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tpm2: Fix a bug in CheckAuthSession

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This patch fixes a bug described in the following TCG Document

ERRATA; Errata Version 1.9, August 23, 2019; For TCG Trusted Platform
Module Library; Family "2.0", Level 00, Revision 1.38, Sept 29, 2016

section 2.34: NV PIN Indices

Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
This commit is contained in:
Stefan Berger 2019-10-23 14:07:24 -04:00 committed by Stefan Berger
parent 75a2cd1a78
commit e58cbdd4fd
1 changed files with 13 additions and 10 deletions
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23
src/tpm2/SessionProcess.c
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@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
/* Process the Authorization Sessions */
/* Written by Ken Goldman */
/* IBM Thomas J. Watson Research Center */
/* $Id: SessionProcess.c 1262 2018-07-11 21:03:43Z kgoldman $ */
/* $Id: SessionProcess.c 1493 2019-09-04 13:31:35Z kgoldman $ */
/* */
/* Licenses and Notices */
/* */
@ -1235,7 +1235,10 @@ CheckAuthSession(
TPM_HANDLE sessionHandle = s_sessionHandles[sessionIndex];
TPM_HANDLE associatedHandle = s_associatedHandles[sessionIndex];
TPM_HT sessionHandleType = HandleGetType(sessionHandle);
BOOL authUsed;
pAssert(sessionHandle != TPM_RH_UNASSIGNED);
// Take care of physical presence
if(associatedHandle == TPM_RH_PLATFORM)
{
@ -1265,11 +1268,14 @@ CheckAuthSession(
session->attributes.includeAuth =
!IsSessionBindEntity(s_associatedHandles[sessionIndex], session);
}
authUsed = session->attributes.includeAuth;
}
else
// Password session
authUsed = TRUE;
// If the authorization session is going to use an authValue, then make sure
// that access to that authValue isn't locked out.
// Note: session == NULL for a PW session.
if(session == NULL || session->attributes.includeAuth)
if(authUsed)
{
// See if entity is subject to lockout.
if(!IsDAExempted(associatedHandle))
@ -1310,19 +1316,16 @@ CheckAuthSession(
else
result = CheckSessionHMAC(command, sessionIndex);
// Do processing for PIN Indexes are only three possibilities for 'result' at
// this point.
// TPM_RC_SUCCESS
// TPM_RC_AUTH_FAIL
// TPM_RC_BAD_AUTH
// this point: TPM_RC_SUCCESS, TPM_RC_AUTH_FAIL, TPM_RC_BAD_AUTH
// For all these cases, we would have to process a PIN index if the
// authValue of the index was used for authorization.
// See if we need to do anything to a PIN index
if(TPM_HT_NV_INDEX == HandleGetType(associatedHandle))
if((TPM_HT_NV_INDEX == HandleGetType(associatedHandle)) && authUsed)
{
NV_REF locator;
NV_INDEX *nvIndex = NvGetIndexInfo(associatedHandle, &locator);
NV_PIN pinData;
TPMA_NV nvAttributes;
pAssert(nvIndex != NULL);
nvAttributes = nvIndex->publicArea.attributes;
// If this is a PIN FAIL index and the value has been written
@ -1338,7 +1341,7 @@ CheckAuthSession(
NvWriteUINT64Data(nvIndex, pinData.intVal);
}
// If this is a PIN PASS Index, increment if we have used the
// authorization value for anything other than NV_Read.
// authorization value.
// NOTE: If the counter has already hit the limit, then we
// would not get here because the authorization value would not
// be available and the TPM would have returned before it gets here