-entry-2020-03-30' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (35 commits) x86/entry: Fix build error x86 with !CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS lockdep: Rename trace_{hard,soft}{irq_context,irqs_enabled}() lockdep: Rename trace_softirqs_{on,off}() lockdep: Rename trace_hardirq_{enter,exit}() x86/entry: Rename ___preempt_schedule x86: Remove unneeded includes x86/entry: Drop asmlinkage from syscalls x86/entry/32: Enable pt_regs based syscalls x86/entry/32: Use IA32-specific wrappers for syscalls taking 64-bit arguments x86/entry/32: Rename 32-bit specific syscalls x86/entry/32: Clean up syscall_32.tbl x86/entry: Remove ABI prefixes from functions in syscall tables x86/entry/64: Add __SYSCALL_COMMON() x86/entry: Remove syscall qualifier support x86/entry/64: Remove ptregs qualifier from syscall table x86/entry: Move max syscall number calculation to syscallhdr.sh x86/entry/64: Split X32 syscall table into its own file x86/entry/64: Move sys_ni_syscall stub to common.c x86/entry/64: Use syscall wrappers for x32_rt_sigreturn x86/entry: Refactor SYS_NI macros ... |
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ffd75b373f |
x86: Remove unneeded includes
Clean up includes of and in <asm/syscalls.h> Signed-off-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200313195144.164260-19-brgerst@gmail.com |
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99bcd4a6e5 |
x86/ioperm: Add new paravirt function update_io_bitmap()
Commit |
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6650cdd9a8 |
x86/split_lock: Enable split lock detection by kernel
A split-lock occurs when an atomic instruction operates on data that spans two cache lines. In order to maintain atomicity the core takes a global bus lock. This is typically >1000 cycles slower than an atomic operation within a cache line. It also disrupts performance on other cores (which must wait for the bus lock to be released before their memory operations can complete). For real-time systems this may mean missing deadlines. For other systems it may just be very annoying. Some CPUs have the capability to raise an #AC trap when a split lock is attempted. Provide a command line option to give the user choices on how to handle this: split_lock_detect= off - not enabled (no traps for split locks) warn - warn once when an application does a split lock, but allow it to continue running. fatal - Send SIGBUS to applications that cause split lock On systems that support split lock detection the default is "warn". Note that if the kernel hits a split lock in any mode other than "off" it will OOPs. One implementation wrinkle is that the MSR to control the split lock detection is per-core, not per thread. This might result in some short lived races on HT systems in "warn" mode if Linux tries to enable on one thread while disabling on the other. Race analysis by Sean Christopherson: - Toggling of split-lock is only done in "warn" mode. Worst case scenario of a race is that a misbehaving task will generate multiple #AC exceptions on the same instruction. And this race will only occur if both siblings are running tasks that generate split-lock #ACs, e.g. a race where sibling threads are writing different values will only occur if CPUx is disabling split-lock after an #AC and CPUy is re-enabling split-lock after *its* previous task generated an #AC. - Transitioning between off/warn/fatal modes at runtime isn't supported and disabling is tracked per task, so hardware will always reach a steady state that matches the configured mode. I.e. split-lock is guaranteed to be enabled in hardware once all _TIF_SLD threads have been scheduled out. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Co-developed-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Co-developed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200126200535.GB30377@agluck-desk2.amr.corp.intel.com |
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27353d5785 |
x86/process: Remove set but not used variables prev and next
Remove two unused variables: arch/x86/kernel/process.c: In function ‘__switch_to_xtra’: arch/x86/kernel/process.c:618:31: warning: variable ‘next’ set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable] 618 | struct thread_struct *prev, *next; | ^~~~ arch/x86/kernel/process.c:618:24: warning: variable ‘prev’ set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable] 618 | struct thread_struct *prev, *next; | They are never used and so can be removed. Signed-off-by: yu kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Cc: yi.zhang@huawei.com Cc: zhengbin13@huawei.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191213121253.10072-1-yukuai3@huawei.com |
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7b0b8cfd26 |
x86/ioperm: Save an indentation level in tss_update_io_bitmap()
... for better readability. No functional changes. [ Minor edit. ] Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> |
