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tpm2: Use new privateExponent struct in CryptRsaGenerateKey for P and Q

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- Import RsaInitializeExponent from upstream
- CryptRsaGenerateKey: Replace local bnP and bnQ variables by using Z->P
  and Z->Q respectively

The only side-effect this change has is that it costs more initialization
time when NEW_PRIVATE_EXPONENT initializes the currently unused variables
dP_unused, dQ_unused, and qInv_unused.

Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
This commit is contained in:
Stefan Berger 2023-08-28 08:55:05 -04:00 committed by Stefan Berger
parent 9b16a500d3
commit 218337ea2a
2 changed files with 32 additions and 19 deletions
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6
src/tpm2/crypto/CryptRsa.h
View File

@ -83,9 +83,9 @@ typedef struct privateExponent
{
bigNum P;
bigNum Q;
bigNum dP;
bigNum dQ;
bigNum qInv;
bigNum dP_unused;
bigNum dQ_unused;
bigNum qInv_unused;
bn_prime_t entries[5];
} privateExponent;

45
src/tpm2/crypto/openssl/CryptRsa.c
View File

@ -97,6 +97,19 @@ CryptRsaStartup(
function returns the pointer to the private exponent value so that it can be used in an
initializer for a data declaration */
static privateExponent* RsaInitializeExponent(privateExponent* Z)
{
bigNum *bn = (bigNum *)&Z->P;
int i;
//
for(i = 0; i < 5; i++)
{
bn[i] = (bigNum)&Z->entries[i];
BnInit(bn[i], BYTES_TO_CRYPT_WORDS(sizeof(Z->entries[0].d)));
}
return Z;
}
#if 0 // libtpms added
/* 10.2.17.4.2 MakePgreaterThanQ() */
/* This function swaps the pointers for P and Q if Q happens to be larger than Q. */
@ -1263,17 +1276,17 @@ CryptRsaGenerateKey(
)
{
UINT32 i;
BN_PRIME(bnP); // These four declarations initialize the number to 0
BN_PRIME(bnQ);
BN_RSA(bnD);
BN_RSA(bnN);
BN_WORD(bnPubExp);
UINT32 e = publicArea->parameters.rsaDetail.exponent;
int keySizeInBits;
TPM_RC retVal = TPM_RC_NO_RESULT;
NEW_PRIVATE_EXPONENT(Z);
//
pAssert(BnEqualZero(Z->Q)); // libtpms added: Z->Q must be Zero
pAssert(publicArea == &rsaKey->publicArea && sensitive == &rsaKey->sensitive); // libtpms added: consistency check
// Need to make sure that the caller did not specify an exponent that is
// not supported
e = publicArea->parameters.rsaDetail.exponent;
@ -1326,7 +1339,7 @@ CryptRsaGenerateKey(
if(_plat__IsCanceled())
ERROR_RETURN(TPM_RC_CANCELED);
if(BnGeneratePrimeForRSA(bnP, keySizeInBits / 2, e, rand) == TPM_RC_FAILURE)
if(BnGeneratePrimeForRSA(Z->P, keySizeInBits / 2, e, rand) == TPM_RC_FAILURE)
{
retVal = TPM_RC_FAILURE;
goto Exit;
@ -1335,27 +1348,27 @@ CryptRsaGenerateKey(
// If this is the second prime, make sure that it differs from the
// first prime by at least 2^100
if(BnEqualZero(bnQ))
if(BnEqualZero(Z->Q))
{
// copy p to q and compute another prime in p
BnCopy(bnQ, bnP);
BnCopy(Z->Q, Z->P);
continue;
}
// Make sure that the difference is at least 100 bits. Need to do it this
// way because the big numbers are only positive values
if(BnUnsignedCmp(bnP, bnQ) < 0)
BnSub(bnD, bnQ, bnP);
if(BnUnsignedCmp(Z->P, Z->Q) < 0)
BnSub(bnD, Z->Q, Z->P);
else
BnSub(bnD, bnP, bnQ);
BnSub(bnD, Z->P, Z->Q);
if(BnMsb(bnD) < 100)
continue;
//Form the public modulus and set the unique value
BnMult(bnN, bnP, bnQ);
BnMult(bnN, Z->P, Z->Q);
BnTo2B(bnN, &publicArea->unique.rsa.b,
(NUMBYTES)BITS_TO_BYTES(keySizeInBits));
// And the prime to the sensitive area
BnTo2B(bnP, &sensitive->sensitive.rsa.b,
BnTo2B(Z->P, &sensitive->sensitive.rsa.b,
(NUMBYTES)BITS_TO_BYTES(keySizeInBits) / 2);
// Make sure everything came out right. The MSb of the values must be one
if(((publicArea->unique.rsa.t.buffer[0] & 0x80) == 0)
@ -1363,13 +1376,13 @@ CryptRsaGenerateKey(
FAIL(FATAL_ERROR_INTERNAL);
// Make sure that we can form the private exponent values
if(ComputePrivateExponent(bnP, bnQ, bnPubExp, &rsaKey->privateExponent) != TRUE)
if(ComputePrivateExponent(Z->P, Z->Q, bnPubExp, &rsaKey->privateExponent) != TRUE)
{
// If ComputePrivateExponent could not find an inverse for
// Q, then copy P and recompute P. This might
// cause both to be recomputed if P is also zero
if(BnEqualZero(bnQ))
BnCopy(bnQ, bnP);
if(BnEqualZero(Z->Q))
BnCopy(Z->Q, Z->P);
continue;
}
retVal = TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
@ -1383,12 +1396,12 @@ CryptRsaGenerateKey(
// Encrypt with public exponent...
BnModExp(temp2, temp1, bnPubExp, bnN);
// ... then decrypt with private exponent
RsaPrivateKeyOp(temp2, bnP, &rsaKey->privateExponent);
RsaPrivateKeyOp(temp2, Z->P, &rsaKey->privateExponent);
// If the starting and ending values are not the same,
// start over )-;
if(BnUnsignedCmp(temp2, temp1) != 0)
{
BnSetWord(bnQ, 0);
BnSetWord(Z->Q, 0);
retVal = TPM_RC_NO_RESULT;
}
}