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e3cb0c7102 |
x86/ioperm: Fix use of deprecated config option
The commit |
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111e7b15cf |
x86/ioperm: Extend IOPL config to control ioperm() as well
If iopl() is disabled, then providing ioperm() does not make much sense. Rename the config option and disable/enable both syscalls with it. Guard the code with #ifdefs where appropriate. Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> |
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c8137ace56 |
x86/iopl: Restrict iopl() permission scope
The access to the full I/O port range can be also provided by the TSS I/O bitmap, but that would require to copy 8k of data on scheduling in the task. As shown with the sched out optimization TSS.io_bitmap_base can be used to switch the incoming task to a preallocated I/O bitmap which has all bits zero, i.e. allows access to all I/O ports. Implementing this allows to provide an iopl() emulation mode which restricts the IOPL level 3 permissions to I/O port access but removes the STI/CLI permission which is coming with the hardware IOPL mechansim. Provide a config option to switch IOPL to emulation mode, make it the default and while at it also provide an option to disable IOPL completely. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> |
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4804e382c1 |
x86/ioperm: Share I/O bitmap if identical
The I/O bitmap is duplicated on fork. That's wasting memory and slows down fork. There is no point to do so. As long as the bitmap is not modified it can be shared between threads and processes. Add a refcount and just share it on fork. If a task modifies the bitmap then it has to do the duplication if and only if it is shared. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> |
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ea5f1cd7ab |
x86/ioperm: Remove bitmap if all permissions dropped
If ioperm() results in a bitmap with all bits set (no permissions to any I/O port), then handling that bitmap on context switch and exit to user mode is pointless. Drop it. Move the bitmap exit handling to the ioport code and reuse it for both the thread exit path and dropping it. This allows to reuse this code for the upcoming iopl() emulation. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> |
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22fe5b0439 |
x86/ioperm: Move TSS bitmap update to exit to user work
There is no point to update the TSS bitmap for tasks which use I/O bitmaps on every context switch. It's enough to update it right before exiting to user space. That reduces the context switch bitmap handling to invalidating the io bitmap base offset in the TSS when the outgoing task has TIF_IO_BITMAP set. The invaldiation is done on purpose when a task with an IO bitmap switches out to prevent any possible leakage of an activated IO bitmap. It also removes the requirement to update the tasks bitmap atomically in ioperm(). Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> |
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060aa16fdb |
x86/ioperm: Add bitmap sequence number
Add a globally unique sequence number which is incremented when ioperm() is changing the I/O bitmap of a task. Store the new sequence number in the io_bitmap structure and compare it with the sequence number of the I/O bitmap which was last loaded on a CPU. Only update the bitmap if the sequence is different. That should further reduce the overhead of I/O bitmap scheduling when there are only a few I/O bitmap users on the system. The 64bit sequence counter is sufficient. A wraparound of the sequence counter assuming an ioperm() call every nanosecond would require about 584 years of uptime. Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> |
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577d5cd7e5 |
x86/ioperm: Move iobitmap data into a struct
No point in having all the data in thread_struct, especially as upcoming changes add more. Make the bitmap in the new struct accessible as array of longs and as array of characters via a union, so both the bitmap functions and the update logic can avoid type casts. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> |
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f5848e5fd2 |
x86/tss: Move I/O bitmap data into a seperate struct
Move the non hardware portion of I/O bitmap data into a seperate struct for readability sake. Originally-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> |
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ecc7e37d4d |
x86/io: Speedup schedule out of I/O bitmap user
There is no requirement to update the TSS I/O bitmap when a thread using it is scheduled out and the incoming thread does not use it. For the permission check based on the TSS I/O bitmap the CPU calculates the memory location of the I/O bitmap by the address of the TSS and the io_bitmap_base member of the tss_struct. The easiest way to invalidate the I/O bitmap is to switch the offset to an address outside of the TSS limit. If an I/O instruction is issued from user space the TSS limit causes #GP to be raised in the same was as valid I/O bitmap with all bits set to 1 would do. This removes the extra work when an I/O bitmap using task is scheduled out and puts the burden on the rare I/O bitmap users when they are scheduled in. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> |
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2fff071d28 |
x86/process: Unify copy_thread_tls()
While looking at the TSS io bitmap it turned out that any change in that area would require identical changes to copy_thread_tls(). The 32 and 64 bit variants share sufficient code to consolidate them into a common function to avoid duplication of upcoming modifications. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> |
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fa86ee90eb |
add cpuidle-haltpoll driver
Add a cpuidle driver that calls the architecture default_idle routine. To be used in conjunction with the haltpoll governor. Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> |
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8ff468c29e |
Merge branch 'x86-fpu-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 FPU state handling updates from Borislav Petkov: "This contains work started by Rik van Riel and brought to fruition by Sebastian Andrzej Siewior with the main goal to optimize when to load FPU registers: only when returning to userspace and not on every context switch (while the task remains in the kernel). In addition, this optimization makes kernel_fpu_begin() cheaper by requiring registers saving only on the first invocation and skipping that in following ones. What is more, this series cleans up and streamlines many aspects of the already complex FPU code, hopefully making it more palatable for future improvements and simplifications. Finally, there's a __user annotations fix from Jann Horn" * 'x86-fpu-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (29 commits) x86/fpu: Fault-in user stack if copy_fpstate_to_sigframe() fails x86/pkeys: Add PKRU value to init_fpstate x86/fpu: Restore regs in copy_fpstate_to_sigframe() in order to use the fastpath x86/fpu: Add a fastpath to copy_fpstate_to_sigframe() x86/fpu: Add a fastpath to __fpu__restore_sig() x86/fpu: Defer FPU state load until return to userspace x86/fpu: Merge the two code paths in __fpu__restore_sig() x86/fpu: Restore from kernel memory on the 64-bit path too x86/fpu: Inline copy_user_to_fpregs_zeroing() x86/fpu: Update xstate's PKRU value on write_pkru() x86/fpu: Prepare copy_fpstate_to_sigframe() for TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD x86/fpu: Always store the registers in copy_fpstate_to_sigframe() x86/entry: Add TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD x86/fpu: Eager switch PKRU state x86/pkeys: Don't check if PKRU is zero before writing it x86/fpu: Only write PKRU if it is different from current x86/pkeys: Provide *pkru() helpers x86/fpu: Use a feature number instead of mask in two more helpers x86/fpu: Make __raw_xsave_addr() use a feature number instead of mask x86/fpu: Add an __fpregs_load_activate() internal helper ... |
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f725492dd1 |
Merge branch 'x86-asm-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 asm updates from Ingo Molnar: "This includes the following changes: - cpu_has() cleanups - sync_bitops.h modernization to the rmwcc.h facility, similarly to bitops.h - continued LTO annotations/fixes - misc cleanups and smaller cleanups" * 'x86-asm-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/um/vdso: Drop unnecessary cc-ldoption x86/vdso: Rename variable to fix -Wshadow warning x86/cpu/amd: Exclude 32bit only assembler from 64bit build x86/asm: Mark all top level asm statements as .text x86/build/vdso: Add FORCE to the build rule of %.so x86/asm: Modernize sync_bitops.h x86/mm: Convert some slow-path static_cpu_has() callers to boot_cpu_has() x86: Convert some slow-path static_cpu_has() callers to boot_cpu_has() x86/asm: Clarify static_cpu_has()'s intended use x86/uaccess: Fix implicit cast of __user pointer x86/cpufeature: Remove __pure attribute to _static_cpu_has() |
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2f5fb19341 |
x86/speculation: Prevent deadlock on ssb_state::lock
Mikhail reported a lockdep splat related to the AMD specific ssb_state
lock:
CPU0 CPU1
lock(&st->lock);
local_irq_disable();
lock(&(&sighand->siglock)->rlock);
lock(&st->lock);
<Interrupt>
lock(&(&sighand->siglock)->rlock);
*** DEADLOCK ***
The connection between sighand->siglock and st->lock comes through seccomp,
which takes st->lock while holding sighand->siglock.
Make sure interrupts are disabled when __speculation_ctrl_update() is
invoked via prctl() -> speculation_ctrl_update(). Add a lockdep assert to
catch future offenders.
Fixes:
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5f409e20b7 |
x86/fpu: Defer FPU state load until return to userspace
Defer loading of FPU state until return to userspace. This gives the kernel the potential to skip loading FPU state for tasks that stay in kernel mode, or for tasks that end up with repeated invocations of kernel_fpu_begin() & kernel_fpu_end(). The fpregs_lock/unlock() section ensures that the registers remain unchanged. Otherwise a context switch or a bottom half could save the registers to its FPU context and the processor's FPU registers would became random if modified at the same time. KVM swaps the host/guest registers on entry/exit path. This flow has been kept as is. First it ensures that the registers are loaded and then saves the current (host) state before it loads the guest's registers. The swap is done at the very end with disabled interrupts so it should not change anymore before theg guest is entered. The read/save version seems to be cheaper compared to memcpy() in a micro benchmark. Each thread gets TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD set as part of fork() / fpu__copy(). For kernel threads, this flag gets never cleared which avoids saving / restoring the FPU state for kernel threads and during in-kernel usage of the FPU registers. [ bp: Correct and update commit message and fix checkpatch warnings. s/register/registers/ where it is used in plural. minor comment corrections. remove unused trace_x86_fpu_activate_state() TP. ] Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Aubrey Li <aubrey.li@intel.com> Cc: Babu Moger <Babu.Moger@amd.com> Cc: "Chang S. Bae" <chang.seok.bae@intel.com> Cc: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: kvm ML <kvm@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Cc: Yi Wang <wang.yi59@zte.com.cn> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190403164156.19645-24-bigeasy@linutronix.de |
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67e87d43b7 |
x86: Convert some slow-path static_cpu_has() callers to boot_cpu_has()
Using static_cpu_has() is pointless on those paths, convert them to the boot_cpu_has() variant. No functional changes. Reported-by: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> # for paravirt Cc: Aubrey Li <aubrey.li@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Thomas Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com> Cc: linux-edac@vger.kernel.org Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org Cc: x86@kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190330112022.28888-3-bp@alien8.de |
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71368af902 |
x86/speculation: Add PR_SPEC_DISABLE_NOEXEC
With the default SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP/SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL mode, the TIF_SSBD bit will be inherited when a new task is fork'ed or cloned. It will also remain when a new program is execve'ed. Only certain class of applications (like Java) that can run on behalf of multiple users on a single thread will require disabling speculative store bypass for security purposes. Those applications will call prctl(2) at startup time to disable SSB. They won't rely on the fact the SSB might have been disabled. Other applications that don't need SSBD will just move on without checking if SSBD has been turned on or not. The fact that the TIF_SSBD is inherited across execve(2) boundary will cause performance of applications that don't need SSBD but their predecessors have SSBD on to be unwittingly impacted especially if they write to memory a lot. To remedy this problem, a new PR_SPEC_DISABLE_NOEXEC argument for the PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL option of prctl(2) is added to allow applications to specify that the SSBD feature bit on the task structure should be cleared whenever a new program is being execve'ed. Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1547676096-3281-1-git-send-email-longman@redhat.com |
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df60673198 |
Linux 4.20-rc5
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQFSBAABCAA8FiEEq68RxlopcLEwq+PEeb4+QwBBGIYFAlwEZdIeHHRvcnZhbGRz QGxpbnV4LWZvdW5kYXRpb24ub3JnAAoJEHm+PkMAQRiGAlQH/19oax2Za3IPqF4X DM3lal5M6zlUVkoYstqzpbR3MqUwgEnMfvoeMDC6mI9N4/+r2LkV7cRR8HzqQCCS jDfD69IzRGb52VSeJmbOrkxBWsR1Nn0t4Z3rEeLPxwaOoNpRc8H973MbAQ2FKMpY S4Y3jIK1dNiRRxdh52NupVkQF+djAUwkBuVk/rrvRJmTDij4la03cuCDAO+Di9lt GHlVvygKw2SJhDR+z3ArwZNmE0ceCcE6+W7zPHzj2KeWuKrZg22kfUD454f2YEIw FG0hu9qecgtpYCkLSm2vr4jQzmpsDoyq3ZfwhjGrP4qtvPC3Db3vL3dbQnkzUcJu JtwhVCE= =O1q1 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'v4.20-rc5' into x86/cleanups, to sync up the tree Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> |
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9137bb27e6 |
x86/speculation: Add prctl() control for indirect branch speculation
Add the PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH option for the PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL and PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL prctls to allow fine grained per task control of indirect branch speculation via STIBP and IBPB. Invocations: Check indirect branch speculation status with - prctl(PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, 0, 0, 0); Enable indirect branch speculation with - prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_ENABLE, 0, 0); Disable indirect branch speculation with - prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_DISABLE, 0, 0); Force disable indirect branch speculation with - prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE, 0, 0); See Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst. Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com> Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.866780996@linutronix.de |
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6d991ba509 |
x86/speculation: Prevent stale SPEC_CTRL msr content
The seccomp speculation control operates on all tasks of a process, but only the current task of a process can update the MSR immediately. For the other threads the update is deferred to the next context switch. This creates the following situation with Process A and B: Process A task 2 and Process B task 1 are pinned on CPU1. Process A task 2 does not have the speculation control TIF bit set. Process B task 1 has the speculation control TIF bit set. CPU0 CPU1 MSR bit is set ProcB.T1 schedules out ProcA.T2 schedules in MSR bit is cleared ProcA.T1 seccomp_update() set TIF bit on ProcA.T2 ProcB.T1 schedules in MSR is not updated <-- FAIL This happens because the context switch code tries to avoid the MSR update if the speculation control TIF bits of the incoming and the outgoing task are the same. In the worst case ProcB.T1 and ProcA.T2 are the only tasks scheduling back and forth on CPU1, which keeps the MSR stale forever. In theory this could be remedied by IPIs, but chasing the remote task which could be migrated is complex and full of races. The straight forward solution is to avoid the asychronous update of the TIF bit and defer it to the next context switch. The speculation control state is stored in task_struct::atomic_flags by the prctl and seccomp updates already. Add a new TIF_SPEC_FORCE_UPDATE bit and set this after updating the atomic_flags. Check the bit on context switch and force a synchronous update of the speculation control if set. Use the same mechanism for updating the current task. Reported-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com> Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.21.1811272247140.1875@nanos.tec.linutronix.de |
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ff16701a29 |
x86/process: Consolidate and simplify switch_to_xtra() code
Move the conditional invocation of __switch_to_xtra() into an inline function so the logic can be shared between 32 and 64 bit. Remove the handthrough of the TSS pointer and retrieve the pointer directly in the bitmap handling function. Use this_cpu_ptr() instead of the per_cpu() indirection. This is a preparatory change so integration of conditional indirect branch speculation optimization happens only in one place. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com> Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.280855518@linutronix.de |
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5bfbe3ad58 |
x86/speculation: Prepare for per task indirect branch speculation control
To avoid the overhead of STIBP always on, it's necessary to allow per task control of STIBP. Add a new task flag TIF_SPEC_IB and evaluate it during context switch if SMT is active and flag evaluation is enabled by the speculation control code. Add the conditional evaluation to x86_virt_spec_ctrl() as well so the guest/host switch works properly. This has no effect because TIF_SPEC_IB cannot be set yet and the static key which controls evaluation is off. Preparatory patch for adding the control code. [ tglx: Simplify the context switch logic and make the TIF evaluation depend on SMP=y and on the static key controlling the conditional update. Rename it to TIF_SPEC_IB because it controls both STIBP and IBPB ] Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com> Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.176917199@linutronix.de |
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01daf56875 |
x86/speculation: Reorganize speculation control MSRs update
The logic to detect whether there's a change in the previous and next task's flag relevant to update speculation control MSRs is spread out across multiple functions. Consolidate all checks needed for updating speculation control MSRs into the new __speculation_ctrl_update() helper function. This makes it easy to pick the right speculation control MSR and the bits in MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL that need updating based on TIF flags changes. Originally-by: Thomas Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com> Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185004.151077005@linutronix.de |
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26c4d75b23 |
x86/speculation: Rename SSBD update functions
During context switch, the SSBD bit in SPEC_CTRL MSR is updated according to changes of the TIF_SSBD flag in the current and next running task. Currently, only the bit controlling speculative store bypass disable in SPEC_CTRL MSR is updated and the related update functions all have "speculative_store" or "ssb" in their names. For enhanced mitigation control other bits in SPEC_CTRL MSR need to be updated as well, which makes the SSB names inadequate. Rename the "speculative_store*" functions to a more generic name. No functional change. Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com> Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185004.058866968@linutronix.de |